{ "id": 5797285, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AURELIANO OCON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ocon", "decision_date": "1991-11-12", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201489\u20141173", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "316", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 311" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3550737 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2627334 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 497", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498877 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0497-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2574245 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" }, { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474907 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 640", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192095 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "2610" }, { "page": "648" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "2610-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5435526 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216740 ], "weight": 15, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "740-41" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "740-41" }, { "page": "376-77" }, { "page": "748-49" }, { "page": "743-44", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" }, { "page": "376-77" }, { "page": "748-49" }, { "page": "743-44", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "744" }, { "page": "740", "parenthetical": "\"slipshod\" manner of inventory search did not affect reasonableness" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177992 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "3097" }, { "page": "369" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "3097" }, { "page": "374-76" }, { "page": "1008-09" }, { "page": "3099-3100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3096881 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523775 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160338 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0209-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 606, "char_count": 12254, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.149348773540807e-08, "percentile": 0.4745224528534289 }, "sha256": "62c2f8aaebeec1f7364bd36cec966eaaf819035ad31116d28147b5868f6efa6b", "simhash": "1:4b0b971cc3ebed35", "word_count": 1970 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:34.404944+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AURELIANO OCON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NICKELS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter denial of defendant\u2019s, Aureliano Ocon\u2019s, motion to suppress evidence that had been obtained during an inventory search of the trunk of defendant\u2019s car, defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 561/2, par. 1401(b)(2)) and was sentenced to four years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court\u2019s finding that the challenged evidence resulted from a lawful inventory of the contents of the trunk of defendant\u2019s impounded car was against the manifest weight of the evidence because such inventory was merely a retrospective pretext for an unconstitutional investigatory search.\nIn the early morning hours of January 26, 1989, Officer Alan Trotsky of the Naperville police department and another officer stopped defendant, who was driving a 1978 Oldsmobile, because the registration displayed on the Oldsmobile was that of a 1987 Honda. Two passengers accompanied defendant. Upon initially stopping defendant\u2019s car, Officer Trotsky observed a \u201cfurtive movement in the vehicle.\u201d More specifically, the officer saw a \u201cbending down motion, as if someone was tucking something under a seat or grabbing for something underneath the seat.\u201d The officer, therefore, searched the interior of the car for weapons after all of the occupants left the car, a search that defendant does not challenge.\nBecause defendant did not have a valid driver\u2019s license, he was placed under arrest for operating a car without a license. Defendant\u2019s subsequent custodial search resulted in the seizure of $622 from his pants pocket. One of defendant\u2019s passengers also had no valid driver\u2019s license. The third occupant of the car had a driver\u2019s license, but because he failed to give the officer his correct name, the officer believed that he, too, did not possess a driver\u2019s license.\nBecause none of the occupants could legally drive the car, Naperville police procedures required that it be towed to a police impound. Such procedures further required that an inventory be taken before the car was moved. Without asking defendant\u2019s permission, the police removed the keys from the car and opened the trunk, where 6.18 grams of a substance containing cocaine were found. The police procedures further required that both a tow request and an inventory report be completed, and Officer Trotsky initially testified that he believed he had completed such forms.\nDefendant moved to suppress the evidence of the cocaine taken from the trunk of his car, asserting that the inventory was merely a pretext for an investigatory search and that Officer Trotsky\u2019s statement in his written report that \u201c[d]ue to the furtive movement in the vehicle and the occupants all not having valid driver\u2019s licenses, an inventory search of the vehicle was conducted prior to the tow\u201d indicated such pretext. However, the officer repeatedly denied that the \u201cfurtive movement\u201d prompted the search of the trunk. The officer testified that \u201c[t]he furtive movement within the main container of the vehicle had no purpose for me going into the trunk looking for weapons.\u201d The court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that the failure of any of the occupants to possess a driver\u2019s license, which was the second half of the reason given in the officer\u2019s written statement, prompted the tow, which had in turn prompted the inventory.\nDefendant sought production of both the written police procedures for the towing and inventory of impounded cars and the actual inventory and tow reports relating to defendant\u2019s auto and, further, moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress. Although the State produced the police procedures, it was unable to produce either the inventory or tow report. On the representations of the assistant State\u2019s Attorney, the second police officer, who was not a street officer familiar with the inventory procedures, actually conducted the inventory of the trunk and failed to complete the form. On reconsideration after reviewing the transcript of the officer\u2019s testimony, a second court commented that \u201cthere may have been a dual purpose in looking in the trunk, but that doesn\u2019t make it an invalid inventory search.\u201d The court found that \u201cthe vehicle had to be towed, and *** according to their regulations they had to search the vehicle.\u201d\nDefendant appeals, asserting that the court\u2019s finding that the search was a lawful inventory search was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, defendant asserts that the statement in the officer\u2019s written report that the search was prompted in part by the furtive movement in the car combined with the failure to comply with the requirements of the police department\u2019s standardized procedure and complete an inventory or tow report indicate the officer\u2019s subjective motivation to investigate rather than inventory the contents of the car. We note that defendant does not challenge the officers\u2019 stop of his car or his arrest, or even the towing of his car. Rather, defendant asserts that an otherwise valid inventory search is rendered invalid by the presence of an officer\u2019s subjective improper motivation. We disagree.\nOn a motion to suppress, the defendant has the burden to prove that the search and seizure of evidence were unlawful. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, eh. 38, par. 114 \u2014 12(b); People v. Hoskins (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 209; People v. Braasch (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 747, 751.) A trial court\u2019s determination on such motion will not be reversed unless it is found to have been clearly erroneous. (People v. Clark (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 96, 99.) Because defendant does not challenge the officer\u2019s testimony, we need only determine whether, as a matter of law, the officer\u2019s dual motive for the inventory search of defendant\u2019s trunk satisfies the fourth amendment\u2019s requirements of reasonableness. See Clark, 92 Ill. 2d at 99.\nThe inventory of the contents of cars taken into police custody fulfills the community caretaking function of the police. (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 369, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 1005, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097.) Thus, inventory searches are a well-established exception to the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. (Colorado v. Bertine (1987), 479 U.S. 367, 371, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 738, 740-41.) Probable cause, which is peculiar to criminal investigations, is unrelated and of no help in the reasonableness analysis required under the fourth amendment for routine administrative caretaking functions such as inventory searches. (Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 745, 107 S. Ct. at 740-41.) Rather, the reasonableness of such procedures arises from three legitimate objectives of inventory searches: to ascertain the extent and value of property needing protection while in police custody; to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and to protect the police from potential danger emanating from items of personal property such as drugs or guns that may be found within a car. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1005, 96 S. Ct. at 3097; People v. Clark (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 169, 174.\nInventory searches conducted in accordance with standardized procedures, which tend to ensure that the intrusion is limited in scope to only the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking function of the police, are reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment. (Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374-76, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1008-09, 96 S. Ct. at 3099-3100.) It is the standardized nature of an inventory search, which limits an officer\u2019s discretion to determine the scope of the search, that ensures that the inventory search will not be purposefully used as an investigatory tool. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376-77, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 748-49, 107 S. Ct. at 743-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring).\nIn this instance because of the inability of any of the occupants to legally drive defendant\u2019s car, police procedures dictated that it be towed to an impound lot. Further, prior to such tow, the same procedures required that the contents of defendant\u2019s car be inventoried. Thus, absent improper motive, defendant concedes that the inventory search was reasonable. Defendant, however, asserts that the officers\u2019 possible dual motivation invalidates the otherwise lawful inventory.\nThe Court has not had occasion to address the issue of the effect of an officer\u2019s subjective improper motive on the validity of an objectively reasonable inventory search. However, the logic and reasoning of the Court in refusing to impose a \u201cless intrusive means\u201d analysis on officers in the course of their daily duties, which instead adopted the objective criteria of standard police procedures to determine the reasonableness of an inventory search, is equally applicable in this instance.\nIn Illinois v. Lafayette (1983), 462 U.S. 640, 647, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 72, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, the Court expressly rejected the \u201cless intrusive means\u201d logic, which prior to that decision was the law in Illinois. (See People v. Bayles (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 128, 142-43.) The reasonableness of an inventory procedure does not depend on the lack of existence of less intrusive means because \u201cit [is] unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding\u201d whether an inventory search is necessary or whether less intrusive means will secure the objectives of such searches. (Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 72, 103 S. Ct. at 2610-11.) Rather, standardized police procedures for inventory searches by their nature eliminate an officer\u2019s discretion to determine the scope of the search and similarly eliminate any effect of an improper subjective motive to use such inventory as an investigatory tool. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376-77, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 748-49, 107 S. Ct. at 743-44 (Blackmun, J., concurring).\nIn the identical context of a motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of a defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights based on the analogous situation of an unreasonable stop, the trend is to determine whether the stop was objectively reasonable. (People v. Perry (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 782, 786; People v. Guerrieri (1990), 194 Ill. App. 3d 497, 501-02; People v. Hattery (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 785, 813-19; People v. Anderson (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 294-98.) If objectively reasonable, such stop is not invalidated by either an officer\u2019s solely improper motivation or by dual motivation. Perry, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 786.\nDefendant also asserts that the officers\u2019 conduct in failing to complete required forms evidences that the inventory was merely a pretext for an investigatory search. However, we need not address the officers\u2019 failure to complete the appropriate forms after the fact of the inventory, which does not affect the objective reasonableness of the police procedures themselves. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 744, 107 S. Ct. at 740 (\u201cslipshod\u201d manner of inventory search did not affect reasonableness).\nEach of the cases cited by defendant was decided prior to Bertine, and most even prior to Lafayette. Further, such cases were decided before the objective standard was adopted by the Illinois Appellate Court to evaluate the analogous reasonableness of a police stop. Thus, the officers\u2019 conduct in inventorying the contents of the trunk of defendant\u2019s car must be tested against an objectively reasonable standard. Because the officers\u2019 compliance with specific, standard police procedures was objectively reasonable, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nUNVERZAGT and McLAREN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NICKELS" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller, Robert C. Cooper, and Beth Katz, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AURELIANO OCON, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 89\u20141173\nOpinion filed November 12, 1991.\nG. Joseph Weller, Robert C. Cooper, and Beth Katz, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (William L. Browers and Cynthia N. Schneider, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 333, "last_page_order": 338 }