{ "id": 5263527, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF R. MARIE HARTIAN, Petitioner-Appellee, and ROBERT M. HARTIAN, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Hartian", "decision_date": "1991-11-25", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20141008", "first_page": "566", "last_page": "570", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 566" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "543 N.E.2d 201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2665143 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1576611 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/126/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554780 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575749 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 N.E.2d 1188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499029 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.W.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Wis. 2d 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Phila. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Phila.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2613977 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160632 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5083035 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0440-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 550, "char_count": 9344, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0911499645675372e-07, "percentile": 0.7603929804401723 }, "sha256": "ae76a8168071211bce2679ef4f074a3e5de1810376e34b3c943afc6d0696c928", "simhash": "1:a9ed7ddc9b01b716", "word_count": 1546 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:31:20.627609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF R. MARIE HARTIAN, Petitioner-Appellee, and ROBERT M. HARTIAN, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Robert Hartian (Robert), appeals from an order of the circuit court which held him in contempt of court. Robert argues that the circuit judge abused her discretion by refusing to recuse herself after Robert had filed a complaint against her with the Judicial Inquiry Board. For the following reasons, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s order.\nThis is the second appeal arising from the divorce action filed by petitioner, R. Marie Hartian (Marie). In the prior appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of dissolution entered by the circuit court on March 21, 1985, but reversed various fees which had been awarded to Robert. See In re Marriage of Hartian (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 440, 526 N.E.2d 1104, appeal denied (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 558, 535 N.E.2d 401.\nDuring the pendency of this earlier appeal, the case was reassigned to Judge Cervini. On April 28, 1987, Robert filed an amended motion to vacate the dissolution order, which sought various forms of relief including the payment of the attorney fees awarded to him by the circuit court.\nMarie moved to strike the amendment, alleging that the settlement was res judicata to all counts of the amended motion. She also requested attorney fees pursuant to section 2 \u2014 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611). Robert then sought judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Marie\u2019s motion failed to indicate whether relief was sought under section 2\u2014 615 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615) or under section 2 \u2014 619 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 619) of .the Code. Robert also asserted that the motion failed to meet the statutory requirements of either procedure.\nMeanwhile, Robert obtained a garnishment of one of Marie\u2019s bank accounts which he claimed contained sufficient funds to satisfy the monetary judgment awarded to him against Marie. Marie filed a motion to quash garnishment which was subsequently granted by the court on July 21. The court later entered an order staying all proceedings pending review in the appellate court.\nOn October 15, the circuit court heard argument on Marie\u2019s amended motion to strike Robert\u2019s amended petition. The court granted the motion, basing its ruling on section 2 \u2014 615. The court further granted Marie\u2019s request for attorney fees in the amount of $400. Four days later, the court informed both parties that it was vacating the fee award because that issue had not been briefed and argued. During this hearing, Marie\u2019s counsel informed the court that the motion to strike was argued under section 2 \u2014 619, but that the order reflected that the court granted relief under section 2 \u2014 615. The court then changed the order to correct this mistake. Prior to the hearing, the court had telephoned both parties\u2019 attorneys and explained the nature of the hearing. Robert\u2019s attorney could not be present at the hearing, but he apparently agreed that Robert would attend the proceedings.\nOn September 29, 1989, Marie filed a petition seeking to compel Robert to pay her 37% of his Navy disability pension as set forth in the dissolution agreement. After hearings on the motion, the circuit court ruled that Robert had the ability to comply with its order, but willfully refused to do so. He was therefore ordered confined to the Department of Corrections for six months or until the $3,123 arrearage was paid. The court stayed enforcement of the judgment, allowing Robert the opportunity to purge the contempt. This appeal followed.\nRobert presents a multipronged argument concerning the propriety of the court\u2019s order of contempt in addition to the trial judge\u2019s refusal to recuse herself under the circumstances presented in this case. Robert first maintains that Judge Cervini should have recused herself under Supreme Court Rule 63(C) (134 Ill. 2d R. 63(C)). Although Rule 63(C) governs the disqualification of judges from cases and provides an extensive list of circumstances requiring judicial disqualification (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 63(C)), none of the listed reasons are implicated in the case at bar. Moreover, nothing in the record supports Robert\u2019s appellate allegations of prejudice on the part of the circuit court.\nRobert next contends that the circuit court should have granted his motion for a change of venue pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1001 of the Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1001.) Robert\u2019s post-decree petition constituted a continuation of the dissolution proceeding and, as such, precluded a change of venue as of right since substantial rulings had been made at bar. (See In re Marriage of Kozloff(1984), 101 Ill. 2d 526, 463 N.E.2d 719.) Accordingly, Robert is entitled to a change of venue only if he can demonstrate actual prejudice. In re Marriage of Kozloff 101 Ill. 2d at 532.\nRobert argues that the record in this case establishes that Judge Cervini engaged in a course of prejudicial conduct against him. A trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden of overcoming this presumption rests on the party making the charge of prejudice, who must present evidence of personal bias stemming from an extrajudicial source and evidence of prejudicial trial conduct. (McCormick v. McCormick (1988), 180 Ill. App. 3d 184, 194, 536 N.E.2d 113, appeal denied (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 620, 545 N.E.2d 113.) Robert maintains that his complaint against the judge, filed with the Judicial Inquiry Board, is an extrajudicial source which necessitates a finding of actual prejudice. This position has not been adopted by any court in Illinois and has been rejected by courts in two foreign jurisdictions. (See Jones v. Alper (1990), 21 Phila. 344; In re S.S.K. (1990), 154 Wis. 2d 868, 455 N.W.2d 678.) In each of these cases, the courts affirmed the trial courts\u2019 denials of petitions for recusal because the allegations of prejudice were not supported by the facts of each case. Both reviewing courts found that recusal was sought due to adverse rulings or in an attempt to intimidate the trial court. Likewise, in the case at bar, Robert\u2019s grievance appears to stem from his belief that Judge Cervini wrongly ruled against him. Allegedly erroneous findings and rulings by the circuit court are insufficient reasons to believe that the court had personal bias or prejudice for or against a litigant. (McCormick, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 194.) To allow a change of venue under these circumstances would create a dangerous precedent whereby those seeking venue changes need only file charges with the Judicial Inquiry Board to achieve that purpose. Robert\u2019s argument for recusal on this ground is meritless.\nA party seeking a change of venue must predicate its motion on facts other than adverse rulings. (Dayan v. McDonald\u2019s Corp. (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 367, 485 N.E.2d 1188.) However, Robert points to various adverse rulings to support his allegations of prejudice. For example, he alleges that the court improperly quashed his garnishment; however, the record indicates that the garnishment was quashed so that the issue could be addressed in toto with other issues. The court later issued a stay on all issues, pending the appellate court\u2019s decision. The alleged ex parte hearing appears to have been held with the consent of Robert\u2019s attorney. Moreover, Robert never filed a motion to reconsider any decision made at the hearing nor did he move for a rehearing. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Robert\u2019s petition for recusal.\nThe circuit court here held Robert in contempt because he refused to pay 37% of his disability pension to Marie. In the first appeal, this court specifically found that Robert agreed and promised to pay that percentage of the disability to Marie. (In re Marriage of Hartian, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 446-47.) Issues previously determined by a court of review bind subsequent proceedings at both the trial and appellate levels. (Stallman v. Youngquist (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 683, 504 N.E.2d 920, rev\u2019d on other grounds (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355.) Robert, therefore, was obliged to comply with this order. Whether and on what grounds a party is guilty of contempt and the decision whether or not to punish a contemnor rests within the sound discretion of the circuit court, whose decision should not be reversed except if grossly abused. (Board of Junior College District No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600 (1970), 126 Ill. App. 2d 418, 262 N.E.2d 125.) Furthermore, a party is in contempt of court when he willfully violates an order of the court. (In re Marriage of Cierny (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 334, 346, 543 N.E.2d 201.) The record in this case clearly establishes that Robert willfully refused to comply with the court\u2019s order to pay Marie the disability payment and does not reveal an abuse of discretion.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMANNING, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "James H. Wolf & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago (James H. Wolf, of counsel), for appellant.", "Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago (Robert J. Franco and Robert Marc Chemers, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF R. MARIE HARTIAN, Petitioner-Appellee, and ROBERT M. HARTIAN, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20141008\nOpinion filed November 25,1991.\nJames H. Wolf & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago (James H. Wolf, of counsel), for appellant.\nPretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, of Chicago (Robert J. Franco and Robert Marc Chemers, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0566-01", "first_page_order": 586, "last_page_order": 590 }