{
  "id": 5798865,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TODD HARLAN, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harlan",
  "decision_date": "1991-09-24",
  "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140112",
  "first_page": "255",
  "last_page": "258",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 255"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "418 N.E.2d 1070",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "1079"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 665",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
        3124825
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "677"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app-3d/94/0665-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 349,
    "char_count": 5396,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.773,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 6.770845263994211e-08,
      "percentile": 0.41312312030546955
    },
    "sha256": "15270a6883556f7c1f466ea489bd99b4cea6da92df07c142fc25fb2cb913a0bb",
    "simhash": "1:c82b910962d59ff7",
    "word_count": 861
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:35.632923+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TODD HARLAN, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant appeals from the Champaign County circuit court\u2019s revocation of his probation, arguing error in the refusal to sentence him to intensive probation supervision (IPS) and the seven-year sentence imposed for burglary. We affirm.\nThe defendant pleaded guilty to burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 1(a)) on November 21, 1989, and was sentenced to 30 months\u2019 probation. The State filed a petition to revoke probation on March 30, 1990, alleging the defendant failed to ever report to the probation office, failed to appear for his intake interview, and failed to notify the probation office of a change of residence. On January 30, 1991, the court revoked the defendant\u2019s probation and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment for burglary.\nAlthough the defendant had been found qualified for IPS, the court declined to sentence him to IPS. The court cited the defendant\u2019s \u201cdeplorable\u201d record in the criminal justice system as the reason for denying IPS. The defendant, born in 1966, had 13 misdemeanor convictions and one felony conviction between 1983 and 1990. The court commented: \u201cThere is very little, if anything, in this report, or anything that\u2019s been presented here that could be considered any significant mitigation. I simply think on this record that a community-based sentence would simply be inconsistent with the ends of justice.\u201d\nOn appeal, the defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to sentence him to IPS. Defendant claims he should have been sentenced to IPS because he met the minimum qualifications for the program, successfully completed probation in St. Clair County in 1983-84, and had no disciplinary problems while incarcerated for the felony conviction.\nSection 5 \u2014 6\u20141(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 6\u20141(a)), provides:\n\u201cExcept where specifically prohibited by other provisions of this Code, the court shall impose a sentence of probation or conditional discharge upon an offender unless, having regard to the nature and circumstance of the offense, and to the history, character and condition of the offender, the court is of the opinion that:\n(1) his imprisonment or periodic imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public; or\n(2) probation or conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of the offender\u2019s conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice.\u201d\nThe decision to grant probation lies within the discretion of the trial court; \u201ca defendant has neither an inherent nor a statutory right to probation.\u201d (People v. Sprouse (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 665, 677, 418 N.E.2d 1070, 1079.) The defendant here failed to cooperate with probation authorities during his sentence of probation. He had no right to be readmitted to a more strict form of probation on revocation. Eligibility for IPS does not mean IPS will automatically be imposed.\nIPS is a special and highly structured program. It can be a viable alternative to imprisonment if the trial court sees evidence of rehabilitative potential and there is reason to believe the defendant can strictly adhere to the conditions of the program. The defendant here has a lengthy record, a prior felony conviction, and demonstrated his cavalier attitude toward a community-based sentence when he blithely failed to ever report to the probation office, failed to appear for intake, and failed to notify the probation office of a change in residence. Scarce resources should not be wasted on uncooperative offenders who demonstrate no willingness to abide by the simplest of conditions.\nGiven the defendant\u2019s criminal record and, as the trial court stated, his failure to \u201creflect upon his situation\u201d while incarcerated for a prior felony, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining his request for IPS. Such a sentence would have been, as the trial court found, \u201cinconsistent with the ends of justice.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-l(a)(2).\nAlternatively, the defendant argues the seven-year sentence imposed for burglary was excessive. According to the information and indictment, the defendant took merchandise valued at $21.32 from Kohl\u2019s Department Store in Champaign, Illinois. Defendant pleaded guilty to the burglary. He now argues seven years is excessive because the merchandise was worth only $21.32.\nBurglary is a Class 2 felony, for which the court can impose a sentence of not less than three and not more than seven years\u2019 imprisonment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 19 \u2014 1(b), 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(5).) The sentence imposed did not exceed the sentence allowed by law and, in light of defendant\u2019s prior criminal record, was not excessive.\nThe order of the Champaign County circuit court revoking the defendant\u2019s probation and sentencing him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLUND, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Daniel D. Yuhas and Karen Munoz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.",
      "Thomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Monroe D. McWard, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TODD HARLAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140112\nOpinion filed September 24, 1991.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Karen Munoz, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Difanis, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and Monroe D. McWard, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0255-01",
  "first_page_order": 277,
  "last_page_order": 280
}