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Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1108476 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0171-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2186, "char_count": 71198, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8209962058402394e-07, "percentile": 0.7192162554650869 }, "sha256": "3b936a8979d7421c5445752f52b4ede6e78cb6583297829bfb62d3f425c10990", "simhash": "1:a3eef88e3fc499a4", "word_count": 11857 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:44.574739+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Keith Coleman appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County, which, following a jury trial, found defendant guilty of murder and two counts of armed robbery and concurrently sentenced him to 35 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and 15 years\u2019 imprisonment for armed robbery. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nThe record on appeal indicates the following. Defendant was charged by indictment with the murder of Elijah Taylor and the armed robbery of Elijah Taylor and Ruby Terrell. Dennis Fox, Nathan Haley and Kenneth Walls were also charged in this matter.\nTHE SUPPRESSION HEARING\nBefore trial, the trial court held a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements made by defendant to the police on the grounds that the statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel under both the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution.\nDefendant testified that at the time of the first interrogation relating to this case (January 30, 1985), he had three indictments pending against him and was incarcerated in the Cook County Department of Corrections. Defendant then testified that the first officer to interrogate him in this matter, Detective O\u2019Connor, thought that defendant knew his constitutional rights. It is unclear from defendant\u2019s testimony whether Detective O\u2019Connor only partially read defendant his Miranda rights or whether the Miranda warnings were perfunctorily read. The defendant presented his attorney\u2019s business card to Detective O\u2019Connor, but did not explicitly ask for an attorney to be present during the interrogation. Defendant had been placed in a lineup relating to the Taylor murder; defendant testified that Detective O\u2019Connor told him that he had been positively identified in that lineup and that Dennis Fox had made a statement implicating him in the Taylor murder. Defendant denied involvement in the murder at that time.\nDefendant was also interrogated by Officers Tuider and McKinley. Defendant testified that he showed these officers his attorney\u2019s card as well, but that Officer Tuider declined to call the attorney because it was after 5 p.m. Defendant gave an oral statement to the officers after about an hour of interrogation and later gave a written statement to an assistant State\u2019s Attorney. Later, a court reporter was called in. According to defendant, the officers did not read him the Miranda warnings at this interrogation session.\nLeonard Petersen, an employee of the Cook County Department of Corrections, testified to the policies of the jail which permitted interrogation concerning crimes unrelated to defendant\u2019s incarceration without first attempting to contact defendant\u2019s attorney.\nDetective O\u2019Connor testified that he read the required Miranda warnings to defendant and that defendant stated he understood them. O\u2019Connor denied that defendant showed him an attorney\u2019s business card and that he told defendant that someone else had given the police a statement about the case.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney Zehe testified that he also interviewed defendant on January 30, 1985. Zehe also testified that he read the Miranda warnings to defendant, after which defendant agreed to speak to Zehe about the case. Zehe stated that the warnings were read again prior to defendant making a statement in the presence of a court reporter. Zehe denied knowing that defendant was represented by counsel on the unrelated charges, but admitted knowing that defendant was incarcerated on other charges at the time of the interrogation. Zehe and defendant went over the court-reported statement together and reread the Miranda warnings.\nThe trial court found that defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to counsel had not attached on the Taylor murder charges. Consequently, defendant\u2019s sixth amendment rights had not been violated. The trial court further found that full Miranda warnings were given to the defendant and that defendant had freely and voluntarily waived his fifth amendment rights. Therefore, there was no violation of defendant\u2019s fifth amendment right to counsel either. The trial court thus denied the motion to suppress defendant\u2019s statements.\nTHE MOTION FOR SEVERANCE\nThe common law record indicates that three of the four men charged in this matter moved for severance from a joint trial (the fourth, Kenneth Walls, entered into a plea agreement with the State). Dennis Fox\u2019s motion was granted; the other two motions were denied. Thus, defendant and Nathan Haley were tried jointly.\nTHE TRIAL\nKenneth Walls testified pursuant to a plea agreement with the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office under which the State agreed to recommend concurrent 10-year sentences for the armed robbery in this case and in an unrelated case in exchange for his testimony. At this time, Walls had known Nathan Haley and defendant for a few years and Dennis Fox for five or six months. The four men were close friends and Walls often visited the apartment of Fox and Haley to talk and \u201cget high.\u201d Walls further testified on direct examination that defendant was occasionally at this apartment, but testified on cross-examination that defendant always accompanied him to the apartment.\nDuring the late evening of December 17 and early morning of December 18, 1984, Walls was socializing, drinking beer and smoking marijuana and \u201csherm\u201d (PCP-coated marijuana) at Fox and Haley\u2019s apartment; defendant was there also. Between midnight and 1:30 a.m., Walls, Fox, Haley and defendant drove to a White Castle restaurant at the corner of 79th and Loomis.\nThe White Castle was diagonally across the street from the Impala Lounge, which was owned and operated by Elijah Taylor, who (according to Elijah\u2019s brother\u2019s testimony) was also known as \u201cPete.\u201d Walls testified that he and defendant had been in the Impala Lounge a couple of times but that defendant was not a regular patron.\nThe four were eating hamburgers in their parked car. Walls testified that Dennis Fox returned to the White Castle for carry-out service and defendant walked over to the Impala Lounge, but did not enter because the door was locked. Walls testified that defendant and Fox returned to the car, at which time defendant stated that the Impala Lounge was about to close, that Pete keeps a lot of money and suggested robbing Pete.\nTwo women and a man then walked out of the Impala Lounge and drove away. Walls testified that defendant said the car was Pete\u2019s but that Pete was not the man who had left. A short time later, the car returned. On direct examination, Walls testified that defendant said \u201cPete\u2019s car is back,\u201d but admitted under cross-examination that, at Fox\u2019s trial the previous week, Walls had testified that Fox said this. The car was driven by one of the women who had previously left. The woman wore a beige coat.\nWalls further testified that a man holding a paper bag then got in the car, but admitted on cross-examination that he told the police that there were two women in the car, not one, and that the man held several bags. Walls testified that defendant identified the man as Pete, stated that he probably had money in the bag and suggested that the four men should rob Pete and that it would be easy to do so.\nWalls then testified that both defendant and Fox suggested that they follow Pete\u2019s car. According to Walls, defendant directed him to drive to 68th Street, then to an alley running parallel to Loomis Street. The car stopped. Fox asked defendant to accompany him, but defendant declined on the ground that Pete might recognize him. Fox asked Walls, but then said \u201cyou\u2019re driving.\u201d Finally, Fox asked Haley, who agreed to go with Fox.\nWalls testified that as Fox and Haley left the car, he saw Fox withdraw a pistol from his trousers, but admitted on cross-examination that he had testified at Fox\u2019s trial only that he could see the handle of a gun protruding from Fox\u2019s waistband. Walls stated that the gun belonged to defendant, but later admitted that he had kept the gun at his house in a tennis racket case. Walls admitted to not seeing defendant with the gun that evening, not knowing how long Fox had possessed the gun and not hearing any discussion between defendant and Fox concerning the gun that evening.\nWalls further testified that Fox and Haley ran down a gangway, while he and defendant remained in the car with the motor running, but with the lights and radio off. According to Walls, he was about to drive away when defendant told him not to worry because Fox and Haley knew what they were doing. Walls also testified that he feared that Fox would injure him and defendant if they drove away, but later admitted that when he had previously told the police about these events, he did not mention defendant\u2019s alleged assurances.\nWalls then heard a woman scream. A short time later, Fox and Haley came running back from the gangway and jumped into the car. Defendant had opened a back door of the car. Fox was holding the gun and a beige coat resembled the one worn by the woman who drove Pete\u2019s car; Haley held a woman\u2019s purse. Fox ordered Walls to go and the car sped off. When asked what happened, Fox stated that a \u201cpunk\u201d grabbed him and that he \u201cpopped\u201d the punk. Fox searched a wallet, but found no money; Fox also mispronounced Elijah Taylor\u2019s name at that time. Haley searched the purse, but only found public aid cards and medicine bottles. The name \u201cRuby\u201d was mentioned in reference to the contents of the purse.\nWalls testified that Haley wore a light blue jacket, a black and white striped sweater, black corduroys, a maroon scarf and black and white gym shoes. Fox wore white gym shoes.\nFox expressed annoyance, stating that he thought Pete was going to have some money. Defendant was silent. Walls dropped defendant at his home, at which time Fox gave defendant the beige coat for defendant\u2019s sister. Walls then dropped off Haley and Fox and went home, but walked back to Fox and Haley\u2019s apartment 10 minutes later. Defendant was not there. Fox stated: \u201cI thought Keith said that they were going to have some money.\u201d All four men went to a hospital later that morning to seek treatment for a gunshot wound suffered by Haley in an unrelated incident. Walls then testified to a conversation which occurred four days later in which Fox asked defendant what he had done with the gun and that defendant replied, \u201cI got it in a safe place.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, Walls admitted that in a previous statement to the police, he attributed all of Haley\u2019s actions that evening to defendant because Haley had not been arrested or taken into custody, whereas defendant was already in custody on unrelated charges. Thus, Haley\u2019s name did not appear in this earlier statement.\nRuby Terrell testified that on the night and morning in question, she went from the Dynasty Lounge, where she worked, to the Impala Lounge. She drove two friends home from the Impala in Pete\u2019s car. She then returned to the Impala to wait for Pete. Pete came out of the Impala carrying a paper bag which contained sausage and eggs.\nTerrell and Taylor then drove to Taylor\u2019s home, where they intended to cook breakfast. As the two entered the vestibule of the building, Fox appeared, wielding a pistol. Fox shot Taylor and demanded money from him. Taylor responded that he didn\u2019t have any money. Fox summoned a second man who helped Fox wrestle Taylor to the ground. Fox ordered the second man to go through Taylor\u2019s pockets; the second man took Taylor\u2019s wallet. Fox snatched a necklace from Terrell\u2019s neck, demanded money which he thought Terrell had hidden in her brassiere and took her coat and purse. The two men then fled the scene.\nHarvey Taylor, the victim\u2019s brother, testified that Elijah Taylor had owned and operated the Impala Lounge for about 18 years, that Harvey worked at the Impala six days a week and that when he arrived home early in the morning in question, his wife and daughter told him that Elijah had been shot. Harvey also testified that Elijah died about 35 minutes after he arrived at the hospital.\nDetective Harold Hoffman testified that he spoke to Haley while he was in the hospital and remembered that Haley was wearing a blue jacket, a black and white sweater, dark pants and gym shoes. He also spoke to Walls and Fox.\nRobert Young, Taylor's neighbor, testified that he heard someone say \u201cTake off that damn jacket\u201d at about 3 a.m. in the morning in question. Young saw two black men running from the scene with their backs turned; one wore a navy blue jacket, a wine-colored scarf and white sneakers. Young heard coins hitting the ground and saw the two men run into a gangway. Young then heard the sound of a car ignition shortly thereafter.\nThe State put on three witnesses, including Ronald Caldwell, to establish that a gun recovered by police had previously been in the possession of defendant. Sergeant Donald Smith testified that a bullet removed from Elijah Taylor matched the gun recovered by the police. Dr. Diane Scala-Barnett, a forensic pathologist, testified that Elijah Taylor died of a gunshot wound to the abdomen.\nDetective O\u2019Connor testified that he requested that defendant, Fox and Walls stand in a lineup viewed by Ruby Terrell and Robert Young. Terrell identified Fox, but not defendant. O\u2019Connor then met with defendant and read the Miranda warnings which defendant said he understood, at which time defendant agreed to speak with him and Officer Tuider. Defendant later had a conversation with Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Zehe. O\u2019Connor also testified that the police then questioned Walls and brought Haley in for questioning.\nOfficer Tuider testified that defendant told him that the four men were sitting in the White Castle parking lot on the morning in question, that Fox ordered Walls to follow the victim\u2019s car, that defendant refused to accompany Fox because the victim might recognize him, that Haley left with Fox and that when the two returned, Fox had the pistol and coat and Haley had the purse.\nA court-reported statement made by defendant was introduced into evidence. Defendant stated that on the morning in question, he had been \u201cgetting high\u201d at Fox\u2019s house and that the four men drove to the White Castle. Fox walked over to the Impala Lounge for cigarettes, but it was closed. When Fox returned to the car, he asked if Pete had any money. Before defendant could reply, Fox asked him whether either of two men leaving the Impala was Pete, to which defendant said \u201cNo.\u201d Fox then said that Pete must still be inside and that they would wait. Defendant then asked \u201cWhat, you going to rob that place?\u201d Fox answered in the affirmative while holding a gun. Two women and a man then left the Impala in Pete\u2019s car. After about five minutes, the car returned and Pete got in. Fox asked defendant if that was Pete and if he had any money on him. Defendant responded in the affirmative upon which Fox declared, \u201cThis ought to be easy, follow him.\u201d\nThe court-reported statement then recounts the events up through Fox and Haley\u2019s return to the car. Defendant asked Fox if he shot Pete, to which Fox allegedly replied, \u201cman, that punk grabbed my arm.\u201d Haley rifled through the purse and Fox complained to defendant: \u201c[D]amn, damn, I thought you said he was going to have money.\u201d Defendant replied that he thought Pete had money. Walls then drove to a central location from which the others departed. Defendant\u2019s statement goes on to say that Fox later gave the gun to defendant, who in turn gave it to Ronald Caldwell.\nOfficer Tuider further testified that Haley refused to give a court-reported statement but agreed to sign a summary of his oral statement. The statement was then introduced. The four men went to the White Castle. Defendant went to the Impala for cigarettes and returned upon finding it closed. Defendant said that Pete had to have money. Haley said he knew Pete owned the Impala because defendant had told him. Defendant stated that the Impala should be closing. Fox suggested that the four men rob Pete. Three people left the Impala. Fox asked if any of them was Pete, to which defendant said \u201cNo.\u201d The car drove away and returned with one person. A man exited the Impala, whom defendant identified as Pete. Fox \u201ctold him\u201d to follow the car.\nFox asked defendant to accompany him; defendant refused because Pete knew him. Fox asked Haley to go with him. Fox entered Taylor\u2019s building, while Haley stood one house away to watch for cars. Haley heard a shot and saw Fox emerge from the building with a coat, a wallet and a gun in his hand. The two ran back to Walls\u2019 car. Fox went through the wallet and became angry upon discovering there was no money in it. Walls and defendant returned to Walls\u2019 house, while Haley and Fox went to Fox\u2019s house.\nDefendant did not testify at trial. Codefendant Haley did testify, denying he was at the scene of the crime and claiming he was at his girl friend\u2019s house when the crime took place. Haley stated that when he was arrested, he was handcuffed to a filing cabinet in the police station and was shown the statement. He signed the statement after being beaten on the face and chest. Haley denied robbing Terrell and Taylor and murdering Taylor.\nDetectives O\u2019Connor and McKinley, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Zehe, Wayne Kinzie, a jail paramedic, and Dr. Sirish Parikh, a jail i doctor, all testified that they had not observed any signs that Haley ] had been beaten. Haley\u2019s girl friend testified that a picture of Haley taken after his arrest showed a \u201cbusted lip\u201d that she had not seen before his arrest.\nFollowing jury instructions and closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of murdering Elijah Taylor and of the armed robbery of Taylor and Ruby Terrell. The trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years on the murder charge and 15 years for the armed robbery, to be served concurrently.\nDefendant now appeals, contending that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to the police; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance where he was unable to cross-examine codefendant Haley about statements Haley made to the police; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance where Haley\u2019s defense was antagonistic to his own; (4) the State used peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from his jury, thus denying his right to a fair trial; (5) the admission of evidence and argument concerning defendant\u2019s incarceration on unrelated robbery charges denied him his right to a fair trial; (6) the trial court erred in refusing to excuse two jurors for cause; (7) the admission of hearsay statements of the police to Kenneth Walls constitutes reversible error; (8) the closing arguments of codefendant Haley\u2019s counsel denied him a fair trial; (9) the trial court erred by instructing the jury before closing arguments; (10) the trial court erred by refusing to further instruct the jury on a question of law during jury deliberations -without notice to counsel; and (11) his sentence is excessive.\nDefendant\u2019s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to the police. Defendant claims that these statements were obtained in violation of his rights to counsel guaranteed by the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution. According to defendant\u2019s brief, his retention of counsel in the unrelated cases pending against him at the time of the custodial interrogations in this matter constitutes an invocation of his rights to counsel under both the fifth and sixth amendments which would make the interrogation in this matter improper.\nThe United States Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a criminal defendant\u2019s invocation of his sixth amendment right to counsel is also an invocation of his fifth amendment right to counsel. (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991), 501 U.S. _, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 111 S. Ct. 2204; see also People v. Bryant (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 290, 559 N.E.2d 930 (rejecting defendant\u2019s argument); People v. Jackson (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 831, 556 N.E.2d 619 (same); cf. People v. Martin (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 412, 466 N.E.2d 228 (rejecting similar argument based solely on the sixth amendment).) We therefore conclude that defendant\u2019s acceptance of counsel on unrelated charges did not also operate to invoke a protection against interrogation concerning the offenses involved in this appeal.\nDefendant\u2019s next two arguments assert that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance. Generally, \u201c \u2018defendants jointly indicted are to be jointly tried unless fairness to one of the defendants requires a separate trial to avoid prejudice.\u2019 \u201d (People v. Byron (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 81, 92, 506 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, quoting People v. Lee (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 182, 187, 429 N.E.2d 461, 463.) Defendant asserts that he suffered two common forms of prejudice. The first occurs when a nontestifying codefendant has made out-of-court admissions that implicate the defendant. Introduction of such statements into evidence, even if the jury is giving limiting instructions not to consider the statements against the defendant, can violate the latter\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation. (People v. Daugherty (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 533, 541-42, 468 N.E.2d 969, 973, citing Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620.) The second type of prejudice occurs when the defendants present defenses that are so antagonistic that it is unfair to try them together. (E.g., People v. Bean (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 80, 93, 485 N.E.2d 349, 355.) The decision to deny a motion for severance is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, based on the information the trial court had at the time the motion was made. People v. Lee (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 182, 186, 429 N.E.2d 461, 463.\nIt is settled that the admission at trial of a statement by a nontestifying codefendant which implicates the defendant violates a defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him (Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620), essential to which is the right of cross-examination (Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 85 S. Ct. 1065). Conversely, the confrontation clause is not violated by the admission of such a statement where the codefendant testifies at trial and is subject to full and effective cross-examination. Nelson v. O\u2019Neil (1971), 402 U.S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 2d 222, 91 S. Ct. 1723; see People v. Jones (1988), 169 Ill. App. 3d 883, 897-98, 524 N.E.2d 593, 602.\nIn Nelson, defendant O\u2019Neil and codefendant Runnels were charged with kidnapping, robbery and vehicle theft. At their joint trial, a police officer testified that Runnels made an oral statement following his arrest which implicated both himself and O\u2019Neil in the crimes with which they were charged. The trial court instructed the jury that the statement was admissible against Runnels but could not be considered as evidence against O\u2019Neil. Both O\u2019Neil and Runnels offered the same alibi defense. Runnels further testified on direct examination that he had not made the statement attributed to him and that its substance was false. The prosecutor cross-examined Runnels; counsel for O\u2019Neil did not. Both men were both found guilty, but O\u2019Neil\u2019s conviction was later overturned on the basis of Bruton, which had been decided during the pendency of his appeal. O\u2019Neil v. Nelson (9th Cir. 1970), 422 F.2d 319.\nThe Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a constitutional violation under Bruton occurs only where the out-of-court statement is made by a declarant who is unavailable at trial for \u201c \u2018full and effective\u2019 cross-examination,\u201d and then proceeding to consider \u201cwhether cross-examination can be full and effective where the declarant is present at the trial, takes the witness stand, testifies fully as to his activities during the period described in his alleged out-of-court statement, but denies that he made the statement and claims that its substance is false.\u201d Nelson, 402 U.S. at 627, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 227, 91 S. Ct. at 1726.\nNoting that Runnels had denied making the statement attributed to him and in fact testified favorably to O\u2019Neil, the Court reasoned:\n\u201cHad Runnels *** \u2018affirmed the statement as his,\u2019 [O\u2019Neil] would certainly have been in far worse straits than those in which he found himself when Runnels testified as he did. For then counsel for [O\u2019Neil] could only have attempted to show through cross-examination that Runnels had confessed to a crime he had not committed, or, slightly more plausibly, that those parts of the confession implicating [O\u2019Neil] were fabricated. This would, moreover, have required an abandonment of the joint alibi defense, and the production of a new explanation for [O\u2019Neil\u2019s] presence with Runnels in the white Cadillac at the time of their arrest. To be sure, Runnels might have \u2018affirmed the statement\u2019 but denied its truthfulness, claiming, for example, that it had been coerced, or made as part of a plea bargain. But cross-examination by [O\u2019Neil\u2019s] counsel would have been futile in that event as well. For once Runnels had testified that the statement was false, it could hardly have profited [O\u2019Neil] for his counsel through cross-examination to try to shake that testimony. If the jury were to believe that the statement was false as to Runnels, it could hardly conclude that it was not false as to [O\u2019Neil] as well.\nThe short of the matter is that, given a joint trial and a common defense, Runnels\u2019 testimony respecting his alleged out-of-court statement was more favorable to [O\u2019Neil] than any that cross-examination by counsel could possibly have produced, had Runnels \u2018affirmed the statement as his.\u2019 It would be unrealistic in the extreme in the circumstances here presented to hold that [O\u2019Neil] was denied either the opportunity or the benefit of full and effective cross-examination of Runnels.\nWe conclude that where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Nelson, 402 U.S. at 628-30, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 228, 91 S. Ct. at 1727.\nThe record in this case presents the situation posed by the Nelson Court in which the codefendant \u201caffirms the statement as his,\u201d yet denies its truthfulness and alleges the statement was coerced. The Court characterized cross-examination by defendant\u2019s counsel in such a situation as \u201cfutile;\u201d defendant has not offered any reason to disagree with that characterization in this case. Defendant has merely asserted that he could have underscored Haley\u2019s favorable testimony, which is insufficient to escape the rationale of Nelson.\nDefendant argues in his reply brief that Haley\u2019s hearsay statement should have been excluded under our State\u2019s law of evidence. (E.g., People v. Duncan (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 400, 413-14, 530 N.E.2d 423, 429.) Defendant has waived this argument by failing to raise it in his initial brief. Dial v. Mihalic (1982), 107 Ill. App. 3d 855, 438 N.E.2d 546.\nEven if defendant had not waived the argument and was correct on this point, defendant would not be entitled to a new trial as the error was harmless. In order for an error to be held harmless, a reviewing court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the defendant\u2019s conviction. (Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 23, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827; Fahy v. Connecticut (1963), 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 11 L. Ed. 2d 171, 173, 84 S. Ct. 229, 230.) In deciding whether an error is harmless, the court must review any effect the unlawfully admitted evidence may have had upon the other evidence introduced at trial and the conduct of the defense. (Fahy, 375 U.S. at 87, 11 L. Ed. 2d at 173-74, 84 S. Ct. at 230-31.) Because confessions carry extreme probative weight, the admission of an unlawfully obtained confession seldom is harmless error. (People v. St. Pierre (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 95, 114, 522 N.E.2d 61, 69.) Nevertheless, defendant\u2019s claim is subject to the harmless error rule. People v. Curtis (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 207, 215, 546 N.E.2d 624, 628.\nHere, defendant was convicted on an accountability theory. A person is accountable for the conduct of another if \u201c[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).) Consent to or mere knowledge of the commission of a crime does not constitute the aiding, abetting, planning or commission of that offense. (People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 27, 61, 554 N.E.2d 174, 190; People v. Washington (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 174, 181.) The mere presence of a defendant at the scene of the crime does not render him or her accountable (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 61, 554 N.E.2d at 190; People v. Ruiz (1982), 94 Ill. 2d 245, 256, 447 N.E.2d 148, 152; People v. Ruekholdt (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 7, 10, 460 N.E.2d 847, 850), even when coupled with defendant\u2019s flight from the scene or knowledge that a crime was being committed. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 61, 554 N.E.2d at 190.\nOn the other hand, our courts have never held that active participation in an offense is a prerequisite to establishing accountability. (Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d at 254, 447 N.E.2d at 151.) Evidence of events surrounding and following the commission of the crime is competent to show participation in the crime itself. (Ruiz, 94 Ill. 2d at 257, 447 N.E.2d at 152; People v. Morgan (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 364 N.E.2d 56, 60; People v. Washington (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 207, 209, 186 N.E.2d 259, 261.) Words of agreement are not essential to establish a common purpose to commit a crime. (Ruckholdt, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 10-11, 460 N.E.2d at 850.) Rather, \u201cproof that the defendant was present during the perpetration of the offense, that he maintained a close affiliation with his companions after the commission of the crime, and that he failed to report the crime are all factors which the trier of fact may consider in determining the defendant\u2019s legal accountability.\u201d (Ruckholdt, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 11, 460 N.E.2d at 850; see People v. Grice (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 718, 725, 410 N.E.2d 209, 216.) Defendant\u2019s flight from the scene may also be considered by the jury. People v. Dotson (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 135, 142, 492 N.E.2d 903, 907.\nTwo examples of legal accountability may be instructive. In Reid, defendant did nothing to discourage the others who committed the crimes, nor did he indicate any disapproval. Defendant was present during the perpetration of the offenses, did not extricate himself from participating in the offenses and fled the scene of the crime. He also maintained a close affiliation with the others afterwards and failed to report the crimes. These acts and omissions were voluntary. The supreme court upheld the conviction, concluding that the evidence of defendant\u2019s behavior before, during and after the commission of the crimes indicated a common design to do an unlawful act to which defendant assented. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 64-65, 554 N.E.2d at 191-92.\nSimilarly, in Morgan, defendant was present while several people planned to rob the victim. He told the others he would accompany them, but would not participate and did not want any money. Defendant watched the fatal beating of the victim. According to one witness, defendant received part of the proceeds of the crimes, though defendant denied receiving any money. The supreme court held that defendant\u2019s acquaintance with the participants in the crimes, his voluntary and deliberate presence at the scene of the crimes, his knowledge of the plot to rob the victim, a venture which contained a risk of violence, and the evidence that he received money from the crimes sufficiently supported defendant\u2019s convictions. Morgan, 67 Ill. 2d at 9, 364 N.E.2d at 60-61.\nIn this case, the jury heard Kenneth Walls testify that defendant was in the car used to follow the victims; identified Elijah Taylor and Taylor\u2019s car; was aware of the plan to rob Elijah Taylor; and directed Walls to the alley near Taylor\u2019s two-flat. Walls also testified that defendant remained in the car while Fox and Haley committed the offenses and opened the car door in anticipation of Fox and Haley returning to the car. Walls further stated that Fox gave the stolen beige coat to defendant and that defendant accompanied him, Fox and Haley to the hospital later that morning, where Haley was treated for a gunshot wound. Finally, Walls testified that four days after the offenses were committed, he heard defendant assure Fox that the gun used to commit the offenses was in a safe place.\nThe State also presented a number of witnesses to establish that Taylor died of a gunshot wound and that the bullet had come from a gun which had previously been in defendant\u2019s possession.\nAs in Reid and Morgan, the jury in this case could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimony listed above. Indeed, defendant concedes elsewhere in his brief that \u201c \u2018[i]f believed by the jury, [Walls\u2019] testimony, standing alone, is sufficient to convict [defendant]. It is [Walls\u2019] testimony that recites every detail of the evening\u2019s activities.\u2019 \u201d (Defendant\u2019s brief at 68, quoting People v. Cobb (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 465, 478, 455 N.E.2d 31, 36.) While defendant denied receiving any proceeds of the crimes, the same could be said of the defendant in Morgan. Moreover, the jury would not have heard this denial if defendant\u2019s statement had been suppressed. Defendant maintains that Walls was severely impeached, but Walls\u2019 overall testimony at trial was, if anything, less inculpatory (as to defendant) than his initial statements to the police. Given the record presented here, the jury could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without Haley\u2019s statement, rendering its admission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23,17 L. Ed. 2d at 710, 87 S. Ct. at 827.\nDefendant next argues he was prejudiced by the failure to sever because he and Haley presented defenses that were so antagonistic that it is unfair to try them together. (E.g., Bean, 109 Ill. 2d 80, 485 N.E.2d 349.) For example, in People v. Braune (1936), 363 Ill. 551, 2 N.E.2d 839, the seminal case on \u201cantagonistic defenses,\u201d our supreme court reversed the convictions of two doctors charged with manslaughter arising from a criminal abortion. Each defendant asserted his innocence, accused the other and attempted to discredit the other\u2019s witnesses. \u201cThe trial was in many respects more of a contest between the defendants than between the People and the defendants. It produced a spectacle where the People frequently stood by and witnessed a combat in which the defendants attempted to destroy each other.\u201d (Braune, 363 Ill. at 557, 2 N.E.2d at 842.) It is generally not sufficient that a codefendant\u2019s theory may be inconsistent or contradictory to defendant\u2019s theory; genuine hostility between the defenses is typically required before a conviction is reversed. See People v. Lekas (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 391, 408, 508 N.E.2d 221, 232.\nIn this case, defendant relies upon Bean, which is distinguishable. Codefendant\u2019s counsel purportedly commented on defendant\u2019s failure to testify during closing arguments, but the record indicates that counsel merely referred to the fact that Haley took the stand in the course of discussing Haley\u2019s testimony. In his brief, defendant asserts that Haley\u2019s counsel stated in closing that\n\u201cthe story [of the murder and robbery] had been concocted in the jail by some people already in jail on an armed robbery and my client got on the stand and testified that he had never been convicted of a crime. He was out on the street living with his wife, you heard from him in this case.\u201d (Emphasis in brief.)\nHowever, the record shows that the final sentence quoted by defendant actually reads: \u201cHe was out on the street living with his wife, who you heard from in this case.\u201d The statement as it appears in the record merely refers to Haley\u2019s testimony and thus does not demonstrate that Haley\u2019s counsel commented on defendant\u2019s decision not to testify. This case does resemble Bean insofar as the codefendant presented an alibi defense. However, the codefendant in Bean also claimed that Bean was the murderer from the opening arguments through the entire trial and closing arguments. Indeed, the codefendant in Bean stated that he intended to assert Bean\u2019s guilt in his own motion for severance. (Bean, 109 Ill. 2d at 86, 485 N.E.2d at 352.) The record in this case shows that defendant merely hypothesized at the hearing on the motion for severance that the defenses could become antagonistic.\nDefendant also cites People v. Johnson (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 756, 544 N.E.2d 392. Johnson is distinguishable because the defense theories there were directly contradictory; the defendant\u2019s theory was that codefendant committed the offense, whereas codefendant asserted that defendant aided him in committing the offense. (Johnson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 765, 544 N.E.2d at 397.) In contrast, Haley\u2019s theory was that he was not present during the offense, which logically would render Haley incapable of personal knowledge implicating defendant. Thus, the defenses may have been inconsistent or contradictory, but not antagonistic. In Johnson, we also noted that defendant\u2019s opening statement implicated the codefendant. (Johnson, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 765, 544 N.E.2d at 397.) Here, Haley\u2019s opening statement implicated Fox, not defendant.\nThis case more closely resembles Lekas (155 Ill. App. 3d at 391, 508 N.E.2d at 221), in which Phillip and Christopher Lekas were jointly tried and convicted of murder, armed robbery and aggravated arson. On appeal, this court held that Phillip\u2019s convictions need not be reversed for failure to sever. The court noted that Phillip\u2019s counsel, in moving for severance, explained that his theory would be that Phillip sat in a car while Christopher committed the crimes. \u201cAt this point, the real possibility existed that Christopher would attempt to pin the blame for the entire crime on Phillip, since Phillip was willing to place himself at the scene.\u201d (Lekas, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 508 N.E.2d at 232.) Nevertheless, after analyzing Bean, the court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in Phillip\u2019s case because Christopher did not argue that Phillip was to blame.\nHere, defendant has failed to point to any part of the record indicating that Haley directly implicated defendant in the commission of the offenses. Haley\u2019s counsel did refer to defendant\u2019s incarceration on uncharged offenses, an .issue which this court addresses separately later in this opinion. Defendant objected to that reference, but not on the basis that the statement placed blame on him and made Haley\u2019s defense antagonistic. Failure to specifically object at trial can result in waiver of the objection. Our supreme court has long recognized:\n\u201cFailure to make proper and timely objection to the admission of evidence claimed to be incompetent or otherwise objectionable or to move to strike it out after its admission, giving specific reason for the objection or motion to strike out such evidence generally constitutes a waiver of the right to object and cures the error, if any.\u201d (Emphasis added.) People v. Trefonas (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 92, 98, 136 N.E.2d 817, 820, quoted in People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 263, 478 N.E.2d 267, 278.\nIn sum, at the time the motion for severance was heard, the trial court here was faced with nothing more than defendant\u2019s apprehension that an unfair trial would result at the time the motion was denied, which does not, by itself, require severance. (Lee, 87 Ill. 2d at 186, 429 N.E.2d at 463.) That defendant has failed to demonstrate by citation to the record that the trial became a \u201cspectacle\u201d further supports the conclusion that defendant was not denied a fair trial. Lekas, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 406-07, 508 N.E.2d at 232.\nDefendant\u2019s fourth argument is that the trial court erred in the jury selection process by not conducting a hearing under Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712. In Batson, the Supreme Court held that under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, a prosecutor cannot exercise peremptory challenges of potential jurors on account of race. (476 U.S. at 89, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 82-83, 106 S. Ct. at 1719.) Batson applies retroactively to this case, which was pending on direct review at the time Batson was decided. See Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649,107 S. Ct. 708.\nTo establish a violation of Batson, defendant must first make aprima facie case of discrimination (Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 85-86, 106 S. Ct. at 1721), which can be shown from the State\u2019s use of peremptory challenges in a single case. (476 U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.) If a prima facie case is shown, the burden shifts to the State to supply race-neutral reasons for excluding the venirepersons. (Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.) A trial court\u2019s decision on this issue will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 388, 413, 539 N.E.2d 1172, 1184.\nThe circumstances relevant to the trial court\u2019s consideration of whether a prima facie case has been made include: a pattern of racial exclusion; the prosecutor\u2019s questions and statements during jury selection; the disproportionate use of peremptory challenges to exclude a racial group; whether the sole common characteristic of the excluded persons was their race; and the race of the defendant, victim and witnesses. A court cannot decide this question solely by reference to the number of members of a group which are excluded. Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d at 413, 539 N.E.2d at 1184.\nIn this case, defendant joined in his codefendant\u2019s motion for a mistrial, asserting that the State had used at least half of its peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans. Defendant failed, however, to note the race of any of the excluded venirepersons for the record, save one. Defendant has therefore waived any objection to the jury selection except as to that one juror whose race appears in the record. (See People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 50, 62, 530 N.E.2d 1360, 1364.) This jury was selected prior to Batson; nevertheless, at that time, defendant was still required to make an adequate record before a reviewing court would recognize a claim under either the earlier Swain standard (which placed a heavier burden on defendants than Batson) or the Batsontype standards that had been recognized in an opinion of this court (People v. Payne (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046), which was later reversed by our supreme court on review (People v. Payne (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 135, 457 N.E.2d 1202). (See People v. Dotson (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 135, 150, 492 N.E.2d 903, 913 (Johnson, J., specially concurring); People v. Fleming (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 99, 106-07, 413 N.E.2d 1330, 1335.) Thus, defendant was on notice that a record would be required if his claim were to be recognized on appeal. The record presented by defendant as to whether venirepersons of color were struck in this case fails to meet either the earlier Swain standard or the current Batson standard.\nAs to the claim concerning the single remaining juror, the record in this case indicates that although the trial court initially indicated it did not wish to hear from the State, the State spontaneously and contemporaneously offered an explanation of its peremptory challenge, namely the venireperson\u2019s statement that he might be partial to the defendants in the case. The record further indicates that the trial court accepted the State\u2019s representation that the peremptory challenges were not exercised on account of race.\nGiven the sufficiency of the record as it relates to this juror, we find it unnecessary to remand the cause for a Batson hearing. (Cf. People v. Hope (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 430, 461, 560 N.E.2d 849, 863 (reviewing court need not remand where, despite record deficiencies, record equals or exceeds what normally would suffice for review).) The record indicates that the trial court followed a procedure quite similar to that envisioned by Batson concerning this juror and determined that it would not declare a mistrial. Under the circumstances in this case, defendant could not make a prima facie case under Batson and has failed to show that the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion for mistrial was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d at 413, 539 N.E.2d at 1184.\nDefendant\u2019s fifth argument on appeal is that the admission of evidence and argument concerning his incarceration on pending unrelated robbery charges at the time of his interrogation denied him a fair trial. As to Walls\u2019 testimony, defendant has waived this objection by failing to specifically object at trial. (Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 263, 478 N.E.2d at 278; Trefonas, 9 Ill. 2d at 98, 136 N.E.2d at 820.) Although defendant timely objected to Walls\u2019 testimony concerning defendant\u2019s incarceration on unrelated charges, he did not give a specific reason for the objection or move that the testimony be struck. Consequently, defendant cannot raise the issue on appeal.\nThe argument would have failed to persuade the court in any event, based on the record presented on appeal. It is true that mere proof of a defendant\u2019s previous arrest on unrelated charges cannot be introduced against a criminal defendant due to the prejudicial effect such inflammatory evidence can have on a jury. (People v. Lampkin (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 418, 429-30, 457 N.E.2d 50, 56; People v. Lindgren (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 402 N.E.2d 238, 242; People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 325, 330, 362 N.E.2d 288, 290.) The State is also barred from making closing arguments that are designed only to inflame a jury. (See People v. Whitlow (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 322, 433 N.E.2d 629.) Moreover, the State cannot admit evidence of other crimes for the purpose of proving defendant\u2019s propensity to commit crimes. See People v. King (1986), 109 Ill. 2d 514, 530, 488 N.E.2d 949, 958.\nNevertheless, evidence of other crimes is admissible if relevant for any other purpose, such as showing knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, or identification. (E.g., People v. Carlson (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 440, 442 N.E.2d 504.) Moreover, where the door to a subject is opened by the defense on cross-examination, the State may, on redirect, question the witness to explain or clarify matters brought out during cross-examination. (People v. Thompkins (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 401, 444, 521 N.E.2d 38, 57.) The State may question a -witness on redirect in such a way as to remove unfavorable inferences or impressions raised during cross-examination. (Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 444, 521 N.E.2d at 57; People v. Hampton (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 558, 561, 182 N.E.2d 698, 700.) The decision to admit or exclude such evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Chambers (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 565, 577, 534 N.E.2d 554, 560.\nIn this case, defendant attempted to impeach Walls\u2019 testimony by getting Walls to admit that Walls\u2019 January 25 statement to the police attributed Haley\u2019s acts to defendant. On cross-examination, defendant\u2019s counsel attempted to establish that Walls left Haley out of the earlier statement in order to protect Haley. Defendant got Walls to admit that he did not want to get Haley in trouble. In doing so, however, defendant \u201copened the door\u201d for the State to ask Walls on redirect examination why Walls had initially imputed Haley\u2019s acts to defendant. Walls replied that he did so because defendant was already incarcerated on the unrelated charges.\nHad the State been precluded from asking this question, the jury would not have known why Walls wished to shield Haley but not defendant, which would have unfairly supported defendant\u2019s theory that Walls was biased in favor of Haley and against defendant. The record on appeal indicates that the trial court barred further inquiry on the issue by sustaining defendant\u2019s second objection. The trial court may have determined that the probative value of this information, limited in scope, outweighed its prejudicial impact on defendant. (E.g., People v. Harris (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 112, 114, 414 N.E.2d 755, 757.) Given these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that the limited admission of such testimony amounted to an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion.\nNor can we say that the use of this information in closing arguments was so prejudicial that defendant was denied a fair trial. Attorneys are granted \u201cconsiderable leeway\u201d in their closing and rebuttal arguments; a reviewing court will accord the trial court every reasonable presumption in the exercise of its discretion concerning argument to the jury. E.g., People v. Simms (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 259, 269, 520 N.E.2d 308, 312.\nIn this case, defendant cites three references to defendant\u2019s incarceration on unrelated charges during the closing arguments. First, Haley\u2019s counsel referred to defendant\u2019s incarceration in the course of arguing that the State was presenting a story created by defendant, Fox and Walls. This reference appears earlier in this opinion. Although counsel later mentioned that Haley had never been convicted of a crime, given the facts and circumstances of this case, we are unable to say that this reference (to information the introduction of which was invited by defendant) was so inflammatory as to deny defendant a fair trial.\nThe State\u2019s references were even less prejudicial. The first reference merely repeated the point made by Walls\u2019 testimony, i.e., that Walls attributed Haley\u2019s acts to defendant in the initial statement to the police because he knew that defendant was already incarcerated and Haley was not. The State\u2019s second reference was made in response to Haley\u2019s argument that Haley would not have wanted to speak to the police upon his arrest and that his statement was coerced; the State argued that Haley\u2019s knowledge that the police had already spoken to defendant, Fox and Walls during their incarceration influenced his decision to speak to the police.\nIn sum, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the testimony and argument in this case, even taken together, were sufficiently inflammatory to mandate reversal of defendant\u2019s conviction.\nDefendant\u2019s sixth argument is that the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by failing to remove two of the potential jurors for cause. Defendant asserts that one juror had poor hearing and that another initially exhibited a hesitancy about his ability to be fair and impartial. Defendant concludes that these jurors should have been excused, or at least that the trial court should have made further inquiry as to the jurors\u2019 abilities. Moreover, defendant contends that he need not show actual prejudice because his right to peremptorily challenge members of the venire was burdened, citing Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824, and various Federal appellate decisions.\nDefendant, however, has failed to point to anything in the record demonstrating that he exhausted his peremptory challenges, thus waiving any objection to the named jurors. (See People v. Ford (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 466, 475, 168 N.E.2d 33, 38.) Defendant also waived the issue by failing to raise it in his post-trial motion. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 38, 554 N.E.2d at 179; People v. Tannenbaum (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 177, 180-81, 415 N.E.2d 1027, 1029.\nThe argument is not persuasive in any event. It is beyond dispute that a fair trial requires fair jurors. (E.g People v. Cole (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 401, 411, 298 N.E.2d 705, 711.) However, the trial court has broad discretion in jury selection (People v. Goff (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 108, 484 N.E.2d 414); defendant must show an abuse of that discretion to obtain a reversal. People v. Bowen (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 221, 408 N.E.2d 993.\nThe record here indicates that the trial court ascertained that the potential juror with the alleged hearing problem could properly hear him and would notify the court if she could not hear something at trial. The trial court also determined that the potential juror who initially expressed a hesitancy when asked if he would be impartial would lay aside any such hesitancy.\nThese factors distinguish this appeal from the cases cited by the defendant, which concerned the failure of a trial court to allow further questioning of an accepted juror where there was evidence that the juror may have falsely answered a question during voir dire or was predisposed to finding defendants guilty. (E.g., People v. Mitchell (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 193, 459 N.E.2d 351.) Here, the alleged problems with the venirepersons were known to the trial court, which then asked questions and apparently was satisfied with the answers given. The trial court is in a better position than this court to evaluate potential jurors, which is one of the reasons why voir dire is largely left to the discretion of the trial court. Moreover, in contrast to the cases cited by defendant, the jurors in this case were not accepted; rather, they were dismissed through the use of defendant\u2019s peremptory challenges.\nAs to defendant\u2019s Swain argument, we note that Ham v. South Carolina (1973), 409 U.S. 524, 527-28, 35 L. Ed. 2d 46, 50-51, 93 S. Ct. 848, 850-51, while holding that the trial court was required to ask about racial prejudice during voir dire, also stated:\n\u201c[T]he trial judge was not required to put the question in any particular form, or to ask any particular number of questions on the subject, simply because requested to do so by petitioner. *** In this context, either of the brief, general questions urged by the petitioner would appear sufficient to focus the attention of prospective jurors on any racial prejudice they might entertain.\nThe third of petitioner\u2019s proposed questions was addressed to the fact that he wore a beard. While we cannot say that prejudice against people with beards might not have been harbored by one or more of the potential jurors in this case, *** [t]he trial judge\u2019s refusal to inquire as to particular bias against beards, after his inquiries as to bias in general, does not reach the level of a constitutional violation.\u201d\nHam supports the discretion afforded to the trial court in conducting voir dire and the conclusion that the procedure followed in this case did not amount to an abuse of that discretion.\nDefendant\u2019s seventh argument is that the trial court erred by allowing the State to elicit hearsay testimony that the State did not offer Kenneth Walls lenient treatment at the time he made statements implicating defendant in the offenses in this case. Defendant failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion, thus waiving the issue for appellate review. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 38, 554 N.E.2d at 179.\nDefendant next argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because Haley\u2019s counsel elicited testimony and made arguments which informed the jury that Dennis Fox had been convicted of the offenses and that Kenneth Walls was guilty of the offenses as well. Defendant did not request that the jury be admonished with regard to the purposes for which the guilty plea was admitted and did not tender a jury instruction on this issue, which constitutes waiver of any objection on review to the absence of such an instruction. (People v. Roberts (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 1, 387 N.E.2d 331; People v. Peebles (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 684, 449 N.E.2d 230.) Defendant also failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion as well, resulting in waiver. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 38, 554 N.E.2d at 179.\nThe argument is unpersuasive in any event. It is settled that evidence that a codefendant or accomplice has pleaded guilty or has been convicted of the same offense is inadmissible at trial for purposes of proving the guilt of a defendant, but such evidence is admissible for impeachment purposes. (People v. Sullivan (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 36, 42, 377 N.E.2d 17, 20.) In addition, when the confession itself is not admitted and the codefendant does not testify that the confession implicated defendant, or when the codefendant fully testifies concerning the crime, including the codefendant\u2019s participation, a reversal is not required. (People v. Baker (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 364, 372-73, 158 N.E.2d 1, 6.) The appellate court has also recognized that an individual case may present a scenario not envisioned within the general prohibition against introducing evidence of a codefendant\u2019s conviction. People v. Callaway (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 136, 540 N.E.2d 1153.\nThe record here indicates that Haley\u2019s counsel did mention Fox\u2019s trial and conviction as well as Wall\u2019s plea agreement in opening argument. However, the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s subsequent objections, preventing counsel from emphasizing Fox\u2019s conviction or Walls\u2019 plea agreement in the manner held reversible in Sullivan. (See Callaway, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 143, 540 N.E.2d at 1157.) The record also indicates that the testimony cited by defendant concerning Walls\u2019 plea agreement was elicited by Haley\u2019s counsel to impeach Walls, which is not error under Sullivan. Moreover, the record shows that Walls had not officially entered a plea as of the date of his testimony and that he fully testified about the offenses, including his own involvement in them, making his testimony similar to that allowed in Baker. Finally, the record here shows the jury was instructed:\n\u201cWhen a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.\u201d (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17 (2d ed. 1981) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 2d).)\nBecause the jury was alerted to the posture in which Walls\u2019 testimony was to be evaluated, any possible prejudice that could have arisen from his admission of guilt does not rise to the level of plain error. (See Peebles, 114 Ill. App. 3d 684, 449 N.E.2d 230.) Consequently, defendant has failed to show that he was denied a fair trial based on the record before this court.\nDefendant\u2019s ninth argument is that the trial court erred by instructing the jury prior to closing argument of counsel rather than after closing arguments as provided by the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 115 \u2014 4(i).) Defendant failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion, thus waiving the issue for appellate review. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 38, 554 N.E.2d at 179.\nEven if the argument was not waived, we believe it to be without merit. Although defendant correctly notes that this court has previously characterized the practice defendant complains of as \u201cprocedural error\u201d in the appeal of Dennis Fox (People v. Fox (1988), 177 Ill. App. 3d 602, 532 N.E.2d 472), defendant has incorrectly taken that phrase out of context. In Fox, this court stated:\n\u201cWhile we believe the better approach would be to follow the guidelines of the statute which provides for the trial judge to instruct the jury after the closing arguments of counsel, we cannot say the procedural error here rises to such a level as to require reversal. The record reveals that the able trial judge delivered the instruction to the jury in a clear, accurate and complete manner. While he deviated from established trial court practice, we find no error in the manner in which he delivered the instructions.\u201d (Fox, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 614, 532 N.E.2d at 479-80.)\nDefendant has failed to demonstrate why the same conclusion should not obtain in his appeal.\nDefendant\u2019s tenth argument is that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on matters of law during jury deliberations without notifying defense counsel. The record indicates that during deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking whether the jury could consider defendant\u2019s court-reported statement against Haley and whether someone could be found guilty of one offense and not guilty of another. The trial court returned the note with the following message: \u201cLadies and gentlemen please read the instructions. They will answer all your questions.\u201d\nDefendant failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion, thus waiving the issue before this court. (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 38, 554 N.E.2d at 179.) By failing to raise the issue in his post-trial motion, defendant has acquiesced in the trial court\u2019s answer to the jury\u2019s question and cannot later complain that the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Dunigan (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 799, 828, 421 N.E.2d 1319, 1340; see People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 391-92, 288 N.E.2d 363, 372.\nEven if defendant had preserved the argument for appellate review, we would have found it meritless.\nIt is beyond dispute that jurors are entitled to have their questions answered. (Clark, 52 Ill. 2d at 391, 288 N.E.2d at 372.) A trial court has a \u201cduty to instruct the jury where clarification is requested, the original instructions are incomplete, and the jurors are manifestly confused.\u201d (People v. Gathings (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1138, 425 N.E.2d 1313, 1316, quoted in Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39, 554 N.E.2d at 179.) \u201cWhere a jury has raised an explicit question on a point of law arising from the facts over which there is doubt or confusion, the court should attempt to clarify the question in the minds of the jury members.\u201d (People v. Jackson (1980), 89 Ill. App. 3d 461, 479, 411 N.E.2d 893, 906, quoted in Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39, 554 N.E.2d at 179.) This duty may arise even if the jury received proper instructions. People v. Flynn (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 318, 323, 526 N.E.2d 579, 583, cited in Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39, 554 N.E.2d at 179.\nNevertheless, under the proper circumstances, a trial court may decline to answer a jury\u2019s question when the jury instructions are easily understandable and sufficiently explain the relevant law, further instructions would not serve a useful purpose or would potentially mislead the jury, or the jury\u2019s inquiry involves a question of fact. (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39, 554 N.E.2d at 179 (and cases cited therein).) A trial court may also refuse to answer the jury when the question is ambiguous and an answer or explanation might require a colloquy between the court and the jury, further explanation of the facts, or an expression of the trial court\u2019s opinion on the evidence or outcome of the case. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 39-40, 554 N.E.2d at 180.\nIn this case, the instruction concerning the use of a codefendant\u2019s statement clearly and sufficiently explained the law. (See IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.05.) Consequently, defendant has not established that the trial court was required to answer the jury\u2019s first question.\nDefendant points out that the Bruton Court felt that this type of instruction would often be disregarded and asserts that this case proves that the Bruton Court\u2019s assumption is correct. Although a question regarding the use of defendant\u2019s statement against Haley could suggest the instruction was not sufficiently noticed by the jury, it could equally suggest that it was noticed by the jury. We also note again that this particular case is governed by Nelson rather than Bruton. Thus, defendant\u2019s speculation as to what the jury may have done does not mandate a reversal under the circumstances of this case.\nDefendant further argues that the trial court was required to answer the question because a simple \u201cno\u201d answer would have sufficed and would not have suggested a particular outcome. While the trial court could have considered this point in deciding whether to directly answer the question (and perhaps it did), this argument does not mandate a reversal on appeal. (Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 42-43, 554 N.E.2d at 181.) Moreover, this argument overlooks the record, which shows that defendant\u2019s counsel agreed to an instruction which did not name either defendant or Haley. The record further shows that the jury in this case asked if defendant\u2019s statement could be used against Haley, not vice versa. Even if defendant were correct in arguing that the judge should have answered \u201cno\u201d to this question, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the court was required to go further in this instance and tell the jury that Haley\u2019s statement could not be used against defendant.\nAs to the jury\u2019s second question, concerning whether someone can be found guilty of one offense and not guilty of the other, the record indicates that the jury again received a full and complete set of instructions on the applicable law. The jury received Hlinois Pattern Jury Instructions on, inter alia, the presumption of innocence (IPI Criminal 2d No. 2.03), legal accountability (IPI Criminal 2d No. 5.03) and the definitions and elements of both murder and armed robbery (IPI Criminal 2d Nos. 7.01, 7.02, 14.01, 14.02). The jury also received four verdict forms: (1) not guilty of murder, (2) guilty of murder, (3) not guilty of armed robbery, and (4) guilty of armed robbery. (IPI Criminal 2d Nos. 26.02, 26.05.) It is apparent the trial court concluded that the instructions sufficiently apprised the jury of the applicable law. Indeed, the Reid jury was provided with substantially equivalent instructions. (See Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 40, 554 N.E.2d at 180.) Thus, under the circumstances in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by referring the jury to the written instructions.\nWe also find Flynn (172 Ill. App. 3d at 323, 526 N.E.2d at 583), which defendant cites for support, distinguishable. While the appellate court in Flynn reversed a conviction because the trial court did not properly answer the jury\u2019s questions, that case had a factual scenario different from that of this case. Cf. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 43, 554 N.E.2d at 181.\nIn sum, while the trial court could have directly answered the jury\u2019s questions, there was no duty to do so under the circumstances of this case. As the record on appeal indicates, the jury received a complete set of written instructions. The trial court apparently determined that the jury was not manifestly confused and that the written instructions settled any confusion the jury displayed. Hence, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nDefendant cites People v. Beck (1922), 305 Ill. 593, 137 N.E. 454, for the proposition that the trial court erred in answering the jury\u2019s questions without notifying and consulting with defense counsel. Even if the ex parte nature of the communication were deemed error, defendant\u2019s conviction will not be reversed where no injury or prejudice has resulted. (E.g., People v. Walker (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 502, 440 N.E.2d 83.) In this case, where the jury was given complete instructions and the trial court\u2019s \u201canswer\u201d to the jury's questions was to merely refer the jury back to those instructions, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.\nDefendant\u2019s final argument is that the trial court erred in sentencing him to 35 years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant further asserts that the trial court refused to take his rehabilitative potential into account.\nThe trial court\u2019s decisions in regard to sentencing are given great deference, and the sentence of a trial court will be affirmed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. (People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 275, 412 N.E.2d 541, 547; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153, 368 N.E.2d 882, 884.) In sentencing a defendant, the trial court may consider the gravity and circumstances of the offense, as well as defendant\u2019s mental capacity, age, demeanor and credibility. (E.g., Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d at 154, 368 N.E.2d at 884.) Furthermore, the trial court must balance the objectives of protecting society and rehabilitating the defendant. (See People v. Harris (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 832, 844, 543 N.E.2d 859, 866.) Once struck, a reviewing court will hesitate to upset this balance, especially where the sentence falls within the statutory limitation. People v. Lambrechts (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 544, 559, 372 N.E.2d 641, 649.\nThe record indicates that the trial court found that there was little or no rehabilitative potential in this case. However, the record in this case also indicates that the trial court considered mitigating material in defendant\u2019s presentence report and aggravating factors in arriving at this sentence. Moreover, defendant was sentenced to 35 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder and 15 years\u2019 imprisonment for armed robbery; these sentences do fall within the statutory guidelines for the charged offenses. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1), (a)(3).) Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in assigning no weight to defendant\u2019s potential for rehabilitation, such error would be harmless under the facts and circumstances presented in this case. People v. Hall (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 513 N.E.2d 429.\nFor all of the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.\nOne could argue (though defendant did not) that Nelson is distinguishable by interpreting it as requiring not only that the codefendant deny the earlier statement, but also testify favorably to the defendant. This argument, however, has failed where the codefendant did not implicate the defendant at trial. Compare United States v. Brown (2d Cir. 1983), 699 F.2d 585 (violation of Bruton where there was no common defense or favorable testimony, but codefendant implicated defendant in the crime), with United States ex rel. Pugach v. Mancusi (2d Cir. 1971), 441 F.2d 1073 (effective cross-examination is possible where defendant merely affirms the statement but denies its truthfulness).\nAlthough the venireperson stated that he would be able to lay aside any partiality after further questioning by the trial court, the prosecutor\u2019s explanation need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88.106 S. Ct. at 1723.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Karen A. Popek and Stephen L. Richards, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "John O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kathleen E Howlett, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 86\u20140409\nOpinion filed July 22, 1991.\nModified on denial of rehearing January 27, 1992.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Karen A. Popek and Stephen L. Richards, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Kathleen E Howlett, Special Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Renee Goldfarb, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0975-01", "first_page_order": 999, "last_page_order": 1031 }