{ "id": 5264505, "name": "SCOTT WILLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, Successor to International Harvester Company, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Wille v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.", "decision_date": "1991-12-06", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20141875", "first_page": "833", "last_page": "843", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 833" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "479 N.E.2d 1000", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 982", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3530138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0982-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 1091", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3620510 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/177/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 1321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 884", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499398 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0884-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3556970 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506720 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 1213", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 140", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464238 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0140-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 891", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2592905 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621838 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 N.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2866138 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 1378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3440703 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/132/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2461681 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 1295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2500016 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2616469 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 744", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614642 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 N.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5603975 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636662 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0766-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 873, "char_count": 21713, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3999097841909957e-07, "percentile": 0.6444842923274677 }, "sha256": "fbd8e52e0b1ebcd7bca49eb2ac2367cec14ad1a5468400997554efb92b43eefd", "simhash": "1:bfcb9135dbfc9db5", "word_count": 3434 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:31:20.627609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SCOTT WILLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, Successor to International Harvester Company, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Scott Wille, brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County seeking damages for injuries incurred when his hand became caught in a bunk feeder machine. Among the defendants were Navistar International Transportation Corporation (successor to International Harvester Company), which sold and distributed the bunk feeder; Alfred Wild, the farmer who employed plaintiff and owned the bunk feeder; and Kasten Manufacturing Corporation, the manufacturer. Navistar in turn filed a counterclaim against Kasten.\nAfter a trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Navistar. The jury found in favor of plaintiff against Wild in the amount of $612,248.47, which it reduced by 20% ($122,500) for plaintiff\u2019s comparative negligence. The trial court entered judgments on these verdicts. On appeal, plaintiff seeks to recover the $122,500 from Navistar. Wild has not appealed the judgment against him. (Prior to trial, the trial court entered a default judgment against Kasten, an insolvent corporation. The jury returned a verdict against Kasten in the amount of $612,248.47, without any reduction. That decision is not involved in this appeal.)\nPlaintiff appeals from the judgment entered in Navistar\u2019s favor and the denial of his post-trial motion. Plaintiff urges that Navistar\u2019s closing argument was prejudicial and violated the trial court\u2019s prior in limine order; that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to give certain jury instructions requested by plaintiff; that the trial court erred in refusing to preclude Navistar\u2019s expert from testifying regarding the \u201cinadvertency\u201d of plaintiff\u2019s conduct; and that the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of Navistar was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn June 1979, Wild hired the 16-year-old plaintiff to assist in harvesting hay. Wild owned a \u201cbunk feeder,\u201d which was designed for and sold by Navistar. The feeder is a type of conveyor belt used to unload hay from a wagon to a silo for storage. The feeder attaches to the side of the wagon and derives its power from the tractor\u2019s engine and is not functional apart from the wagon and tractor. Wild showed plaintiff how to use the equipment to unload hay, and during the several weeks prior to the incident, plaintiff unloaded 20 loads of hay daily using the bunk feeder.\nOn the day of the accident, when the bunk feeder initially jammed, Wild stuck his hand into the \u201cclean-out hole\u201d in the bunk feeder without turning off the power. The clean-out holes, each rectangular and measuring three by six inches, had no doors or guards preventing access to the clean-out holes. After several attempts, Wild dislodged the hay and the machine began functioning again. Later that day, when the feeder again jammed with hay, plaintiff stuck his hand into the opening several times to dislodge the hay, as he had seen Wild do earlier. Plaintiff testified that he felt \u201creal uneasy\u201d about sticking his hand into the hole and that he thought doing so involved \u201csome danger.\u201d On the third attempt, plaintiff\u2019s hand got caught in the \u201cpinch point\u201d between the belt and the power roller. Plaintiff\u2019s hand was crushed and severely burned, requiring skin grafts and the amputation of several fingers.\nPlaintiff testified that he read and followed all the operating instructions. Plaintiff knew there were rollers inside the feeder\u2019s conveyor belt, knew their approximate location and knew that one could access the rollers through the clean-out hole. Plaintiff also knew that the wagon bore a warning which cautioned users to disengage the engine before cleaning or servicing and knew that this warning applied to all farm equipment. He stated that he would not have placed his hand inside the hole if there had been a warning sticker on the feeder itself.\nThe parties do not dispute that there were no warning signs on the bunk feeder to caution users about the unguarded clean-out hole. Nor did the owner\u2019s manual contain instructions regarding the clean-out hole.\nPlaintiff\u2019s expert, Dror Kopernick, a mechanical engineer specializing in machine safety, testified that the feeder was defective and unreasonably dangerous because the clean-out hole was unguarded and allowed access to the \u201cpinch point\u201d; the feeder lacked a warning advising of the danger of the clean-out hole; and the feeder failed to comply with all the applicable industry standards.\nNavistar\u2019s expert, Randall Swanson, an expert in farm safety, testified that the feeder\u2019s design was safe and complied with applicable industry standards, and that sufficient warnings were provided. He further testified that the pinch point on the feeder was adequately guarded and complied with the American Society of Agricultural Engineers (ASAE) standard which requires that the pinch point be guarded from accidental or inadvertent conduct. Prior to Swanson\u2019s testimony, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion in limine to bar Swanson from rendering an opinion on the inadvertency of plaintiff\u2019s conduct. According to Swanson, after plaintiff intentionally inserted his hand into the clean-out hole, his conduct could not be deemed \u201cinadvertent.\u201d\nPlaintiffs strict liability claim against Navistar alleged that the bunk feeder was defective because it lacked warnings near the clean-out hole and because the bunk feeder had no guard over the clean-out hole near the drive roller. Plaintiff sought recovery against Wild, the farmer who owned the equipment and employed plaintiff, for his negligence in supervising plaintiff.\nPrior to trial, the trial court granted plaintiff\u2019s motion in limine precluding Navistar from asserting, suggesting or implying that plaintiff\u2019s injuries were caused by plaintiff\u2019s inattentive, negligent or careless conduct or by any misuse of the bunk feeder. These orders did not apply to Wild. The trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s motion in limine to bar evidence or argument that plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries. At the close of the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in plaintiff\u2019s favor on Navistar\u2019s affirmative defense of assumption of risk. The trial court subsequently denied plaintiff\u2019s request to instruct the jury regarding the directed verdict on assumption of risk, stating that plaintiff\u2019s counsel would \u201ccover that in closing arguments.\u201d During closing arguments, over plaintiff\u2019s objection, Navistar repeatedly referred to plaintiff\u2019s conduct and knowledge of the dangers of the machine, arguing that plaintiff\u2019s conduct, not its product, was a proximate cause of the injuries. Navistar also argued that the product was not unreasonably dangerous.\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends that Navistar\u2019s references during closing argument to plaintiff\u2019s knowledge and conduct violated the trial court\u2019s prior in limine order and its directed finding for plaintiff on Navistar\u2019s assumption of risk defense, and thus, constituted reversible error.\nA violation of an order granting a motion in limine can be the basis for a new trial only if the order is specific and the violation is clear. (In re Estate of Loesch (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 766, 481 N.E.2d 32.) When the likelihood of prejudice is great, the violation of an order in limine is reversible error. (Shehy v. Bober (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 398 N.E.2d 80.) Moreover, we will reverse a judgment based upon errors in closing argument when the errors are clearly improper and prejudicial. Ferry v. Checker Taxi Co. (1987), 165 Ill. App. 3d 744, 520 N.E.2d 733.\nIn this case, the court granted plaintiff\u2019s pretrial motions in limine which precluded Navistar from arguing or implying that plaintiff\u2019s conduct was inattentive, negligent or careless or that plaintiff misused the bunk feeder. Despite the specificity and clarity of the order, Navistar\u2019s counsel nonetheless argued as follows during closing argument:\n\u201cNAVISTAR\u2019S COUNSEL: Mr. Wille admitted that he knew that before he stuck his hand in the clean-out hole. He knew that there were moving parts inside of the opening. He knew he could get hurt\u2014\nMR. WEINSTEIN [Plaintiff\u2019s attorney]: Objection, your Honor, to this line of argument. There is no assumption of risk in this case. His conduct is not at issue.\nTHE COURT: You may proceed.\nNAVISTAR\u2019S COUNSEL: He admitted in court that before he put his hand in that hole he knew it was dangerous. He admitted in court that before he put his hand in the hole he knew he could get hurt.\nHe admitted in court that he knew approximately where the drive roller was before he put his hand in the cleanout hole.\nHe didn\u2019t shut the engine off to the tractor, he didn\u2019t turn the PTO lever to the off position.\nHe knew there were moving parts inside that bunk feeder. He knew it was dangerous to stick his hand in there near those moving parts. He knew he could get hurt.\nHe knew he had to shut off the machinery before servicing it but he didn\u2019t shut it off. And he did stick his hand into the moving parts and it was dangerous. And his hand did get caught and he was injured.\n* * *\nMR. WEINSTEIN: Your Honor, objection\u2014\nNAVISTAR\u2019S COUNSEL: -and he did not shut the engine off to tractor.\nTHE COURT: What is your objection? (WHEREUPON, a conversation was had off the record).\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\n* * *\nNAVISTAR\u2019S COUNSEL: So why did this accident happen? It happened because Mr. Wille ignored his own warning and he took what he knew to be the wrong \u2014 he did what he knew to be the wrong thing. He violated the basic rule of the farm safety he already knew about, \u2018Don\u2019t Stick Your Hand Near Moving Parts.\u2019 \u201d\nThe record reveals approximately 11 pages of argument concerning plaintiff\u2019s conduct. By focusing on what plaintiff knew and what plaintiff did, Navistar improperly argued that plaintiff voluntarily encountered a known danger and assumed the risk of his injuries. Such argument clearly contradicted the trial court\u2019s prior in limine orders which specifically precluded reference to plaintiff\u2019s conduct. We believe that the likelihood of prejudice from Navistar\u2019s violation of the in limine orders was great and therefore constituted reversible error. On this basis, we remand the case for a new trial on Navistar\u2019s liability.\nWe also conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to inform the jury about its directed finding for plaintiff on the assumption of risk defense as to Navistar. In denying plaintiff\u2019s request for such an instruction, the trial court asserted that plaintiff\u2019s counsel \u201cwould cover that in [closing argument], and then [the jury] will get the instruction.\u201d A party is entitled to have the jury informed about the issues presented, the applicable legal principles and the facts that must be proved to support a verdict. (Erickson v. Muskin Corp. (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 117, 535 N.E.2d 475.) In reviewing the propriety of instructions on appeal, we must consider them as a whole in determining whether they are clear enough so as not to mislead and whether they fairly and accurately state the applicable law. (Erickson v. Muskin Corp., 180 Ill. App. 3d 117, 535 N.E.2d 475.) Giving or denying jury instructions is in the trial court\u2019s discretion, and the refusal to give instructions will result in new trial only where a party shows serious prejudice to his right to a fair trial. (Thompson v. Abbott Laboratories (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 188, 549 N.E.2d 1295; In re Estate of Loesch, 134 Ill. App. 3d 766, 481 N.E.2d 32.) We believe that the trial court\u2019s refusal to inform the jury about its directed finding for plaintiff on the assumption of risk defense offered by Navistar misled the jury by failing to fully set forth the applicable law and seriously prejudiced plaintiff\u2019s right to a fair trial.\nAs the trial court anticipated, plaintiff\u2019s counsel told the jury during closing argument that the assumption of risk defense did not apply to Navistar and that plaintiff\u2019s negligence was only significant with respect to plaintiff\u2019s claim against Wild. The trial court, however, did not inform the jury about its directed finding on assumption of risk, or define such concept for the jury. Moreover, despite plaintiff\u2019s directed finding on the assumption of risk defense, the court permitted Navistar\u2019s counsel to argue at length that plaintiff\u2019s conduct caused his injury. We believe that by allowing Navistar to vigorously present such argument to the jury over plaintiff's objection, the trial court tacitly indicated to the jury that it could consider plaintiff\u2019s conduct as to Navistar. Moreover, despite plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s remarks during closing argument regarding the inapplicability of the assumption of risk defense, the jury could construe such statements as advocacy, not \u201claw,\u201d especially given Navistar\u2019s focus on plaintiff\u2019s conduct. Taken as a whole, we believe that the absence of instructions, combined with Navistar\u2019s argument emphasizing plaintiff\u2019s conduct, failed to accurately and fairly inform the jury in this case that it could not consider plaintiff\u2019s conduct in determining Navistar\u2019s liability. As such, we find that prejudice resulted which requires us to reverse and remand this cause for a new trial.\nNavistar concedes on appeal that in closing argument it asserted that plaintiff was a proximate cause of his injuries, but maintains that such argument was proper because causation was at issue in the case. It is well established that a strict products liability plaintiff must prove that his injury resulted from an unreasonably dangerous condition of the product. (Rios v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 526, 558 N.E.2d 252.) Navistar maintains that plaintiff, and not any condition of defendant\u2019s product, was a proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injuries and that it was properly permitted to argue this in closing argument. We believe, however, that after the trial court entered the in limine order barring Navistar from arguing plaintiff\u2019s conduct, and then directed a finding for plaintiff on assumption of risk, Navistar was barred from making plaintiff\u2019s knowing and intentional conduct an issue, as it forcefully did during closing argument. As such, we reject its attempt to cloak the argument as one of sole proximate cause. Moreover, because we conclude that such extensive references and argument likely confused the jury, we find that the comments were highly prejudicial.\nBecause we remand this case, we consider several other issues that will likely arise on remand. Plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as follows on the applicable ASAE standard:\n\u201cIf you decide that Navistar failed to comply with these standards, you may consider that fact together with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence in determining whether or not the bunk feeder was unreasonably dangerous.\u201d\nThe court rejected plaintiff\u2019s instruction as \u201cverbose\u201d and relied instead upon Navistar\u2019s non-Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions (IPI) instruction, which provided as follows:\n\u201c[Y]ou may consider whether [the product] complied with relevant industry standards. A standard is relevant if it applies to the equipment and the use of that equipment involved in a particular case.\u201d\nWe do not believe that the proffered instruction failed to advise the jury that compliance with the standard was only one factor to be considered. Rather, the instructions as a whole fairly and accurately informed the jury of the various factors to be considered in determining whether Navistar\u2019s product was unreasonably dangerous. A trial court has considerable discretion in determining the form of an instruction (Ralston v. Plogger (1985), 132 Ill. App. 3d 90, 476 N.E.2d 1378), and we cannot say that the trial court erred in giving Navistar\u2019s instruction on the industry standard.\nWe also reject plaintiff\u2019s assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a manufacturer\u2019s nondelegable duty. Plaintiff tendered this instruction in anticipation of Navistar\u2019s argument that Wild\u2019s failure to properly instruct plaintiff caused the injury. Here, the trial court instructed the jury separately in the elements required to support plaintiff\u2019s action against Navistar and against Wild. Moreover, the court instructed the jury: \u201cYou will decide each defendant\u2019s case separately as if each were a separate lawsuit.\u201d The court also informed the jury as follows:\n\u201cIf you decide that the plaintiff has proved all the propositions of his case, against defendant Navistar, then it is not a defense that the defendant, Navistar, did not create the condition which rendered the bunk feeder unreasonably dangerous and that the condition of the bunk feeder existed before the bunk feeder came under the control of defendant, Navistar.\u201d\nAlthough these instructions do not specifically describe Navistar\u2019s \u201cnondelegable duty,\u201d we conclude that these instructions as a whole clearly advised the jury as to Navistar\u2019s duty and the applicable law. As such, no others were needed. See Erickson v. Muskin Corp., 180 Ill. App. 3d 117, 535 N.E.2d 475.\nWe also consider plaintiff\u2019s contention that the trial court improperly allowed Navistar\u2019s expert, Swanson, to testify about the inadvertency of plaintiff\u2019s conduct. Plaintiff\u2019s expert, Kopernick, testified that the feeder was unreasonably dangerous because the clean-out hole allowed access to an unguarded \u201cpinch point.\u201d In so concluding, Kopernick relied upon an ASAE safety standard which requires in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cThe acute entry angles of exposed gears, belts, and chain drives and idlers shall be covered by shields, rods, mesh or other portions of the machine to minimize the possibility of inadvertent contact.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nKopernick quoted this standard, tendered copies to the jury and explained why he believed that plaintiff\u2019s contact was inadvertent. Kopernick concluded that the feeder was unreasonably dangerous because \u201c[the pinch point] was not guarded against accidental contact.\u201d Because the inadvertency of plaintiff\u2019s contact relates directly to the applicability of this safety standard and the determination of whether the feeder was unreasonably dangerous, we believe that Swanson\u2019s opinion would have been helpful to the jury and that Navistar was entitled to offer such testimony. We conclude that the trial court properly allowed Swanson to offer his opinion as to the inadvertency of plaintiff\u2019s conduct.\nFinally, we must consider plaintiff\u2019s contention that he is entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.\nA judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate only where the evidence when viewed in a light most favorable to the opponent so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict can stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co. (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504; Ziekert v. Cox (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 926, 538 N.E.2d 751.\nTo recover for strict liability in tort, a plaintiff must prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous and that plaintiff\u2019s injuries resulted from such condition. (West v. Deere & Co. (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 891, 559 N.E.2d 511.) Whether a product is defective, and therefore, unreasonably dangerous, is ordinarily a fact for the jury. (Renfro v. Allied Industrial Equipment Corp. (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 140, 507 N.E.2d 1213.) Plaintiff must also prove that his injury proximately resulted from the product\u2019s alleged defective condition (Lindenmier v. City of Rockford (1987), 156 Ill. App. 3d 76, 508 N.E.2d 1201), and a legal inference of defectiveness may not be drawn merely from evidence that an injury occurred. Artis v. Fibre Metal Products (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 228, 450 N.E.2d 756.\nBecause of the conflicting testimony, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the feeder was not unreasonably dangerous or that the feeder did not proximately cause plaintiff\u2019s injuries. Plaintiff\u2019s expert testified that the feeder was unreasonably dangerous because the clean-out hole allowed access to the nip point and that the feeder failed to comply with all applicable industry standards. Such evidence was substantially countered, however, by Navistar\u2019 s expert, who testified that the nip points were adequately shielded and conformed to the relevant industry standards. Although the experts offered contrary opinions, the weight to be assigned to each expert was for the jury to decide. (Rybak v. Provenzale (1989), 181 Ill. App. 3d 884, 537 N.E.2d 1321.) Where experts offer divergent conclusions, as here, the jury is entitled to believe one expert over the other. (See Loitz v. Remington Arms Co. (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 532 N.E.2d 1091; Martin v. Zucker (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 982, 479 N.E.2d 1000.) We cannot conclude that the evidence so overwhelmingly favored plaintiff that the verdict for Navistar cannot stand.\nWe find that plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on the issue of Navistar\u2019s liability. Plaintiff agrees that he cannot recover a judgment from Navistar in excess of $122,500, the amount deducted from the judgment entered against Wild.\nAccordingly, the judgment in favor of Navistar is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial in accordance with the holdings of this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nRAKOWSKI, P.J., and LaPORTA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Baskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein, of Chicago (Burton I. Weinstein and John R. Malkinson, of counsel), for appellant.", "Arnstein & Lehr, of Chicago (Arthur L. Klein and David B. Goodman, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SCOTT WILLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, Successor to International Harvester Company, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20141875\nOpinion filed December 6,1991.\nBaskin, Server, Berke & Weinstein, of Chicago (Burton I. Weinstein and John R. Malkinson, of counsel), for appellant.\nArnstein & Lehr, of Chicago (Arthur L. Klein and David B. Goodman, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0833-01", "first_page_order": 853, "last_page_order": 863 }