{ "id": 5276285, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEOFFREY FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Freeman", "decision_date": "1991-10-09", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201489\u20142414, 1\u201489\u20142500 cons.", "first_page": "825", "last_page": "832", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 825" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "309 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405202 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454447 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 1060", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2581037 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2605710 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567019 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228708 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" }, { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228767 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 430", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251613 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "467" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0430-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "1722" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "1722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 1080", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3507761 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1094" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/1080-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 683, "char_count": 15056, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.557120553221455e-08, "percentile": 0.3496089926478339 }, "sha256": "0647d49211282a27e2d4e14c75e34391e2fecea294621bf3c8662e5edf3d0988", "simhash": "1:83566c44f4e3fcf8", "word_count": 2424 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:36.621238+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEOFFREY FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Geoffrey Freeman, was convicted of the murder and armed robbery of 71-year-old Madeline Mullenix and was sentenced to natural life imprisonment. This court upheld the jury conviction (People v. Freeman (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 516 N.E.2d 440 (hereinafter Freeman I)), but found prima facie discrimination by the prosecution\u2019s exercise of peremptory challenges during jury selection and remanded the matter to the circuit court of Cook County for a Batson hearing. Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 93, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 85, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1722.\nThe judge who presided over the trial died shortly thereafter and the Batson hearing was assigned to another judge (hereinafter the hearing judge).\nAt the Batson hearing, the hearing judge found the State provided racially neutral explanations for the exclusion of the 13 jurors in question and affirmed the conviction.\nFor the reasons set forth below, this matter is remanded to the trial court for a new Batson hearing.\nIn Freeman I when we remanded the case for a Batson hearing, we gave the State an opportunity to come forward with neutral explanations for the exclusion of certain black prospective jurors, and we said:\n\u201cIf the trial court decides that the State has come forward with a neutral explanation for the exercise of its peremptory challenges excluding the black prospective jurors, and the neutral explanation is sufficient to rebut defendant\u2019s prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination, then defendant\u2019s conviction will stand.\u201d Freeman, 162 Ill. App. 3d at 1094.\nAt the commencement of the Batson hearing, the hearing judge ruled that all witnesses at the Batson hearing, including the trial prosecutors, would be placed under oath and subject to cross-examination and determined that a mere statement by the trial prosecutors would not overcome the prima facie discrimination determined by us in Freeman I.\nImmediately thereafter, July 16, 1988, the State filed a motion for a supervisory order in the Illinois Supreme Court requesting that the hearing judge\u2019s requirements of testimony under oath by the prosecutor be vacated. People v. Freeman (May 26, 1989), No. 67180, unpublished supervisory order.\nThe unpublished supervisory order of May 26, 1989, obviated the requirement of the prosecutors being sworn and subject to cross-examination regarding their use of peremptory challenges. The Illinois Supreme Court first decided this issue in People v. Young on February 22, 1989; the rehearing of that case being denied on May 26, 1989, the day the unpublished supervisory order in this case was issued. Given the narrow time frame, it is understandable that the hearing judge may not have been completely familiar with the case. The supervisory order might be considered the precursor of later supreme court cases which make it clear that prosecutors would not be under oath and subject to cross-examination. People v. Hope (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 430, 560 N.E.2d 849; People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 231, 538 N.E.2d 1107; People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 538 N.E.2d 453.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court in Young observed that the United States Supreme Court in Batson refrained from making prosecutors witnesses in a trial within a trial. Batson left the specific procedures for conducting a hearing to State courts.\nSince that time, Illinois has provided an even more restrictive setting for Batson hearings. (Hope, 137 Ill. 2d 430, 560 N.E.2d 849.) Criminal evidentiary procedures such as those set out in Supreme Court Rule 412 (134 Ill. 2d R. 412) are not applied mandatorily to post-conviction Batson hearings. Hope, 137 Ill. 2d at 484.\nAt the Batson hearing, the prosecutor gave explanations for the exclusion of each of the 13 African-Americans excluded from the Freeman I jury. The prosecutor provided various explanations, some of which were duplicative with respect to these members of the venire.\nAfter examination of the transcript of the hearing and the trial, the hearing judge concluded: \u201cthe record does not contain a reasonable explanation for the use of at least four of the [State\u2019s] peremptory challenges\u201d and that \u201cnormally, the assessment of a witness\u2019s credibility, is essential to the fact-finding process. In this case the prosecutor was not a witness but an officer of the court and an advocate for his own cause.\u201d\nThe hearing judge went on to state \u201cthe court does not find [the prosecutor\u2019s] explanations to be truthful since he refused to take an oath and to be subject to cross-examination *** the [supervisory [o]rder requires me to evaluate the unsworn statements of the prosecutor. But, in America trial judges are not commanded to believe anyone.\u201d\nThe trial court also believed that the supervisory order prohibited cross-examination of the trial prosecutors and the offering of rebuttal testimony and that he was required to accept the State\u2019s facially neutral explanations.\nThereafter, the trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nThe hearing judge was required to sail on somewhat uncharted waters. The trial court had only the Young case as a guideline since Hope and People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 123, 544 N.E.2d 357, had yet to be decided. These cases would have been instructive for the hearing judge in determining the nature of the hearing over which he was about to preside.\nAt best it is difficult for a reviewing court to completely understand the nature of the hearing judge\u2019s ruling. On the one hand, he finds the State\u2019s explanations were not credible and that the State apparently did not bring forth sufficient evidence to establish appropriate explanations for the peremptory challenges. On the other hand, the hearing judge ultimately concluded that he was required to accept the State\u2019s facially neutral Batson explanations as conclusive and declined to weigh the credibility of the State\u2019s witnesses in providing explanations.\nThe hearing judge observed that the prosecutor\u2019s Batson statement was \u201csubstantially supported\u201d by the record but determined \u201cthat in view of the restrictions imposed by the supervisory order\u201d he could not say whether he believed the prosecutor. From this, we can only conclude that the hearing judge provided an overly restrictive interpretation of the supervisory order of May 26,1989.\nThis court recently held in People v. Kindelan (1991), 213 Ill. App. 3d 548, that the State\u2019s burden of proving neutrality is \u201cgrounded in [the] credibility\u201d that the trial judge accords the prosecutor. The hearing judge in the case at bar found the statements were facially neutral as compared to the record, but did not find them \u201ctruthful\u201d since the prosecutor declined to be sworn. It should be clear that Kindelan requires the hearing judge at a Batson hearing to weigh the credibility of the prosecutor. Requiring the prosecutor\u2019s oath ought not to be the cutting edge for this task.\nOnce a defendant has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the State has the burden of providing a race-neutral explanation for each peremptory challenge to which defendant objects. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 85, 106 S. Ct. at 1722.) The State\u2019s explanations must be clear, reasonably specific, legitimate and nonracial. (Hope, 137 Ill. 2d at 467.) They must be more than a mere assertion that the prosecution acted in good faith or without discriminatory motive. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 174.\nThe trial court must make a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the State\u2019s explanations (Hope, 137 Ill. 2d at 467) and must assess the genuineness of the State\u2019s assertions to determine if they are legitimate and, in fact, race-neutral. People v. Baisten (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 64, 77, 560 N.E.2d 1060.\nBased on this record, we are unable to determine whether the hearing judge appropriately weighed the evidence in determining whether there was a Batson violation. Accordingly, we believe that the hearing judge should be afforded another opportunity to examine the Batson allegations and we will therefore remand this matter to the trial court for a new Batson hearing.\nThree additional matters remain for our consideration: (i) defendant\u2019s right to propound interrogatories; (ii) defendant\u2019s right to the discovery of certain documents; and (iii) defendant\u2019s right to provide rebuttal testimony.\nAs to the first issue, we agree with the hearing judge\u2019s determination that the supervisory order of May 26, 1989, precluded the use of interrogatories directed at the State. Although the order is silent with respect to interrogatories, the spirit of the court\u2019s order seems clear, and defendant ought not to be allowed to circumvent the prohibition against cross-examination by interrogation through interrogatories.\nIllinois decisions have made it clear that the Illinois Supreme Court expects the Batson hearings to more closely follow the format of a preliminary hearing rather than a full-blown criminal trial. In Mack, the court rejected the notion of expanded trial procedures or procedural safeguards when the Batson hearing was held before a judge different than the trial judge. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 252.\nAs to the second issue, nothing in the supervisory order precludes initiation of reasonable discovery by the defendant. As in all cases, the court has control of that discovery process and can determine the reasonableness of the request. If material contained in training manuals or policies of the State\u2019s Attorney would add to the court\u2019s finding of prima facie discrimination and increase the State\u2019s burden, the trial court should be able to consider such matters. It will assist in leading to a just result in ensuring that defendant had a fair trial by a jury appropriately selected.\nAlthough Mack establishes the kinds of limitations the court wishes to impose on Batson hearings, it does not expressly rule upon the propriety of a discovery request. The defendant ought to be able to determine whether the questions asked of veniremen and the exercise of peremptory challenges are part of a scheme or a plan to limit the minority members of a jury before which defendant will be tried.\nMack did address the issue of discovery of the prosecutor\u2019s notes. Because a prosecutor\u2019s notes are protected from disclosure under the work-product doctrine unless they contain material favorable to the defense under Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194, the notes in Mack were inspected in camera by the hearing judge. The judge found that the notes did not contain material favorable to the defendant and denied the motion to compel production. (Mack, 128 Ill. 2d at 247.) Here, the hearing judge inspected the prosecutor\u2019s notes in camera and determined that the notes supported the prosecutor\u2019s explanations. The hearing judge concluded that there was no material favorable to defendant and that discovery of the notes should be denied. On that basis, we agree.\nAs to the third issue, defendant sought to introduce testimony of excluded jurors to rebut the State\u2019s explanations for its exercise of peremptory challenges. The hearing judge excluded the rebuttal testimony of challenged jurors, stating:\n\u201cI think that [testimony] would go beyond the scope of the Bat-son decision. Particularly, since the Appellate Court has already found there is prima facie evidence of discrimination in the exclusion of these jurors. The Court will not permit excluded jurors to be called at this limited hearing.\u201d\nGenerally, a defendant should be afforded the opportunity to rebut the prosecutor\u2019s Batson explanations for the exercise of peremptory challenges. (Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 177; Young, 128 Ill. 2d at 27.) It is the duty of the hearing judge to determine whether the State\u2019s explanations are race-neutral, and it is the judge\u2019s decision whether certain rebuttal testimony would be helpful to his determination.\nIn Young, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court properly refused to admit rebuttal testimony of defendant and his trial counsel regarding a juror\u2019s responses since the hearing judge had also presided over the voir dire and had observed the demeanor of the prospective jurors directly. Young, 128 Ill. 2d at 27-28.\nIn Harris, the court clearly set out the format for a Batson hearing:\n\u201c[I]n Batson, the Court stated that once a defendant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecutor need only \u2018articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.\u2019 [Citation.] The defendant may then attempt to rebut the prosecution\u2019s explanation as being pretextual. [Citation.] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court has the duty to weigh the evidence and \u2018determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 177.\nThe court specifically authorizes rebuttal evidence by the defense and commands the hearing judge to carefully weigh the evidence. Harris does not limit the kind of rebuttal evidence which can be offered. In the instant case, the defendant sought to offer testimony of excluded jurors, and under Young and Harris, a hearing judge may properly find their testimony helpful in determining whether the State\u2019s race-neutral explanations are pretextual. Harris, 129 Ill. 2d at 177; Young, 128 Ill. 2d at 27.\nAccordingly, at the new Batson hearing the defendant shall be permitted to offer testimony of excluded jurors for the purpose of demonstrating that the State\u2019s race-neutral explanations are pretextual.\nFinally, we reiterate the instruction given the trial court when we initially reviewed defendant\u2019s case in Freeman I and again direct that the trial court enter sentence on defendant\u2019s armed robbery conviction if the State prevails at a new Batson hearing. If the defendant prevails at the hearing, this defendant shall be afforded a new trial on armed robbery as well as murder. See People v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 85, 87-88, 370 N.E.2d 540; People v. Lilly (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 493, 495-96, 309 N.E.2d 1 (which allow us to pass upon the armed robbery conviction for which no sentence has been entered).\nThis matter is remanded for a new Batson hearing and for entry of a sentence upon defendant\u2019s conviction for armed robbery.\nRemanded with directions.\nRIZZI and WHITE, JJ., concur.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court initially denied the State\u2019s motion for a supervisory order on August 19, 1988, but vacated that order on August 25, 1988, on its own motion and continued the State\u2019s motion.\nJustice White participated in this opinion prior to his retirement.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jenner & Block, of Chicago (Joel T. Pelz, Glenn E. Heilizer, and Caesar A. Tabet, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Bonnie Meyer Sloan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GEOFFREY FREEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNos. 1\u201489\u20142414, 1\u201489\u20142500 cons.\nOpinion filed October 9, 1991.\nJenner & Block, of Chicago (Joel T. Pelz, Glenn E. Heilizer, and Caesar A. Tabet, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Bonnie Meyer Sloan, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0825-01", "first_page_order": 847, "last_page_order": 854 }