{ "id": 5254779, "name": "JAMES CALLAHAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Callahan v. Department of State Police", "decision_date": "1991-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 1-90-0525", "first_page": "1081", "last_page": "1088", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "223 Ill. App. 3d 1081" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "172 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5217146 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/28/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 N.E.2d 1197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 1127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3085858 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/1127-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 1192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3028715 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 N.E.2d 395", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "385 Ill. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5305723 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/385/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570064 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3577987 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146286 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. App. 3d 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3625136 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 N.E.2d 1160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "378 N.E.2d 1160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5619984 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2508321 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "973" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/23/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 1036", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2521270 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1047" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/1036-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5217146 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/28/0435-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 776, "char_count": 17137, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.962723012612911e-08, "percentile": 0.5021476155559649 }, "sha256": "d78bf7d2486d428d3b060e7d6d210e50f30b743d2379e5b4e69d7c0d1a075c28", "simhash": "1:65e768ee3a86ed40", "word_count": 2756 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:46:44.574739+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JAMES CALLAHAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, the Illinois Department of State Police (Department), appeals from the order of the circuit court reversing the decision of the Illinois State Police Merit Board (Board) that plaintiff, Special Agent James Callahan, had violated the Department\u2019s rule proscribing insubordination by disobeying a lawful order of a superior. The Department contends that the trial court erred in reversing the decision of the Board because the decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence presented at the administrative hearing.\nIn November 1986, Callahan was charged with violating certain paragraphs of the Department\u2019s Rules of Conduct, including paragraph 1 \u2014 4, Insubordination, which states in relevant part:\n\u201cOfficers shall promptly obey any lawful orders of a superior.\u201d\nCallahan denied the charges, and a hearing was held before an administrative hearing officer. Although the record is voluminous, the facts are relatively uncomplicated and largely undisputed.\nIn August 1984, Callahan was involved in an automobile accident while on duty. As a result of the collision, he was hospitalized for a period of time and was off from work for a total of approximately six to seven weeks. This time off was compensated as service-connected sick leave, which is designated by the Department as \u201c512\u201d time, in contrast to \u201c515\u201d time, which refers to personal, non-service-related sick time. The \u201c512\u201d time category derives from the Continuing Compensation Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 91), which allows up to one year of full compensation to State law enforcement officers who are injured in the line of duty, and from the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), which also provides for disability payments to employees injured in the course of their work.\nIn July 1985, Callahan was examined by Dr. Proctor Anderson, an orthopedic physician associated with the Department. Dr. Anderson prepared a report in which he stated his opinion that Callahan did not require further treatment at that time. Following review of the report by Master Sergeant Donald Burgess, the supervisor of the medical records section, Burgess recommended to James Zagel, then-Director of the Department, that Callahan\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation benefits, including additional \u201c512\u201d time and treatment expenses relating to the 1984 injury, be discontinued. On July 31, 1985, the following letter, which is the subject of this case, was sent to Callahan:\n\u201cDear Special Agent Callahan:\nRE: Service-Connected Injury\nD/A 8/31/84\nOur Case No. 11 \u2014 84\u2014N\u2014260\nOn July 15, 1985, you were examined by Proctor Anderson M.D. at our request regarding the injuries sustained in the above-captioned case. Based on Dr. Anderson\u2019s report, your workers\u2019 compensation benefits including additional service-connected time off and any treatment expense will be discontinued effective August 1, 1985.\nIf you have any questions, please contact Master Sergeant Don Burgess at 217/782/4453.\nVery truly yours,\nJames B. Zagel Director.\u201d\nThis letter is a standard form letter sent to all officers whose \u201c512\u201d time is being discontinued.\nOn June 3, 1986, Callahan called his supervisor, Lieutenant Michael Sliozis, and informed him that he, Callahan, was having problems with his back and was undergoing treatment from Dr. James Phelps, a chiropractor. Callahan returned to work on June 23. There was some conflicting testimony concerning whether Rita Klein, the business manager, approached Callahan or Callahan approached Klein regarding whether the time off was to be designated as \u201c512\u201d or \u201c515\u201d time. It was agreed, however, that Callahan informed Klein that his doctor believed that his back problems were related to the 1984 injury, and that Callahan caused the 21 days off in June, which had been originally recorded in the computer as \u201c515\u201d time, to be re-designated by Klein as \u201c512\u201d time under the case number of his 1984 injury. Changes in the designation of time off are not unusual, and all time records are reviewed monthly.\nIn mid-July 1986, a summary of Callahan\u2019s 1986 time off was prepared by Sliozis at the direction of one of Sliozis\u2019 superiors. Sliozis then met with Callahan to discuss the change from \u201c515\u201d to \u201c512\u201d time for his June sick days. Sliozis advised Callahan that he would have to submit to an examination by a \u201cstate doctor\u201d and also provide a letter from his own doctor, both of which Callahan agreed to do.\nOn July 22, after learning of the letter of July 31, 1985, discontinuing \u201c512\u201d time for the 1984 injury, Sliozis met again with Callahan and questioned him regarding the \u201c512\u201d designation for the June 1986 sick days. Callahan acknowledged receiving the letter, but stated that it was his belief that Department policy allowed the taking of additional \u201c512\u201d time under the case number of the original injury if that injury recurred. He informed Sliozis that his doctor believed that his then-current back problems were related to the 1984 injury, and that he had consulted with his attorney before causing the days off in June to be changed from \u201c515\u201d to \u201c512\u201d time. Sliozis informed Callahan that Major Charles Doerr had directed him to have Callahan's time off in June changed from \u201c512\u201d time to other time-off categories. Callahan stated that he disagreed with Doerr\u2019s decision but would not contest it pending examination by Dr. Anderson and a Department review of his medical records. On July 29, the Department received a letter from Dr. Phelps stating that he had been treating Callahan for back problems and that in his opinion those problems were related to the 1984 accident. On August 15, 1986, after an examination by Dr. Anderson and a review of Callahan\u2019s medical records, Sliozis sent a memorandum directing the timekeeper to change the time taken by Callahan in June 1986 from \u201c512\u201d to other time-off categories.\nIt is undisputed that the Department had no written rule governing the procedure to be followed for reactivating \u201c512\u201d time for medical problems arising from an earlier injury. Major Charles Doerr testified, however, that the proper procedure in these circumstances would have been for Callahan to submit a memorandum to the Director\u2019s office through the chain of command together with medical documentation supporting his request for reconsideration of the 1985 discontinuance of \u201c512\u201d time for the original injury. Sergeant Burgess testified that although it is not unusual for the Department to allow additional \u201c512\u201d time for the reoccurrence of a previous work-related injury, Callahan should have contacted him or someone on his staff in the medical records section and submitted documentation of his claim prior to changing or causing to have changed the designation of his time off from \u201c515\u201d to \u201c512\u201d time.\nFollowing a disciplinary meeting in October 1986, Callahan was suspended for 15 days for insubordination and other alleged violations of Department rules. Upon administrative review, the hearing officer issued his \u201cFindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law\u201d in which he stated that the letter of July 31, 1985, \u201camounted to a lawful order from a superior,\u201d and that Callahan\u2019s changing of the designation of his time off in June 1986 from \u201c515\u201d to \u201c512\u201d without authorization constituted insubordination in violation of paragraph 1 \u2014 4 of the Department rules. The hearing officer also concluded, however, that the Department had failed to sustain its burden of proof on two other charges filed against Callahan. The Police Merit Board accepted the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law and reduced Callahan\u2019s suspension from 15 to 5 days for insubordination. The circuit court reversed the decision of the Board, ruling that the letter of July 31, 1985, was not an order. This appeal followed.\nOpinion\nThe Department contends that the trial court erred in reversing the Board\u2019s decision that Callahan\u2019s conduct constituted insubordination. The Department argues that it is well settled that an administrative agency\u2019s findings on questions of fact are considered prima facie true and correct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 3\u2014 110) and that those findings should not be disturbed on review unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence (Garland v. Department of Labor (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 383, 472 N.E.2d 434). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if an opposite conclusion is clearly evident from the record. (Sheehan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 275, 509 N.E.2d 467.) The Department maintains that the findings of the hearing officer were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the Board\u2019s decision must, therefore, be upheld.\nHowever, it is also well settled that the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review does not apply where the question presented is one of law. (Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 1, 544 N.E.2d 762; Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 613, 548 N.E.2d 1129.) When the facts are not in dispute, their legal effect becomes a matter of law which is reviewable by the court, and a reviewing court is not bound by an agency\u2019s conclusions of law. Kensington Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1944), 385 Ill. 504, 53 N.E.2d 395; Local 7-641 v. Department of Labor (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 476, 435 N.E.2d 1192; Hale v. Hellstrom (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 1127, 428 N.E.2d 1197.\nIn the instant case, the trial court found that the hearing officer\u2019s conclusion that the July 1985 letter \u201camounted to\u201d an order which Callahan disobeyed by claiming additional \u201c512\u201d medical leave in June 1986 was incorrect as a matter of law. We agree with the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nThe trial court in the case at bar noted that the word \u201corder\u201d is defined in Black\u2019s Law Dictionary as \u201c[a] mandate; precept; command or direction authoritatively given; rule or regulation.\u201d (Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 988 (5th ed. 1979).) The letter at issue was a standard form letter sent to all officers upon the termination of service-connected injury benefits. Contrary to the Department\u2019s argument that it \u201cdirected [Callahan] not to use any more \u2018512\u2019 time with regard to the 1984 accident,\u201d the letter contains no mandate, command or direction to Callahan to do or refrain from doing any act. It simply informed Callahan that his workers\u2019 compensation benefits, including service-connected time off attributable to injuries sustained in the 1984 accident, were being discontinued. It then advised him to contact Burgess in the medical records section if he had any questions.\nRelying on Zisner v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1961), 28 Ill. App. 2d 435, 172 N.E.2d 33, the Department nevertheless argues that \u201calthough the *** letter *** did not contain the language of a formal order,\u201d its clear import was that Callahan \u201cwas not to take any more \u2018512\u2019 *** time off with regard to his 1984 accident.\u201d We cannot agree.\nZisner involved a notice, signed by the assistant fire chief at the direction of the hospitalized fire chief, and posted in the city\u2019s firehouses which read:\n\u201cAll off duty men are to report to [a local auditorium on a specified date.]\nA refresher class as a follow up of the regional officer school will be conducted.\nCoffee and donuts will be provided again in the auditorium.\u201d\nNineteen members of the fire department who failed to attend the refresher course were suspended for insubordination. Although the court opined that the notice \u201cdid not appear in the language of a formal order,\u201d seemingly because of the reference to refreshments, the court nonetheless found that the notice constituted an order which the firefighters were obliged to obey.\nIn the case sub judice, the Department\u2019s reliance on Zisner is clearly misplaced. The Zisner case language, \u201c[a]ll off duty men are to report,\u201d is a clear and definite directive. The letter in the instant case contains no command or directive. It does not, as the Department argues, tell Callahan that \u201che was not to take any more 512 time.\u201d Rather, the letter merely informed him that the Department was discontinuing the benefits it had been giving to Callahan for the injuries attributable to the 1984 accident.\nThe written findings of the hearing officer suggest to us that his finding of insubordination was based on Callahan\u2019s change of the classification of his time from \u201c515\u201d to \u201c512\u201d sick leave \u201cwithout authorization\u201d and \u201ccontrary to proper procedure.\u201d However, it has been conceded that there was no written policy concerning the procedure to be followed for seeking additional \u201c512\u201d time following its earlier discontinuance. Further, witnesses differed as to what they understood to be the proper, albeit unwritten, policy governing this situation. Doerr testified that Callahan should have sent a memo and medical documentation to the Director\u2019s office; Burgess testified that such information should have been submitted to his office.\nHowever, Callahan was not charged with failing to follow proper procedure. He was charged with insubordination for failing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Since we hold, as a matter of law, that the letter did not constitute a lawful order, it necessarily follows that the decision of the Board finding that Callahan was insubordinate for violating a lawful order was erroneous.\nFor the reason stated, the order of the trial court reversing the decision of the Board is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJOHNSON, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority because I believe that it was within the province of the Board to determine whether the plaintiff\u2019s conduct amounted to a violation of the Department\u2019s rule prohibiting insubordination.\nThe plaintiff was sent a letter informing him that his service-connected time off relating to an injury which occurred in 1984 was being discontinued as of August 1, 1985. The letter contained the name of a person the plaintiff could contact if he had any questions. Ten months later, without informing anyone, the plaintiff took additional service-connected time off relating to that injury. As a result, he was suspended for violating the Department\u2019s rule against insubordination, which provides that \u201cofficers should promptly obey any lawful orders of a superior.\u201d The majority examined the language of the letter and concluded that as a matter of law it did not constitute an order.\nIt is true, as the majority asserts, that a reviewing court is not bound by an agency\u2019s conclusion of law. However, administrative agencies are afforded substantial discretion by a reviewing court in construing and applying their own rules, and a court will interfere only where the agency\u2019s interpretation is plainly erroneous. (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1047, 547 N.E.2d 499; Scheffki v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 971, 973, 320 N.E.2d 371.) In the context of disciplinary action taken by a police department, deference is accorded the agency because, as a part of the executive branch of government, it has both the responsibility and expertise in matters relating to the enforcement of standards which concern the maintenance of discipline and morale within the department. (Taylor v. Police Board (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 486, 489, 378 N.E.2d 1160.) A reviewing court\u2019s only obligation is to determine whether the agency\u2019s interpretation of its own rules has a reasonable basis in law. Taylor, 62 Ill. App. 3d 486, 376 N.E.2d 1160.\nIn the case at bar, I believe that it was within the Board\u2019s power to determine whether the plaintiff\u2019s conduct violated the rule prohibiting insubordination. As was stated in Zinser v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1961), 28 Ill. App. 2d 435, 439, 172 N.E.2d 33, the absence of formal language is not in itself determinative of whether a particular communication constitutes an order. The need for discipline and obedience is inherent in the operation of a paramilitary organization such as the Illinois Department of State Police. CPhillips v. Hall (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 409, 419, 447 N.E.2d 418.) In light of that need, I believe that the Board should be accorded great deference in setting standards of acceptable conduct for Department personnel. In my view, the conclusion of the Board that the plaintiff\u2019s conduct constituted insubordination has a reasonable basis in law and should not be overturned.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI," } ], "attorneys": [ "Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Ann Plunkett-Sheldon, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.", "Eugene G. Callahan, Matthew W. LaKoma, and Robert J. Metis, all of Callahan, Fitzpatrick, LaKoma & McGlynn, of Oak Brook, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JAMES CALLAHAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 90\u20140525\nOpinion filed December 19, 1991.\nJIGANTI, P.J., dissenting.\nNeil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor General, and Ann Plunkett-Sheldon, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.\nEugene G. Callahan, Matthew W. LaKoma, and Robert J. Metis, all of Callahan, Fitzpatrick, LaKoma & McGlynn, of Oak Brook, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1081-01", "first_page_order": 1105, "last_page_order": 1112 }