{ "id": 5800487, "name": "TONJA NOTMAN, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Thrif-T-Mart, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Notman v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1991-07-19", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201490\u20140853WC", "first_page": "203", "last_page": "208", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 203" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 1316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1318" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074909 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 898", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3588646 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 1154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5436041 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0108-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 577, "char_count": 13205, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.555949484723828e-08, "percentile": 0.4018234267712133 }, "sha256": "d30757f890c7c845b1458439c52b1039fcaf83bea1d7476758c61d89289bc855", "simhash": "1:e8bf0be50dd1d919", "word_count": 2091 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:35.632923+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TONJA NOTMAN, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Thrif-T-Mart, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nClaimant, Tonja Notman, appeals from an order of the circuit court of La Salle County confirming the Industrial Commission\u2019s (Commission\u2019s) decision that it lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator\u2019s dismissal of the case.\nIn February 1984, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Commission, which alleged that claimant was entitled to benefits as a collateral heir seeking death penalty benefits under section 7(d) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(d)). William Notman, claimant\u2019s brother, was employed by respondent, Thrif-T-Mart, at the time of his death. Claimant alleged that she was dependent upon decedent. Section 7(d) of the Act requires a claimant seeking death benefits as a collateral heir to prove that she was more than 50% dependent upon the decedent. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(d).) On November 15, 1985, claimant was served with subpoenas requesting production of her income tax returns for the years 1980 to 1983 and of decedent\u2019s tax returns for the same years. On November 25, 1985, after argument, the arbitrator denied claimant\u2019s motion to quash the subpoenas and ordered her to produce the tax returns before January 6, 1986, the rescheduled hearing date. On January 6, 1986, the arbitrator continued the case to March 5, 1986, again ordering production of the documents prior to the rescheduled hearing date. On February 14, 1986, claimant forwarded documents to respondent purporting to comply with the order: the documents included various W-2 forms for claimant and decedent and claimant\u2019s 1982 State and Federal returns. On March 5, the arbitrator again continued the case for hearing until June 4, 1986, this time ordering certified copies of all documents subpoenaed to be produced. On May 7, 1986, respondent filed a motion asking that claimant\u2019s attorney be held in contempt for his repeated disregard of the Commission\u2019s orders and that the matter be dismissed with prejudice. On the final hearing date, June 4, 1986, neither claimant nor her counsel appeared. The arbitrator dismissed the case with prejudice by written order dated June 11, 1986. Such order reserved ruling on the contempt issue, but stated:\n\u201cYou are further notified that unless a Petition for Review is filed with the Industrial Commission within fifteen (15) days after receipt of this order and a review perfected in accordance with the provisions of the Illinois Workers Compensation Act and the Rules of the Industrial Commission then the order of the arbitrator shall be entered as the decision of the Industrial Commission.\u201d\nClaimant maintains that she never received a copy of this dismissal order. Claimant also contends that her attorney appeared before the arbitrator on June 2, 1986, and showed him a letter from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicating that the returns were forthcoming. The IRS letter states that copies of claimant\u2019s 1981 to 1984 returns were attached, but that the IRS still had not located the 1980 return.\nOn July 17, 1986, and August 11, 1986, claimant filed motions requesting reinstatement of the case. Claimant failed to appear at the hearing on her motion. Claimant\u2019s attorney asserts that he was informed by telephone on the day before the scheduled hearing that the Commission would be closed on that day due to a judge\u2019s funeral. (The Commission was not closed.) In an order dated August 25, 1986, the arbitrator denied claimant\u2019s motion to reinstate, specifically finding that because claimant failed to file a petition for review within the time required by statute, the Commission lost jurisdiction of the matter. On September 12, 1986, claimant filed a petition for review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision. Upon review, the Commission affirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision, finding lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court of La Salle County confirmed.\nOn appeal, claimant makes several arguments. First, she contends that the Commission had no authority to enter a dismissal order for failure to produce discovery materials and therefore such order was void. Alternatively, claimant maintains that the Commission\u2019s order could only have been a dismissal for want of prosecution, for which the Act allows claimant 60 days to petition for reinstatement. Finally, claimant maintains that her petition for reinstatement, filed within 15 days after receipt of the order, was sufficient as a petition for review.\nInitially, claimant contends that the arbitrator lacked authority to dismiss the cause for failure to produce the tax returns as ordered by subpoena, and that the order is, therefore, void. Respondent maintains that the order is not void because the Commission had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction and the order was within its inherent authority. We agree with respondent.\nA \u201cvoid judgment\u201d is one entered by a court or quasi-judicial tribunal that lacks jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter or that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the decision and may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally. (City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm\u2019n (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 108, 357 N.E.2d 1154.) Further, as a statutory creature, the Commission\u2019s powers derive from the statutes which authorize and create it. City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Comm\u2019n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 357 N.E.2d 1154.\nThe Industrial Commission has original subject matter jurisdiction over actions, such as this one, brought under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Moreover, claimant, by filing this claim, and respondent, by responding, conferred personal jurisdiction upon the Commission. The Commission, therefore, did not lack either subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Nor do we believe that the arbitrator here lacked the inherent power to dismiss claimant\u2019s cause for her failure to produce the ordered documents.\nSection 19(b) of the Act provides:\n\u201cThe Arbitrator shall make such inquiries and investigations as he or they shall deem necessary and may examine and inspect all books, papers, records, places, or premises relating to the questions in dispute and hear such proper evidence as the parties may submit.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b).\nThe Act unequivocally authorizes the arbitrator to order production of documents related to disputed issues. Whether claimant was \u201cdependent\u201d on the decedent to the extent of 50% or more of total dependency (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.7(d)) was a critical issue in this case, and the tax records ordered by the subpoena would likely have provided necessary information regarding that status and claimant\u2019s entitlement to relief. Claimant\u2019s repeated failure to produce these documents precluded the Commission from adequately resolving this threshold issue. Claimant suggests that the arbitrator\u2019s authority permitted him to take only two actions: hear the case and issue a written decision, as authorized by section 19(b) of the Act, or dismiss the case for want of prosecution, as authorized by Rule 7020.90 of the Industrial Commission. We disagree. Although the Act does not explicitly so provide, we believe that the arbitrator\u2019s inherent authority permitted him under the circumstances here to enter the present order. Any other result would fail to recognize the arbitrator\u2019s authority to conduct hearings and make decisions on issues raised through the filing of a claim and to reasonably dispose of cases. We find no authority to support claimant\u2019s position and, therefore, conclude that the Commission\u2019s order was not void.\nWe also decline to accept claimant\u2019s characterization of the order as a dismissal for want of prosecution, which would entitle claimant to file a petition to reinstate within 60 days. A review of the arbitrator\u2019s order reveals that the cause was not dismissed for want of prosecution, as claimant suggests, but rather for her failure to produce the tax returns. Paragraphs 3 through 8 of the four-page order refer primarily to the tax returns, tracing the chronology of the subpoena for the returns, the subsequent orders and claimant\u2019s failure to produce them. Indeed, the order details the following: the service of subpoenas in November 1985; the subsequent denial of claimant\u2019s motion to quash; claimant\u2019s purported production of documents in February 1986; orders dated November 26, 1985, January 6 and March 5, 1986, ordering production of the tax returns and continuing hearing; and the March 1986 order requiring claimant to certify the tax returns as true, complete and without alteration and to provide a letter from the IRS if the returns were lost. After setting forth the above chronology regarding the tax returns, the arbitrator dismissed the case with prejudice. Based upon the detailed reference to the tax returns and the tenor of the order, we cannot conclude that the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. Rather, the arbitrator dismissed the case because claimant failed, despite three hearing continuances over a period of several months, to supply documents which she needed to establish her claim against respondent. As such, claimant\u2019s attempt to reinstate the case was inappropriate, especially in light of the order\u2019s specific direction that unless claimant filed a petition for review within 15 days, the order would be entered by the Commission. Such procedure is also mandated by the plain language of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b).\nFinally, we reject claimant\u2019s argument that its petition for reinstatement was sufficient as a timely petition for review. Claimant suggests that if the Commission received the order on June 26, 1986, then processed it in due course, her petition, filed on July 15, 1986, must have been timely filed. An arbitrator\u2019s decision becomes the Commission\u2019s decision and is conclusive, absent fraud, unless a petition for review is filed by either party within 15 days after the party receives the decision and notification of when it was filed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b); Wiscons v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 898, 531 N.E.2d 956.) By filing a motion to reinstate on July 15, 1986, claimant demonstrated that she knew at least as of that date about the arbitrator\u2019s decision. Claimant failed to file a petition for review until September 12, almost 60 days later. Such delayed action simply failed to meet the statutory filing deadline, as delineated in the arbitrator\u2019s order.\nMoreover, we refuse to equate claimant\u2019s motion to reinstate with a petition for review. Claimant urges, relying on Cranfield v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 251, 399 N.E.2d 1316, that this court should consider her petition for reinstatement as a petition for review. In Cranfield, the trial court confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision denying reinstatement of the case, which had been dismissed for want of prosecution. On appeal, our supreme court found that the Commission properly treated claimant\u2019s petition for reinstatement as a timely filed petition for review. The court focused on the arbitrator\u2019s dismissal for want of prosecution, finding that \u201cin these circumstances\u201d claimant had 60 days to seek reinstatement. Importantly, the court noted: \u201cHad claimant in fact sought review of an arbitrator\u2019s award or other disposition of the case on the merits, we would [find jurisdiction lacking.]\u201d (Cranfield, 78 Ill. 2d at 255, 399 N.E.2d at 1318.) Unlike Cranfield, however, the arbitrator here did not dismiss the case for want of prosecution. Rather, the arbitrator dismissed the case after claimant failed, despite adequate time and various orders, to produce the required documents, which were relevant to the key issue in the case. Moreover, the respondent in Cranfield moved to dismiss for want of prosecution; conversely, the transcript of the June 4, 1986, hearing here reveals that the basis of respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss was the failure to produce the subpoenaed tax returns. Because claimant\u2019s eligibility for benefits turned on her ability to prove dependency, her failure or inability to produce such evidence adversely affected the merits of her claim. We, therefore, believe such dismissal is more akin to a disposition on the merits than a dismissal for want of prosecution and, as such, find Cranfield distinguishable from the present case.\nWe find that the Commission properly dismissed the 1986 petition on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction based upon claimant\u2019s failure to file a petition for review within 15 days after the arbitrator entered his decision.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County, confirming the Industrial Commission\u2019s dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction, is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and WOODWARD, STOUDER and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Emmanuel E Guyon, of Streator, for appellant.", "John A. Nudo, of Joliet, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TONJA NOTMAN, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Thrif-T-Mart, Appellee).\nThird District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 3\u201490\u20140853WC\nOpinion filed July 19, 1991.\nRehearing denied October 22, 1991.\nEmmanuel E Guyon, of Streator, for appellant.\nJohn A. Nudo, of Joliet, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0203-01", "first_page_order": 225, "last_page_order": 230 }