{ "id": 5251430, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY FELDER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Felder", "decision_date": "1992-01-14", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20143502", "first_page": "744", "last_page": "763", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 744" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228419 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 679", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563499 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555329 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" }, { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589302 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "572 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591835 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 948", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587359 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228316 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588559 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567019 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11319062 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "1366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 1060", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2581037 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73-74" }, { "page": "74-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5253361 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542942 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 N.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2826177 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3105961 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 1298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520847 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 1191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3640711 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0736-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 748", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3033561 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 1025", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2493614 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260348 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "217-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238368 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2678599 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2838755 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3030605 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809127 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 N.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2639673 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5444161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480573 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8-9" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5287543 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0011-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1520, "char_count": 43726, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.130821600015972e-08, "percentile": 0.46841842902810166 }, "sha256": "42cc531e8abcd5af366971126440c5e1fed40b792721be50d3534eb2c9805580", "simhash": "1:2e35d872704677d3", "word_count": 7280 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:25.672470+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY FELDER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE DiVITO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Larry Felder was charged by indictment with murder, attempted murder, and home invasion. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9\u20141(a)(1), 8\u20144(a), 12\u201411(a)(2).) After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to 80 years\u2019 imprisonment for murder, 30 years for attempted murder to run consecutively with the murder sentence, and 30 years for home invasion to run concurrently with the two other sentences.\nDefendant appeals both his conviction and his sentence, raising in issue (1) whether the attempted murder instruction given to the jury improperly stated the elements necessary to establish attempted murder; (2) whether the testimony of several State witnesses that they initially withheld information from the police out of fear for their own and their families\u2019 safety was properly admitted; (3) whether a photo taken of the deceased prior to her death and the testimony of the deceased\u2019s mother about the last time she saw her daughter alive were properly admitted; (4) whether defendant was denied a fair trial due to the State\u2019s exercise of a peremptory challenge of one juror in an allegedly racially discriminatory manner; (5) whether the court erroneously found that defendant was eligible for the death penalty; and (6) whether the court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant to consecutive sentences for murder and attempted murder.\nAt trial, Karen Spaulding (Karen) testified that, on March 14, 1987, she was living with her friend Sharon Eskridge (Sharon) in Sharon\u2019s attic apartment located in a single-family house at 734 East 103rd Place in Chicago. Also living in the apartment was Sharon\u2019s boyfriend, Guy Brackston.\nAt 10 p.m. on March 14, 1987, Karen and Sharon left the apartment and took a taxi to the Holiday Inn Mart Plaza, where defendant\u2019s brother, Robert Felder (Felder), was hosting a party in three rented suites. Approximately 50 people were at the party, including defendant, whom Karen knew as \u201cBo Bo,\u201d and Sherman Spears, known as \u201cSpiro.\u201d Karen had known defendant for approximately one year and Spears for six months; both defendant and Spears sold drugs for Felder, head of the \u201cPay Masters,\u201d a street gang which dealt in narcotics. Felder and the other drug dealers at the party provided champagne, cocaine, marijuana, and heroin for the party guests. While there, Karen drank three or four glasses of champagne and \u201cdid do a lot of coke.\u201d\nSometime during the night, Felder suffered an asthma attack; Karen helped him by propping him up on a bed, loosening his clothing, and removing his jewelry. After she removed his jewelry, Karen put on Felder\u2019s gold necklace and gave his rings to his girl friend.\nAt approximately 5:30 a.m. on March 15, 1987, Karen left the party with Sharon and Brackston; when they returned to their apartment, Sharon and Brackston went into the bedroom to sleep and Karen slept on the sofa in the living room. Later that morning, at approximately noon, Felder telephoned, asking for Brackston; however, Karen told him that Brackston was asleep. One hour later, Felder called again and told Karen to wake Brackston. After speaking with Felder for about 20 minutes, Brackston hung up and asked Karen about Felder\u2019s gold necklace. She then took off the necklace and gave it to Brackston.\nShortly thereafter, the doorbell rang and Karen went down to answer the door; at the door were Willie Streeter and Larry Byrd, both of whom sold drugs for Felder. After she let them into the apartment, the two men went into the bedroom to talk to Brackston. During the time that Streeter and Byrd were in the apartment, Karen took a shower and Sharon sat on the living room couch watching television. When Karen came out of the shower, Streeter and Brackston were leaving the apartment. Because it was not typical of Brackston to leave without telling Sharon, she and Karen discussed whether something might be wrong; Sharon was concerned that Brackston\u2019s departure could be because she had taken some money at Felder\u2019s party the previous night.\nAfter 10 minutes, Streeter returned to the apartment with defendant and Sherman Spears. Defendant went into the bedroom and Spears followed; Spears then came out and told Karen that she had gotten him in trouble by taking the necklace. Spears grabbed her by the arm and started yelling at her in a \u201cnasty\u201d tone of voice. Streeter stepped between Spears and Karen, telling Spears, \u201cMan, you should freeze that, you know. Don\u2019t do that.\u201d Defendant then called Sharon into the bedroom with him. After defendant and Sharon came out of the bedroom, defendant told Karen to go into the bedroom.\nWhile in the bedroom, defendant asked Karen why she took money from his brother; Karen denied taking any money and defendant responded, \u201cBitch, I know you took the money, and I am not going to be standing up here just to keep on asking you about the money and this shit.\u201d Defendant then hit Karen on the head with the butt of his gun, a \u201cblue steel .32 automatic.\u201d Karen fell crying to the bed and asked defendant why he had hit her; defendant answered, \u201cI am going to kill you, bitch,\u201d unless she would tell him where the money and \u201cstuff\u201d was. Defendant then began hitting and kicking Karen. After hitting Karen five or six times, defendant stood up and leaned with his hand against the wall. When Spears entered the room shortly thereafter, he threw a towel to defendant; defendant then used the towel to clean the area where his hand had touched the wall.\nAfter Spears entered the bedroom, defendant told him to \u201cgo get that other bitch and bring her in here.\u201d Karen then got off the bed and stood next to a dresser near the wall. When Sharon entered the bedroom, Spears pushed her onto the bed, picked up a pillow, and handed it to defendant. Both defendant and Spears, who had a .38 caliber gun, put their guns inside of the pillows. When Karen then yelled, \u201cno, don\u2019t. You know you don\u2019t have to do that,\u201d defendant turned around and shot her in her left shoulder. As she fell to the floor, Karen could see both defendant and Spears shoot Sharon \u201cabout 5 or 6, or more\u201d times. She also could hear two different sounds emitted from the guns. Karen began feeling a \u201cburning sensation\u201d in her body and realized that it was because of her numerous gunshot wounds.\nWhen she was able to get up, Karen called to Sharon, who was lying facedown on the bed, but received no response; she attempted to walk to the living room and call the police but she could not walk very well, was dizzy, nauseated, and everything appeared to her to be in \u201cslow motion.\u201d When she got into the living room, she turned down the television volume, which had been turned up; she then locked the door and tried to call the police. Someone then knocked on the door; Karen \u201chollered, no, no. Don\u2019t hurt me, no, no.\u201d\nA man then broke the glass in the door and opened the door; Karen did not know him, but she told him in \u201cblurred\u201d words that Sharon was in the bedroom, dead. Shortly thereafter, as the police were arriving, Felder telephoned and Karen answered and told him, \u201cHello, Rob. Your brother and Spiro just shot me, and they killed Sharon.\u201d Before hanging up, Felder told Karen that she had better not say anything or he would \u201cdo something\u201d to her mother and her child.\nImmediately thereafter, the paramedics arrived and took Karen to Bernard Mitchell Hospital, where she underwent surgery. On March 16, 1987, while Karen was still in the hospital, she spoke to several Chicago police detectives; she did not tell them, however, what had happened because she \u201cwas still afraid for\u201d herself and her family. After the police assured Karen that they would protect her, she told them that \u201cSpiro\u201d and \u201cBo Bo\u201d had shot her and Sharon. A few hours later, Karen gave the police defendant\u2019s and Spears\u2019 proper names and told them where they might find them, an address on the west side of Chicago and the names of several downtown hotels where they usually stayed. During that day and the next, police showed her some photographs and she identified Spears and defendant as the men who shot her and killed Sharon.\nOn cross-examination, Karen admitted that she had used drugs with Felder on prior occasions and that her sister was Felder\u2019s old girl friend. She also admitted that, after the shooting, she was arrested for possession of cocaine; however, she explained that, at the time of the arrest, she was wearing an old coat, unaware that there was one-tenth of a gram of cocaine in the pocket. She further acknowledged that she never told the police about defendant wiping the wall where his hand had touched, nor did she tell the police that, one year prior to the shooting, she had an argument with defendant and he threatened to kill her.\nNolan Lando testified that, at the time of the shooting, he lived across the street and knew both Sharon and the owner of the building where Sharon\u2019s attic apartment was located. On March 15, 1987, the owner of the building called him and told him that something was going on in her house and asked him to come up to the attic apartment with her. Before he entered the apartment, he could see Karen staggering inside, covered with blood, and trying to use the phone. Lando pushed the locked door open with his shoulder; at the time, Karen was yelling at him not to hurt her. Once in the apartment, he could see that Sharon was dead in the bedroom. Five to six minutes after he entered the apartment, as the police were arriving, the phone rang and Karen had a brief conversation; Lando, however, could not hear what she was saying.\nChicago police officer William Peak testified that he was one of the first police officers to arrive at the scene of the shooting; there, he \u201cobserved a female black laying across the bed,\u201d motionless. He further saw \u201canother female black,\u201d who was \u201cbleeding profusely\u201d and in \u201cserious condition\u201d with a gunshot wound through her cheek and several other gunshot wounds to \u201cvarious parts of her body.\u201d While in the apartment, Peak questioned Lando and spoke to Karen for approximately 35 seconds; Karen\u2019s speech was difficult to understand, but she was able to tell him that \u201cBo\u201d was one of her attackers.\nChicago police detective Michael Bosco testified that he spoke with Karen in the hospital on March 16, 1987; however, she was reluctant to answer any of his questions. According to Bosco, Karen \u201cstated she was very much afraid of what had happened to her and what might happen to her in the future. And she was also very much afraid for the well-being of her family.\u201d After Bosco assured her that extra security measures would be taken, Karen gave him two names. Bosco, however, felt that Karen was \u201cholding back certain information\u201d and, thus, requested that someone else interview her.\nAfter talking to Bosco, Chicago police detective George Basile went to Bernard Mitchell Hospital to interview Karen; however, during the interview, Karen was again reluctant and stated that she was concerned about the safety of her child. After Basile\u2019s reassurance that the promised security measures had indeed been taken, Karen told him that \u201cBo\u201d was defendant, but she did not know \u201cSpiro\u2019s\u201d real name. Thereafter, Karen identified defendant\u2019s picture from a photo array. On cross-examination, Basile admitted that Karen never told him about Felder\u2019s phone call after the shooting, nor did she tell him about defendant threatening her in the past.\nAfter being given the information provided by Karen, Chicago police detectives Edmond Leracz and William Pedersen went to the Cabrini Green housing project and several downtown hotels to look for defendant and Spears. On March 17, 1987, after the desk clerk at the Essex Hotel positively identified defendant as one of the registered guests, Leracz and Pedersen set up observation outside of defendant\u2019s room. Shortly thereafter, they observed Spears enter the room; when Spears left the room, Leracz approached him, identified himself as a police officer, and \u201cpatted him down.\u201d In Spears\u2019 pocket Leracz found a key to the room and a newspaper clipping about the shooting.\nWillie Streeter testified that, at the time of the shooting, he was a member of the Pay Masters; he described himself as \u201csecurity\u201d in the gang and Felder as the \u201cDon,\u201d or leader of the gang. He further described defendant as the \u201cnumber 2\u201d man under Felder and Spears as Felder\u2019s \u201cright hand man, bodyguard and enforcer.\u201d\nOn March 15, 1987, Streeter was with Robert Byrd at a \u201csafe house\u201d that Felder had rented. While at the house, Streeter and Byrd received a phone call from Felder telling them to go to Guy Brack-ston\u2019s house to pick up his money. Streeter and Byrd then went to Brackston\u2019s .house. After Karen let them into the apartment, the two men entered the bedroom, where Brackston was on the phone. After Brackston got off the phone, Streeter told him that Felder had sent him there to pick up his necklace and $2,000 that had been taken at the party. Brackston then gave Streeter the gold necklace, but before he could give Streeter the money, the phone rang. Brackston answered and spoke for approximately two minutes before he gave the phone to Streeter, saying that it was Felder. Felder asked Streeter if \u201cBo-Bo\u201d and \u201cSpiro\u201d had arrived yet and Streeter answered \u201cno,\u201d but that Brackston had given him the gold necklace and \u201cwas in the process of giving\u201d him the money. Felder responded, \u201cFuck that shit. *** Keep everybody in the house there until Spiro and Bo-Bo get there.\u201d\nAfter he hung up the phone, Streeter told Brackston that Spears and defendant were on their way to the apartment. He then asked for the money and Brackston gave him $2,500. Immediately thereafter, the phone rang again, Streeter answered and spoke again with Felder. After Felder asked if Spears and defendant were there yet, Streeter told him that he had the necklace and the money; however, Felder stated, \u201cFuck that shit. *** Don\u2019t let the bitches or Guy out of the house. *** Keep them there. *** Bo-Bo and Spiro going to gun them bitches.\u201d After he hung up, Streeter warned Brackston to \u201cget your girl and go,\u201d because Spears and defendant were on the way to the apartment to \u201cgun y\u2019all down.\u201d\nThereafter, Brackston, a drug dealer, packed up his drug paraphernalia and left the apartment with Streeter. As they were leaving the building, Spears, defendant, and another man drove up to the apartment in a van. After asking Streeter where Brackston was going, defendant and Spears entered the apartment. Streeter followed them in.\nOnce in the apartment, Spears began swearing at Karen and saying that she had made him look bad in front of \u201cthe Don\u201d; when Spears, who had a .38 caliber gun, grabbed Karen by the wrist, Stree-ter attempted to \u201cdiffuse\u201d the situation and told Spears to \u201cfreeze that shit.\u201d Defendant, who had a .32 automatic, then walked over to Sharon and said he needed to talk to her in the bedroom. When Sharon left the bedroom, defendant asked Karen to come into the bedroom.\nShortly thereafter, defendant came out of the bedroom and gave the telephone to Streeter, saying that Felder wanted to talk to him. On the phone, Streeter tried to convince Felder that what was happening made no sense because he already had the money and the necklace. Felder, however, refused to listen and again said, \u201cMan, fuck that shit. They are going to gun those bitches.\u201d After he hung up, Streeter went into the kitchen and told Byrd that he was leaving; Byrd then followed him out of the apartment.\nOnce they left the house, Streeter and Byrd got into the van with the other man. Approximately five minutes later, defendant and Spears came running out and got into the van with their \u201cpistols in their hands.\u201d As he drove the van away, defendant turned to Spears and said, \u201cYou\u2019s a cold mother-fucker\u201d; Spears responded, with a grin, \u201cMan, we gunned them bitches. We gave the bitches 2 to the head.\u201d Defendant and Spears then emptied their guns, wiped them off, and gave them to the other man in the van.\nAfter driving a short while, defendant, Spears, and the other man left the van. Streeter and Byrd drove the van for a little longer, but then parked it and took a cab to the house where Felder was staying.\nWhen they entered the house, Felder asked Streeter what had happened and stated, \u201cSpiro and Bo fucked up. I just got through to that bitch Karen on the phone. The bitch ain\u2019t dead.\u201d\nAfter the shooting, Streeter never went to the police to give them information; moreover, he refused to answer the questions of both the police and the grand jury. According to Streeter, he did not want to jeopardize his life or his family\u2019s safety. Nevertheless, after his arrest and conviction on charges not pertaining to the shooting, Streeter made a plea agreement with the State\u2019s Attorney whereby he agreed to testify at defendant\u2019s trial.\nChicago police officer Irwin Temoir testified for defendant that he handled the initial paperwork on the case. After speaking with several officers at the scene of the shooting, Temoir wrote in his report that the two offenders were \u201cBo\u201d and \u201cJeff.\u201d\nAccording to Chicago police officer Fred Harris, a latent fingerprint examiner for the police department, he received numerous fingerprint lifts from the crime scene, 21 of which were suitable for comparison purposes. Of those prints, none matched Spears\u2019 prints; further, a palm print taken from the scene did not match defendant\u2019s print. One print, however, taken from a plastic bag found inside a tool box, matched Jeff Davis\u2019 prints.\nAt the close of all the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of murder, attempted murder, and home invasion. Finding that defendant was eligible for the death penalty, the circuit court sentenced defendant to 80 years for murder, 30 years for attempted murder to run consecutively with the murder sentence and 30 years for home invasion to run concurrently with the other sentences. Defendant appeals both his conviction and his sentence.\nI\nDefendant initially contends that the instructions given by the circuit court improperly allowed the jury to convict him of attempted murder if it found that he merely intended to do \u201cgreat bodily harm\u201d without the requisite intent to kill. In response, the State maintains that defendant has waived appellate review of this issue due to his failure to object at trial or to raise the issue in his post-trial motion. (See People v. Solis (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 11, 576 N.E.2d 120.) In the alternative, the State contends that any error which may have resulted from the instructions was harmless in light of the proper instructions which were given and the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt.\nAt trial, the jury was instructed as follows:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of murder when he kills an individual without lawful justification if, in performing the acts which caused the death,\nhe intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual; or\nhe knows such acts will cause death to that individual; or\nhe knows that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual; or\nhe is committing the offense of home invasion.\u201d\nThe court then instructed the jury on the propositions that the State must sustain in order to prove the charge of murder:\n\u201cFirst: That the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, performed the acts which caused the death of Sharon Eskridge; and\nthat when the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible did so, he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Sharon Eskridge; or\nhe knew that his act would cause death or great bodily harm to Sharon Eskridge; or\nhe was committing the offense of home invasion.\u201d\nThe court next gave the jury an instruction which defined attempted murder:\n\u201cA person commits the offense of attempt murder when he, with the intent to commit the offense of murder, does any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the commission of the offense of murder.\nThe offense attempted need not have been committed.\u201d\nThereafter, the court instructed the jury as to the elements necessary for an attempted murder conviction:\n\u201cTo sustain the charge of attempt murder, the State must prove the following propositions:\nFirst: That the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible performed an act which constituted a substantial step towards the commission of the offense of murder; and\nSecond: That the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, did so with intent to commit the offense of murder.\u201d\nThus, defendant contends, the jury was instructed that it could find him guilty of attempted murder on a finding that he intended to kill Karen Spaulding, but that the jury was also additionally, but erroneously, instructed that it could likewise find him guilty of attempted murder on the jury\u2019s alternative finding that he solely intended to do great bodily harm to Karen.\nSpecific intent to kill is an essential element of the offense of attempted murder and, correspondingly, a finding of nothing less than proof of specific intent to kill is necessary to support a conviction for attempted murder. (People v. Jones (1979), 81 Ill. 2d 1, 405 N.E.2d 343; People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16, 377 N.E.2d 28; People v. Velasco (1989), 184 Ill. App. 3d 618, 540 N.E.2d 521.) \u201cKnowledge that the consequences of an accused\u2019s act may result in death (or grave bodily injury), *** is not enough; specific intent to kill is required [citation]. Both the indictment and the instructions must unambiguously reflect this.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) People v. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d at 8-9.\nWhere a defendant is tried for both murder and attempted murder, as here, the court, for the purpose of the attempted murder charge, must give a separate instruction defining murder which limits the murder definition to acts committed with the specific intent to kill. (People v. Velasco, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 632.) Attempted murder instructions such as those given in the instant case, which include the full definition of murder, are erroneous. People v. Harris, 72 Ill. 2d 16; People v. Trinkle (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 198, 369 N.E.2d 888.\nNevertheless, the State asserts that, assuming arguendo that the jury should have received a modified instruction, any error was harmless. The State maintains that an error in instructions will not justify reversal where, as here, the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was so overwhelming that even if properly instructed the jury could not reasonably have found him not guilty.\nBecause \u201c[t]he interests of justice demand that the rule of waiver be modified, in criminal cases, where necessary to ensure fundamental fairness,\u201d which includes \u201cseeing to it that certain basic instructions\u201d are given (People v. Ogunsola (1981), 87 Ill. 2d 216, 222, 429 N.E.2d 861), the State\u2019s initial assertion that the error was effectively waived must fail. We find, however, that there was not grave or substantial error in the failure to give the proper instructions. \u201c \u2018Even though error may have been committed in giving or refusing instructions it will not always justify reversal when the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt is so clear and convincing that the jury could not reasonably have found him not guilty.\u2019 \u201d People v. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d at 9, quoting People v. Ward (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 253, 256, 204 N.E.2d 741.\nIn the instant case, that defendant and Spears attempted to murder Karen Spaulding was evident from the circumstances. Not only did Karen testify that defendant told her that he was going to kill her if she did not give him the money, but she also testified that, after he shot her in the left shoulder, he began shooting at Sharon. Moreover, Streeter testified that Felder told him a number of times that defendant and Spears were going to \u201cgun them bitches.\u201d Streeter also testified that, after the shooting, Spears stated that \u201cwe gave the bitches 2 to the head,\u201d meaning he and defendant. (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant\u2019s contention that the evidence against him that he intended to kill Karen was not overwhelming is incorrect. Defendant asserts that \u201cSharon Eskridge was shot in the brain and killed by Sherman Spears\u201d; however, the pathologist testified that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds, not just the wound to her head. Defendant additionally maintains that the evidence \u201cshows that Spears *** fatally shot [Sharon] Eskridge in the head and also shot [Karen] Spaulding, while Mr. Felder may have only shot [Karen] Spaulding in the shoulder\u201d; however, it is clear from Karen\u2019s testimony that both defendant and Spears were shooting at both women. Defendant\u2019s reliance upon People v. Okundaye (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 601, 545 N.E.2d 601, to support his argument is misplaced. There, the evidence \u201cwas far from overwhelming that the defendant intended to kill\u201d his victim. People v. Okundaye, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 607.\nBecause the evidence in the case at bar that defendant intended to kill Karen was overwhelming, we find that any error in the court\u2019s instructions was harmless.\nII\nDefendant next contends that the circuit court erred in allowing testimony from the State\u2019s witnesses that they were reluctant to cooperate with the police out of fear for their safety. Specifically, defendant maintains that the admission of this testimony was prejudicial because it gave rise to the inference that the witnesses\u2019 fears were due to threats by defendant.\nIn response, the State initially maintains that defendant has waived review of this issue because of his failure to object at trial. In the alternative, the State contends that the testimony was highly relevant as to the credibility of the witnesses and was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect.\nCertainly, prosecutorial comments which suggest that witnesses were afraid to testify because the defendant had threatened or intimidated them, when not based upon any evidence in the record, are highly prejudicial and inflammatory. (People v. Mullen (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 394, 405, 566 N.E.2d 222.) Evidence of the fears of witnesses is relevant and admissible, however, where it tends to prove a material fact in issue and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. See, e.g., People v. Eyler (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 173, 217-18, 549 N.E.2d 268.\nDespite defendant\u2019s contentions to the contrary, the witnesses\u2019 testimony, in the instant case, did not give rise to the inference that defendant in any manner threatened them. Rather, the testimony merely explained why those witnesses initially were reluctant to speak to the police. Karen Spaulding explained that she did not, at first, give the detectives any names, even though she thought there was a good chance that she might die from her wounds, because she was fearful that defendant and Spears would be able to again \u201cget to\u201d her. Moreover, Streeter explained his failure to cooperate with the police or the grand jury by stating that he was afraid for himself and his family. Thus, the testimony concerning witnesses\u2019 fears explained why those witnesses did not initially provide information to the police.\nAccordingly, the court did not err in admitting the foregoing evidence; however, even if the evidence was improperly admitted, the alleged error is harmless where, as here, evidence supporting defendant\u2019s conviction is so overwhelming that his conviction would have resulted even if the alleged error was eliminated. People v. Jackson (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 104, 551 N.E.2d 1025.\nIll\nDefendant next contends that the circuit court erred in admitting both a photograph of Sharon taken prior to the shooting and the testimony of Laura Eskridge, Sharon\u2019s mother, about the last time she saw her daughter alive. Specifically, defendant maintains that the admission of the photograph and the testimony from Sharon\u2019s mother so prejudiced the jury that defendant was denied a fair trial.\nIn response, the State initially maintains that defendant has waived review of this issue because of his failure to object at trial. In the alternative, the State contends that, since the evidence was incidental and since the testimony was not related to defendant\u2019s guilt, the evidence was properly admitted.\nAt trial, Laura Eskridge testified that the last time she saw her daughter alive was on March 13, 1987, when Sharon visited her father in the hospital; on that day, according to Eskridge, Sharon was in f\u00edne health and in good spirits. The next time Eskridge saw her daughter was at the morgue.\nDuring her testimony, Eskridge provided a photograph of Sharon depicting the way she looked prior to the shooting. Later in the trial, despite defense counsel\u2019s objections to the photograph as prejudicial, the court entered the photograph into evidence and allowed the jury to use it during its deliberations.\nGenerally, the State is entitled to call \u201clife and death\u201d witnesses to establish that a murder victim had been alive prior to the events at issue. (People v. Toth (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 27, 435 N.E.2d 748.) Even where the defendant stipulates to the identity of the deceased and to her death, such testimony is properly elicited. (People v. Williams (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 736, 744, 484 N.E.2d 1191; People v. Starks (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 384, 390, 451 N.E.2d 1298.) However, where testimony \u201c \u2018in a murder case respecting the fact the deceased has left a spouse and family is not elicited incidentally, but is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is highly prejudicial and constitutes reversible error.\u2019 \u201d People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 378, 414, 447 N.E.2d 218, quoting People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 359, 371, 197 N.E.2d 436.\nIn the instant case, the photograph, which Eskridge testified accurately depicted what Sharon looked like on the day of her death, merely illustrated her testimony. Moreover, Eskridge\u2019s testimony that Sharon was 29 years old at her death and one of eight children in the family was incidental and not presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it to be material to defendant\u2019s guilt.\nAlthough defendant urges this court to find that the admission of the testimony and the photograph was prejudicial, the cases relied upon by defendant reveal that the prosecution there did more than just make the jury aware of the fact that the deceased left behind a family. Rather, in those cases, the prosecution dwelt upon the deceased\u2019s family in opening statement and closing argument to the point that the jury could have related the evidence to the defendant\u2019s guilt. (See People v. Hope (1986), 116 Ill. 2d 265, 508 N.E.2d 202; People v. Logan (1991), 224 Ill. App. 3d 735; People v. Starks, 116 Ill. App. 3d 384, 451 N.E.2d 1298.) Here, the evidence was not accompanied by testimony or statements specifically regarding the family left behind by Sharon, nor was there an inflammatory closing argument.\n\u201cCommon sense tells us that murder victims do not live in a vacuum and that, in most cases, they leave behind family members.\u201d (People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 415.) Thus, not every mention of a deceased\u2019s family ipso facto entitles the defendant to a new trial, since in certain instances such a statement can be harmless. (People v. Free, 94 Ill. 2d at 414.) Accordingly, we find that defendant was not denied a fair trial due to the admission of the photograph of Sharon and Eskridge\u2019s testimony.\nIV\nDefendant next contends that this case should be remanded to the circuit court for a hearing, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712, on whether the State violated his equal protection rights by exercising a peremptory challenge during jury selection to prevent a black venireperson from serving on his jury solely on account of her race.\nIn order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination during voir dire, a defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the State exercised its peremptory challenges to remove members of that group, and that other relevant circumstances exist which raise an inference that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenges to exclude venirepersons from the jury on racial grounds. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712; People v. Baisten (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 64, 73-74, 560 N.E.2d 1060.) Further, the Supreme Court has recently held that \u201ca criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race.\u201d Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400, 402, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 419, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366.\nAlthough it is true, as defendant argues, that even the exclusion of just one minority venireperson for racial reasons is unconstitutional and grounds for reversal (People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 123, 544 N.E.2d 357), a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges cannot be established merely by the numbers of venirepersons stricken by the prosecution. Rather, the issue is whether this fact, in addition to \u201cany other relevant circumstances,\u201d raises an inference that the prosecutor conducted purposeful discrimination. (People v. Holman (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 128, 172-73, 547 N.E.2d 124.) \u201cRelevant circumstances\u201d include a pattern of strikes against black venirepersons; a prosecutor\u2019s questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges; the disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against blacks; whether the excluded blacks were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic; the level of black representation in the venire as compared to the jury; the race of the defendant and the victim; and the race of the witnesses. People v. Baisten, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 74-75; People v. Mahaffey (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 388, 413, 539 N.E.2d 1172.\nIn the instant case, during voir dire, the State excused potential juror Melanie Walters by exercising a peremptory challenge. The defense objected and requested a race-neutral reason for the exclusion. The circuit court declined to compel the State to provide a reason, stating that \u201cthere is not an appearance in my mind as to a violation of\u201d Batson v. Kentucky. The court further found that several witnesses, defendant, and juror Walters were black.\nAt the conclusion of jury selection, the court found that\n\u201cthe State has used six out of seven peremptory challenges. All of them were used for white jurors except one, and that one was Melanie Walters. The defense has used up seven peremptory challenges. Two of them were for blacks, one was for an Asian, and four were for white and some of those were tendered by the State. And on the jury right now we have four blacks, one Asian, and six whites.\nThe blacks in the jury are in a higher proportion than the number of prospective jurors that we had out there in the Court\u2019s estimation, and further the Court sees no preliminary showing by the defense that the State is challenging blacks because of their race.\u201d\nBecause a circuit court\u2019s determination that a defendant failed to establish a prima facie Batson case will not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence (People v. Mahaffey, 128 Ill. 2d at 413; People v. Batchelor (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 316, 323, 559 N.E.2d 948), defendant\u2019s request for a Batson hearing is denied. Applying the principles enunciated to the case at bar, we find that the record fails to establish a case of purposeful discrimination, and thus, the court did not err in finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.\nV\nDefendant next contends that the circuit court erroneously found him eligible for the death penalty. Specifically, defendant urges that the court erred in finding that he inflicted physical injuries on Sharon contemporaneously with those injuries inflicted by Spears. Rather, defendant contends that no evidence was presented as to whether his gun inflicted any of Sharon\u2019s wounds. Thus, defendant maintains, the court\u2019s error mandates that his sentence be vacated and the cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing.\nFor support, defendant points to the trial testimony of Robert Kirschner, the forensic pathologist, who testified that Sharon suffered several gunshot wounds: among them, one to the head, from which a .38 caliber bullet was recovered, and one to the neck, from which no bullet was recovered. According to Kirschner, the cause of her death was \u201cmultiple gunshot wounds.\u201d Thus, defendant maintains, because no .32 caliber bullet was recovered from Sharon\u2019s body, there was no proof that he actually shot her.\nA defendant is eligible for the death penalty only if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a statutory aggravating factor exists. (People v. Simms (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 154, 169, 572 N.E.2d 947.) In the instant ease, defendant\u2019s eligibility for the death penalty was predicated upon the statutory aggravating factor set out in section 9 \u2014 l(bX6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9\u20141(b)(6)), which authorizes the imposition of a death sentence upon a defendant who commits a murder, or inflicts injuries contemporaneously with those causing death, in the course of another felony. See People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill. 2d 235, 276, 547 N.E.2d 202.\nIn the case at bar, during the eligibility hearing for the death penalty, the court made a series of findings before ruling that defendant was eligible. The court initially found that defendant was over 18 when the offense was committed and that the victim was killed during the course of another felony, home invasion. Next, the court found that the murdered victim \u201creceived physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by\u201d one for whose conduct the defendant was legally accountable. Based upon these findings, the court held that defendant qualified for the death penalty. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6).\nNotwithstanding defendant\u2019s argument, it does not appear that the circuit court sentenced defendant under a mistaken belief that he was eligible for the death penalty. Although defendant argues that the autopsy did not reveal that a bullet from his gun wounded Sharon, Karen testified that she saw both defendant and Spears shooting at Sharon and, further, she heard two different sounds coming from the two guns. Based on this evidence, the court properly found that the State met its burden to prove that defendant inflicted injuries on Sharon contemporaneously with those injuries inflicted by Spears beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s request for a new sentencing hearing is denied.\nVI\nDefendant lastly contends that the circuit court improperly sentenced him to consecutive terms for murder and attempted murder. Specifically, defendant maintains that the record fails to support the court\u2019s conclusion that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public. The State maintains, in response, that in light of the evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearing, the court properly sentenced defendant to consecutive terms.\nThe applicable statute at the time of defendant\u2019s sentencing granted the discretion to impose consecutive sentences where the court was of the opinion that such a term was necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(b).) Although sentencing courts are vested with wide discretion so that reasoned judgments as to the penalty appropriate to the particular circumstances of each case can be accomplished, consecutive sentences should be imposed sparingly and only in instances demanding such sentences. People v. O\u2019Neal (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 291, 297, 531 N.E.2d 366; People v. Timmons (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 679, 687-88, 469 N.E.2d 646.\nIn the case at bar, during the sentencing hearing, the circuit court reviewed the factors in mitigation \u2014 defendant\u2019s one prior conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, his attendance of high school, his wife\u2019s and friend\u2019s testimony concerning his good character \u2014 but did not find that those factors effectively excused defendant's behavior. In aggravation, the court noted that defendant committed the shooting while on probation from the other offense, that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201ccruel,\u201d and that the sentence was necessary to deter others from committing crimes. The court did not, however, note specifically that a consecutive term was necessary for the protection of the public.\nAlthough the sentencing court is not required to recite the language of the statute in reaching its determination that a consecutive sentence is warranted, the record must show that the court is of the opinion that a consecutive term is necessary for the protection of the public. (People v. O\u2019Neal, 125 Ill. 2d at 299.) Here, it appears from the record that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, but rather, seriously considered all factors in mitigation and aggravation, and determined, based on those factors and the evidence presented at trial, that a consecutive sentence was mandated. While the amended statute arguably mandates consecutive sentences in the instant case (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20142(a)), the former statute, applicable in this case, vested discretion in the court. Because we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm defendant\u2019s sentence.\nVII\nDefendant also claims, though not delineated as a separate issue, that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel because of his attorney\u2019s failure to object to the allegedly erroneous jury instructions; to the allegedly prejudicial testimony concerning witnesses\u2019 fears; and to the allegedly prejudicial testimony of Sharon\u2019s mother and the admission of Sharon\u2019s photograph.\nTo establish a denial of his constitutional right to representation by competent counsel, defendant must establish that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that his attorney\u2019s shortcomings were so serious as to deprive him of Ms right to a fair trial. (Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052; People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253, 538 N.E.2d 1118.) Defendant must clearly establish not only that his attorney was actually incompetent in the performance of his duties, but also that were it not for that incompetence the outcome of the trial would likely have been different. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.\nHere, defendant has failed to establish a denial of his constitutional right to counsel; rather, defendant has raised only a cursory allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because defendant has failed to establish that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence.\nAffirmed.\nSCARIANO and McCORMICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE DiVITO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Marc Davidson, and Anna Ahronheim, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David Sta-brawa, and Carrie Weiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY FELDER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20143502\nOpinion filed January 14, 1992.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Marc Davidson, and Anna Ahronheim, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, David Sta-brawa, and Carrie Weiner, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0744-01", "first_page_order": 768, "last_page_order": 787 }