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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CLUB EXCHANGE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID J. RICHTER et al., Defendants-Appellees (Sandra J. Rachell et al., Defendants-Appellants)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, Sandra J. Rachell and Richard W. Rachell, appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County denying their motion for summary judgment and granting the cross-motion for summary judgment of plaintiff, Club Exchange Corporation, d/b/a Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange. In this cause, defendants raise the following issues: (1) whether the policy issued by plaintiff is ambiguous in its definition of the term \u201cbodily injury,\u201d and (2) whether loss of consortium is a separate compensable injury. This court reverses.\nOn July 2, 1987, insured, David Richter, was involved in an automobile collision with Sandra Rachell. Richter\u2019s insurance policy limited his liability coverage to $100,000 per person, $300,000 per accident. Mrs. Rachell suffered extensive injuries, and plaintiff settled with her by payment of $100,000 \u2014 the policy limit on individual injury. Plaintiff then filed its complaint for declaratory judgment alleging that as the loss-of-consortium claim by defendant, Richard Rachell, was not a separate injury, no further coverage applied. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the term \u201cbodily injury\u201d is ambiguously defined in the policy and therefore must be construed against plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment arguing that the term is not ambiguous. On September 21, 1989, the circuit court, citing McDaniel v. Madison County Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 420 N.E.2d 1032, and Creamer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 223, 514 N.E.2d 214, denied defendants\u2019 motion, and granted plaintiff\u2019s cross-motion.\nOn appeal, defendants assert that the policy issued by plaintiff is ambiguous in its definition of the term \u201cbodily injury\u201d and that loss of consortium is a separate compensable injury. Plaintiff responds that its obligation to defendants was extinguished by the payment of the per-person policy limit.\nLoss of consortium is a separate injury. Our supreme court has stated:\n\u201c[A]n action for loss of consortium is not a derivative claim brought by the spouse as the personal representative of the employee, but is an independent action to recover for injuries the spouse has suffered, such as loss of support and loss of society. (See Brown v. Metzger (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 30, 38[, 470 N.E.2d 302, 306]; Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 195, 208-09[, 454 N.E.2d 210, 218].\u201d (Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48, 518 N.E.2d 69, 72.)\nA loss-of-consortium claim is based on a \u201ctransferred negligence\u201d theory. The defendant\u2019s duty to act with reasonable care toward the injured party is transferred to the spouse. (Giardino v. Fierke (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653, 513 N.E.2d 1168, 1171.) A loss-of-consortium claim is derivative in the sense of using the spouse\u2019s underlying personal injury claim as the vehicle to establish liability and for purposes of assessing comparative fault. (See Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equipment Co. (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 188, 572 N.E.2d 920.) The Blagg situation, however, does not apply in the case at bar.\nThe dispute here concerns whether defendant may recover from the insurance company. This question is determined by the language of the policy in question. (Giardino v. Fierke (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d at 653, 513 N.E.2d at 1171-72.) While Mr. Rachell may state a claim for loss of consortium, the question is whether Richter\u2019s insurance covered the alleged injury. Our research has determined that Illinois courts have decided this issue according to policy language.\nIn the definitions section of this policy, the language reads, \u201c \u2018Bodily Injury\u2019 means injury, sickness, disease or death.\u201d Another section titled \u201cLimit of Liability\u201d limits the amount recoverable. It states:\n\u201cThe limit of liability shown in the Declarations for \u2018each person\u2019 for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject to this limit for \u2018each person\u2019, the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for \u2018each accident\u2019 for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one auto accident. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for \u2018each accident\u2019 for Property Damage Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages to all property resulting from any one auto accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:\n1. Covered persons;\n2. Claims made[.]\u201d\nIn Giardino, the policy defined bodily injury to specifically include \u201closs of services\u201d which result from a bodily injury. (160 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 513 N.E.2d at 1172.) The Appellate Court, Second District, concluded that, under the policy before it, loss of consortium is a separate bodily injury and subject to the occurrence, not individual, limitations of the policy. (160 Ill. App. 3d at 655, 513 N.E.2d at 1173.) As the policy before us does not explicitly include \u201closs of services,\u201d Giardino does not guide us.\nOn the other hand, Creamer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 223, 514 N.E.2d 214, cited by the circuit court, defined bodily injury as \u201cbodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.\u201d (161 Ill. App. 3d at 224, 514 N.E.2d at 215.) The Appellate Court, Third District, characterized this definition as \u201cunambiguous.\u201d\nIn Cross v. Country Cos. (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 847, 544 N.E.2d 1246, the policy stated that the damages for bodily injury \u201cinclude required care, loss of services, loss of use and death.\u201d (188 Ill. App. 3d at 849, 544 N.E.2d at 1247.) The limit-of-liability section of the policy, however, stated that the bodily-injury liability limit for each person includes any claim of other persons for damages arising out of that bodily injury. (188 Ill. App. 3d at 849, 544 N.E.2d at 1247.) The Appellate Court, Fourth District, concluded that the intent of the policy before it was to limit loss-of-consortium claims to the personally injured \u201cper person\u201d maximum. 188 Ill. App. 3d at 850, 544 N.E.2d at 1248.\nMost recently, the Appellate Court, First District, First Division, in Filip v. North River Insurance Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 351, 559 N.E.2d 17, considered a policy which defined \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201cinjury, sickness, disease or death.\u201d Noting that loss of consortium has been defined as an \u201cinjury,\u201d the court concluded that loss of consortium was included as a compensable bodily injury. Creamer was distinguished as follows:\n\u201cIn Creamer, the policy defined \u2018bodily injury\u2019 as \u2018bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.\u2019 (Creamer, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 224[, 514 N.E.2d at 215].) Predicated on that definition, the Creamer court held that \u2018bodily injury,\u2019 as defined by the relevant policy, did not include loss of consortium, which was a type of personal injury. In contrast to the policy in Creamer, the Policy in the present case defines \u2018bodily injury\u2019 as \u2018injury,\u2019 thereby broadening the ordinary definition of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 to encompass all types of injury, including the personal injury of loss of consortium.\u201d 201 Ill. App. 3d at 353-54, 559 N.E.2d at 19.\nWe have before us a policy which defines \u201cbodily injury\u201d as \u201cinjury, sickness, disease or death\u201d and limits liability as the \u201cmaximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident.\u201d We note the definition of \u201cbodily injury\u201d as identical to the language in Filip. Also considering a per-person limit of liability, the court in Filip noted:\n\u201cNorth River further argues that it would be against public policy to hold that loss of consortium is payable under a separate \u2018per person\u2019 limit of liability because that decision would effectively double the amount of potential recovery for each automobile accident involving an insured motorist. In addition, North River contends that the word \u2018injury\u2019 was intended to reiterate \u2018the type of traumatic physical injury to one\u2019s body that insurers and insureds alike understand to be encompassed by the term \u201cbodily injury.\u201d \u2019 However, not only is this intent not evidenced by the Policy\u2019s definition, a contrary intent is evidenced by use of the broader term \u2018injury.\u2019 \u201d 201 Ill. App. 3d at 354-55, 559 N.E.2d at 19.\nBased on the language, analysis, and authorities stated above, we conclude the circuit court erred in denying defendants Rachells\u2019 motion for summary judgment and granting plaintiff\u2019s cross-motion for summary judgment. We therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of defendants Rachells on their motion for summary judgment.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nLEWIS and HOWERTON, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Beth Kamp Veath and Kathleen A. Buckley, both of Brown, James & Rabbitt, EC., of Belleville and St. Louis, Missouri, for appellants.",
      "Robert L. DeVoto, of Wuestling, James & DeVoto, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee Club Exchange Corporation.",
      "No brief filed for appellees David J. Richter and Amy Richter."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CLUB EXCHANGE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAVID J. RICHTER et al., Defendants-Appellees (Sandra J. Rachell et al., Defendants-Appellants).\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 89\u20140705\nOpinion filed October 15, 1991.\nBeth Kamp Veath and Kathleen A. Buckley, both of Brown, James & Rabbitt, EC., of Belleville and St. Louis, Missouri, for appellants.\nRobert L. DeVoto, of Wuestling, James & DeVoto, of St. Louis, Missouri, for appellee Club Exchange Corporation.\nNo brief filed for appellees David J. Richter and Amy Richter."
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