{ "id": 5799880, "name": "GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. DAVID McCOWAN et al., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants (Arnold D. Sternberg, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "General Casualty Co. v. McCowan", "decision_date": "1991-10-22", "docket_number": "No. 5-90-0115", "first_page": "96", "last_page": "100", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 96" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147072 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515452 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591191 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2593606 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "353-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467934 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 847", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2693194 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0847-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.E.2d 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192813 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77" }, { "page": "76-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. App. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5280669 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/52/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141899 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0486-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 449, "char_count": 8591, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3360982494952585e-07, "percentile": 0.630148707511519 }, "sha256": "e25c8874567f874fba026db513c0e0883779fd96d08f68db43ecb2fe65d93f9b", "simhash": "1:7156bd857d668df7", "word_count": 1403 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:34.404944+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. DAVID McCOWAN et al., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants (Arnold D. Sternberg, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDavid McCowan was involved in an automobile accident between his vehicle and one driven by Arnold Sternberg. David McCowan and his wife, Karla McCowan, brought a two-count complaint against Mr. Sternberg: count I for the personal injuries sustained by David, and count II for loss of consortium for Karla.\nWhile the above action was pending, the General Casualty Company of Illinois (General Casualty), Sternberg\u2019s insurer, brought a declaratory judgment action for the purpose of determining the amount of insurance coverage afforded by its automobile liability policy. The McGowans filed a counterclaim in the declaratory judgment action in which they also sought a declaration in the amount of coverage afforded. The policy provides coverages in the amount of $50,000 per \u201cperson\u201d and $100,000 per \u201caccident.\u201d General Casualty sought a determination that only $50,000 coverage was afforded while the McGowans sought a ruling that $100,000 was available.\nThe circuit court of Randolph County found in favor of General Casualty and allowed its motion for summary judgment. It denied the counterclaim for summary judgment filed by the McGowans. The Mc-Gowans appeal.\nThe issue presented for this court is whether the loss-of-consortium claim of Karla McCowan is a separate bodily injury claim so as to activate the per-occurrence limit of $100,000 of the General Casualty policy.\nThe determination of this issue depends upon the language of the policy, as the parties are bound to the agreement they made. (Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 486, 475 N.E.2d 872.) Several provisions of the policy must be considered. Under the heading, \u201cII \u2014 Liability Coverage, Part A,\u201d the policy provides:\n\u201cWe will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nUnder another part of the policy, \u201cPart B \u2014 Definitions,\u201d \u201cbodily injury\u201d is defined: \u201c \u2018Bodily injury\u2019 means injury, sickness, disease or death.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) One final paragraph of the policy that needs to be considered is found under the section labelled, \u201cLimit of Liability\u201d:\n\u201cThe limit of liability shown in the Declarations for \u2018each person\u2019 for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject to this limit for \u2018each person\u2019, the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for \u2018each accident\u2019 for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting from any one auto accident.\u201d\nWith these provisions in mind, we examine Illinois cases that have addressed this issue. The first case brought to our attention is Gass v. Carducci (1964), 52 Ill. App. 2d 394, 202 N.E.2d 73, which denied coverage to a husband on a loss-of-consortium damage claim because:\n\u201cThe term \u2018one person\u2019 contained therein has repeatedly been construed by the courts to mean \u2018one person injured\u2019 and that it applies to all damages sustained by all persons as the result of injury to one person; they have rejected the contention that the \u2018one person\u2019 limit merely deals with the loss suffered by any one person.\u201d (Gass, 52 Ill. App. 2d at 402, 202 N.E.2d at 77.)\nWhile it is not completely clear from the Gass opinion, it is at least suggested that the provision involved in that case included any damages for loss of services that arose out of the bodily injury. That interpretation is found in the following language:\n\u201cThe policy of insurance limits recovery to $25,000 for damages arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person in any one accident, which includes damages for care and loss of services arising out of bodily injury.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Gass, 52 Ill. App. 2d at 402, 202 N.E.2d at 76-77.)\nThus it is at least suggested that loss of services was specifically included in the injuries to one person involved in the policy in Gass.\nWe observe that Gass comes to its conclusion that \u201cone person\u201d means \u201call persons\u201d with very little discussion or analysis. Also, we note that Gass cited no Illinois cases, in fact no cases at all, for its broad proposition. Finally, we observe that Gass was decided some years before the supreme court\u2019s ruling in Page v. Hibbard, which held that\n\u201can action for loss of consortium is not a derivative claim brought by the spouse as the personal representative of the employee, but is an independent action to recover for injuries the spouse has suffered, such as loss of support and loss of society.\u201d (Page v. Hibbard (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 48, 518 N.E.2d 69, 72.)\nIn view of the foregoing, we hold that Gass is not controlling on the issue of whether or not a loss-of-consortium claim is subject to the limitation of one person in all situations.\nGeneral Casualty relies upon Cross v. Country Cos. (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 847, 544 N.E.2d 1246, and Creamer v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 223, 514 N.E.2d 214. The policy involved in Cross apparently included loss of services, not as a separate bodily injury, but instead as an explanation of the extent of the liability coverage. The Creamer decision has been distinguished by the recent first district case of Filip v. North River Insurance Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 351, 559 N.E.2d 17, because in Creamer the policy defined \u201c \u2018bodily injury\u2019 \u201d as \u201c \u2018bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.\u2019 \u201d (Filip, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 353, 559 N.E.2d at 19, quoting Creamer, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 224.) The Filip court pointed out that \u201c[i]n contrast to the policy in Creamer, the Policy in the present case defines \u2018bodily injury\u2019 as \u2018injury,\u2019 thereby broadening the ordinary definition of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 to encompass all types of injury, including the personal injury of loss of consortium.\u201d (201 Ill. App. 3d at 353-54.) The policy language involved in our case is closer to that involved in Filip than that involved in Creamer.\nWith this in mind, we now turn to the recent supreme court decision of Blagg v. Illinois F.W.D. Truck & Equipment Co. (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 188, 572 N.E.2d 920, which addressed the issue of whether a spouse\u2019s loss-of-consortium claim is derivative or an independent cause of action. One of the issues before the supreme court in Blagg was whether the wife\u2019s loss-of-consortium award should be reduced by the comparative fault of William in causing his own injuries, and the court held that for the purposes of comparative negligence, a loss-of-consortium claim is derivative. While Blagg holds that a loss-of-consortium award may be reduced by the comparative negligence of the injured spouse, this is not to say that a loss-of-consortium action is wholly derivative. To the contrary, Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp. (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210, Brown v. Metzger (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 30, 470 N.E.2d 302, and Page v. Hibbard, (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 41, 518 N.E.2d 69, recognize the fact that the noninjured spouse has a separate and distinct loss-of-consortium claim.\nThe issue here regarding coverage afforded under the insurance policy provisions is not whether Karla\u2019s award is to be reduced by the comparative fault of David, but whether Karla has a separate and distinct claim for which the policy in question extends coverage. We hold that the loss-of-consortium claim in the instant case is independent of the primary claim to the extent that loss of consortium is a separate bodily injury under the policy.\nWe conclude, therefore, that the policy involved in this case provides separate coverage for the loss of consortium as a compensable bodily injury and that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of General Casualty. We hereby reverse the trial court\u2019s decision and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of the McGowans and against General Casualty.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nRARICK, P.J., and GOLDENHERSH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "J.C. Mitchell, of Mitchell & Armstrong, Ltd., of Marion, and Donald R. Brandon, of Herrin, for appellants.", "Ted W. Dennis and Jeffery A. Cain, both of Freeark, Harvey, Mendillo, Dennis & Wuller, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. DAVID McCOWAN et al., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants (Arnold D. Sternberg, Defendant).\nFifth District\nNo. 5-90-0115\nOpinion filed October 22, 1991.\nJ.C. Mitchell, of Mitchell & Armstrong, Ltd., of Marion, and Donald R. Brandon, of Herrin, for appellants.\nTed W. Dennis and Jeffery A. Cain, both of Freeark, Harvey, Mendillo, Dennis & Wuller, P.C., of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0096-01", "first_page_order": 118, "last_page_order": 122 }