{ "id": 5253361, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALTON LOGAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Logan", "decision_date": "1991-12-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20141591", "first_page": "735", "last_page": "744", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 735" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 1340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612955 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 3d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3345354 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/61/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 N.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5472446 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3523333 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 N.E. 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5120578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/312/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 696", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160428 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 N.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 2d 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2600967 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/58/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2790543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105961 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 353", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111039 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5514997 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3121913 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 1369", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122553 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152504 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2861206 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 59", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3123281 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2629793 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 1378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2493179 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 N.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2907689 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/48/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 1089", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557518 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" }, { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" }, { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542942 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 N.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 1162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 1015", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568178 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0726-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 873, "char_count": 21767, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.985302501728386e-08, "percentile": 0.5382253946079482 }, "sha256": "74ec75dfdd58c0b1d8fa504a843e84a07208581b5a18c3c440197908da3ea686", "simhash": "1:1b3d7152563de7c9", "word_count": 3554 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:25.672470+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALTON LOGAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCORMICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Alton Logan, appeals from the circuit court\u2019s disposition of his petition for post-conviction relief.\nDefendant was charged with murder, attempted murder and armed robbery in connection with the January 11, 1982, robbery of a McDonald\u2019s restaurant. One restaurant security guard, Lloyd Wyck-liffe, was killed in the robbery and another, Alvin Thompson, was seriously wounded.\nDefendant was tried jointly with Edgar Hope. Prior to trial, the State and counsel for Hope filed motions in limine to preclude defendant\u2019s counsel from eliciting evidence of a connection between Hope and Andrew and Jackie Wilson. The Wilsons have been convicted of murdering Chicago police officers William Fahey and Richard O\u2019Brien. The killings occurred on February 9, 1982, and in a statement made at the time of his arrest, Jackie Wilson claimed that a few hours before the killings, Andrew Wilson had devised a plan to help his friend Edgar Hope escape from Cook County Hospital. Hope was being held at the hospital in connection with the murder of another Chicago police officer that occurred on February 5, 1982. See People v. Wilson (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 726, 487 N.E.2d 1015.\nIn response to these motions, defendant pointed out that the shotgun used in the McDonald\u2019s robbery and the service revolvers belonging to Officers Fahey and O\u2019Brien were discovered by the police in the beauty shop where Andrew Wilson lived and worked and that the weapons were recovered by the police when they went to the shop in an attempt to arrest the Wilsons for the murders of Fahey and O\u2019Brien. Defendant argued that it was his theory of defense that one of the Wilson brothers, and not defendant, was involved in the robbery at the McDonald\u2019s restaurant and, therefore, he should be allowed to show the connection between Hope and the Wilsons.\nThe trial court granted the motions in limine, but ruled that defendant could ask witnesses to identify photographs of the Wilsons. The trial court later stated that if any of the witnesses could identify the Wilsons, defendant would be allowed to introduce evidence linking the murder weapon to the Wilsons.\nThe record indicates that defendant\u2019s counsel showed a photograph of Andrew Wilson to two of the eyewitnesses. Counsel did not ask either witness if Wilson could have been the man who shot Wyck-liffe; however, one of the witnesses testified that there were a lot of similarities between defendant and the person pictured in the photograph.\nFollowing the trial, defendant and Hope were convicted of all charges. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, while Hope was sentenced to death.\nDefendant appealed his conviction and sentence arguing that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State improperly failed to complete its attempted impeachment of him, that he was prejudiced by the State\u2019s personal attack on his counsel during closing arguments, and that his sentence was excessive. This court affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence in an unpublished Rule 23 order, dated January 14, 1986. (People v. Logan (1986), 138 Ill. App. 3d 1162, 502 N.E.2d 874 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).) A petition for leave to appeal was filed with the Illinois Supreme Court on February 11, 1986 (appeal denied (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 592).\nIn the meantime, Hope\u2019s conviction and sentence were automatically appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. In an opinion dated February 21, 1986, the supreme court reversed Hope\u2019s conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. (People v. Hope (1986), 116 Ill. 2d 265, 508 N.E.2d 202.) Relying on its earlier decision in People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 197 N.E.2d 436, the supreme court held in Hope that it was error to allow the State to introduce evidence about Wyckliffe\u2019s family during the trial.\nSubsequently, defendant filed a motion to supplement his previously filed petition for leave to appeal to include the Bernette issue. This motion was accompanied by an affidavit prepared by defendant\u2019s appellate counsel in which counsel stated that she had not raised the Bernette issue because she was not aware of the Bernette case, nor of the importance of the issue.\nDefendant\u2019s motion was granted; however, the supreme court later denied leave to appeal. Logan, 111 Ill. 2d 592.\nIn July 1988, defendant filed a three-part petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, defendant alleged that he was denied effective assistance during his appeal due to appellate counsel\u2019s failure to raise several meritorious issues. Part I of the petition alleged that defendant\u2019s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Bernette issue; part II alleged that counsel should have raised the issue of whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence that someone other than defendant committed the offense; and part III alleged that counsel should have raised the issue of the trial court\u2019s consideration of outside information in determining defendant\u2019s sentence.\nThe State filed a motion to dismiss defendant\u2019s petition. Following arguments, the circuit court granted the State\u2019s motion with respect to parts II and III of defendant\u2019s petition. However, the court refused to dismiss part I of the petition, holding that defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the question of his counsel\u2019s failure to address the Bernette issue on appeal.\nAt the hearing, Donna Hickstein Foley, defendant\u2019s appellate counsel, testified that she had read the trial transcript before filing defendant\u2019s brief on appeal and that she was aware that defendant\u2019s trial counsel made objections to the evidence concerning the victims\u2019 families before the proceedings, during the trial and in a post-trial motion. Foley also testified that she did not raise the issue on appeal because she did not think it was a \u201cstrong\u201d issue. She further testified that, while she would not dismiss an issue without doing some research on it, she was not aware of the Bernette decision and had not read the decision before filing her appellate brief. Foley added that if she had been aware of the Bernette decision, she would have raised the issue on appeal.\nIn denying defendant\u2019s request for post-conviction relief, the circuit court stated that Foley\u2019s selection of issues to pursue on appeal could not be deemed incompetent. The court stated that it believed Foley was aware of the \u201cfamily issue\u201d and that it did not believe her testimony that she had not heard of the Bernette case. The circuit court also stated that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel\u2019s failure to raise the issue because the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming.\nIn this appeal, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in finding that he was not entitled to post-conviction relief. Defendant contends that the circuit court\u2019s finding that his appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the Bernette issue was clearly erroneous and inconsistent with the applicable facts and law.\nThe courts of this State have acknowledged that a post-conviction hearing is the proper vehicle for review of a claim that a defendant has been inadequately represented on direct appeal. People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 248, 533 N.E.2d 1089; People v. Frank (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 500, 272 N.E.2d 25; People v. Ferro (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 282, 551 N.E.2d 1378; People v. Pecka (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 60, 538 N.E.2d 1189.\nIn Caballero, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the two-part standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, was applicable in assessing the competence of counsel in a direct appeal. Thus, when a defendant maintains in a post-conviction proceeding that his attorney was ineffective in failing to argue a particular issue on appeal, he must show that the failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for this failure, the sentence or conviction would have been reversed. (Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d at 270.) There is no obligation on the part of counsel to brief every conceivable issue on appeal, nor is it incompetence for counsel to refrain from raising those issues that, in his opinion, are without merit, unless counsel\u2019s appraisal of the merits is patently wrong. People v. Barnard (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 218, 470 N.E.2d 1005.\nIn the present case, defendant argues that the Bernette issue was \u201cpatently meritorious\u201d and that the failure to raise the issue on appeal constituted ineffective assistance.\nIn Bernette, the victim\u2019s widow testified, without objection from the defendant, that she had four children, that the eldest was six years old and the youngest seven months, and that the youngest was the only child bom of her marriage to the victim. During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated that the victim \u201chad a wife, he had a child and he had a right \u2014 he was only 20 years old when he died \u2014 to be with that family and to pursue his life and liberty.\u201d Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371.\nIn reversing the defendant\u2019s conviction, the supreme court held that \u201cwhere testimony in a murder case respecting the fact the deceased has left a spouse and family is not elicited incidentally, but is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is highly prejudicial and constitutes reversible error unless an objection thereto is sustained and the jury instructed to disregard such evidence.\u201d (Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371.) The court added that \u201cjury argument by the prosecution which dwells upon the decedent\u2019s family or seeks to relate a defendant\u2019s punishment to the existence of family is inflammatory and improper.\u201d Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d at 371.\nIn ruling that defendant\u2019s appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to argue the Bernette issue, the circuit court found that appellate counsel\u2019s assessment of the testimony concerning the victims\u2019 families as harmless error was correct. It was the court\u2019s view that at the time the appellate brief was filed the trend was \u201cagainst this issue\u201d and, therefore, counsel\u2019s failure to raise the issue did not prejudice defendant.\nThe circuit court based its ruling on the supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 294, 456 N.E.2d 59, where it was held that a comment about the victim\u2019s family made by the prosecutor during closing arguments was harmless error. However, Bartall involved one improper statement to which defendant failed to object. In affirming defendant\u2019s conviction, the supreme court pointed out that \u201c[ujnlike many of the cases where comments about the victim\u2019s family required reversal, there was no presentation of irrelevant evidence about the grieving family and the prosecution did not dwell upon the victim\u2019s family so much that \u2018the jury could well have related this fact to the question of defendant\u2019s culpability.\u2019 \u201d Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d at 323, quoting People v. Jordan (1983), 38 Ill. 2d 83, 92.\nThere is nothing in Bartall that indicates that the supreme court intended to abandon its earlier holding in Bernette, nor is there any reason to assume that appellate counsel\u2019s decision not to raise the issue was made in reliance on the supreme court\u2019s decision in Bartall. Moreover, in the two years preceding the filing of the appellate brief, the supreme court repeatedly cited the Bernette case as support for the proposition that admission of testimony concerning a victim\u2019s family is reversible error when the testimony is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe that it is material. See People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 133, 469 N.E.2d 119; People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 502, 456 N.E.2d 1369; People v. Ramirez (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 439, 457 N.E.2d 31; People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 1, 452 N.E.2d 525; People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 1, 447 N.E.2d 353; People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 447 N.E.2d 218.\nAlthough Holman, Ramirez, and the two Davis cases involved the admissibility of evidence concerning the victims\u2019 families at sentencing, they all suggest the continuing viability of the rule set forth in Bernette. The same can be said of the Yates and Free decisions, in which evidence of the victims\u2019 families was introduced during the guilt and innocence phase of the proceedings. In those cases, the supreme court reiterated the Bernette rule but found that the facts in those cases were distinguishable from those in Bernette. A review of Yates, Free and Bernette would have revealed the great similarity between the facts in Bernette and those in the present case, as well as the obvious distinctions between the present case and Yates and Free.\nIn Yates, there was testimony from the deceased victim\u2019s mother that she and the victim were the only residents of the apartment where the victim\u2019s body was found and that certain items in the apartment were missing or moved. The supreme court found that there was no impropriety in the admission of this evidence. Yates, 98 Ill. 2d at 530.\nIn Free, there was testimony from the deceased victim\u2019s husband that they had been married 14 years and had two children. The supreme court found that this testimony was incidental and not presented in a manner that would cause the jury to believe the testimony was material. Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 415.\nThe testimony in the present case went far beyond that presented in Yates and Free. Here, as in Bernette, the deceased victim\u2019s widow testified in response to a series of questions that she had three children, that the children were aged 10, 6, and 3, and that the eldest was not the child of the deceased. In addition, the prosecutor commented on both victims\u2019 families in opening and closing argument and a photograph showing the deceased victim with his wife and children was admitted into evidence. It also should be noted that, unlike Bernette where no objection was made, here, the testimony concerning the victims\u2019 families was admitted over defendant\u2019s objections.\nIn light of the foregoing, we find that appellate counsel\u2019s assessment of the issue as harmless error was patently wrong and that, therefore, her representation of defendant on appeal was deficient.\nThus, we now must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s deficiencies, defendant\u2019s convictions would have been reversed. In Strickland, the Supreme Court defined a reasonable probability as one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.) As we stated above, this standard is applicable in assessing counsel\u2019s performance on appeal. Cabellero, 126 Ill. 2d 270.\nIn Cabellero, the Illinois Supreme Court citing Bernette described comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments as \u201cverg[ing] upon the kind of detailed discussion of the deceased victim\u2019s families\u201d which it previously had condemned.\u201d (Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d at 272.) However, the court found that the failure to challenge the remarks on appeal did not warrant reversal under Strickland because some of them were made in rebuttal to comments made by defense counsel, and because defendant had not contested the State\u2019s contention that the evidence against him, which included his own confession and admissions, was overwhelming. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d at 273.\nIn the present case, the evidence and comments complained of were precisely the kind of detailed discussion of the deceased victim\u2019s family that has been condemned by the supreme court. And unlike Caballero, here, the evidence not only was uninvited, it was admitted over the strong objections of defendant. Moreover, in the present case, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against him in his original appeal and continues to do so in the present appeal.\nAdditionally, in defendant\u2019s original appeal, this court found that the State acted improperly during cross-examination of defendant when it attempted to impeach defendant by creating an unsupported insinuation that he had attempted to intimidate a prosecution witness. This improper questioning when combined with the improperly admitted testimony and evidence concerning the victims\u2019 families creates a strong probability that the jury\u2019s finding of guilt was based on something other than the circumstances of the crime with which defendant was charged. (See People v. Gregory (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 601, 177 N.E.2d 120.) The existence of this probability is further supported by the supreme court\u2019s statement in People v. Hope, that the overruling of defendants\u2019 objections to the evidence of the victims\u2019 families amplified its prejudicial effect because it indicated to the jury that the evidence was material. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 278.\nIn attempting to persuade this court that the failure of defendant\u2019s appellate counsel to challenge the introduction of the evidence concerning the victims\u2019 families did not undermine the reliability of the outcome of defendant\u2019s appeal, the State argues that a significant factor in the supreme court\u2019s decision in Hope was the imposition of the death penalty. The State argues that because, here, defendant was not sentenced to death, it is probable that this court would have affirmed defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence even if admission of the evidence had been challenged on appeal.\nThe State\u2019s argument is based on the following language from Hope:\n\u201cThus, every mention of a deceased\u2019s family does not per se entitle the defendant to a new trial. [Citation.] In certain instances, depending upon how this evidence is introduced, such a statement can be harmless; this is particularly true when the death penalty is not imposed.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 276.\nWe find nothing in the supreme court\u2019s language that requires us to conclude that introduction of evidence of a victim\u2019s family will always constitute harmless error when the death penalty is not imposed. Rather, the court appears to be saying that when the death penalty is not imposed, the question of whether introduction of such evidence constitutes harmless error will depend upon the manner in which the evidence is introduced.\nAs noted above, the supreme court has ruled that the evidence in this case was not brought to the jury\u2019s attention incidentally but was presented in a manner that permitted the jury to believe it was material. (Hope, 116 Ill. 2d at 278.) The court also found that the comments about the victims\u2019 families made during opening and closing arguments were not invited by the defense and amounted to an improper appeal to the emotions of the jurors. Thus, the supreme court has already held that the manner in which the evidence was introduced served to prejudice the jury, and we find that the fact that the death penalty was not imposed does not require a different conclusion. See People v. Tajra (1965), 58 Ill. App. 2d 479, 208 N.E.2d 9.\nIn summary, we find that the failure of defendant\u2019s counsel to challenge the admission of evidence and arguments concerning the victims\u2019 families was objectively unreasonable and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the failure to raise the issue, defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence would have been reversed.\nDefendant also argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in dismissing part II of his post-conviction petition without an eviden-tiary hearing. In part II, defendant alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to allow evidence linking the Wilsons to the McDonald\u2019s robbery.\nDefendant correctly points out that one accused of a crime may prove any fact or circumstance tending to show that the crime was committed by someone other than himself (People v. Ward (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 443, 463 N.E.2d 696; People v. Nitti (1924), 312 Ill. 73, 143 N.E. 448), and that such evidence is relevant when a close connection can be demonstrated between the other person and the commission of the crime. (People v. Smith (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 609, 461 N.E.2d 534; People v. Bryant (1982), 105 Ill. App. 3d 285, 434 N.E.2d 316; People v. King (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 49, 377 N.E.2d 856.) It is also correct, as defendant points out, that evidence that a weapon was recovered in the place where an individual resided has been held sufficient to connect that individual to a crime committed with that weapon. See People v. Bennett (1987), 159 Ill. App. 3d 172, 511 N.E.2d 1340.\nWhile there was evidence in the present case of a connection between Hope, the Wilsons and the McDonald\u2019s robbery, because of our disposition of the Bernette issue, we need not determine whether counsel\u2019s failure to challenge the exclusion of this evidence on direct appeal amounted to ineffective assistance. Similarly, we find no need to address defendant\u2019s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court considered improper factors in imposing sentence.\nThe order of the circuit court denying defendant\u2019s request for post-conviction relief is reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nHARTMAN and DiVITO, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCORMICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Barbara Kamm, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Sharon L. Heath, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALTON LOGAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20141591\nOpinion filed December 31, 1991.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Barbara Kamm, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Sharon L. Heath, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0735-01", "first_page_order": 759, "last_page_order": 768 }