{ "id": 5799032, "name": "HERITAGE HOUSE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Sharon Bell, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Heritage House v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1991-08-14", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201490\u20140484WC", "first_page": "19", "last_page": "25", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 19" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3073439 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2896407 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454958 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075716 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516453 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809167 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 680, "char_count": 13120, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17046901189992159 }, "sha256": "40a1c352efa5b79a12f2f8f97dc87ead8c43fb4e4a888bdf04a71f5dcfa56135", "simhash": "1:a48587b996b641a8", "word_count": 2090 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:35.632923+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HERITAGE HOUSE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Sharon Bell, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Heritage House, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court, which confirmed the Industrial Commission\u2019s (Commission\u2019s) award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits to claimant, Sharon Bell.\nThe arbitrator heard this cause on February 17, 1987. In her decision filed August 12, 1987, the arbitrator concluded that claimant\u2019s lower back injury, sustained on October 16, 1985, was causally related to her fall at respondent\u2019s restaurant on April 26, 1985. The arbitrator further found that claimant was permanently and totally disabled. Upon review, the Commission adopted the arbitrator\u2019s findings and conclusions in their entirety.\nIn the appeal at bar, respondent raises two issues, namely, that the Commission\u2019s decisions as to causal connection and permanency of claimant\u2019s condition were against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nRegarding the issue of causal connection, the following facts are pertinent. On April 26, 1985, claimant was working as a waitress for respondent. While carrying a stack of glasses, claimant slipped on a wet tile floor and fell sideways onto her head. Subsequently, claimant suffered severe headaches and received a variety of prescription drugs to alleviate the pain. Eventually, claimant was diagnosed as having fracture of the zygomatic bone, which was surgically repaired.\nFollowing her injury, claimant experienced a loss of consciousness with accompanying incontinence on at least three occasions. The final of these episodes occurred on October 16, 1985. Claimant went to bed at approximately 8 p.m. to read. At approximately 10:30 p.m., her husband, Roy, went into their bedroom and found claimant \u201chalf in and half out of bed.\u201d The upper part of her body was on the bed, while at least one of her feet was upon the floor. Claimant was in a half-conscious state and took about 10 minutes to return to full consciousness. She complained of sharp pains in her lower back. Following this incident, on October 17, 1985, claimant consulted with Dr. James Couch, professor of neurology at Southern Illinois School of Medicine, who prescribed Dilantin for control of the alleged spells, which were substantially controlled by the medication. Dr. Couch examined claimant and determined that she had suffered an acute herniated disc. He ordered claimant\u2019s admission to Memorial Medical Center on October 31, 1987, and then referred claimant to Dr. Donald Pearson, a neurosurgeon who examined her and subsequently removed a herniated disc at S5-L1.\nRespondent argues that the evidence fails to support the Commission\u2019s decision that claimant\u2019s lower back problems are causally related to the above-described fall at respondent\u2019s restaurant. We disagree. It is axiomatic that the Commission\u2019s decision will not be disturbed on review unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (County of Cook v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 24.) It is the Commission\u2019s function to resolve disputed questions of fact, including those of causal connection, to draw permissible inferences and to decide which of the conflicting medical views is to be accepted. Material Service Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 382.\nSpecifically, respondent argues that Dr. Couch\u2019s testimony was insufficient to establish a causal connection between claimant\u2019s fall and her subsequent back injury. The arbitrator\u2019s decision stated in relevant part:\n\u201cThere is no dispute that the fractured facial bone resulted from that accident. The dispute concerns whether the injury to the head caused the subsequent periods of altered consciousness which in turn caused injury to the low back. Dr. Couch\u2019s testimony indicates that the periods of altered consciousness could indeed be related to this injury. His testimony was that it is rare for a person to suffer a herniated disc during a seizure. Fractured vertebra are more common than ruptured vertebra during seizures. He did not, however, exclude the possibility that this could occur.\u201d\nThe evidence deposition of Dr. Couch contains the following testimony:\n\u201cQ. [I]s her complaint consistent with her history?\nA. If I can answer this way. Assuming there was a fall, this could be consistent with a fall-lumbar injury, herniated disk occurring at that point becoming symptomatic over the next 12 hours.\nQ. Can you state whether or not it is possible, indeed sometimes more than possible, that patients can receive herniated disks as a result of a seizure?\nA. It is possible, it is surprisingly uncommon. Given the intense activity that may go along with a seizure it is probably more common that patients will develop a collapsed fracture of a vertebra. Now, I can\u2019t really give a reason why collapse is more common than herniation, but it is very uncommon that patients will develop a herniated disk specifically as a result of a seizure.\u201d\nUnder the totality of the circumstances, the Commission could have found a causal connection between her fall at work and the subsequent back injury. The work-related accident is undisputed. Claimant\u2019s testimony that she suffered loss of consciousness on prior occasions is not disputed. The evidence demonstrates claimant experienced a loss of consciousness on October 16, 1985, on which date her husband found her in a semi-conscious state, half in and half out of bed. Claimant had no back problems prior to this incident and immediately experienced back pains which, on the following day, Dr. Couch ascribed to an acutely herniated disc. Dr. Couch\u2019s testimony regarding the possibility of a seizure leading to a lumbar injury, when taken with these facts, supports the Commission\u2019s determination as to causal connection.\nRespondent next argues that there was no evidence of a fall or other trauma to precipitate a disc herniation. This argument is incorrect. As noted above, claimant was found in a dazed condition with her body in an awkward position. Upon reviving, she immediately felt a pain in her lower back. The following day, this pain was diagnosed by Dr. Couch as being caused by an acute disc herniation. Under these facts, the Commission made the permissible inference that claimant had suffered a seizure which, in turn, resulted in her back injury.\nFurther, respondent argues that the subject injury could have been caused by headaches rather than seizures and that the evidence suggests the headaches are not causally related to her back injury. We note that the wording of this argument underscores its lack of persuasiveness. From the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing, the Commission properly found that claimant suffered seizures and headaches from her fall. Also, there was sufficient evidence in support of the Commission\u2019s determination that a seizure rather than a headache was causally connected to claimant\u2019s back injury.\nFinally, respondent argues that claimant failed to prove she is permanently totally disabled. Specifically, respondent contends that there is no medical evidence to support such an award. An employee does not have to be reduced to total physical incapacity to be permanently and totally disabled. (Goldblatt Brothers, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 62, 67.) Total and permanent disability exists when the only jobs an employee can perform are \u201c \u2018so limited in quantity, dependability, or quality that there is no reasonably stable market for them.\u2019 \u201d (Goldblatt Brothers, 78 Ill. 2d at 67, quoting C.R. Wikel, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 273, 278.) Further, continuing pain due to an injury and the inability to obtain employment justify a finding of permanent and total disability. (Goldblatt Brothers, 78 Ill. 2d at 67-68.) A reviewing court will not disturb the Commission\u2019s factual evaluation unless the Commission\u2019s conclusion is against the manifest weight of the evidence. As noted above, the Commission adopted the arbitrator\u2019s findings, which provided:\n\u201cIt is clear from the medical evidence that Petitioner is not able to perform those jobs for which she has training and experience, specifically nursing and restaurant work. Dr. Stauffer indicated in his testimony that Petitioner may be among the 20 percent of low back surgery patients who ultimately require a fusion. She did get some relief from the body cast he put her in and the subsequent use of various corsets and braces. At the present time, Petitioner has not had a fusion and is not able to obtain employment within her physical limitation.\u201d\nAt the review hearing before the Commission, claimant gave the following testimony. Since the arbitration, she had undergone a spinal fusion surgery in September 1987. She experienced pain in her back and left and right legs since the fusion surgery. Claimant had not been able to return to work since the arbitration hearing. She still could not lift any object over 10 pounds because of pain in her back and her legs. Nor could she turn or twist her body in situations such as trying to look out the rear window of a car while driving or riding. Her inability to turn or twist had not improved since her fusion surgery. Claimant\u2019s previous jobs as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) and waitress required her to lift items over 10 pounds and to turn or twist her body in the regular course of her employment. Further, she could not carry out her regular household duties. She was not able to run the vacuum cleaner, make the beds, get clothes out of the dryer, put things in the oven, or even wipe off a table. Claimant also had a problem standing or sitting for any extended period of time. Moreover, claimant sought work as an LPN at St. John\u2019s Hospital in Springfield. She was not hired. Further, no treating physician had released her to return to work.\nThe testimony of Dr. Pearson, who last examined claimant in May 1986, is not dispositive as to the permanency and extent of claimant\u2019s back injury. Dr. Couch had no opinion as to claimant\u2019s back problem. Dr. Stauffer stated that \u201cit is difficult to get people back to work as nurses unless they are fully fit and have no limitations.\u201d He opined that, due to claimant\u2019s complaints of back pain, she might not be able to perform an LPN\u2019s work duties. As to waitressing, Dr. Stauffer was too unfamiliar with the job\u2019s demands to make an informed judgment as to whether she could perform that job.\nClearly, the Commission based its decision as to the permanency and extent of her back injury in large part upon claimant\u2019s testimony. It was entitled to do so. (See Skokie Valley Asphalt Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 333, 335.) Under the evidence adduced, the Commission could find that claimant was incapacitated to the point that she was totally unable to secure permanent employment. The respondent could have rebutted said conclusion by demonstrating that work within claimant\u2019s limited capacity was reasonably available. (See Inland Robbins Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 271, 276.) Respondent failed to do so.\nAccordingly, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nLEWIS and STOUDER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH,\ndissenting:\nI disagree with the majority, which finds causal connection between claimant\u2019s fall at work and the subsequent back injury.\nAs the majority states, the arbitrator, referring to causal connection, work-related injury, and subsequent herniated disc, found Dr. Couch\u2019s testimony \u201cdid not, however, exclude the possibility this could occur.\u201d Dr. Couch\u2019s statement, \u201c[I]t is possible, it is surprisingly uncommon,\u201d along with his further statement, \u201cI think it is a possibility, but I don\u2019t think a very good one,\u201d does not show causal connection. Dr. Couch, a treating physician, was fully informed of the claimant\u2019s medical history, the work-related accident, and the history of headaches and seizures. To allow recovery in this case will eliminate any requirement that causal connection be proved to a reasonable degree of medical certainty in cases requiring expert testimony. This is such a case.\nPossibility of causal connection is not the standard required. The arbitrator, Commission, and majority decision rely upon Dr. Couch\u2019s testimony to find causal connection. Dr. Couch, however, found only a \u201cpossibility.\u201d The Commission\u2019s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe decision of the Commission awarding permanent disability is also against the manifest weight of the evidence. The claimant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence she is permanently totally disabled as a result of the April 26 work-related accident. She is not obviously unemployable.\nMcNAMARA, J., joins in dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Karen L. Kendall, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, and Gary L. Borah, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield, for appellant.", "William A. Pryor, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HERITAGE HOUSE, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Sharon Bell, Appellee).\nFourth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 4\u201490\u20140484WC\nOpinion filed August 14, 1991.\nRehearing denied October 22, 1991.\nMcCULLOUGH, PI., and McNAMARA, J., dissenting.\nKaren L. Kendall, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, and Gary L. Borah, of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Pryor, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0019-01", "first_page_order": 41, "last_page_order": 47 }