{ "id": 5274652, "name": "RAYMOND KAPPEL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. POLICE BOARD OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Respondent-Appellant; FRED RICE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RAYMOND KAPPEL et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Kappel v. Police Board", "decision_date": "1991-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20140975", "first_page": "580", "last_page": "599", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 580" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562015 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529472 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 1289", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531067 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill. App. 3d 1042", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3410173 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/55/1042-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5456767 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3091741 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565967 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557-58", "parenthetical": "distinguishing Walsh" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3115527 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 877", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3391803 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577987 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833631 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 N.E.2d 212", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. App. 3d 864", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2756043 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869" }, { "page": "869-70", "parenthetical": "\"if discipline were absent, the Department would lose the respect of the public and should this occur the department would become incompetent and demoralized\"" }, { "page": "869", "parenthetical": "discharge upheld where officer attempted \"to take the law into his own hands\" by knocking down and hitting an individual with whom he was arguing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/2/0864-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. 2d 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5314769 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/1/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 91", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568277 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 3d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3233589 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" }, { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/80/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.E.2d 236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 2d 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5144222 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "many enforcement difficulties confront police departments in large metropolitan area" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/7/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 1038", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531048 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3621655 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" }, { "page": "587", "parenthetical": "no evidence that calculated plan to steal was caused by alcoholism; unlike Walsh, no evidence which would prompt the court to look for further details of his alcoholism" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 950", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2504701 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950" }, { "page": "965", "parenthetical": "discharge upheld; conduct affected members of community and thus could undermine public confidence in police department and impede its efforts to maintain honesty and integrity" }, { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0950-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 1019", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621359 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025", "parenthetical": "demotion upheld for negligence while on duty, notwithstanding 17 years of unblemished record" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/1019-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10981684 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/549/1063-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2692813 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638", "parenthetical": "discharge upheld where officer showed disrespect for the law by selling used parts from stolen cars recovered by the police to his own car repair business; conduct was \"neither trivial nor unrelated to what the public has a right to expect from a police officer\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 1363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2518913 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3320971 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3035386 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "459 N.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3559189 ], "weight": 7, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/121/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469434 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" }, { "page": "551" }, { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3113986 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106" }, { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "court found that \"[n]othing can undermine public confidence in the ability and good judgment of police officers more than the misuse of firearms\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0252-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1543, "char_count": 47333, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.053383224193046e-07, "percentile": 0.755636525527164 }, "sha256": "07ac05d38ddcd59beaa846b46037efd3609f46ba778b0282e0f15be828cf71e0", "simhash": "1:a33660d673c7c40c", "word_count": 7706 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:36.621238+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND KAPPEL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. POLICE BOARD OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Respondent-Appellant.\u2014FRED RICE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RAYMOND KAPPEL et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 1985, defendant Police Board of the City of Chicago (the Board) discharged defendant Raymond Kappel, a Chicago police officer, for possession and sale of unregistered weapons. After a lengthy process of administrative review, in June 1987 the Board \u201cwith great reluctance\u201d complied with a circuit court order by vacating the discharge and instead suspending Kappel for years, but only after the Board had resisted two prior remand orders to reduce the sanction. The procedural history is relatively complicated and is set forth in more detail below.\nFacts\nOn July 30, 1984, the superintendent of police suspended Kappel and filed charges against Kappel with the Board. On December 21, 1984, the date set for hearing, amended charges were filed. He was charged with violation of several rules and regulations of the police department, including:\n\u201cRule 2. Any action or conduct which impedes the department\u2019s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the department.\nRule 6. Disobedience of an order or directive, whether written or oral.\u201d\nThe basis of these charges, each pertaining to Kappel\u2019s conduct during the spring of 1981, included: (1) possession of an unregistered automatic rifle; (2) possession of an unregistered semi-automatic rifle; (3) selling a handgun from which the serial number had been removed; (4) firing a gun within the city limits; and (5) lying regarding his knowledge of the rifle being automatic.\nA two-day hearing took place on December 21, 1984, and January 9, 1985. The parties entered into stipulations regarding certain facts, including the following: On April 16, 1981, Kappel sold a .25 caliber Berretta automatic handgun without a serial number on it to a Federal undercover agent. On May 13, 1981, at 1 a.m., he discharged an automatic rifle at 1-55 and Pulaski, which is within the corporate limits of the City of Chicago. On May 15, 1981, Kappel was in possession of an AR-15 rifle (serial No. 133842) which had been converted to a fully automatic weapon, and was also in possession of an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle (serial No. 46995).\nMorris Steward, of the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) of the Chicago police department, testified for the department. He believed the department received \u201cfederal documents\u201d regarding Kappel in late 1983 or early 1984, which triggered an IAD investigation. To Steward\u2019s knowledge, Kappel later cooperated with State and Federal authorities. The Federal government granted Kappel immunity from prosecution.\nFrancisco Guerrero, a Chicago police officer, testified for the Department that he sold a semi-automatic rifle (serial No. 46995) to Kappel three or four years earlier (which would have been 1980 or 1981).\nMichael Van Amburgh testified for the department that he is a special investigator, criminal, for the United States Treasury Department, Department of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). In June 1980, he was assigned to investigate Chicago police officer Michael Gallagher. Van Amburgh testified that the Gallagher investigation began \u201c[d]ue to allegations that Michael Gallagher was a federal firearms dealer [who] was illegally obtaining and selling firearms.\u201d Federal charges were subsequently brought against Gallagher through a government information and Gallagher pleaded guilty and was imprisoned as a result of that plea.\nKappel himself was not under investigation when Gallagher introduced Van Amburgh to Kappel. On April 1, 1981, Kappel telephoned Van Amburgh and identified himself as \u201cRay.\u201d Van Amburgh testified that \u201cRay told me that he understood I was interested in purchasing a .25 *** caliber Berretta, that I had previously spoken to Michael Gallagher about.\u201d Kappel also remarked that \u201che was not crazy about talking over the phone because he did not know who he was talking to. He felt that he had phone problems.\u201d They agreed on a price of $100 for the handgun.\nOn April 16, 1981, at 10:30 p.m., Van Amburgh met at a restaurant parking lot with Kappel, Gallagher and an unidentified Chicago police officer. Gallagher produced the .25 caliber Berretta and handed it to Van Amburgh. There was evidence indicating that the serial number had been removed. Van Amburgh testified further that he \u201cturned to [Kappel] and asked him if we still agreed upon the price of $100. He said, \u2018Yes, that\u2019s right,\u2019 at which time I gave him $100.\u201d\nSeveral weeks later, Van Amburgh arranged to meet Kappel at a restaurant in the company of Gallagher and his nephew. They discussed \u201cdifferent types of weapons.\u201d Kappel told Van Amburgh \u201cas we were talking about different rifles [he said] that he did possess an AR-15 rifle that *** was converted.\u201d\nOn May 12, 1981, Van Amburgh and Reggie Humphries, a friend of Kappel, were at Kappel\u2019s home with Kappel. Two women were also in and out of the house. Kappel showed Van Amburgh a converted AR-15 rifle. Van Amburgh performed a standard field test and determined it could fire in a fully automatic mode. Kappel, Humphries and Van Amburgh later went to a restaurant, then drove to 1-55 and Pulaski at about 12:15 a.m. Kappel \u201cproduced an AR-15 rifle along with ammunition,\u201d and Van Amburgh produced a 9 millimeter machine gun. They took turns firing the weapons into the water and into the land next to the water. The only people in the vicinity were several ATF agents.\nOn May 15, 1981, Van Amburgh, along with several other ATF agents and Sergeant Morris Steward of the Chicago police department, executed a search warrant at Kappel's apartment. They found an AR-15 rifle (serial No. 133842) which was fully automatic, and a second AR-15 rifle (serial No. 46995) which was semi-automatic.\nKappel, in exchange for a promise of immunity, then cooperated with ATF in the investigation of Gallagher. Kappel also cooperated subsequently in a second investigation in which he wore an electronic surveillance device.\nOn cross-examination, Van Amburgh agreed that he told Kappel he was a good police officer, and that he felt Kappel had been \u201ccaught up in a bad situation because he was a gun buff.\u201d\nCaptain Matthias Casey testified for petitioner that he worked with Kappel for eight years as his watch commander. Kappel\u2019s quality of work was excellent, and he was an asset to the police department. On cross-examination Casey testified that the stipulated facts did not change his opinion as to Kappel\u2019s \u201ccapacity as I know him as a police officer.\u201d\nSergeant Jesse Acosta testified for Kappel that he worked with Kappel for 4V2 years as his immediate supervisor. Kappel had a very good reputation as a police officer. The stipulated facts did not change his opinion. \u201c[H]e\u2019s still a good officer as far as I\u2019m concerned.\u201d\nSergeant Charles Hensley testified for Kappel that he worked with Kappel for seven years as his immediate supervisor. His performanee, efficiency ratings and reputation were good. He considered Kappel \u201cabsolutely\u201d to be an asset to the police department. Hensley specified that he was Kappel\u2019s immediate supervisor in April and May of 1981 and noticed nothing unusual or problematic about Kappel\u2019s performance as a police officer during that time. On cross-examination, Hensley testified that the stipulated facts did not change his opinion of Kappel.\nKappel testified on his own behalf that he became a police officer on October 25, 1971. From 1971 to 1985, he received approximately 115 honorable mentions and one department commendation. He was never told that his performance during this period was substandard or insufficient. He had never been disciplined. His average efficiency grades were 85% to 90%. From May 15, 1981, to July 30, 1984, he received one department commendation and 20 to 30 honorable mentions.\nIn 1978, Kappel and his wife were divorced. In 1979, his father committed suicide. In 1981, his mother died. During this period, Kappel began to drink. In late 1981, he sought help through the police department and entered the alcoholism treatment program recommended by the police department. He was hospitalized for the minimum time \u2014 seven days \u2014 and then released by attending physicians. \u201cThey felt that I was capable at that time. I wasn\u2019t a confirmed alcoholic and I went to almost a year of AA meetings.\u201d He stated that he experienced no problems with alcohol after December 1981. On cross-examination, Kappel agreed that between 1978 and 1981 he drank excessively.\nKappel testified that on April 16, 1981, at 10:30 p.m., he sold a .25 caliber Berretta automatic handgun to Van Amburgh. They met in the parking lot of a restaurant. Gallagher had possession of the gun and handed it to Van Amburgh. The gun had no serial number and Kappel had no permit to sell the gun.\nOn May 13, 1981, at 1:30 a.m., Kappel fired an AR-15 fully automatic rifle at 1-55 and Pulaski while Van Amburgh was present. Kappel described the vicinity of 1-55 and Pulaski as private land owned by the City of Chicago Sanitary District, covering an area of one-half by three miles located along the canal. It was a \u201cdesolate\u201d area which was unoccupied. \u201cIt\u2019s mainly used as a road from Pulaski up into Cicero where the City stores piping and sewage [sic].\u201d\nKappel testified that on May 15, 1981, a search warrant was executed and two AR-15 rifles were found in his apartment. Kappel agreed that he had bought one (serial No. 133482) rifle \u201cfrom the gun dealer, Michael Gallagher.\u201d He did not register it. It was not fully automatic when he purchased it. However, he conceded that it could be converted to a fully automatic weapon with the addition of a part which he possessed. Kappel purchased the second rifle (serial No. 46995) from Chicago police officer Guerrero.\nKappel testified further that he cooperated with ATF agent Van Amburgh in the investigation of Gallagher, and in one additional investigation (not further identified in the record), during which he wore a recording device. Kappel felt his life was in danger during the period he performed this undercover work.\nIn closing arguments before the Board, counsel for the police Department argued that \u201cthe Police Board should take note of the context of these actions. We must not forget that Kappel had close association with Michael Gallagher.\u201d Counsel for Kappel responded that Kappel was simply \u201ccaught up in an investigation of Michael Gallagher,\u201d who pleaded guilty only because of Kappel\u2019s cooperation in the investigation and \u201cthat is the crux of this entire case.\u201d\nPROCEDURAL HISTORY\nIn March 1985 the Board found Kappel guilty of all charges and found cause for discharge. Kappel filed a petition for administrative review in the circuit court. In November 1985, the circuit court reversed the Board\u2019s decision and remanded for reconsideration of the penalty after finding the penalty of discharge was \u201cagainst the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d\nIn January 1986, the Board again decided that Kappel should be discharged. Kappel again petitioned for administrative review. The circuit court, for the second time, remanded to the Board with directions that it \u201cimpose a penalty lesser than that of discharge.\u201d\nIn June 1986, the Board reaffirmed its decision to discharge Kappel for the third time. The Board then asked the circuit court for an \u201centry of final judgment\u201d to render the matter appealable, and to end the remand process. The Board stated: \u201cThat the interests of justice and of administrative and judicial economy will not be best served by further remand ***.\u201d On June 17, 1986, notwithstanding the Board\u2019s motion for entry of a final order, the trial court again entered an order remanding the matter to the Board and stating that \u201cin accordance with the order entered herein on May 9, 1986, the Board *** is ordered to impose an alternative penalty lesser than that of discharge.\u201d Notwithstanding this circuit court order, the Board continued with the appeal process in this court.\nOn May 1, 1987, this court, in an unpublished Rule 23 order (Nos. 86\u20141516, 86\u20142109 (cons.)) dismissed the Board\u2019s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the June 17, 1986, trial court remand order was not a final and appealable order.\nOn June 10, 1987, the Board reconsidered its decision pursuant to the June 17, 1986, trial court order, and on July 9, 1987, it issued the following findings and decision.\n\u201cIt is the opinion of the Police Board that [Kappel] should be separated and discharged from the Chicago Police Department. The several offenses for which he stands convicted properly preclude his continued service. However, in obedience to the order of Judge George Higgins, and in order to facilitate an appeal against that order should this be thought appropriate, the Police Board with great reluctance orders a punishment less than separation.\u201d\nThe Board then ordered that Kappel be suspended \u201cfrom July 30, 1984 to and including January 29, 1988.\u201d\nOn August 11, 1987, the superintendent (Rice) filed a petition for administrative review of the July 9, 1987, order of the Board in the circuit court naming the Board and Kappel as defendants.\nOn September 2, 1988, Judge Robert L. Sklodowski entered an order which (1) joined Leroy Martin, superintendent of police, as a party plaintiff; (2) reversed the July 9, 1987, findings and decision of the Board \u201cinsofar as the suspension of [Kappel] was therein ordered\u201d; and (3) remanded to the Board for an entry of a decision \u201cordering the discharge of Raymond Kappel from employment.\u201d The record does not show any reasons given by the court. (The order was made nunc pro tunc effective August 9,1988.)\nOn September 8, 1988, Kappel filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted.\nOn December 5, 1988, Judge Sklodowski entered an order which: (1) vacated the August 9, 1988 (Sept. 2, 1988) order; and (2) remanded to the Board \u201cwith directions to impose a sanction less than discharge against Kappel.\u201d Again, the record does not show any reasons given by the court as a basis for its decision.\nOn December 22, 1988, plaintiffs (Rice and Martin) filed a motion for \u201centry of final judgment,\u201d arguing that the remand order was unnecessarily duplicative because a penalty less than discharge had already been imposed, and Kappel had never challenged that decision of the Board.\nOn March 15, 1989, the court granted plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cmotion for entry of final judgment\u201d and entered an order which: (1) \u201caffirmed and deemed final\u201d the Board\u2019s July 9, 1987, suspension order; (2) vacated the December 5, 1988, trial court order remanding to the Board; and (3) found no just reason or cause for the delay of appeal from the order.\nOn April 11, 1989, plaintiff (Rice) filed a notice of appeal from the March 15, 1989, order affirming the Board\u2019s suspension of Kappel. The notice of appeal states: \u201cBy this appeal, the respondent [police superintendent] will ask the Appellate Court to reverse the decision of the circuit court and reinstate Raymond Kappel\u2019s discharge.\u201d\nOpinion\nThe police superintendent contends that the circuit court erred in overturning Kappel\u2019s discharge because the Board\u2019s decision to discharge Kappel was not arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the needs of the Chicago police department. He asks that we reverse the circuit court decision and reinstate the Board\u2019s original decision discharging Kappel.\nKappel counters that the Board\u2019s discharge was arbitrary, unreasonable and did not serve the purposes of the police department, because Kappel\u2019s misconduct in 1981 was \u201ca brief, unfortunate episode in an otherwise exemplary career,\u201d and because he has \u201catonefd] for his mistakes\u201d since that time. Kappel argues in his brief that he \u201cestablished his abilities as a policeman over a ten year period before becoming enmeshed in the federal investigation of Michael Gallagher.\u201d (Kappel does not argue that suspension is improper, and in fact asked the circuit court to affirm the SVa-year suspension.)\nThe scope of review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision regarding discharge requires a two-step analysis. (Kloss v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 252, 449 N.E.2d 845; Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 547, 426 N.E.2d 885.) First, the court must determine if the agency\u2019s findings of fact are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Kloss v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 252, 449 N.E.2d 845; Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 85 Ill. 2d 547, 426 N.E.2d 885.) In applying this rule of law, the findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014110.\nThe second step in the court\u2019s analysis is to determine if the findings of fact provide a sufficient basis for the agency\u2019s conclusion that cause for discharge does or does not exist. Kloss v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 252, 449 N.E.2d 845; Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n; Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 303, 459 N.E.2d 659.\nIn the present case, we are not concerned with the first prong of the test, i.e., whether the manifest weight of the evidence supported the factual findings of the Board. Kappel does not contend that the factual findings of the Board are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Indeed, those findings are predicated largely upon the facts which have been stipulated to by the parties.\nUnlike the first step of the analysis, in the second step, the agency\u2019s findings as to whether Kappel\u2019s misconduct provided cause for discharge are not subject to a manifest weight of the evidence test. (See Jenkins v. Universities Civil Service Merit Board (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 215, 435 N.E.2d 804, citing Fox v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 381, 383 N.E.2d 1201.) The proper standard of review for the second prong is: \u201c[T]he agency\u2019s decision as to cause will not be reversed unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of service.\u201d (Department of Mental Health, 85 Ill. 2d at 552; Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 252, 449 N.E.2d 845.) The trial court and the appellate court are bound by the same standard of review. Blunier v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 92, 107, 545 N.E.2d 1363.\nA police officer may not be discharged without \u201ccause.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 24, par. 10\u20141\u201418(a).) \u201cCause\u201d for discharge has been judicially defined as \u201csome substantial shortcoming which renders the employee\u2019s continuance in office in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public opinion recognize as good cause for his no longer holding the position.\u201d Department of Mental Health, 85 Ill. 2d at 551; Rispoli v. Police Board (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 622, 549 N.E.2d 1063; O\u2019Malley v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 538 N.E.2d 888; Kvidera v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 950, 549 N.E.2d 747; Glenville v. Police Board (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 583, 532 N.E.2d 490; Allman v. Police Board (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 489 N.E.2d 929; Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 121 Ill. App. 3d 303, 459 N.E.2d 804; Jenkins v. Universities Civil Services Merit Board, 106 Ill. App. 3d 215, 435 N.E.2d 804; Nolting v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1955), 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236.\nAn administrative tribunal\u2019s finding of cause for discharge commands respect (Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d at 105, 449 N.E.2d 115; Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 121 Ill. App. 3d 303, 459 N.E.2d 659) and \u201csubstantial\u201d or \u201cconsiderable deference\u201d (Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d at 106; Blunier v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 107). The Board has \u201cconsiderable latitude\u201d (Rispoli v. Police Board (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d at 638) and \u201cconsiderable discretion\u201d (Kvidera v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 950) in determining what constitutes cause for discharge.\nThe Board\u2019s decision will stand even if the court were to consider another sanction more appropriate. (Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d at 106; Kvidera v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 192 Ill. App. 3d 950, 549 N.E.2d 47; Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 121 Ill. App. 3d 303, 459 N.E.2d 659.) The court cannot sit as a supercommission in reviewing the punishment imposed. (Nolting v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 7 Ill. App. 2d at 153.) It is the Board, rather than the court, which is best able to determine the effect of the officer\u2019s conduct on the proper operation of the department. (Jones v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1979), 80 Ill. App. 3d 74, 76, 399 N.E.2d 256.) The wisdom, necessity or propriety of any action regarding the administration of a police force is within the province of the municipality. Braje v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 90, 487 N.E.2d 91.\nWe note that the Board did not articulate a full rationale underlying its disciplinary decisions, although it would be helpful to the reviewing courts. Nevertheless, we must review the record \u201cin light of the conduct meant to be penalized by [the] rule\u201d which Kappel was found guilty of violating (Harrison v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1953), 1 Ill. 2d 137, 149, 115 N.E.2d 521) and determine whether a reasonable and nonarbitrary rationale relating to the needs of the service supports the sanction of discharge.\nKappel was found guilty of violating Rule 2 of the police department. That rule prohibits \u201c[a]ny action or conduct which impedes the department\u2019s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the department.\u201d The department\u2019s underlying policy and goals require it to protect the lives and property of the public by enforcing the criminal code and city ordinances. (Davenport v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1972), 2 Ill. App. 3d 864, 869, 278 N.E.2d 212.) This task requires the police department to surmount many difficulties because of the numerous problems confronting a large metropolitan city police force. Davenport v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2 Ill. App. 3d at 869; Nolting v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 7 Ill. App. 2d at 160 (many enforcement difficulties confront police departments in large metropolitan area).\nThus, in order to accomplish the task, the \u201cdiscipline and efficiency\u201d of the department referred to above in the definition of \u201ccause\u201d are \u201cnot only vital but absolutely essential.\u201d (Davenport v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2 Ill. App. 3d at 869.) Discipline enables the department, which \u201cin many respects resembles a military force in that there is the same necessity of discipline\u201d (DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 482, 488, 202 N.E.2d 522; Harrison v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 1 Ill. 2d at 153; Nolting v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 7 Ill. App. 2d at 160), to \u201cbe staffed with well trained and organized personnel\u201d and ensure the \u201cproper functioning of the department\u201d (Harrison v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 1 Ill. 2d at 153).\nIn addition, discipline is \u201cvital *** not only for the members of the department, but [also] in order to maintain the respect of the public, without which the department would become incompetent and demoralized.\u201d (DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 31 Ill. 2d at 488, citing Nolting v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 7 Ill. App. 2d at 160. See also Davenport, 2 Ill. App. 3d at 869-70 (\u201cif discipline were absent, the Department would lose the respect of the public and should this occur the department would become incompetent and demoralized\u201d).) Thus, \u201cthe discharge of a police officer for conduct unbecoming to the department is not only for the purpose of punishing the officer, but for the protection of the public,\u201d which must maintain respect for the department. DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 31 Ill. 2d at 488; Harrison v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 1 Ill. 2d at 153.\nThe essence of the misconduct for which Kappel was found guilty focuses directly upon Kappel\u2019s failure to respect the law which the public trusts Kappel to enforce for its protection. \u201cIt is apparent that a police officer who does not abide by the laws that he has a duty to enforce will impair the discipline and efficiency of the police force.\u201d (Jones v. Civil Service Commission, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 76; Sheehan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 275, 290, 509 N.E.2d 467 (discharge upheld; officer must obey laws he is sworn to uphold).) Kappel was found guilty of possession and sale of an unregistered handgun, with the serial number removed, to a stranger referred to him by fellow officer Gallagher, a \u201cfederal firearms dealer\u201d; possession of an unregistered, automatic rifle sold to him by Gallagher; and possession of an unregistered, semi-automatic rifle sold to him by fellow officer Guerrero. The Board could reason that this conduct evidenced a disrespect for the law.\nCourts have upheld the discharge of police officers for offenses similar in nature to the offenses here, where the misconduct manifested a disrespect for the law and tended to bring discredit upon the department. See, e.g., DeGrazio v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 31 Ill. 2d at 489 (discharge of Chicago police lieutenant upheld; court found \u201c[i]t does not require an expert opinion to establish that\u201d the officer \u201cbrought ridicule to the department\u201d when he went to Europe with a man whose \u201creputation was bad\u201d and who had been seen \u201cmeeting with known criminals and hoodlums at a certain bar and restaurant\u201d and who had invited \u201cnotorious criminals\u201d to parties at his home, accounts of which parties were published in Chicago newspapers); Rispoli v. Police Board, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 638 (discharge upheld where officer showed disrespect for the law by selling used parts from stolen cars recovered by the police to his own car repair business; conduct was \u201cneither trivial nor unrelated to what the public has a right to expect from a police officer\u201d); Sheehan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 290 (discharge upheld where officer failed to \u201cabide by the laws which he has a duty to enforce\u201d and was found to have \u201ccommitted the criminal offenses of theft and attempted theft\u201d (158 Ill. App. 3d at 279) and showed a \u201ccontinuous pattern and practice of deception of off-duty employers\u201d (158 Ill. App. 3d at 290) and acted in a way unbecoming to an officer when he repeatedly falsely represented that he was working as a security guard for two different employers at two different places at the same time and was being paid on both payrolls); Davenport, 2 Ill. App. 3d at 869 (discharge upheld where officer attempted \u201cto take the law into his own hands\u201d by knocking down and hitting an individual with whom he was arguing).\nEven if Kappel\u2019s sale of the $100 handgun were not considered, possession alone of the handgun, along with the two rifles, exacerbated by the unlawful firing of an unregistered automatic weapon, would constitute a lack of respect for the law particularly inappropriate in a police officer, which undermines public confidence in the judgment and intelligence of law enforcement officers. Allman v. Police Board (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 489 N.E.2d 929 (unregistered firearm used by officer). See also Glenville v. Police Board, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 586.\nBy selling the unregistered handgun, in addition to manifesting a general disrespect for the law and undermining the public\u2019s confidence in the judgment of law enforcement officers, Kappel committed an act which could potentially endanger members of the public. He placed an illegal weapon in the hands of unknown persons. It would therefore not be arbitrary or unreasonable for the Board to find cause to discharge Kappel particularly if one considers the impact on members of the public who might discover that a weapon subsequently used in an armed robbery or murder was purchased from a police officer.\nPolice officers, more than other public servants, must exhibit and maintain respect for the dangerous nature of weapons generally. (See, e.g., Jenkins v. Universities Civil Service Merit Board, 106 Ill. App. 3d 215, 435 N.E.2d 804 (respect for weapons is paramount to efficient and disciplined police department; harm that may result from misuse of a gun, intended or accidental, is great); Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d at 106 (court found that \u201c[n]othing can undermine public confidence in the ability and good judgment of police officers more than the misuse of firearms\u201d); Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 121 Ill. App. 3d 303, 459 N.E.2d 659 (officer properly discharged where he misused his gun; respect for weapons is paramount to an efficient and disciplined police department); Ritenour v. Police Board (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 877, 369 N.E.2d 135 (officer properly discharged where he fired gun at a street lamp in an alley).) The sale of guns, unlike a single incident of weapons misuse, as in the case of an officer\u2019s improperly drawing a service revolver while intoxicated, has a continuing effect because the unregistered, illegally possessed gun has been placed in circulation and it will continue to be used, most probably for criminal purposes.\nAn additional factor the Board was free to consider was the fact that such public confidence would be further undermined by Kappel\u2019s having spoken about and showed the handgun and rifles either directly to, or in the presence of, other people including Van Amburgh, two women who were at Kappel\u2019s home, Guerrero, Reggie Humphries, an unidentified officer, Gallagher\u2019s nephew, and Gallagher himself. See Kvidera v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 965 (discharge upheld; conduct affected members of community and thus could undermine public confidence in police department and impede its efforts to maintain honesty and integrity).\nThis was not a chance meeting between two gun collectors. Kappel permitted Gallagher to put him into contact with Van Amburgh, a potential customer. The Board was aware that Kappel was cognizant enough of the illegal nature of his activities that, after telephoning Van Amburgh at Gallagher\u2019s suggestion, Kappel expressed concern about talking with Van Amburgh on the telephone because \u201che did not know who he was talking to [ ] [and] [h]e felt that he had phone problems.\u201d Kappel advanced his relationship with Van Amburgh several weeks after the sale of the handgun, by again arranging to meet at a parking lot, where they discussed \u201cdifferent types of weapons.\u201d While there is no evidence that Kappel offered the automatic rifle to Van Amburgh for sale, the Board was aware that the men arranged to meet a third time at a parking lot, and this time Kappel brought an automatic rifle and ammunition, and after midnight they drove to the canal to fire the gun for some unknown purpose \u2014 presumably either to test the weapon for a potential sale, or for recreation. All of this conduct evidences a more flagrant disregard for the law than simply, e.g., a \u201cgun buff\u201d maintaining a private collection in his home.\nThe Board could also note that Kappel\u2019s conduct described above persisted over a period of time necessary to accumulate the guns in question and negotiate the sale with Van Amburgh and make arrangements to meet with Van Amburgh several times. This was not a single, impulsive act. It required time, planning, telephone calls, meetings, initiative and preparation.\nIn addition to focusing directly upon public safety and public confidence, the Board could also legitimately focus on the effect which its sanction of Kappel may have on the other officers in the department. The Board might properly find that discharge would have a greater deterrent effect on other officers in the department than suspension and thereby would enhance the protection of the public. The Board is in the best position to determine the impact of one officer\u2019s discharge upon other officers and whether it would deter them from taking advantage of the many illicit opportunities generally available to police officers. (See Nolting v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 7 Ill. App. 2d 147, 129 N.E.2d 236.) This concern about the impact on the discipline and morale of fellow officers is especially relevant where at least three other police officers and several members of the public were aware either of Kappel\u2019s illegal possession of guns or of the gun-related contacts between Van Amburgh and Kappel.\nKappel argues that he never directly threatened violence to another person, as borne out by the fact that the department let him \u201ccarr[y] a gun as part of his duties as a Chicago Police Officer for three years after the events of April and May, 1981.\u201d The crux of Kappel\u2019s misconduct, while it could be broadly characterized as the \u201cmisuse of weapons\u201d in that he sold and possessed illegal weapons, differed considerably from the typical impulsive misuse of service weapons evidenced in the following cases. See, e.g., Walsh v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 101, 449 N.E.2d 115 (officer must show considerable care in handling and using his service revolver because he has access to the weapon every day of his career; officer in Walsh intentionally discharged his gun at the floor in a close proximity to his wife and a friend, and then accidentally fired the gun into his friend\u2019s face); McCoy v. Kamradt (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 551, 483 N.E.2d 544 (officer draws gun and points at boys with BB gun); Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 121 Ill. App. 3d 303, 459 N.E.2d 659 (officer becomes enraged with wife, draws gun and shoots toilet after wife throws marijuana into toilet; failed to recognize possibility of ricochet with wife standing a few feet from toilet); Kloss v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 252, 449 N.E.2d 845 (officer threatens suicide, holding arm of his daughter while drawing gun and threatening other officers); Jenkins v. Universities Civil Service Merit Board, 106 Ill. App. 3d 215, 435 N.E.2d 804 (when officer was stopped for drinking while driving State vehicle, he threatened other police officers with his gun).\nThis is clearly not such a case. Here, Kappel exhibited neither impulsive nor emotionally charged behavior. Instead, any \u201cmisuse of weapons\u201d in this case was the product of deliberate, calculated dealings and in the presence of members of the public and other officers, involving the possession of a semi-automatic and an automatic rifle, and the sale of an automatic handgun.\nKappel nevertheless argues the inconsistency of the Board\u2019s seeking to remove him from the department when it permitted him to wear a badge for three years after the department was aware of his misconduct in 1981. The delay in time, however, is not by itself a dis-positive factor here. Under normal circumstances, without the pendency of this action and supervision during the 3x/2 years of undercover work, Kappel would not have had that opportunity. It does not contradict the Board\u2019s conclusion that there was a need to discharge Kappel in order to punish Kappel; to effectively deter similar acts of misconduct by other officers; and to maintain the public\u2019s confidence in the department. Moreover, while the department or the Board may very well have trusted Kappel to perform his undercover duties under Federal and State supervision, it does not dispel the possibility of future misconduct in ordinary police activities without such supervision.\nKappel argues further that the discharge is unreasonable because of his drinking problems and \u201cunrelenting emotional upheaval\u201d due to his divorce, his father\u2019s suicide and his mother\u2019s death. The evidence, however, does not show that Kappel\u2019s misconduct was caused by any mental or emotional disorder, whether temporary or otherwise. (Cf, e.g., Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 101, 449 N.E.2d 115 (court remanded for more medical evidence where record indicated misconduct of officer was probably result of psycho logical problems for which he was on disability suspension at the time the misconduct occurred).) There was no evidence that Kappel\u2019s alcoholism led him to engage in the business of selling illegal weapons. He presented no expert testimony regarding any causal connection between his drinking problems or for that matter any psychological or emotional disorders, and his misconduct. (See Glenville v. Police Board, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 587 (no evidence that calculated plan to steal was caused by alcoholism; unlike Walsh, no evidence which would prompt the court to look for further details of his alcoholism).) In addition, we note that Kappel himself testified that he \u201cwasn\u2019t a confirmed alcoholic.\u201d Three of his superiors testified that Kappel\u2019s performance on the job was excellent, and Hensley specified that there was no change in Kappel\u2019s performance during April and May of 1981. In his brief, Kappel admits that his \u201cjob performance remained unaffected\u201d by the drinking, and it only \u201cclouded his judgment with respect to off-duty activities.\u201d Given this evidence, the Board was not required to find that any psychological stress or drinking problems caused the misconduct or required further inquiry. See Glenville v. Police Board, 197 Ill. App. 3d 583, 532 N.E.2d 490 (distinguishing Walsh); McCoy v. Kamradt, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 557-58 (distinguishing Walsh).\nKappel also focuses on his cooperation with the government in the undercover investigation. The unique circumstances involving Kappel\u2019s working undercover for several years following his misconduct permitted Kappel the necessary time and opportunity to earn the praise of three superiors and many commendations. Notwithstanding these unusual circumstances, the Board is not precluded from emphasizing the misconduct in 1981, when Kappel committed the acts with which he was charged. The Board was also free to consider that Kappel\u2019s cooperation with the government was originally induced by a promise of immunity from prosecution for very serious criminal offenses. In return for his cooperation, Kappel was spared a possible felony conviction.\nIn regard to Kappel\u2019s otherwise exemplary record prior to 1981, while the Board may consider such evidence in mitigation, it is not required to place dispositive weight on such evidence. The Board is not required to suspend, rather than discharge, an officer solely because he has provided numerous years of good service, even where some of those years are subsequent to the misconduct. See, e.g., Allman v. Police Board, 140 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 489 N.E.2d 929 (discharge upheld for carrying firearm while drinking, possessing an unregistered firearm and unnecessarily displaying or pointing firearm at several people, notwithstanding officer\u2019s 23 years of service and numerous commendations); Carrigan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 121 Ill. App. 3d 303, 459 N.E.2d 659 (discharge upheld for misuse of gun notwithstanding rank and years as officer). See also O\u2019Malley v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 1025 (demotion upheld for negligence while on duty, notwithstanding 17 years of unblemished record).\nIn regard to all of the mitigating evidence presented by Kappel generally, the question before us is not whether this court would conclude in view of the mitigating circumstances that a different penalty would have been more appropriate. (Sutton v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 404, 411, 438 N.E.2d 147.) These factors were before the Board for it to consider in selecting the appropriate discipline. (Kloss v. Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 252, 449 N.E.2d 845.) Our review is narrowly restricted to the question of whether, in view of all the circumstances presented, the Board\u2019s choice of discharge was unreasonable, arbitrary or unrelated to the needs of the service. Kloss v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 252, 449 N.E.2d 845.\nEven if we would not have been led to discharge Kappel pursuant to the mitigating evidence presented, which might well have been the case, this court is bound by the strict standard of review, and we cannot say that the Board\u2019s decision to discharge Kappel is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the requirements of the service. The evidence would justify a finding of a violation of the Department\u2019s Rule 2: \u201cAny action or conduct which impedes the department\u2019s efforts to achieve its policy and goals or brings discredit upon the department.\u201d Kappel\u2019s conduct could reasonably be viewed as \u201csome substantial shortcoming which renders the employee\u2019s continuance in office in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public opinion recognize as good cause for his no longer holding the position.\u201d Department of Mental Health, 85 Ill. 2d at 551.\nKappel relies on Kreiser v. Police Board (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 27, 370 N.E.2d 511, to support his argument that his conduct did not warrant discharge. In Kreiser, the court found discharge was unwarranted where a police officer was discharged for operating his vehicle without a proper license, disobeying the order of a superior officer, making a false oral statement to a superior officer and leaving the police station without being properly relieved and without logging out. In contrast, the conduct here, involving the illegal possession of automatic and semi-automatic rifles and the illegal sale of an unregistered automatic handgun with an obliterated serial number, is considerably more serious than the failure to license a car or not logging out at the police station.\nKappel\u2019s reliance on Kirsch v. Rochford (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 371 N.E.2d 899 (court found police officer\u2019s discharge was unwarranted where he was refused permission to board a plane at O\u2019Hare because of his intoxicated condition), and Massingale v. Police Board (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 378, 488 N.E.2d 1289 (court found police officer\u2019s discharge was unwarranted where she had been intoxicated while off duty, and driving a car with two open containers of alcohol), is misplaced. As previously noted, Kappel\u2019s conduct, unlike that of the officers in Kirsch and Massingale, was not the result of any transitory mental impairment or addiction.\nFinally, we have considered the question of precisely which order of the Board is before us on appeal, notwithstanding the parties\u2019 presumption, without discussion, that it is the Board\u2019s 1985 and 1986 discharge orders and not the final July 9, 1987, suspension order entered by the Board under protest, to which we are required to apply the relevant standard of review.\nOnly final orders of the Board can be appealed in an administrative review proceeding. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014102.) The applicable standard of review must be applied to that final order. No other case has discussed the issue of which order is to be examined on appeal where the final administrative agency order was entered under protest and in compliance with a circuit court remand order. In two such cases, however, this court, albeit without discussion, presumed the appeal to be from the administrative agency\u2019s original, preferred decision \u2014 not the agency\u2019s final, mandated decision entered after remand.\nIn Kvidera v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, the police board discharged a police officer. The circuit court found the sanction too severe and remanded with instructions to impose an appropriate lesser sanction. On remand, the police board again discharged the officer. The circuit court refused to confirm the discharge. The board appealed, and this court dismissed the appeal because the order was not appealable. The circuit court again remanded to the board to impose a penalty less than discharge. The board finally complied by suspending the officer for 30 days. The board appealed. Without discussion, this court applied the \u201carbitrary and unreasonable\u201d standard of review to the police board\u2019s original discharge order \u2014 not to the forced suspension order. We \u201creverse[d] the court\u2019s order to the Board to impose a penalty exclusive of terminations\u201d and we \u201cmodif[ied] the Board\u2019s disciplinary decision to impose a penalty of discharge.\u201d Kvidera, 192 Ill. App.. 3d at 965.\nSimilarly, in Brown v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 35, 478 N.E.2d 541, the Civil Service Commission discharged a court reporter employed by the Industrial Commission from his position. The circuit court found the sanction too severe and remanded with instructions to reinstate the employee and impose a lesser sanction. On remand, the Civil Service Commission complied by reinstating the employee and imposing a 120-day suspension. The circuit court affirmed the modified penalty, and the Industrial Commission appealed to the appellate court. Without discussion, this court applied the \u201carbitrary and unreasonable\u201d standard of review to the Civil Service Commission\u2019s original discharge order \u2014 not to the forced suspension order. We \u201caffirm[ed] the decision of the trial court, reversing the decision of the Civil Service Commission and remand[ed] for imposition of a lesser penalty.\u201d Brown, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 42.\nIn view of Kvidera and Brown, we concur with the parties that the essence of the matter appealed from is the circuit court\u2019s 1985 and 1986 orders directing the Board to vacate its March 1985, January 1986, and June 1986, orders discharging Kappel and to impose a lesser penalty; and not the circuit court\u2019s March 15, 1989, affirmance of the Board\u2019s July 9, 1987, suspension order.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court ordering the Board to impose a lesser penalty than discharge is reversed. We remand the cause to the Board, with leave to vacate the order imposing the suspension and to reinstate its earlier order of discharge. However, we note that, pursuant to Jones v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 793, 797, 469 N.E.2d 393 (it is within the Board\u2019s authority on remand to exercise its discretion in accordance with the law, provided that the Board does not act in any way which would be contrary to the holdings stated herein), the Board is not compelled on remand to reinstate its earlier discharge order, if the Board under its present evaluation chooses instead to let the lesser penalty stand.\nCircuit court judgment reversed; cause remanded to Police Board with leave to reinstate its prior discharge order.\nLORENZ, P.J., and MURRAY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kelly R. Welsh, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Muscovitch and Nina Puglia, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.", "William J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND KAPPEL, Petitioner-Appellee, v. POLICE BOARD OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Respondent-Appellant.\u2014FRED RICE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RAYMOND KAPPEL et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20140975\nOpinion filed September 30, 1991.\nKelly R. Welsh, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Ruth M. Muscovitch and Nina Puglia, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam J. Harte, Ltd., of Chicago (William J. Harte, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0580-01", "first_page_order": 602, "last_page_order": 621 }