{ "id": 5801671, "name": "BOATMEN'S NATIONAL BANK OF BELLEVILLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IVADELL BENTON et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Boatmen's National Bank v. Benton", "decision_date": "1991-08-27", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201490\u20140349", "first_page": "117", "last_page": "119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 117" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "39 Cal. Rptr. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "228 Cal. App. 2d 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2144455 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/228/0810-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866114 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" }, { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 N.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. App. 3d 1053", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5378808 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/39/1053-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 N.E.2d 1102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3187582 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 347", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3556847 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0183-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 374, "char_count": 5770, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.643594115661138e-08, "percentile": 0.29063393271190713 }, "sha256": "db0d1a14e70a15ae3e311ea23f19ec0c398075f59d19082c47992bacd92d397c", "simhash": "1:fe57a866a7cb90c4", "word_count": 930 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:35.632923+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BOATMEN\u2019S NATIONAL BANK OF BELLEVILLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IVADELL BENTON et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn September 24, 1986, defendants, Ivadell Benton and Sarah Benton-Leavitt, entered into a contract of guaranty with plaintiff, Boatmen\u2019s National Bank of Belleville. This instrument, denominated as a \u201ccontinuing, absolute, unconditional guarantee,\u201d was given in consideration of any credits or advances to be made to \u201cThe Cowboy Shop.\u201d The contract provided in part:\n\u201cThis guaranty is absolute and is not affected by any failure of the bank to give notice of default on the part of the borrower, nor by extensions granted to said borrower, nor by any acts or omissions whatsoever by the bank relative to the indebtedness of the borrower or any of the undersigned or any collateral that may be secured therefore. Notice of the acceptance of this guaranty by the bank is hereby waived by the undersigned.\u201d\nThe Cowboy Shop defaulted on its loans, and on September 30, 1988, Boatmen\u2019s sued defendants to recover the balance due on the loans plus interest, costs, and attorney fees. Defendants filed their answers on October 28, 1988. Plaintiff filed its motion for summary judgment on September 14, 1989. On December 15, 1989, defendants filed a motion to amend their answers and countercomplaints and filed an answer to plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held on February 7, 1990, and on February 26, 1990, the trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions to amend their answers and their countercomplaints and granted plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The trial court based its decision to grant plaintiff\u2019s motion on the guaranty contract executed by the parties. The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $58,151.45. Defendants filed a motion to vacate the trial court\u2019s order on March 5, 1990, which was denied on May 5, 1990. Defendants then filed a timely notice of appeal. We note at the outset that a motion to strike defendants\u2019 brief was taken with the case. Defendants\u2019 brief contains numerous factual assertions which are not contained in the record. While we do not approve of this procedure, we shall, nevertheless, deny the motion to strike defendants\u2019 brief and address defendants\u2019 contentions.\nDefendants argue on appeal that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment for plaintiff because the guaranty contract was unenforceable. While defendants also appeal the denial of their motions to amend their answer and countercomplaint, they state in their brief that if the trial court\u2019s decision to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff based upon the guaranty contract was proper, it would render these issues moot. We agree, and because we affirm the trial court, we shall address only defendants\u2019 contention regarding the enforceability of the guaranty contract.\nDefendants contend that the guaranty contract is unenforceable because it is ambiguous and overly broad and amounts to an adhesion contract. We disagree.\nIn Du Quoin State Bank v. Daulby (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 183, 450 N.E.2d 347, we stated:\n\u201cThe rules of construction applicable to contracts generally also apply to contracts of guaranty [citation], and if such a contract is unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. [Citations.] These principles apply even in cases such as this where the guaranty agreement contains broad statements of guarantor liability.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Du Quoin State Bank, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 185-86, 450 N.E.2d at 349.)\n(See also Bank of Naperville v. Holz (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 533, 407 N.E.2d 1102; Jacobson v. Devon Bank (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 351 N.E.2d 254.) We conclude that the guaranty contract relied upon by the trial court is neither ambiguous nor overly broad.\nDefendants also claim the guaranty contract is unenforceable because it is an adhesion contract. A contract of adhesion has been described as\n\u201c \u2018a standardized contract prepared entirely by one party, and which, due to the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a \u201ctake it or leave it\u201d basis without opportunity for bargaining and under such conditions that the second party or \u201cadherer\u201d cannot obtain the desired product or service save by acquiescing in the form of the agreement.\u2019 \u201d (Star Finance Corp. v. McGee (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 421, 426, 326 N.E.2d 518, 522, quoting Walnut Creek Pipe Distributors, Inc. v. Gates Rubber Co. (1964), 228 Cal. App. 2d 810, 814-15, 39 Cal. Rptr. 767, 771.)\nThe court continued: \u201cWhether a contract is one of adhesion is itself a question of fact ***.\u201d (Star Finance Corp., 27 Ill. App. 3d at 426, 326 N.E.2d at 522.) While defendants argue that there was a disparity in bargaining power between the parties, that the contract was offered on a \u201ctake it or leave it\u201d basis without the opportunity for bargaining, and that they could not obtain the service provided by plaintiff elsewhere, their affidavits filed in response to plaintiff\u2019s motion for summary judgment contained no statements which would support these arguments. In the absence of any evidence to support their contention that the bank\u2019s standard form agreement was one of adhesion, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the plaintiff.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nRARICK, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Melvin W. Trotier, of Belleville, for appellants.", "Steven M. Wallace, of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy, Glass & Bogard, of East St. Louis, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BOATMEN\u2019S NATIONAL BANK OF BELLEVILLE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IVADELL BENTON et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201490\u20140349\nOpinion filed August 27, 1991.\nRehearing denied October 4, 1991.\nMelvin W. Trotier, of Belleville, for appellants.\nSteven M. Wallace, of Carr, Korein, Tillery, Kunin, Montroy, Glass & Bogard, of East St. Louis, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0117-01", "first_page_order": 139, "last_page_order": 141 }