{ "id": 5795185, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellant, v. JACK E. PUCKETT, Petitioner-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Puckett", "decision_date": "1991-11-14", "docket_number": "No. 3-91-0122", "first_page": "594", "last_page": "597", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 594" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 918", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505645 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0918-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 1153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 981", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499540 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0981-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2583083 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798373 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" }, { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 809", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2586907 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" }, { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0809-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 332, "char_count": 6778, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.767180240611436e-08, "percentile": 0.4561883723722889 }, "sha256": "e1d72605a5d9469faabe31501e5e6f3f4bd107d853ba2d1c8046fc725b09bf4a", "simhash": "1:b9ab6f973573bea9", "word_count": 1139 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:34.404944+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellant, v. JACK E. PUCKETT, Petitioner-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SLATER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Jack Puckett, filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license. The trial court granted the rescission based on the failure to hold a hearing within 30 days of petitioner\u2019s request for judicial review as required by statute. The State appeals, and we affirm.\nThe record shows that on November 3, 1990, the petitioner was arrested and charged with the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(2)). He was also served with notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license based on his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1). A confirmation of statutory summary suspension was sent to the petitioner indicating that his license would be suspended as of December 19,1990.\nOn December 7, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial review of the summary suspension. On January 18, 1991, the petitioner filed a motion to immediately rescind the summary suspension on the grounds that no hearing had been conducted within 30 days of the filing of his petition for judicial review as required under section 2\u2014 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b)). Following a hearing on January 23, 1991, the trial court denied the motion to immediately rescind the suspension. On January 25, after reviewing additional case law, the trial court granted the petitioner\u2019s motion to reconsider and ordered the summary suspension rescinded.\nThe issue raised on appeal is whether the statutory right to a hearing within 30 days begins to run upon the filing of a petition for judicial review of the statutory summary suspension with the circuit clerk, or whether the petitioner must do something more in order to commence the 30-day period (i.e., attempt to secure a hearing date).\nSection 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides in relevant part:\n\u201cUpon the notice of statutory summary suspension served under Section 11 \u2014 501.1, the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds upon which the person seeks to have the statutory summary suspension rescinded. Within 30 days after receipt of the written request or the first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket issued pursuant to a violation of Section 11 \u2014 501, *** the hearing shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b).\nThe State argues that the mere filing of a petition for judicial review of a summary suspension is not a sufficient request for a hearing under section 2 \u2014 118.1(b). The State contends that the petitioner must also attempt to set a hearing date in order to begin the 30-day period. We do not agree.\nThis issue was recently addressed by this court in People v. Johnson (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 809, 560 N.E.2d 430, where the petitioner filed a petition to revoke his statutory summary suspension with the circuit clerk and did nothing further. After 30 days elapsed, the petitioner filed a motion to strike the summary suspension for failure to hold a timely hearing. The motion was granted, and the State appealed. In affirming the rescission, this court noted that a petitioner seeking rescission of his summary suspension bears the burden of proceeding and the burden of proof. (Johnson, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 811, 560 N.E.2d at 431.) However, we held that once a petition for a rescission hearing has been filed with the clerk, the petitioner has met his burden under section 2 \u2014 118.1 and the burden then shifts to the State to ensure that a hearing is held within 30 days. We further held that the failure to hold a hearing within 30 days is a violation of the right to due process and that the only appropriate remedy is to rescind the summary suspension. Johnson, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 812, 560 N.E.2d at 431.\nWe are aware that other districts have reached a different conclusion on this issue. (People v. Hill (4th Dist. 1991), 219 Ill. App. 3d 259; People v. Sowers (5th Dist. 1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 561 N.E.2d 469; People v. Grange (2d Dist. 1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 981, 537 N.E.2d 1153.) In order to grant the State\u2019s requested relief, we would have to reverse our decision in Johnson. We decline to do so.\nIn In re Summary Suspension of Driver\u2019s License of Trainor (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 918, 923, 510 N.E.2d 614, 618, the court held that \u201cin order to comply with due process requirements, the hearing required in section 2 \u2014 118.1 must be held within the 30 days unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, and failure to do so will require rescission of the suspension.\u201d In the case at bar, the delay was not occasioned by the petitioner. The statute requires that the petitioner make a written request for a judicial hearing to the circuit court of venue. Petitioner met this requirement by filing his petition for judicial review with the clerk of the circuit court and by sending a copy of the petition to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. The statute also requires that \u201c[wjithin 30 days after receipt of the written request *** the hearing shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 2 \u2014 118.1(b).) No hearing was held within 30 days of the petitioner\u2019s request.\nThe confirmation of statutory summary suspension which was sent to the petitioner clearly set forth the procedure for obtaining judicial review. In relevant part, it stated as follows:\n\u201cYou have the right to petition for judicial review of the Statutory Summary Suspension. Petitions must be filed in writing and submitted to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Court shown on the front of this Confirmation of Statutory Suspension.\u201d\nPetitioner met the filing requirements of section 2 \u2014 118.1 and thus fulfilled his burden of proceeding with the petition. Because no hearing was held within 30 days of the filing of the petition for judicial review by the petitioner, the trial court correctly rescinded the statutory summary suspension.\nFor the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGORMAN and HAASE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SLATER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Gregory J. McHugh, of Appleton & McHugh, of Aledo (Mark A. Appleton, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellant, v. JACK E. PUCKETT, Petitioner-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3-91-0122\nOpinion filed November 14, 1991.\nMarshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (Terry A. Mertel, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nGregory J. McHugh, of Appleton & McHugh, of Aledo (Mark A. Appleton, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0594-01", "first_page_order": 616, "last_page_order": 619 }