{ "id": 5798551, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Allen", "decision_date": "1991-09-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20143256", "first_page": "737", "last_page": "741", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 737" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466473 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 955", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2576704 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "960" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2637468 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2565999 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256255 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" }, { "page": "702" }, { "page": "2071" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 L. Ed. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1108476 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588537 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576240 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0349-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 542, "char_count": 8927, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.86486014027979e-08, "percentile": 0.459181790135255 }, "sha256": "5f596f8577c06e4ab59354f72b794dc8b82fc203310499e0f5792af7cb320d63", "simhash": "1:493b39daa4d68688", "word_count": 1443 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:24:34.404944+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SCARIANO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn July 3, 1985, defendant was convicted of the murder of Carl Gibson and sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment. While defendant\u2019s conviction in that case was pending on appeal in this court, Detective Michael Pochordo, who had been in frequent contact with defendant in investigating the case, arranged to see defendant in the Stateville penitentiary, where he had been serving his sentence.\nPochordo testified as follows: After advising defendant of his Miranda rights, he informed him that he had certain information linking defendant to the murder of Robert Ciralski, which had occurred in August of 1984. Defendant acknowledged the Miranda warnings and responded that Pochordo\u2019s information was \u201cbasically correct,\u201d that he and one Griffin were involved in the Gibson \u201ccontract\u201d murder, that Griffin shot Ciralski, and that the motive for the assassination was that the victim had cut back on quinine sales to drug dealers. Defendant also implicated two other men besides Griffin in the planning of the murder, but he told Pochordo that he would have to think over whether he would provide any more details because he was concerned about his own safety and that of his family.\nA few days later, defendant phoned Pochordo and arranged for another meeting with him at the Stateville prison. Pochordo was accompanied to this meeting by Richard Bueke, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. In response to defendant\u2019s query, Bueke told him of the results of their investigation and their belief as to his involvement in the Ciralski killing.\nDefendant agreed to talk to Bueke and Pochordo, and after he was given his Miranda warnings, he went into considerable incriminating detail, not only with respect to the Ciralski murder, but the Gibson case as well, again implicating others and himself in both crimes. After some protracted negotiations, defendant offered to cooperate in the prosecution of the Ciralski murder on condition that he be given immunity, but Bueke promised only to recommend a natural life sentence to run concurrently with the one he was given in the Gibson case, in exchange for his testimony before the grand jury and at trial. Defendant accepted the offer.\nDefendant and his codefendant, Franklin Freeman, were tried separately for the Ciralski murder; however, prior to trial, defendant recanted his grand jury testimony. The oral statements defendant made to Bueke, Pochordo and other officials, and the transcript of his testimony before the grand jury, were used as evidence against him, all without objection on his part. In testifying in his own behalf, defendant denied that he was involved in the Ciralski murder, disavowed giving Pochordo any information at their first meeting in the Stateville penitentiary, insisted that he lied to Bueke at Pochordo\u2019s instigation, contended that the testimony that he gave before the grand jury was based on lies fed to him by Pochordo and Bueke, who had coached him, and maintained that he had no intention of pleading guilty to another natural life sentence.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty on three counts of murder, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and another of armed robbery. Having found that the three counts of murder merged into one and that the armed robbery verdict also merged into the murder charge, the circuit judge imposed the mandatory natural life sentence for murder, to run concurrently with the one of 40 years for conspiracy, both sentences to run consecutive to a sentence of natural life which defendant was serving on the earlier murder conviction. Defendant appeals.\nDefendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to move to suppress the statements obtained from him by the State while he was in jail after having been convicted of another offense, and while his appeal from that conviction was pending, in the absence of the attorney who was representing him in that appeal. Defendant relies upon a number of Illinois cases, among them, People v. Bernasco (1990), 138 Ill. 2d 349, and People v. Hicks (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 488. Defendant concedes that McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991), 501 U.S. _, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 111 S. Ct. 2204, decided while the instant appeal was pending, denies him any relief under the United States Constitution. McNeil held that an accused\u2019s invocation of his sixth amendment right to counsel as to a charged offense does not serve as an assertion of his fifth amendment Miranda right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation on crimes with which he has not yet been charged.\nDefendant contends, however, that \u201cIllinois law is more protective of his right against self-incrimination than is the federal line of cases starting with the Miranda decision.\u201d We cannot agree. Instead, we choose to follow McNeil, for we discern no reasonable basis for holding that an accused\u2019s invocation, \u201c[i]n [a] criminal prosecution[ ],\u201d of his \u201cright to appear and defend in person and by counsel\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a78) metamorphoses as well into an unarticulated invocation of his right not to \u201cbe compelled in [another, but unrelated] criminal case to give evidence against himself.\u201d (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a710.) As in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 700, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 702, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2071, \u201c[failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. Here there is a double failure.\u201d\nDefendant further complains that he was also denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to object to testimony and the prosecutor\u2019s statements that he had committed previous crimes, including the State\u2019s eliciting from defendant that he was convicted of the Gibson murder and had earlier been convicted of the murder of a police officer. Defendant also argues that his counsel improperly allowed him to testify that he had committed intimidation over 10 years before, despite the fact that there was no record of his commission of such a crime in the presentence investigation report. Defendant maintains that these offenses were admitted into evidence merely to show his propensity to commit crime. Assuming, however, without deciding, that the trial court erred, we hold any such error to be harmless, considering the enormously damning evidence presented against him. People v. Nevitt (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 423, 448.\nDefendant next argues that he was erroneously convicted of three counts of murder, even though his murder conviction arose from one act. However, as noted earlier, the record indefeasibly reflects that the three counts were merged into one, and that judgment was entered only on the one count. We hold, therefore, that there was no error committed in merging the three counts. See People v. Matthews (1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 371, 418.\nThe State agrees with defendant\u2019s final contention that he should not have been convicted of both conspiracy and murder. Conspiracy is the inchoate offense; murder is the principal one; and Illinois law does not permit the State to sentence a defendant for both. (People v. Allen (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 438, 453; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 5.) The 40-year sentence for conspiracy was to run concurrent to the life term for murder. Defendant maintains that there should be a new sentencing hearing and that the three counts of murder which were merged into one should be vacated.\nThere is no indication in the record that the conspiracy conviction influenced that for murder. On the contrary, there were separate concurrent sentences imposed for the two counts, and because the record unmistakably reflects that the sentences were independent, there is no need for a new sentencing hearing. (People v. Kite (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 955, 960; People v. Atkins (1987) 161 Ill. App. 3d 600, 611-12.) Therefore, we vacate the conviction and sentence for conspiracy.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence for conspiracy are vacated and in all other respects the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHARTMAN and DiVITO, JJ., concur.\nAlthough Judge Hartman did not participate in the oral argument had in this case, he has read the briefs, and memoranda filed herein, audited the tape made at oral argument, and has otherwise participated in the decision-making process.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SCARIANO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Anna Ahronheim, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Cecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Joseph Brent, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 87\u20143256\nOpinion filed September 30, 1991.\n\u2014 Modified on denial of rehearing November 26, 1991.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Anna Ahronheim, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nCecil A. Partee, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Joseph Brent, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0737-01", "first_page_order": 759, "last_page_order": 763 }