{ "id": 5264075, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME RASGAITIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rasgaitis", "decision_date": "1991-12-12", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20143897", "first_page": "855", "last_page": "862", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 855" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 584", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524750 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 U.S. 715", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173472 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/406/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 858", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3449830 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0858-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 1105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173858 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2577532 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" }, { "page": "429" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "430-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568792 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 N.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. App. 3d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2655042 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/186/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3529442 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/133/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. App. 3d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3587816 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/176/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 N.E.2d 1098", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598313 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0600-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 591, "char_count": 14371, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.9127943806329716e-08, "percentile": 0.3696053322027655 }, "sha256": "d99de742746da6ed19ccd6ff27b09cb864d80f765e14b5afcfd70a254b460c34", "simhash": "1:abb823357f4c9e6e", "word_count": 2353 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:31:20.627609+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME RASGAITIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Jerome Rasgaitis appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County that, pursuant to section 104 \u2014 25(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25(g)), found defendant to be subject to involuntary admission, remanded defendant to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (hereinafter Department of Mental Health) for further treatment for a period of 40 years, and subjected said treatment to the court\u2019s continuing supervision, including court approval of \u201csuch matters as conditional release or discharge of the defendant.\u201d On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court\u2019s order was in error because the State failed to prove that he was subject to involuntary admission. Defendant also raises various challenges to the trial court\u2019s commitment of him for treatment for a period of 40 years. We reverse and remand.\nThe record reflects the following pertinent procedural history culminating in the circuit court order from which defendant appeals. Defendant was charged with the murder of Matti Griffin on December 1, 1975. He was found unfit for trial on March 9, 1976, and was held for treatment in accordance with section 5 \u2014 2\u20142 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 2\u20142). During this time, the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were amended to provide for a modified procedure in the confinement of an accused found unfit to stand trial. See People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 600, 476 N.E.2d 1098.\nOn December 10, 1981, pursuant to defendant\u2019s request, the court held a fitness hearing, under the new, amended provision to the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein the court determined that defendant was not fit to stand trial and would not be fit within one year. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 104 \u2014 23(b), 104 \u2014 28.) The trial court then held a discharge hearing to determine the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence to prove defendant guilty of the murder for which he was charged. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25(a).) The court found that the defendant was \u201cnot guilty\u201d of the murder and imposed a maximum treatment of five years with the Department of Mental Health. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25(d).) Defendant appealed from this determination, which this court affirmed in Raseaitis (126 Ill. App. 3d 600).\nAt the expiration of the five-year treatment period, an additional hearing was held, pursuant to section 104 \u2014 25(g) of the Code, on July 14, 1987. At this hearing, Dr. Gerson Kaplan, psychiatrist at the Psychiatric Institute of the circuit court of Cook County, testified that he examined defendant on June 16, 1987, and reviewed the defendant\u2019s medical, social, and psycho-social history. Dr. Kaplan determined that defendant had a history of mental illness, including psychosis. He noted that during the examination, defendant said that he had been hearing voices for many years and continued to hear voices. Dr. Kaplan testified that defendant exhibited a rather flat affect, had poor eye contact, and that his appearance was messy and disheveled. Defendant\u2019s mental health records indicated that defendant participated very minimally in program activities and that he continued to be rather sloppy.\nDr. Kaplan testified that he considered defendant as currently psychotic and that he was currently unfit for trial and in need of hospital psychiatric care. He testified that he considered defendant a danger to other people and that defendant would be a threat to public safety if defendant were released into society. Dr. Kaplan stated that in his opinion defendant was subject to involuntary admission. He further testified that defendant\u2019s prognosis was poor and that defendant remained severely disturbed. Dr. Kaplan stated that defendant would probably continue to need hospital care for an indefinite period in the future.\nThe State presented no additional evidence at the hearing, and the defense offered no evidence for the court\u2019s consideration. The trial court determined that defendant continued to be unfit for trial and was subject to involuntary admission to the Department of Mental Health. The court also found that defendant was \u201ca serious threat or danger to the public safety.\u201d The trial court entered an order reciting that, pursuant to section 104 \u2014 25(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, defendant was \u201csubject to involuntary admission and a serious threat to the public safety. Accordingly, the defendant is remanded to the [Department of Mental Health] for further treatment for a period of 40 years nunc pro tunc from July 14, 1987. Said treatment is subject to the court\u2019s supervision during the pendency of this 40 year order including court approval of such matters as conditional release or discharge of the defendant.\u201d Defendant\u2019s appeal followed.\nDefendant argues that the State failed to prove that he was subject to involuntary admission, or a threat to the public safety, pursuant to section 104 \u2014 25(g)(2). We disagree.\nA person is subject to involuntary admission where he is mentally ill and, because of this disability, is either (1) \u201creasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future,\u201d or (2) \u201cunable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 1 \u2014 119.) An order of involuntary admission is appropriate when the evidence reveals prior dangerous conduct in conjunction with evidence that the respondent remains in need of hospitalized mental treatment. See, e.g., In re Orr (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 498, 531 N.E.2d 64; In re Mazzara (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 146, 478 N.E.2d 567.\nIn the instant cause, the record reveals that defendant confessed that he had murdered Matti Griffin. According to the testimony of Dr. Kaplan, defendant suffered from psychosis. Dr. Kaplan stated that, despite over a decade of medical treatment, defendant continued to be psychotic in need of psychiatric care. Dr. Kaplan also testified that defendant\u2019s prognosis is poor, and that he will need psychiatric care for an indefinite period of time. In light of all of these circumstances, we find sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant was subject to involuntary admission and a threat to public safety. The cases cited by defendant are factually inapposite, since neither respondent in those decisions had been charged with a violent crime. In re Cutsinger (1989), 186 Ill. App. 3d 219, 542 N.E.2d 414; In re Cochran (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 198, 487 N.E.2d 389.\nAlthough we find sufficient evidence to support the trial court\u2019s determination that defendant was subject to involuntary admission and a threat to public safety, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court erred in ordering that the period of defendant\u2019s treatment, to a maximum of 40 years, commenced upon the date of the court\u2019s hearing on July 14, 1987.\nBoth section 104 \u2014 23 and section 104 \u2014 25 consider a defendant\u2019s treatment period to commence upon a determination that the defendant is unfit to stand trial. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 104\u2014 23, 104 \u2014 25.) Under section 104 \u2014 23, if the trial court determines that the defendant will probably not be fit to stand trial \u201cwithin one year from the date of the original finding of unfitness, or if at the end of one year from that date the court finds the defendant still unfit,\u201d the court is empowered to hold a discharge hearing pursuant to section 104 \u2014 25. (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104\u2014 23(b).\nAt that discharge hearing, the court is authorized to determine the sufficiency of the evidence against the accused. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25(a).) If the trial court does not enter an order of acquittal pursuant to the discharge hearing, subsection 104\u2014 25(d) allows the following:\n\u201c[T]he defendant may be remanded for further treatment and the one year time limit set forth in Section 101 \u2014 23 shall be extended as follows: ***\nIf the State sustained its burden of proof on a charge of murder, the treatment period may be extended up to a maximum treatment period of 5 years.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104-25(d)(2).\nSection 104 \u2014 25(g) states that, upon the expiration of an extended period of treatment order in accordance with subsection 104 \u2014 25(d):\n\u201cIf the defendant continues to be unfit to stand trial, the court shall determine whether he or she is subject to involuntary admission under the Mental Health and Development Disabilities Code or constitutes a serious threat to the public safety. If so found, the defendant shall be remanded to the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities or to the Department of Rehabilitation Services for further treatment and shall be treated in the same manner as a civilly committed patient for all purposes, except that the original court having jurisdiction over the defendant shall be required to approve any conditional release or discharge of the defendant, for the period of commitment equal to the maximum sentence to which the defendant would have been subject had he or she been c\u2019onvicted in a criminal proceeding.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25(g)(2).\nSubsection (g)(4) of section 104 \u2014 25 explicitly states, \u201cIn no event may the treatment period be extended to exceed the maximum sentence to which a defendant would have been subject had he or she been convicted in a criminal proceeding.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 104 \u2014 25(g)(4).) Under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections, the maximum sentence for murder is 40 years\u2019 imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141.\nIn light of these provisions, and under the plain language of section 104 \u2014 25(g), the trial court was empowered to remand the defendant to the Department of Mental Health for treatment and the trial court retained jurisdiction to approve defendant\u2019s conditional release or discharge. (Yiadom v. Kiley (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 418, 429, 562 N.E.2d 310.) However, as shown in the above quotations, sections 104 \u2014 23 and 104 \u2014 25 consider a treatment period to commence upon the original finding of unfitness. In addition, section 104 \u2014 25(g)(4) states that the defendant\u2019s treatment period cannot be extended beyond the maximum sentence he would have received had he been convicted of murder, i.e., 40 years. Thus, the trial court\u2019s supervisory jurisdiction over the defendant\u2019s conditional release or discharge cannot be computed from the date of the court\u2019s section 104 \u2014 25(g) hearing on July 14, 1987. Rather, the trial court\u2019s supervisory jurisdiction over the defendant\u2019s conditional release or discharge, during defendant\u2019s involuntary admission, began to run from the date of the original finding of defendant\u2019s unfitness to stand trial, which occurred in March 1976.\nWe note that, in according the defendant the status of a \u201ccivilly committed patient,\u201d section 104 \u2014 25(g) anticipates application of the provisions of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, pars. 3 \u2014 700 through 3 \u2014 819) (hereinafter the MHDDC) to the defendant\u2019s involuntary admission and treatment. (Yiadom, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 429.) The record does not disclose whether the appropriate hearing has been held in defendant\u2019s cause. If the appropriate hearing has not been held, the circuit court is directed, on remand, to hold a hearing to determine defendant\u2019s continued need for involuntary admission. \u201cIf the circuit court deems [defendant\u2019s] discharge inappropriate, it can again remand him to custody of [the Department of Mental Health] pursuant to section 104\u2014 25(g)(2).\u201d (Yiadom, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 431.) We also note that the MHDDC anticipates periodic hearings to reevaluate the defendant\u2019s continued need for involuntary admission (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 813), and that such hearings should be held with regard to defendant\u2019s involuntary admission. (Yiadom, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 431.) In addition, the trial court should hold periodic hearings with respect to the defendant\u2019s continued unfitness to stand trial. (Yiadom, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 430-31, citing People v. Lang (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 407, 444, 498 N.E.2d 1105.) In light of these considerations, the trial court\u2019s order is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.\nThe remaining arguments raised by defendant have largely been rejected by prior Illinois precedent, to which we continue to adhere in the instant appeal. Contrary to defendant\u2019s claim, he is not entitled to credit for day-for-day good time under section 104 \u2014 25. (People v. Williams (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 858, 494 N.E.2d 525.) Also, because section 104 \u2014 25 refers to the maximum sentence defendant would receive if convicted, the defendant cannot \u201celect\u201d that the court\u2019s supervisory jurisdiction continue for the time period that represents a lesser sentence he might receive upon conviction under the provisions of the former Unified Code of Corrections in effect when the murder was allegedly committed. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(b) (maximum term for murder set at \u201cany term in excess of 40 years\u201d).) The present procedure, in light of our rulings upon review, does not deprive defendant of equal protection or due process under Jackson v. Indiana (1972), 406 U.S. 715, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435, 92 S. Ct. 1845. See Yiadom, 204 Ill. App. 3d 418; Raseaitis, 126 Ill. App. 3d 600; People v. Polachek (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 200, 470 N.E.2d 584.\nFor the reasons stated, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.\nReversed and remanded.\nJOHNSON and LINN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Veronica X. Calderon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME RASGAITIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20143897\nOpinion filed December 12,1991.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Ronald P. Alwin, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and Veronica X. Calderon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0855-01", "first_page_order": 875, "last_page_order": 882 }