{ "id": 5276359, "name": "BIENVENIDO BRUNO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Bruno v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance", "decision_date": "1991-07-17", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20141765", "first_page": "641", "last_page": "647", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 641" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2909582 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3351567 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "897" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/60/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 N.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 1025", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5315352 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1028" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/1/1025-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405907 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386799 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2526977 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "569 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534792 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 1223", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5544901 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 644", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600324 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994690 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0507-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 598, "char_count": 12160, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.31347348822267246 }, "sha256": "840ad19316f9f61fb5f34fda22f69f71dec5d075c9f59a7c32645ff255508afa", "simhash": "1:1b88ba5fa7ef75ef", "word_count": 1941 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:36.621238+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BIENVENIDO BRUNO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Bienvenido Bruno, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County granting summary judgment (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2\u20141005) to defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment based on its finding that the contractual limit of defendant\u2019s uninsured motorist coverage ($25,000) was entirely offset by the same amount of money paid to plaintiff by another insurance carrier where actual damages may have exceeded the $25,000 so paid.\nFor the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nThe facts are not in dispute. On March 24, 1986, plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by Norma Burgess. The automobile was struck by an unidentified motorist which resulted in injuries to plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that as a result of the accident he incurred medical and incidental bills in excess of $50,000.\nThe Burgess automobile was insured by Government Employees\u2019 Insurance Company (GEICO), which provided bodily injury liability limits of $25,000, and uninsured motorist limits of $25,000.\nPlaintiff was insured by defendant. The terms of his policy provided uninsured motorist limits of $25,000. Plaintiff\u2019s policy contained a setoff provision which stated that any amount which would be payable to him under the uninsured motorist coverage would be reduced by any amount which was payable or paid to him by anyone responsible for bodily injury to him.\nPlaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant and GEICO seeking recovery from each insurance company. On May 17, 1989, the trial court granted GEICO\u2019s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice upon GEICO\u2019s payment of $25,000 to plaintiff under its bodily injury liability provision. Thus, GEICO is not a party to this appeal.\nIn its motion for summary judgment, defendant asserted that the $25,000 GEICO payment offset the coverage provided by its policy, which was limited to $25,000. Defendant argued that since GEICO\u2019s payment was equal to defendant\u2019s liability limit, plaintiff was not entitled to recover any additional award from defendant.\nOn appeal, plaintiff argues that the $25,000 paid by GEICO does not fully compensate him for his injuries and he would not be receiving double recovery because his medical bills exceed the combined total of the amount paid by GEICO and the uninsured motorist coverage provided by defendant\u2019s policy.\nIn response, defendant maintains that under its setoff and subrogation provisions, plaintiff is not entitled to any uninsured motorist coverage because plaintiff already collected an amount equal to the maximum coverage under its policy. Defendant relies on cases which have upheld the validity of setoff and subrogation provisions under other circumstances. Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 507, 386 N.E.2d 36; Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1, 269 N.E.2d 295; Schutt v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 136, 478 N.E.2d 644.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Vuletich v. United States Steel Corp. (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 417, 421, 512 N.E.2d 1223.) We find that summary judgment was improper in this case because proof of damages must be resolved.\nIn granting summary judgment for defendant, the trial court relied on Schutt v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 136, 478 N.E.2d 644. We find that Sehutt is factually distinguishable.\nLike this case, the Sehutt court was faced with two claims under limited \u201cuninsured motorists\u201d clauses. Payment had been made under one for $2,600 and the other claim was valued at $2,500 by subsequent binding arbitration. Under these circumstances, the insurer was relieved of further payment since the plaintiff had already been fully compensated for her loss. The case is silent on what the effect might have been had the damages determined by the arbitration proceedings been more than the amount paid in the first instance.\nThus, the key distinction between the case at bar and the Sehutt case is that damages in Sehutt had already been established. Greenawalt v. State Farm Insurance Co. (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 543, 549, 569 N.E.2d 154, appeal allowed (1991), 139 Ill. 2d 595.\nOther cases relied on by defendant are also distinguishable. In Ullman and Stryker, our supreme court addressed a different setoff provision and held that an insurer\u2019s liability under an uninsured motorist provision can be reduced by the amount the insured received from workmen\u2019s compensation. (Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 507, 386 N.E.2d 36; Ullman v. Wolverine Insurance Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 1, 269 N.E.2d 295.) The present case does not involve workmen\u2019s compensation benefits or the setoff provision which deals with such benefits.\nThe issue raised in this appeal has recently been decided by this district in Greenawalt v. State Farm Insurance Co. (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 543, 569 N.E.2d 154, appeal allowed (1991), 139 Ill. 2d 595, and Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 600, 570 N.E.2d 553, appeal allowed (1991), 139 Ill. 2d 596. The Greenawalt and Hoglund courts held that a determination of damages is a prerequisite in considering whether a setoff provision properly prevents double recovery. Accordingly, both courts reversed the trial courts\u2019 judgments on the pleadings and remanded for proof of damages.\nThe present case is virtually identical on its facts to the Greenawalt and Hoglund cases and involves the same uninsured motorist provision in State Farm\u2019s policy. The setoff provision at issue is contained in State Farm\u2019s policy under Section Ill-Coverage U for uninsured motor vehicles and states, in relevant part, as follows:\n\u201c2. Any amount payable under this coverage shall be reduced by any amount paid or payable to or for the insured:\na. by or for any person or organization who is or may be held legally liable for the bodily injury to the insured ***.\u201d\nBoth the present plaintiff Bruno and the Greenawalt and Hoglund plaintiffs were passengers in motor vehicles involved in accidents with other vehicles, required to make claims against the insurance carrier insuring the vehicles in which they were riding and insuring their own cars, and received payment equal to the maximum amount payable under the uninsured motorist provisions of one of the policies.\nIn response to the claims, State Farm asserted that no contractual liability remained for these plaintiffs because their respective policy limits had been entirely offset by the payments they received from other responsible parties. The trial courts agreed with State Farm.\nHowever, in the view of the Greenawalt and Hoglund courts and in our view, the trial courts\u2019 decisions were premature because State Farm is not entitled to setoff unless and until it can demonstrate duplication of payments. (Greenawalt v. State Farm Insurance Co. (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 543, 569 N.E.2d 154; Hoglund v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1991), 211 Ill. App. 3d 600, 570 N.E.2d 553; Hoel v. Crum & Forster Insurance Co. (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 624, 633, 366 N.E.2d 901.) \u201cSetoffs are to apply only where necessary to prevent double exposure ***.\u201d Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 338, 312 N.E.2d 247; see also Melson v. Illinois National Insurance Co. (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1028, 274 N.E.2d 664 (a crediting provision cannot operate to reduce payment where the total proven or undisputed damages incurred by the insured are greater than the combined total of uninsured motorist and medical coverage).\nBruno alleges that he is not seeking double recovery, that his medical bills exceed $50,000 and that his total damages exceed $150,000. However, the record does not provide any information to establish the actual amount of damages incurred by Bruno. Thus we cannot determine whether recovery, if any, would duplicate the compensation which Bruno has already received.\nThe language of the Coverage U section of the State Farm policy must be construed in light of the strong public policy of the State that those injured by uninsured motorists be afforded sufficient coverage to allow compensation to at least the same extent as if the injured claimant had been injured by a motorist insured with the minimum coverage required by law. Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 335, 312 N.E.2d 247.\nHoglund provides a particularly thoughtful analysis of the public policy considerations at issue. The court notes the enactment of the Financial Responsibility Law in the Vehicle Code requiring minimum insurance coverage for all policies issued. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 7\u2014203.\nThe Insurance Code establishes the requirement of offering uninsured motorist coverage (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 73, par. 755a) and providing insurance in an amount up to the insured\u2019s bodily injury liability limits (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 73, par. 755a\u20142(1)). To be sure, the legislature has also provided for the right of subrogation or set off where the insured has received the proceeds of settlement or judgment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 73, par. 755a(4).\nBut nowhere do these statutory provisions suggest that an injured party may not resort to coverage under several uninsured motorist clauses where his damages exceed the amount so limited.\nAll of the legislation encouraging liberal regulation of uninsured motorist coverage must be overlaid on the 20-year controversy in the Illinois General Assembly with respect to mandatory automobile insurance.\nExpansion of uninsured motorist coverage was viewed as a response to the call for mandatory automobile insurance. Only recently has Illinois become the 41st State to adopt such legislation.\nMoreover, \u201c \u2018the intent of the legislature was that the uninsured motorist coverage would protect an insured generally against injuries caused by motorists who are uninsured, and by hit-and-run motorists, and that this would complement the liability coverage.\u2019 \u201d (Wilhelm v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 894, 897, 377 N.E.2d 62, quoting Barnes v. Powell (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 449, 454.) \u201c[I]n a situation where one of the joint tortfeasors is insured and the other is uninsured, the pivotal public policy issue is whether subrogation or setoff would prevent double recovery or whether it would act to deprive the plaintiff of damages she might otherwise receive if the uninsured tortfeasor had been at least minimally insured.\u201d Greenawalt, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 547.\nSince the actual amount of Bruno\u2019s damages is not known, we find it premature to conclude that plaintiff may not recover under the second uninsured motorist policy. In order to fulfill the public policy mandate of the State, the trial court will be required to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to damages.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nRIZZI and WHITE, JJ., concur.\nSection 7\u2014601 et seq. became effective on January 1, 1990. This legislation, in one form or another, was offered in the Illinois General Assembly each term since 1970. Such legislation actually passed both Houses of the General Assembly in 1975 only to receive a gubernatorial veto.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "William E. Reynolds, of Chicago (Edward F. Cozzi, of counsel), for appellant.", "Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago (James J. Hoffnagle, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BIENVENIDO BRUNO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20141765\nOpinion filed July 17, 1991.\nRehearing denied November 8, 1991.\nWilliam E. Reynolds, of Chicago (Edward F. Cozzi, of counsel), for appellant.\nTaylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago (James J. Hoffnagle, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0641-01", "first_page_order": 663, "last_page_order": 669 }