{ "id": 5238496, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Williams", "decision_date": "1992-02-21", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20142850", "first_page": "188", "last_page": "195", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 188" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "582 N.E. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592370 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" }, { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E. 2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E. 2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3616743 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 N.E. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2547722 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 N.E. 2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533502 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160843 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E. 2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5538892 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E. 2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569956 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E. 2d 136", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3102209 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0309-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 628, "char_count": 14524, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.422188994090435e-08, "percentile": 0.34175293617504343 }, "sha256": "10c9203ea4fb967a60c68859f9d016dcd9479ca17e4dbb3cc045f2a214801e1e", "simhash": "1:2238b704734eb209", "word_count": 2338 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:12.469333+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LaPORTA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Jerome Williams was convicted of three counts of aggravated battery and one count of armed violence. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison on the armed violence conviction, the term to run consecutively with an unrelated three-year conviction for possession of a controlled substance and concurrently with an unrelated 20-year murder conviction.\nDefendant\u2019s appeal does not involve the propriety of the aggravated battery and armed violence convictions per se but asks this court to vacate defendant\u2019s conviction because he did not waive representation by a \u201cconflict-free\u201d attorney, who at the time of defendant\u2019s trial had a disciplinary proceeding pending against him before the Illinois Supreme Court.\nPrior to defendant\u2019s trial, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered that the law license of Leo Fox, defendant\u2019s counsel, be suspended for 18 months because of his failure to prosecute two appeals. Fox filed a petition for rehearing and that petition was pending when defendant\u2019s armed violence case went to trial. Therefore, at the time of trial, counsel was licensed to practice law in the State.\nOn the day of defendant\u2019s trial, May 18, 1988, defendant and counsels for defendant and the State appeared in chambers together with the trial judge to apprise defendant of Fox\u2019s situation. Though no court reporter was present, the parties stipulated to a written re-creation of what occurred in chambers. The stipulation read:\n\u201cOn May 18, 1988, Jerome Williams, his attorney Leo Fox, and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Edward Ronkowski met in the chambers of Circuit Court Judge Romie Palmer. No court reporter was present.\nJudge Palmer informed Jerome Williams his attorney was under investigation and that Mr. Fox\u2019s license may be suspended as a result of the investigation. Judge Palmer did not disclose the nature of the investigation. Judge Palmer wanted Jerome to know about the investigation so Jerome could decide whether he still wished Fox to remain his attorney. Judge Palmer informed Jerome Williams that if he no longer wanted Mr. Fox to continue as counsel, Jerome could have a continuance to obtain new counsel. It is Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Edward Ronkowski\u2019s recollection that Judge Palmer also told Jerome if he could not afford counsel one would be appointed. Neither Judge Palmer [n]or Mr. Fox recall whether Judge Palmer did or did not make this statement; however, it was Judge Palmer\u2019s practice to include this court appointed counsel admonition in similar situations.\nJerome Williams answered Judge Palmer\u2019s question by stating \u2018Yes\u2019 he wanted Mr. Fox to continue to be his lawyer. Judge Palmer told Jerome that by answering \u2018Yes\u2019 he couldn\u2019t thereafter use Mr. Fox\u2019s professional problems on appeal. Jerome Williams then asked Judge Palmer whether Mr. Fox was eligible to represent him (Williams). Judge Palmer answered \u2018Yes.\u2019\nWhereafter, the parties returned to the courtroom. (Stipulated Statement of facts.)\u201d\nIn open court Judge Palmer admonished defendant again with regard to his counsel\u2019s pending disciplinary proceeding. The following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: I would like to admonish him a little bit more. Can I do that? Any objection to me doing this?\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: Mr. Williams, you were in the chambers not too long ago with your attorney, and the State\u2019s Attorney, is that correct, and the Court? At that time I advised you as to certain things relating to your attorney. Is that right?\nMR. WILLIAMS: Yes.\nTHE COURT: And I also advised you, I believe I did, that if for some reason this matter comes up, you were convicted and this matter comes up in the future, you would have then waived your right to bring this up as a matter of appeal, insofar as the attorneys\u2019 [s-ic] qualifications. Do you recall that?\nMR. WILLIAMS: Yes.\nTHE COURT: I\u2019m again advising you. Do you understand that?\nMR. WILLIAMS: Yes.\nTHE COURT: I asked you then, do you want your attorney to represent you?\nMR. WILLIAMS: Yes.\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: For the record, by your attorney you are referring to me, Leo Fox?\nMR. WILLIAMS: Yes.\u201d\nDefendant then waived his right to a jury and his trial proceeded. The trial judge found defendant not guilty of attempted murder and guilty of one count of armed violence and three counts of aggravated battery. The trial judge set the sentencing for June 2, commenting to defendant that: \u201cI understand we are continuing it to June 2. Mr. Williams, this case, Counsel may not be able to finish it. Do you understand it? *** That he may have to bring in another attorney or a Public Defender. You understand that? *** That is agreeable?\u201d Three times defendant responded, \u201cYes.\u201d\nFox\u2019s license was suspended for 18 months on April 25,1988.\nOn June 2, 1988, defendant appeared before the trial court and agreed to be represented by a public defender. The trial judge admonished defendant: \u201cThe attorney that you had will not be representing you. *** You were admonished before that he might not represent you at the sentencing, is that correct?\u201d The defendant responded in the affirmative and stated that he wanted the public defender to represent him at the sentencing.\nOn August 19, 1988, defendant, represented by a public defender, was sentenced to 15 years. His motion for a new trial was also denied and the court noted that Fox\u2019s involvement in the case was not grounds for reversal.\nOn appeal, defendant contends he is entitled to a new trial without regard to his trial counsel\u2019s actual performance because he did not waive his right to be represented by conflict-free counsel. Defendant concedes that \u201c[a] review of the appellate record reveals Mr. Fox\u2019s performance was within acceptable perameters.\u201d However, defendant contends that in certain circumstances, citing Peo ple v. Williams (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 309, 444 N.E. 2d 136, pending disciplinary proceedings against defendant\u2019s counsel may subject defendant to representation by an attorney with an actual or possible conflict of interest.\nIn Williams, defendant was sentenced to death following his conviction for murder, rape and aggravated kidnapping. The supreme court upheld the conviction but reconsidered defendant\u2019s case when defendant\u2019s petition for rehearing detailed his attorney\u2019s subsequent disbarment. The supreme court ordered a new trial for Williams because the court found that though his counsel\u2019s trial court actions were competent it could not say with \u201cany degree of assurance\u201d that defendant had received effective assistance of counsel. Williams, 93 Ill. 2d at 324.\nThe Williams court noted the unique circumstances of the Williams case because defendant\u2019s counsel had represented three defendants in capital cases before two juries simultaneously. The court characterized the circumstances as \u201cunique\u201d and stated that the \u201csequence of events in this capital case, *** will rarely, if ever, be duplicated.\u201d Williams, 93 Ill. 2d at 325.\nDefendant urges this court to find, first, that defendant\u2019s counsel too faced a conflict of interest and, second, that defendant did not waive his right to representation by conflict-free counsel.\nA defendant is not required to show prejudice to his case in order to justify reversal of his conviction where his counsel has had an actual or possible conflict in professional conduct. (People v. Thomas (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 104, 545 N.E. 2d 654.) A defendant may waive his right to a conflict-free counsel if the court admonishes defendant regarding the existence and the significance of the conflict and takes into consideration the defendant\u2019s background, experience and conduct. People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 324, 339, 493 N.E. 2d 579; People v. Washington (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 104, 114, 461 N.E. 2d 393.\nDefendant asks this court to find defendant\u2019s counsel had a conflict of interest and contends the record is devoid of any statement as to the nature of the conflict, a consideration of Williams\u2019 background and an indication that Williams was told the nature of his lawyer\u2019s disciplinary charges and what effect it might have on defendant.\nDefendant contends that in light of this court\u2019s decision in People v. Washington (1990), 210 Ill. App. 3d 147, 568 N.E. 2d 1279, this court should find defendant did not waive his right to representation by a conflict-free attorney. The Washington court relied on Williams and held that defendant\u2019s counsel had a conflict of interest because he had a disciplinary proceeding pending before the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission at the time of defendant\u2019s trial. The appellate court found defendant did not waive his right to a conflict-free counsel and ordered the case reversed and remanded. However, after briefs were filed in this case, the supreme court vacated and remanded the Washington decision to the appellate court. People v. Washington (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 663, 582 N.E. 2d 183.\nThe State contends that, even if we were to find that a conflict existed, the stipulated facts establish defendant voluntarily waived his right to representation by a conflict-free counsel. The State argues that defendant was advised that defense counsel might be suspended from the practice of law, putting defendant on notice that his counsel might not be able to represent him at a later date. The trial judge offered him the opportunity to seek and obtain other counsel and indicated that he would grant a continuance should defendant wish to do so. The State contends that defendant was admonished repeatedly about the situation and warned that his counsel\u2019s disciplinary case could not be raised on appeal.\nThe State contends that defendant was not represented by counsel facing a conflict of interest and that the Williams case is factually distinguishable from defendant\u2019s case. The State notes that the supreme court characterized Williams as a \u201crarely, if ever *** duplicated\u201d capital case where the attorney represented three defendants in two trials held simultaneously. In addition, the attorney in Williams never appeared before the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission on his own case and explained later to the supreme court that he \u201cdid not feel mentally or physically capable of presenting his case.\u201d In re Weston (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 431, 436, 442 N.E. 2d 236.\nIn support of its position, the State cites People v. Perry (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 534, 540 N.E. 2d 379, where the appellate court rejected the argument made by defendant that the mere pendency of disciplinary proceedings brands an attorney incompetent to defend a person charged with a crime. (Perry, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 540.) As the court aptly noted, the fact that attorneys still are permitted to continue practicing law until they are suspended or disbarred \u201cis a clear answer to that argument.\u201d Perry, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 540.\nThis identical argument was also rejected in People v. Long (1990), 208 Ill. App. 3d 627, 567 N.E. 2d 514, and People v. Bernardo (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 652, 525 N.E. 2d 857. In Bernardo, the appellate court rejected defendant\u2019s contention that Williams established a per se rule permitting all criminal defendants a new trial when their attorneys are subject to disbarment proceedings. Bernardo, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 659.\nThe appellate court in Perry, Long and Bernardo instead found defendants\u2019 counsel\u2019s conduct proper by applying the standard used to review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim as enunciated in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052.\nIn Strickland the court stated that a defendant must show that his counsel\u2019s performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the performance prejudiced the defense of the case. (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) The Strickland standard was adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504, 473 N.E. 2d 1246.\nThe supreme court, aware of the anomaly it created, emphasized the limitations of Williams in People v. Szabo (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 525, 529-30, 582 N.E. 2d 173. In Szabo, not decided at the time the parties filed briefs in this case, the defendant contended that he should be granted a new trial solely on the basis of his attorney\u2019s disciplinary troubles. The defendant relied on Williams, but the court held that \u201cthe Williams decision was an aberration peculiar to the facts of that case.\u201d (144 Ill. 2d at 529.) Two days after Szabo was published, the court vacated the Washington decision, citing the Szabo decision in support of its action.\nWe find defendant\u2019s case in line with Szabo, Perry, Long and Bernardo where the courts found no unique circumstances such as existed in Williams to warrant a departure from the Strickland/Albanese standard. Defendant was advised fully in chambers and again in open court prior to trial. He repeatedly indicated to the court that he wished Fox to represent him and at no time expressed dissatisfaction with his counsel\u2019s representation. Defendant acknowledges in his appellate brief that a review of the appellate record reveals \u201cMr. Fox\u2019s performance was within acceptable parameters.\u201d Defendant has pointed to no deficiencies in his counsel\u2019s representation. Our review of the trial record establishes that counsel\u2019s performance did not fall below the Strickland!Albanese objective standard of reasonableness nor did his representation prejudice the defendant. We find no grounds to reverse the decision of the trial court because of defense counsel\u2019s disciplinary problems.\nDefendant also asks this court to order a resentencing of his case if his murder conviction in an unrelated case is reversed on appeal. This court affirmed the murder conviction in an unpublished opinion (People v. Williams (1st Dist. 1990), No. 1\u201488\u20141303 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)) and therefore this issue is moot.\nWe therefore affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and 15-year sentence for armed violence.\nAffirmed.\nMcNAMARA and RAKOWSKI, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LaPORTA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William P. Pistorius, and David B. Franks, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEROME WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20142850\nOpinion filed February 21, 1992.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (James N. Perlman, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, William P. Pistorius, and David B. Franks, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0188-01", "first_page_order": 212, "last_page_order": 219 }