{
  "id": 5256738,
  "name": "SHIRLEY L. STASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCIS J. DOLL, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Stash v. Doll",
  "decision_date": "1992-01-15",
  "docket_number": "No. 3-91-0440",
  "first_page": "662",
  "last_page": "665",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:44.574739+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "SHIRLEY L. STASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCIS J. DOLL, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE GORMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Shirley Stash, appeals from a dismissal with prejudice of her claim against the defendant, Francis Doll, for lack of diligence in obtaining service of process. We reverse.\nOn August 1, 1986, plaintiff and defendant were involved in a traffic accident. On July 28, 1988, plaintiff filed suit against defendant. On August 1, 1988, a summons was issued and plaintiff attempted to have defendant served at the address shown on the accident report, which address was 1313 North Second Street, Henry, Illinois. The summons was returned expired and unserved because the address was incorrect.\nPlaintiff inquired about the matter and learned that the house at the Henry address was vacant. Plaintiff then contacted the Secretary of State\u2019s office and was told that the license number shown on the accident report was nonexistent in Illinois. Plaintiff contacted the Marshall County sheriff\u2019s office to learn where defendant lived, but to no avail. The 1989/90 telephone directory for the Lacon-Henry-Chillicothe area did not show a listing for defendant.\nIn early January 1990, plaintiff learned from the sheriff\u2019s office that defendant resided in Varna, Illinois. On January 9, 1990, an alias summons was procured and two days later defendant was served.\nIn December 1990, defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (134 Ill. 2d R. 103(b)), alleging that plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in serving process on defendant. In January 1991 the court granted the motion and dismissed the cause with prejudice. Plaintiff now appeals.\nSupreme Court Rule 103(b) provides in relevant part that an action shall be dismissed with prejudice if a plaintiff\u2019s failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service occurs after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 103(b) is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of that discretion. Montero v. University of Illinois Hospital (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 206, 372 N.E.2d 1010.\nEach case must be determined on its own facts, but the court will consider several factors to determine whether a plaintiff has carried his burden of showing that he has exercised reasonable diligence: (1) length of time used to obtain service; (2) the activities of the plaintiff; (3) plaintiff\u2019s knowledge of defendant\u2019s location; (4) the ease with which defendant\u2019s location could have been ascertained; (5) defendant\u2019s actual knowledge of the pendency of the action; and (6) special circumstances which would affect the plaintiff\u2019s efforts. North Cicero Dodge, Inc. v. Victoria Feed Co. (1987), 151 Ill. App. 3d 860, 503 N.E.2d 868.\nIn North Cicero, the court upheld the dismissal with prejudice under Rule 103(b) of plaintiff\u2019s auto accident case. It pointed out that plaintiff filed its complaint and issued the original summons one day before the statute of limitations expired. Following return of the unanswered summons, plaintiff spent 20 months examining 10 telephone directories before finding defendant\u2019s address. The court stated that plaintiff could have easily discovered the address through defendant\u2019s corporation registration, through the truck\u2019s operating permit with the Illinois Commerce Commission, through defendant\u2019s corporate registration, or through defendant\u2019s vehicle registration with the Secretary of State.\nUnder the facts of the instant case, a determination of lack of diligence and the dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s cause of action was an abuse of discretion. As to the first factor set forth in North Cicero, length of time, plaintiff did file her lawsuit shortly before the statute of limitations expired and did wait 17 months before having an alias summons issued after the original summons was returned unserved. However, this lengthy delay can partly be charged to defendant\u2019s maintaining a resident address with the Secretary of State in a home that he did not occupy.\nAs to the activities of plaintiff, plaintiff here had consulted the accident report to determine where to find defendant. She learned that the home at that address was vacant after the process server attempted service there. Plaintiff then contacted the Secretary of State\u2019s office, only to be told that the license number written on the accident report was not an existing number in Illinois. Plaintiff consulted the area telephone directory and also made periodic inquiries at the Marshall County sheriff\u2019s office. While she could have investigated in further ways, plaintiff\u2019s efforts were frustrated by defendant\u2019s failure to provide his current resident address to the Secretary of State. ^\nWe note that it is a strong policy of the State of Illinois, as reflected in the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 6 \u2014 116), that all drivers are to maintain their current address with the Secretary of State\u2019s office, and are, in fact, required by statute to notify him of any change within 10 days.\nAs to the third factor, plaintiff did not know where defendant was located. Defendant asserts that plaintiff\u2019s reliance on the process server\u2019s notation that the address was incorrect was not objectively reasonable. We disagree with this contention. Plaintiff should be allowed to rely on the return of service from the process server. She was objectively reasonable in believing that defendant did not live at the Henry address.\nAs to the fourth factor, the records kept with the Secretary of State \u2014 the one usually ready indicator of proper address \u2014 were not reliable here. This made locating defendant a more difficult process and distinguishes this case from North Cicero Dodge. Moreover, in the face of defendant\u2019s failure to update his resident address with the Secretary of State, we are unwilling to impose on plaintiff a duty that she hire a special process server to locate and serve defendant.\nAs to the fifth factor, there have been no claims that defendant knew of the pendency of plaintiff\u2019s action.\nFinally, there are special circumstances here which affected plaintiff\u2019s efforts to serve defendant. The defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license number was incorrect on the accident report. While not defendant\u2019s fault, this did occasion some delay on plaintiff\u2019s part in serving defendant.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Marshall County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTOUDER and HAASE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE GORMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Elmo E. Koos, Sr., of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "T. Donald Henson, of Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Reagan, P.C., of La Salle (Michael C. Jansz, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SHIRLEY L. STASH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCIS J. DOLL, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 91\u20140440\nOpinion filed January 15, 1992.\nElmo E. Koos, Sr., of Peoria, for appellant.\nT. Donald Henson, of Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Reagan, P.C., of La Salle (Michael C. Jansz, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0662-01",
  "first_page_order": 686,
  "last_page_order": 689
}