{ "id": 5247365, "name": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. JEREMY MARGOLIS, Director of the Department of the State Police, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ROBB et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Margolis v. Robb", "decision_date": "1992-02-13", "docket_number": "No. 4-91-0388", "first_page": "843", "last_page": "850", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "225 Ill. App. 3d 843" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564417 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5554869 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1073-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557342 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1206" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3320971 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "8-9" }, { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512315 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146286 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" }, { "page": "837" }, { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2627688 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0901-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 729, "char_count": 18216, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.209811994104169e-08, "percentile": 0.3844670094665751 }, "sha256": "4afad48c38c36b4e60118a2ff411c647b18cc13e4daba256743e1fceb58e3e53", "simhash": "1:a1b2d1d3cfd3e4e3", "word_count": 2883 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:36:39.761728+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE ex rel. JEREMY MARGOLIS, Director of the Department of the State Police, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ROBB et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Director of the Illinois State Police (State Police) filed charges with the Illinois State Police Merit Board (Merit Board or Board), alleging defendant Michael Robb had improperly provided three documents\u2014relating to allegations made against an elected official, the coroner\u2014to the official who was the subject of the allegations. The three documents were: (1) an investigative report prepared by Master Sergeant C.F Gross (petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 1); (2) an office memorandum from Gross to Major Thomas Schumpp (petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2); and (3) an office memorandum from Schumpp to Deputy Superintendent Larry Dowdy (petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 3). Based on this alleged conduct, the complaint charged defendant violated the rules of conduct (ROC) of the State Police: ROC-1, paragraph 1\u201427 (dissemination of information); ROC-1, paragraph 1\u20143(a), and official policies (OPS), OPS 18\u20143 (dissemination of intelligence and investigative information), OPS 18\u20143(a) (assisting criminals), and OPS 18\u20143(b) (compromising criminal cases); ROC-3 (code of ethics); and ROC-1, paragraph 1\u20146 (unbecoming conduct).\nOriginally, zone 6 of the State Police obtained information relating to allegations of unlawful conduct and wrongdoing by the official. Gross compiled information, including exhibit Nos. 1 and 2, copies of the official\u2019s telephone records and other items, and forwarded them to zone 10 of the State Police. At this time, no case number had been assigned to the matter, nor had an official investigative file been opened.\nDefendant Robb, along with two other officers from zone 10, took the documents received from zone 6 to the Champaign County State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office to be reviewed to determine whether further investigation was warranted for that office to bring criminal charges. On December 11, 1987, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office informed defendant Robb, for the benefit of the State Police, that it did not wish to pursue the matter but had forwarded the material to the Attorney General\u2019s office for an independent determination.\nIn April 1988, the official approached defendant Robb and inquired about the status of the investigation. Robb responded that the State Police was not conducting an investigation, but the matter had been referred to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. The official indicated he was aware of the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s involvement and that the matter had been referred to the Attorney General\u2019s office. He then asked Robb if he could obtain a copy of the original documents received by the State Police. Later, Robb delivered the State Police\u2019s copy of the documents that had been provided to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office to the business with which the official was affiliated in an envelope on which Robb had written the official\u2019s name. Robb stated the documents were bound together by an \u201cAcco\u201d clip. On July 20, 1988, the Attorney General\u2019s office executed a search warrant on the official\u2019s office. During the search, copies of the exhibits were found in the official\u2019s briefcase. The exhibits were in an envelope and did not appear to have any punch holes which would indicate they had been fastened with other documents.\nThe Attorney General\u2019s office and the State Police questioned Robb to determine how the official had obtained the documents. Robb responded he had given the official the documents he had received from zone 6 and which had been delivered to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office. During the Attorney General\u2019s interview, Robb was not shown all of the exhibits, and, therefore, it was unclear whether the documents Robb admitted delivering to the official were the same as the exhibits. During the disciplinary hearing, Robb testified he did not recall petitioner\u2019s exhibit Nos. 1 and 3 as being included in the documents he had given over to the official. However, he did admit that if petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2 was not one of the documents he gave over to the coroner, it was very similar to it. Robb further testified he regarded the coroner as part of the law enforcement community.\nThe State\u2019s Attorney testified that exhibit No. 2 had been the top document on the sheath of papers which he had been asked to review and which he had forwarded to the Attorney General\u2019s office for an independent assessment. Robb\u2019s superior testified it would be incorrect to provide someone, including another police officer, police agency, or another governmental agency, with documents containing information relating to allegations made against that person or agency.\nAdditionally, at the hearing, conflicting testimony was heard regarding which of the exhibits were included in the papers taken to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office, but there was uncontroverted evidence the State Police did not commence an investigation of the elected official or open an official investigative file, pursuant to departmental procedures.\nBased on this evidence, the hearing officer held plaintiff had failed to establish Robb violated its rules. To reach this conclusion, the hearing officer maintained that plaintiff failed to prove Robb actually delivered petitioner\u2019s exhibits Nos. 1 and 3 to the official. He relied on the fact the exhibits did not appear to have been fastened at the top as described by Robb. As to petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2, he stated Robb admitted providing that document, along with other items, to the official. However, he noted petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2 was an interoffice memorandum and not an investigative file as, he stated, had been pleaded. (This was erroneous as the charges had identified exhibit No. 2 as an \u201cinter-office memorandum.\u201d) The officer concluded ROC 1\u201427 prohibited only the dissemination of investigatory information. Since petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2 was not an investigatory document, the State Police had not commenced an investigation of the official or opened an investigatory file, and there was no evidence before him concerning \u201cestablished departmental procedures\u201d for the dissemination of noninvestigatory material, he held the plaintiff failed to prove Robb had violated the rules by providing the coroner with petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2. Further, he held Robb\u2019s admission of providing other documents to the coroner was not a per se violation of ROC 1\u201427. As a result of plaintiff\u2019s failure to establish a violation of ROC 1\u201427, he found no violation of OPS 18\u20143, OPS 18\u20143(a) and OPS 18\u2014 3(b). The hearing officer further found no violation of ROC-3 (the code of ethics), or ROC-1, paragraph 1\u20146 (unbecoming conduct). On November 8, 1989, the Merit Board adopted the findings of the hearing officer.\nThe plaintiff petitioned for administrative review, and on August 7, 1990, the circuit court reversed the decision of the Merit Board and remanded the case to it to enter findings and conduct further proceedings. Pursuant to the circuit court\u2019s order, the Merit Board accepted that plaintiff had proved the charges against Robb and ordered him suspended for 15 days. Later, plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint for administrative review, seeking Robb\u2019s discharge or additional hearings to determine the appropriate disciplinary action against Robb. Additionally, Robb filed a petition for reconsideration of the circuit court\u2019s August 7 ruling. On May 6, 1991, the circuit court denied plaintiff\u2019s supplemental complaint and denied Robb\u2019s motion for reconsideration. Robb appeals the circuit court\u2019s August 7 order reversing the decision of the Merit Board, contending the Merit Board\u2019s original decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reinstated.\nThe Merit Board\u2019s findings and conclusions on questions of fact will not be disturbed on review unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (Lyles v. Department of Transportation (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 901, 907, 539 N.E.2d 833, 837, citing Garland v. Department of Labor (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 383, 392, 472 N.E.2d 434, 437.) A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if all reasonable and unbiased persons could agree an opposite conclusion is \u201cclearly evident.\u201d (Lyles, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 539 N.E.2d at 837 (and cases cited therein); Jackson v. Department of Labor (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 494, 499, 523 N.E.2d 5, 9 (and cases cited therein).) A reviewing court cannot reweigh the evidence, make independent determination of facts or substitute its judgment for that of the Board, even if it believes the opposite conclusion might be reasonable. The court\u2019s function is limited to ascertaining whether the Board\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Lyles, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 539 N.E.2d at 837; Jackson, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 499, 523 N.E.2d at 8-9.) Conflicting evidence is insufficient to reverse the Board\u2019s decision. (Lyles, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 539 N.E.2d at 837, citing Fox v. Illinois Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 381, 388, 383 N.E.2d 1201, 1206.) Since the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses are within the province of the Board, there only needs to be some competent evidence in the record to support the Board\u2019s decision. Jackson, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 499, 523 N.E.2d at 9 (and cases cited therein).\nBased upon the aforementioned principles and consideration of the record, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s decision. We do not reach the issue of whether it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the Board to conclude Robb had not provided the official with petitioner\u2019s exhibit Nos. 1 and 3 because, by defendant\u2019s own admission, he provided the elected official with petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2. We now turn to determine whether it was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the Board to conclude dissemination of this document did not violate the rules of the State Police. In doing so, we note that although an agency\u2019s interpretation of its own rules or the statute it is charged with administering is to be accorded some deference, courts of review are not bound to give the same degree of deference to an agency\u2019s construction of, for example, a statute, contract, or rules, as given to its findings of fact. Therefore, it has been held, for example, that a decision based upon an erroneous, arbitrary or unreasonable construction of a statute will not stand. (Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority v. Department of Revenue (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 326, 331, 533 N.E.2d 1072, 1073-74.) The resolution of this issue in this case turns on the interpretation given to the State Police\u2019s rules by the hearing officer and adopted by the Merit Board.\nCount I alleged Robb violated ROC-1, paragraph 1\u201427, which states:\n\u201cOfficers shall treat the official business, evidence, documents and photographs of the Department as confidential. Information regarding official business shall be disseminated in accordance with established Departmental procedures. Officers may remove or copy official records or reports from a police installation only in accordance with established Departmental procedures. Officers shall not divulge the identity of persons giving confidential information except as authorized by proper authority or release items of evidence, documents, photographs, etc. to members of the news media or others outside the criminal justice system without the express permission of the applicable Division Head.\u201d\nThe hearing officer held this rule prohibited only the dissemination of investigative material. However, this interpretation is clearly erroneous. The rule makes no distinction between investigative and noninvestigative material. Rather, the rule precludes the dissemination of the \u201cofficial\u201d business, et cetera, of the State Police. Although \u201cofficial\u201d is not defined, it is incomprehensible to conclude petitioner\u2019s exhibit No. 2 was not within the meaning of \u201cofficial business, evidence or documents *** of the Department.\u201d Zone 10 received the information during the course of its work and in its capacity as a facet of the State Police. This was official business, regardless of whether an investigation was pending, case number assigned or an official file opened.\nCount II alleged Robb violated ROC-1, paragraph 1\u20143(a), in that he violated the following policies of the State Police: OPS 18\u20143, OPS 18\u20143(a) and OPS 18\u20143(b), which state:\n\u201cDISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION The dissemination of information that is in possession of this Department is permitted on a need-to-know basis. No Departmental employee shall confirm the existence or non-existence of any intelligence, investigative, criminal, or any other Departmental record or information to any person or agency not specifically authorized to receive such information. Those authorized to receive such information shall be limited to members of this Department or another criminal justice agency if,\nand only if they have need for the information in the performance of their official duties. All employees shall treat as confidential the business of the Department.\n{a) Assisting Criminals\nEmployees shall not knowingly communicate in any manner, directly or indirectly, any information in possession of the Department which might assist persons guilty or suspected of criminal acts to escape detection, arrest, prosecution, or punishment, or which may enable them to dispose of or to secret evidence of unlawful activity or money, merchandise, or other property unlawfully obtained.\n(b) Compromising Criminal Cases\nEmployees shall not interfere with or interrupt any investigatory or legal process, nor without authorization discuss the content of any on-going investigation other than as may be required in the performance of their official duties.\u201d\nAccording to OPS 18\u20141, the purpose of the OPS rules is to maintain \u201cthe security and confidentiality of intelligence and investigative information.\u201d According to OPS 18\u20142, the policy of the State Police is to adopt procedures to \u201cprevent the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or investigative information in order to preserve the integrity of the investigative process, to promote adherence to the principles of due process, and to insure the safety of its officers.\u201d Clearly, Robb\u2019s conduct violated these policies.\nSection 18\u20143 specifically prohibits the dissemination of information \u201cin the possession of the Department.\u201d Zone 6 compiled the information through the course of its work and forwarded it to zone 10. The information dealt with allegations against an elected official and obviously was departmental business, regardless of whether it was technically classified as investigative or intelligence information and irrespective of whether a case number had been assigned or an official file opened. Upon receipt of the information, Robb, along with other officers, took the material to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office to determine whether that office would conclude further investigation was warranted. Later, the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office informed Robb, for the benefit of the State Police, that it was forwarding information to the Attorney General\u2019s office for an independent assessment. When Robb gave the official the State Police\u2019s copy of the documents, he was aware the Attorney General\u2019s office was in possession of the same documents.\nTo conclude Robb did not disseminate information in the possession of the State Police, and within the purview of OPS 18\u20143, defies logic. To hold otherwise would render much of the policies\u2019 language meaningless or superfluous. The use of the terms \u201cany intelligence, investigative, criminal or any other departmental record or information\u201d demands they be given broad meaning to maintain the security and confidentiality of information received by the State Police. If information given to the State Police were not treated as confidential and could readily be given to the subject of the material, the investigative process would be severely undermined. A police officer should be aware giving documents relating to the allegations against an elected official, which had also been given to the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office and forwarded by that office to the Attorney General\u2019s office, to the very official who was the subject of the allegations violated departmental policy. This interpretation gives meaning and effect to all of the language of the policy and accords with the principle that a court should not adopt a construction that would render language meaningless or superfluous. (See People v. Parvin (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 519, 525, 533 N.E.2d 813, 815; In re Application of Rosewell (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 404, 409-10, 537 N.E.2d 762, 765.) Neither should the Merit Board.\nBased on this analysis, it equally is necessary to conclude Robb violated the code of ethics, which states, in pertinent part: \u201cWhatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided to me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless revelation is necessary in performance of my duty.\u201d Further, it is logical to conclude Robb violated ROC-1, paragraph 1\u20146, unbecoming conduct, which states:\n\u201cOfficers shall conduct themselves on and off duty in such a manner as to reflect favorably on the Department. Officers will not engage in conduct which discredits the integrity of the Department or its employees, or which impairs the operations of the Department. Such actions shall constitute conduct unbecoming an officer.\u201d\nTo give such a limited reading to the rules and policies of the State Police as did the hearing officer is more than unwise; it defies all reason. Our interpretation gives meaning to all the language of the State Police\u2019s rules and policies. The decisions of the hearing officer and of the Merit Board were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s ruling.\nAffirmed.\nGREEN, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward H. Rawles, of Reno, O\u2019Byrne & Kepley, P.C., of Champaign, for appellants.", "Joseph J. Duffy and Heidi Dalenberg, both of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE ex rel. JEREMY MARGOLIS, Director of the Department of the State Police, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL ROBB et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 91\u20140388\nOpinion filed February 13, 1992.\nEdward H. Rawles, of Reno, O\u2019Byrne & Kepley, P.C., of Champaign, for appellants.\nJoseph J. Duffy and Heidi Dalenberg, both of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0843-01", "first_page_order": 869, "last_page_order": 876 }