{
  "id": 2945473,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Curtis, Sr., Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Curtis",
  "decision_date": "1974-09-09",
  "docket_number": "No. 72-226",
  "first_page": "4",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
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        2536018
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      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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      "weight": 2,
      "year": 1974,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:04:13.341458+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Curtis, Sr., Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCharged by complaint with the offense of deceptive practices, the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to 1 year at Vandalia. On appeal it is contended that the complaint was fatally defective in that it failed to specify the person defrauded.\nThe complaint charged that defendant committed the offense of \u201cDeceptive Practice, in that he, with the intent to obtain control over property of TOTAL CONCEPT, 1420 North Main Street, Rockford, Illinois delivered to TOTAL CONCEPT a check for the payment of money in the amount of ($25.00) Twenty Five Dollars, drawn on the State Bank of Rockford, Illinois, with an intent to defraud and knowing at the time of delivering said check that it would not be paid by said depository in violation of Paragraph 17 \u2014 1, Chapter 38, Illinois Revised Statutes.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch, 38, \u00a7 17 \u2014 1.\nIn order to be valid, a complaint must set forth the nature and elements of the crime charged. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, \u00a7 111 \u2014 3(a)(3).) The essential elements of the offense of deceptive practice are the intent to defraud and the intent to obtain control over property of another. (People v. Greer, 18 Ill.App.3d 617 (1974).) \u201cAnother\u201d is defined as a \u201cperson.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, \u00a7 2 \u2014 3.) A \u201cperson\u201d is defined as an \u201cindividual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, \u00a7 2 \u2014 15.) Defendant argues that from the language of the complaint it could not be determined that \u201cTotal Concept, 1420 North Main Street, Rockford, Illinois\u201d was a \u201cperson\u201d within the meaning of the statute and that the complaint therefore was fatally defective for having failed to charge an offense.\n\u201cTotal Concept * * *\u201d is no more a \u201cperson\u201d than \u201cBoren\u2019s IGA Foodliner, * * *\u201d (People v. Greer, supra), \u201cSully House Fine Furniture\u201d (People v. Tenen, 132 Ill.App.2d 786, 787 (1971)), or \u201cDay and Palin\u201d (People v. Brakebill, 9 Ill.App.3d 691, 692 (1973)), and following these cases, the complaint would be fatally defective in failing to allege the essential elements that the defendant intended to defraud and obtain control of property of \u201canother.\u201d Recently, however, the supreme court found the Tenen case non-persuasive when, in People v. Mahle, 57 Ill.2d 279 (1974), it held the complaints for deceptive practices to be sufficient. There, the court merged the requirement that a complaint must allege the essential elements of the crime charged with the case law that finds a complaint sufficient if it \u201cstates specifically the elements of the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise accused of the crime charged and to enable him to prepare his defense and permit a conviction or acquittal to be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and, as stated by some courts, to indicate to the court the correct judgment to be pronounced on a verdict of guilty. [Citations.]\u201d\u201d\u2019 57 IH.2d at 283.\nWe are bound by the decisions of our supreme court. In Mahle, supra, the court held that complaints of deceptive practices, naming \u201cStreator Car Wash, Streator, Illinois,\u201d and \u201cMarmion\u2019s Sinclair Service, Ottawa, Illinois,\u201d were words sufficient to denote a \u201cperson.\u201d We cannot distinguish that case from the one at bar and therefore find the identification of \u201cTotal Concept, 1420 North Main Street, Rockford, Illinois\u201d sufficient to allege a \u201cperson\u201d within the meaning of the statute.\nJudgment affirmed.\nSEIDENFELD and RECHENMACHER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE THOMAS J. MORAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ralph Ruebner and Adam Lutynsld, both of State Appellate Defenders Office, of Elgin, for appellant.",
      "Philip G. Reinhard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford, for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Curtis, Sr., Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 72-226;\nSecond District\nSeptember 9, 1974.\nRalph Ruebner and Adam Lutynsld, both of State Appellate Defenders Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nPhilip G. Reinhard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford, for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0004-01",
  "first_page_order": 26,
  "last_page_order": 27
}