{ "id": 5798081, "name": "FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOUNT GREENWOOD BANK LAND TRUST 5-0899 et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Forest Preserve District v. Mount Greenwood Bank Land Trust 5-0899", "decision_date": "1991-09-13", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20140743", "first_page": "524", "last_page": "529", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 524" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "567 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 823", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2547590 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0823-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3548099 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 N.E.2d 1273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 884", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636073 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "891" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0884-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Cal. Rptr. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Cal. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2000185 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/98/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 A.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.J. Super. 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 338509 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/119/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Cal. Rptr. 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Cal. 2d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. App. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5201393 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/22/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 740, "char_count": 14280, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.004458969743936e-08, "percentile": 0.503365833297617 }, "sha256": "07bd4ec9af30f42b864094379470ff12a99ba4af08fbb358cdf8b1dc65f671a9", "simhash": "1:c3e6f5071b4c0fd6", "word_count": 2258 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:35:35.632923+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOUNT GREENWOOD BANK LAND TRUST 5\u20140899 et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE RAKOWSKI\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Forest Preserve District of Cook County (District) filed a complaint against defendants Mount Greenwood Bank land trust 5 \u2014 0899, Patrie D. Greene and Green Development Group, Inc. (Defendants), seeking to enjoin Defendants from cutting trees, moving earth and otherwise destroying the forest and natural beauty on Defendants\u2019 property. The complaint alleged that the subject property adjoined the District\u2019s adjoining Dan Ryan Woods Forest Preserve and that the District desired to acquire Defendants\u2019 property as an addition to the District\u2019s adjoining forest preserve. The District prayed for an injunction to maintain the status quo and preserve the subject property until it was acquired by the District.\nThe trial court issued a temporary restraining order. Subsequently, however, the trial court heard evidence, and at the close of the District\u2019s case, denied the District\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction. The District appeals the trial court\u2019s ruling. We reverse.\nThe relevant facts necessary to disposition of this appeal are as follows. The District is a body corporate and politic established pursuant to \u201cAn Act in relation to the creation and management of forest preserve districts in counties having a population of 3,000,000 or more, amending certain Acts named therein to conform thereto\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 961/2, par. 6401 et seq.). The governing body of the District is the Board of Commissioners of Cook County, and the District is co-extensive with Cook County, Illinois, where the subject property is located. Defendants are a land trust, an individual and a corporation who collectively own the subject property.\nThe property at issue is a narrow strip of land which comprises approximately 14x/2 acres. It is located in the Beverly neighborhood of Chicago, Illinois, between 87th Street at the north end and 90th Street on the south end. The property was once a railroad right-of-way; the right-of-way has been abandoned for years, however. Until the activities of Defendants, the land has been forested and undeveloped. Defendants purchased 4.3 acres of the property in December of 1989, and 10 acres in January of 1991. Previous to November 7, 1990, the property had been zoned single-family residential (R1 and R2). At this time, however, the City of Chicago adopted an ordinance establishing a residential planned development. The City of Chicago issued a building permit for Defendants to begin construction in December of 1990.\nThe District\u2019s Dan Ryan Woods Forest Preserve adjoins the subject property. This forest preserve comprises approximately 200 acres. About 50% of the Dan Ryan Woods is forested, including the portion of the Dan Ryan Woods which is immediately adjoining the subject property.\nOn February 14, 1991, the real estate committee of the District met and approved a report authorizing the District \u201cto enter into negotiations for the acquisition of the property adjacent to the Dan Ryan Woods contingent on the Forest Preserve District administration returning to the Board of Commissioners for final approval of the price and acquisition.\u201d On February 15, 1991, the chief attorney of the District wrote to Defendants seeking \u201cto negotiate for the purchase\u201d of the subject property. No response from Defendants to this letter forthcame. On February 22, 1991, the District\u2019s attorney hand-delivered another letter to Defendants advising Defendants that the District was aware that Defendants had begun developing the property, requesting Defendants to cease development of the property and renewing the District\u2019s offer to negotiate the purchase of the property. Prior to delivery of the second letter, on February 19, 1991, the District\u2019s Board met and approved the real estate committee\u2019s report.\nThe District filed its complaint on February 25, 1991. The District alleged that the subject property contained numerous types of trees and high quality ground cover that the District sought to protect and preserve. It was further alleged that after the District sent its initial letter to Defendants seeking to negotiate for the purchase of the property, Defendants commenced to develop the property and that the development of the property was destroying not only the flora and scenic beauty of the subject premises, but that the development of the subject property adversely disrupted the water balance necessary to preserve and protect flora on the Dan Ryan Woods. Alleging irreparable damage to both the subject property and the Dan Ryan Woods, the complaint sought a temporary restraining order, which the trial court granted.\nDefendants answered the complaint on February 28, 1991. Defendants admitted ownership of the property, and Defendants admitted that they had commenced development of the property. The answer denied, however, that the property contained valuable trees and other flora, and that their activities would damage the Dan Ryan Woods. Affirmatively, Defendants alleged that they had obtained Chicago Plan Commission and Chicago city council permission for rezoning the property. Fifty-nine residences, according to Defendants, were planned for the property, one of which was 95% complete. The nearly complete residence was under a contract of sale to a third party. The answer further averred that a consultant had found that the subject property was not a wetland, and that this finding had been accepted by the United States Corps of Engineers.\nDefendants filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order along with the answer. The motion was accompanied by documentation, and alleged, inter alia, that the District had no standing to bring the action.\nThe District\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on March 7 and 8, 1991. At the outset, the trial court dismissed the District\u2019s claim \u201cto the *** extent of plaintiff\u2019s status as a condemnor.\u201d At the time the trial court ruled on this issue, the evidence showed that the District\u2019s real estate committee had scheduled a meeting for the 12th of March to receive appraisals on the subject property. The hearing continued solely on the issue of whether the Dan Ryan Woods would be damaged by Defendants\u2019 development activities.\nThe District put on several witnesses, including an environmental engineer for the United States Army Corps of Engineers, the individual who videotaped Defendants\u2019 development activities, the chief forester of the District, a research scientist/ecological consultant, and an ecologist. Upon the completion of the District\u2019s case, the trial court ruled that the preliminary injunction was denied.\nThe District has raised two issues on appeal, namely: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the District\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction to stop development on the subject property when the District was seeking to condemn the property; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the District\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction based on the alleged damage that would occur to the District\u2019s Dan Ryan Woods property, the standing which the District has to this property being unchallenged. Due to our resolution of the first issue, we need not consider the second.\nSection 7 (HI. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 96x/2, par. 6410) provides in pertinent part that the District:\n\u201c[SJhall have the power to acquire in fee simple *** lands containing one or more natural forests or parts thereof *** for the purpose of protecting and preserving the flora, fauna, and scenic beauties within such district, and to *** protect and preserve the natural forests and such lands together with their flora and fauna, as nearly as may be, in their natural state and condition, for the purpose of the education, pleasure, and recreation of the public. Lands may be acquired in fee simple for the consolidation of such preserves into unit areas of size and form convenient and desirable for public use[.]\u201d\nSection 8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 96V2, par. 6411) provides in relevant part:\n\u201cAny forest preserve district shall have power to acquire lands in fee simple and grounds within such district for the aforesaid purposes by gift, grant, legacy, purchase or condemnation and to construct, lay out, improve and maintain *** improvements and facilities in and through such forest preserves as it shall deem necessary or desirable for the use of such forest preserves by the public.\u201d\nIn this case, Defendants argue that the trial court was correct to deny the District\u2019s motion for a preliminary injunction (or to grant Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the District\u2019s action) based on the standing issue due to the trial court\u2019s proper weighing of traditional equitable considerations in actions for injunctive relief, and due to the fact that as the District was only potentially entitled to possession of the property, the District had no enforceable rights to the property.\nThe District, on the other hand, argues that the trial court erred in denying it injunctive relief because the trial court failed \u201cto apply the time-tested principle that land development activities can be stopped during a period when a governmental agency is in the midst of planning or enacting laws that would make such development illegal.\u201d In support of its argument, the District cites a number of cases which are distinguishable in the respect that there, the courts stopped development or demolition activities when the governmental agency was in the process of amending or sought to amend zoning ordinances which would restrict the complained-of activities or complained-of changes to the properties. (See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Village of Palatine (1959), 22 Ill. App. 2d 264, 160 N.E.2d 697; Hunter v. Adams (1960), 180 Cal. 2d 511, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776.) The District also cites cases wherein the denial of building permits were upheld when the proposed areas were subject to future condemnation. (See East Rutherford Industrial Park, Inc. v. State of New Jersey (1972), 119 N.J. Super. 352, 291 A.2d 588; Briggs v. State Department of Parks & Recreation (1979), 98 Cal. App. 3d 190, 159 Cal. Rptr. 390.) Here, the City of Chicago is not in the process of amending its zoning classifications of the subject property nor was the issuance of a building permit at issue. In fact, due to Defendants\u2019 efforts preceding the instant controversy, the City had changed the zoning classification, and building permits had been awarded Defendants.\nNotwithstanding the above, we are convinced that Defendants should have been enjoined from continuing their development activities on the subject property. The District\u2019s complaint prayed for an injunction \u201cwhile the District negotiates for or condemns the premises.\u201d The complaint further informed the court that the District, as is required by law, had been in the process of first negotiating for the purchase of the property before filing a condemnation action. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 7 \u2014 102.) At the time of the hearing, the authority of the District to negotiate the purchase of the property had been approved by the District\u2019s real estate committee and the District\u2019s board. The trial court was informed, and the record reveals no reason to doubt, that the District\u2019s real estate committee was meeting in five days to consider the definitive ordinance.\nBy failing to grant the injunction, which could have been dissolved at a later date should the District fail to pursue the matter, the District appears to have been forced to immediately appeal the matter. Too, the District, consistent with its representations, has in fact filed a condemnation proceeding. Further development of the property would be contrary to the District\u2019s planned and statutorily permitted use of the property. Under the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court should have granted the District injunctive relief.\nA traditional equitable analysis enforces our holding. One seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction must establish each of the following elements: (1) he possesses a clearly ascertainable right or interest which needs protection; (2) he has no remedy at law; (3) irreparable harm will result if the preliminary injunction is not granted; and (4) he has a likelihood of success on the merits. (The Instrumentalist Co. v. Band, Inc. (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 884, 891, 480 N.E.2d 1273.) Additionally, the trial court must conclude that the benefits of granting the injunction outweigh the possible injury that the opposing party might suffer as a result thereof. Gannett Outdoor v. Baise (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 717, 721, 516 N.E.2d 915.\nHere, the District\u2019s statutory power to acquire the subject property is not at issue, and the District\u2019s interest in protecting the property, for the benefit of the public, is free from doubt. The destruction of the flora and fauna could not be remedied at law. Destruction of the flora, fauna and scenic beauty would be irreparable, and indeed, final. Given the District\u2019s statutory grant of authority to acquire the property, success on the merits was likely. While Defendants have argued that they would be tremendously injured by the granting of injunctive relief, it is to be remembered that an attempt at agreement as to compensation for condemned property must be both bona fide and in good faith (Forest Preserve District v. Marquette National Bank (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 823, 567 N.E.2d 635) and the very purpose of condemnation proceedings is to determine the just compensation due the owner. Thus, we are convinced that the benefits to the District of providing injunctive relief outweigh the potential injury to Defendants.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nReversed.\nMcNAMARA and LaPORTA, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE RAKOWSKI" } ], "attorneys": [ "Greg A. Kinczewski, of Forest Preserve District of Cook County, and Earl L. Neal & Associates, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "George J. Anos, Lawrence M. Freedman, Barry Ash, and Yolanda M. Kielar, all of Ash, Anos, Freedman & Logan, and Burke & Ryan, both of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MOUNT GREENWOOD BANK LAND TRUST 5\u20140899 et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20140743\nOpinion filed September 13, 1991.\nGreg A. Kinczewski, of Forest Preserve District of Cook County, and Earl L. Neal & Associates, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nGeorge J. Anos, Lawrence M. Freedman, Barry Ash, and Yolanda M. Kielar, all of Ash, Anos, Freedman & Logan, and Burke & Ryan, both of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0524-01", "first_page_order": 546, "last_page_order": 551 }