{ "id": 5251692, "name": "DOUGLAS ROUSEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Central Illinois Public Service Company, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Rousey v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "1992-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140333WC", "first_page": "1096", "last_page": "1102", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 1096" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "201 Neb. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5260102 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" }, { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/201/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 Neb. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 5407059 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/228/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 So. 2d 1306", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7601775 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/491/1306-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2554617 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0371-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 676, "char_count": 11996, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.087085966315723e-08, "percentile": 0.37573754299961115 }, "sha256": "c9d1ba244c8398e42429b44efba459654fd11250864f9db8e43904f49299f8e1", "simhash": "1:de6bed9594a8c8a6", "word_count": 1899 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:10:25.672470+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DOUGLAS ROUSEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Central Illinois Public Service Company, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn September 20, 1983, claimant fell from a 35- to 40-foot height and suffered a depressed skull fracture, a contrecoup brain injury to the left side and a fractured right clavicle. Following five months of hospitalization, claimant returned home, where he has lived continuously to the present time. The parties stipulated claimant is permanently and totally disabled due, in part, to his permanent brain injuries. The arbitrator and Industrial Commission (Commission) denied claimant\u2019s wife\u2019s request for reimbursement for past and prospective maintenance expenses. The circuit court reversed, concluding claimant\u2019s spouse\u2019s household services should not be considered gratuitous simply because she is married to claimant and, although claimant\u2019s visible injuries are minimal, his brain injury requires that he be \u201csupervised\u201d on a full-time basis. Respondent appeals, contending the circuit court\u2019s award of maintenance expenses for claimant\u2019s wife\u2019s services is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe facts are not in dispute. After claimant was released from the hospital he returned home to his wife and two children. They subsequently moved in with claimant\u2019s father and have lived together continuously since early 1985.\nClaimant\u2019s wife testified at arbitration that claimant operates at the level of a six to seven year old and requires constant care and attention out of fear he might do something inadvertently harmful to himself. On one occasion, claimant, who had been an electrician, tried to fix a lamp but accidentally set it on fire.\nDespite the guidance and supervision claimant\u2019s wife provides, claimant is able to leave the house on his own to visit nearby friends and an automobile repair garage a short distance from the house. Claimant is also capable of driving an automobile and can hunt and use a weapon. At home, claimant helps out with household chores by folding clothes and washing windows. He is able to dress and feed himself and tend to his own personal hygiene.\nClaimant\u2019s only noticeable physical deficit is a limp and the fact he is sometimes unsure of his footing when he walks or steps, although he does not use any medical appliances such as a cane or a wheelchair. Mentally, claimant can become agitated and frustrated and the presence of his two young children sometimes bothers him. He is unable to concentrate for periods of time in excess of an hour or two.\nClaimant\u2019s spouse testified he has received no medical treatment since June 1985 and that she has had no formal medical training and provides no medical assistance of any sort to him. She cooks meals for the entire family and cleans house but conceded she would do so irrespective of whether claimant was injured. She also handles all the family finances and had done so to a large extent prior to the accident. Reimbursement was sought for what claimant\u2019s spouse described as \u201cguarding services\u201d because an individual needs to be with claimant in the home to watch him and help him if he requires it.\nThe testimony of Dr. Eilers, who had examined claimant in 1985, was admitted. Claimant suffers from significant cognitive deficits due to his injuries. Because of what the doctor termed a classic traumatic brain injury pattern, claimant can become agitated and is not completely independent but needs supervision for his own safety. His judgment is sometimes subject to question and he suffers from recent memory impairment. Claimant nonetheless is alert and oriented and is able to comply with certain commands which require only one or two steps. He can become frustrated, however, when more complex tasks are required.\nDr. Eilers believes that claimant\u2019s condition requires that someone be with him at all times because, although he does not need \u201cguarding,\u201d he could be impulsive because of his brain damage and do things such as forget to turn off the gas on the stove. The person attending claimant would not, in Eilers\u2019 opinion, need any medical training. Although claimant could become aggressive, Eilers was unaware of any actual episodes of violent behavior demonstrated by claimant. In Eilers\u2019 words, the supervision claimant requires is akin to that one would provide a child.\nThe arbitrator denied the spouse\u2019s claim for maintenance expenses because she was not performing necessary medical, surgical, or hospital services within the meaning of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a)). Rather, the arbitrator concluded she was performing the normal duties of a spouse. The Commission affirmed the decision of the arbitrator. On review, the circuit court reversed that aspect of the Commission\u2019s decision, concluding claimant\u2019s brain injury required supervision on a full-time basis and such care should not be considered gratuitous simply because claimant is married to the individual providing the care.\nOn appeal, respondent contends the Commission\u2019s determination that claimant\u2019s wife was not entitled to maintenance care reimbursement was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nSection 8(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cIf as a result of the injury the employee is unable to be self-sufficient the employer shall further pay for such maintenance or institutional care as shall be required.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a).\nThe parties stipulate that claimant is permanently and totally disabled from pursuing further employment with respondent. They also agree that claimant suffers from a substantial brain injury, although he has made a remarkable recovery given the nature of the accident and the severity of the injuries. It is also clear claimant is self-sufficient to the extent he is able to tend to his basic needs and get about in the community on his own to a limited extent. He can feed and clothe himself without assistance. He can leave the house for trips in the neighborhood unattended. He drives an automobile, hunts, and performs certain limited routine household chores. He interacts with his children and is able, to a limited extent, to enjoy certain routine pleasures such as watching television.\nNevertheless, claimant\u2019s mental capacity is limited and he must be looked after to the extent one would supervise a child. The fear is that claimant might undertake some task beyond his capabilities and accidentally injure himself. Claimant\u2019s spouse, however, provides no medical assistance of any sort to claimant and none is con-cededly required.\nIn Burd v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1991), 207 Ill. App. 3d 371, 566 N.E.2d 35, this court considered the issue of when home care services were appropriately compensated under section 8(a) of the Act. In Burd, the services were provided by a nonrelative, a fiancee. Claimant\u2019s work injury rendered him a paraplegic and his treating physician prescribed nine home modifications to allow claimant to live independently without nursing care. Because of the insubstantial value of claimant\u2019s home, however, these changes were never made. According to claimant\u2019s doctor, he could not exist in the house without the assistance of either a \u201chome care service or a \u2018significant other.\u2019 \u201d (Burd, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 374, 566 N.E.2d at 37.) When the employer-paid assistance from home care services was terminated, claimant\u2019s live-in fiancee began assisting claimant in entering and exiting the home, tending to claimant\u2019s personal hygiene, and performing general housekeeping tasks.\nIn reviewing whether an award for these home care services was appropriate, the court reviewed cases from other jurisdictions and determined that the record supported the award. Significant to Burd were two factors, the type of duties and the status of the party rendering them. In that case, claimant required 24-hour-per-day nursing care because of his paraplegia, which his fiancee was not legally obligated to provide. In the instant case, the assistance rendered to claimant was provided by his spouse and these activities were described alternatively as \u201cguarding\u201d services or the passive supervision which a baby-sitter might provide for a child.\nThe circuit court concluded that these services constituted something other than ordinary household duties and it was inappropriate to deny a claim for maintenance services simply because a spouse was providing them. We disagree.\nA majority of cases have recognized the general rule that shopping, cooking, and other household services performed by a spouse or other family members are considered gratuitous and cannot form the basis for an award for attendant care services. (DeLong v. 3015 West Corp. (Fla. App. 1986), 491 So. 2d 1306.) The rationale for denying compensation for ordinary household duties when performed by a spouse is that a spouse performs such activities for both parties as part of the marital relationship. (Currier v. Roman L. Hruska United States Meat Animal Research Center (1988), 228 Neb. 38, 421 N.W.2d 25.) As one court observed, one spouse has agreed to care for the other \u201c \u2018in sickness and in health.\u2019 \u201d (Spiker v. John Day Co. (1978), 201 Neb. 503, 530, 270 N.W.2d 300, 314.) For this reason, a distinction has been drawn, for compensation purposes, based on the status of the individual performing those services. Although not necessary to the decision in Burd, this court embraced that concept when it stated that mere household duties provided by a spouse who is otherwise \u201cobligated\u201d to perform them by virtue of the marital relationship are not compensable, whereas a different result may obtain when an individual not legally or otherwise required to perform the services does so.\nNotwithstanding claimant\u2019s wife\u2019s status as his spouse, she argues that the services she performs are more than mere household duties. While the evidence supports the conclusion that someone ought to be with claimant to watch over him, it is equally clear that the supervision offered is precisely the type which someone might give to a child in the home. There is also evidence that claimant is at least partially independent to the extent he is able to travel in the neighborhood, drive a car unsupervised, and handle a weapon when hunting.\nProfessor Larson has said that while \u201cattendance in the nursing sense is covered by statutes providing for reimbursement for maintenance expenses, a line has been drawn between nursing attendants and services that are, in essence, housekeeping. (2A A. Larson, Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a761.13(d)(4), at 10 \u2014 892 (1989).) It is conceded that claimant is not receiving any medical or nursing services of any sort.\nThe question of whether the kind of assistance claimant\u2019s spouse provides constitutes maintenance within the meaning of the Act is one of fact for the Commission to determine. The fact that the injury has affected claimant\u2019s mental processes, standing alone, is not determinative. In the absence of medical care or active attendance to claimant\u2019s basic needs, the Commission\u2019s determination that claimant\u2019s spouse is performing household duties which are not compensable within the meaning of section 8(a) of the Act is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County, insofar as it overturned the Industrial Commission decision on this issue, is reversed, and the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision is reinstated in its entirety.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part; Industrial Commission order reinstated.\nEGAN, WOODWARD, STOUDER, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary A. Brown and Liesl G. Smith, both of Sorting, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen & Cochran, Ltd., of Springfield, for appellant.", "James C. Serkland, of Serkland & Muelhausen, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DOUGLAS ROUSEY, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Central Illinois Public Service Company, Appellant).\nFourth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140333WC\nOpinion filed January 30, 1992.\nRehearing denied March 12, 1992.\nGary A. Brown and Liesl G. Smith, both of Sorting, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen & Cochran, Ltd., of Springfield, for appellant.\nJames C. Serkland, of Serkland & Muelhausen, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1096-01", "first_page_order": 1120, "last_page_order": 1126 }