{
  "id": 5256712,
  "name": "VICTOR VIDAL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Vidal v. Human Rights Commission",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "VICTOR VIDAL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE HOWERTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, who is black and from Nigeria, filed a complaint with the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Commission) accusing respondent, St. Mary\u2019s Hospital of East St. Louis, of employment discrimination. The complaint alleged disparate treatment, i.e., that the hospital fired petitioner for neglect of duty but did not fire American employees, whether black or white, for similar offenses.\nAn administrative law judge ruled in petitioner\u2019s favor, but the Commission reversed. Petitioner appealed, claiming: (1) the Commission failed to give proper weight to the findings of the administrative law judge as required by section 8A \u2014 103(E)(2) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 8A \u2014 103(E)(2)), namely that the Commission shall adopt the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) the administrative law judge erred when he refused to admit a newspaper article that detailed petitioner\u2019s dedication to the hospital during a blizzard. We vacate the Commission\u2019s order and remand.\nThe order and allocation of proofs in an employment discrimination case are as follows: The employee first must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facia case of discrimination. If this is accomplished, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If the employer produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, then the burden of production shifts back to the employee, who must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer\u2019s stated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. (See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817; refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089; Habinka v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 343, 548 N.E.2d 702.) Thus, the employee carries the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer discriminated against him throughout the entire proceeding. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 215,101 S. Ct. at 1093.\nIn the case at bar, the administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Commission agreed that petitioner made a prima facie case of disparate treatment and that the hospital stated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for firing petitioner. The ALJ and the Commission disagreed, however, on the issue of pretext.\nAfter petitioner made a prima facie case and after the hospital articulated nondiscriminatory purposes for its action, petitioner proffered evidence of pretext, namely, that American employees, whether black or white, charged with similar neglect of duty were not fired.\nThe ALJ ruled that the hospital\u2019s reasons for firing petitioner were merely a pretext for discrimination, finding the distinctions that the hospital made between petitioner and his fellow employees, e.g., that petitioner\u2019s misconduct jeopardized patient care, were not credible because petitioner\u2019s fellow employees\u2019 misconduct also jeopardized patient care.\nThe Commission, citing Kindred v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1989), 180 Ill. App. 3d 766, 536 N.E.2d 447, reversed the ALJ\u2019s finding of pretext stating that \u201cit is only when an employer\u2019s decision-making is so obviously wrong that legitimate explanations for the decisions are unbelievable that the Commission may step in and infer that an illegal, discriminatory motivation was behind the employment transaction at issue.\u201d This is a misstatement and a misapplication of the correct standard. We, therefore, vacate the Commission\u2019s order and remand for further review consistent with the proper standard.\nAn employee establishes pretext by a preponderance of the evidence (see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817; Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089; Habinka v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 343, 548 N.E.2d 702) and may do so in one of two ways: \u201ceither directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory purpose more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer\u2019s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 217, 101 S. Ct. at 1095.) The operative words of the above-quoted Burdine language are \u201cdirectly\u201d and \u201cindirectly,\u201d because, by their use, the Supreme Court instructs us that pretext may be shown: (1) \u201cdirectly,\u201d e.g., by the employee offering evidence of pretext that, when weighed against the employer\u2019s statement of nondiscriminatory purpose, tilts the scales ever so slightly in the employee\u2019s favor; or (2) \u201cindirectly,\u201d e.g., by showing through cross-examination that the employer\u2019s statement of nondiscriminatory purpose is unworthy of belief. To say, however, as did the Commission, that pretext is shown \u201conly when an employer\u2019s decision-making is so obviously wrong that legitimate explanations for the decisions are unbelievable\u201d is a misstatement, for it imposes a higher standard than prescribed in Burdine. Thus, the Commission erred.\nWe recognize that the Human Rights Act limits our function to ascertaining whether the final decision of the Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 8 \u2014 111(A)(2); Habinka v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 343, 548 N.E.2d 702.) We believe, however, that neither the Human Rights Act, nor cases interpreting it, compel us to ignore the Commission\u2019s application of an improper burden of proof upon the employee. Therefore, we vacate the Commission\u2019s order and remand this matter for review consistent with the proper burden for proving pretext set forth in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur- dine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 101 S. Ct. 1089, and the proper standard of review set forth in section 8A \u2014 103(E)(2) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 68, par. 8A\u2014 103(E)(2) (\u201c[t]he Commission shall adopt the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact if they are not against the manifest weight of the evidence\u201d)).\nPetitioner\u2019s second claim, that the ALJ erred by not admitting into evidence a newspaper article detailing his dedication to the hospital during a snowstorm, is waived because he filed no objection with the Commission. Glassworks, Inc. v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 842, 518 N.E.2d 343.\nVacated and remanded.\nGOLDENHERSH, P.J., and CHAPMAN, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE HOWERTON"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Edward L. Welch, of Welch & Bush, P.C., of East St. Louis, for petitioner.",
      "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Tanya Solov, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Human Rights Commission.",
      "Gerald M. Richardson, of Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for respondent St. Mary\u2019s Hospital of East St. Louis, Inc."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "VICTOR VIDAL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 5-90-0484\nOpinion filed December 27, 1991.\nRehearing denied February 4, 1992.\nEdward L. Welch, of Welch & Bush, P.C., of East St. Louis, for petitioner.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Tanya Solov, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Human Rights Commission.\nGerald M. Richardson, of Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, for respondent St. Mary\u2019s Hospital of East St. Louis, Inc."
  },
  "file_name": "0467-01",
  "first_page_order": 491,
  "last_page_order": 495
}