{ "id": 5239650, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD V. PERRY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Perry", "decision_date": "1992-02-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201487\u20140463", "first_page": "326", "last_page": "345", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 326" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 606", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3439482 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 2d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3069192 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/79/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260454 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3310358 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 N.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. App. 3d 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 12127273 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/96/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228708 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 S. Ct. 138", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 L. Ed. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 U.S. 857", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6258435, 6260933, 6260615, 6259111, 6261292, 6258158, 6260271, 6258800, 6259918, 6261692, 6259615 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/409/0857-02", "/us/409/0857-09", "/us/409/0857-08", "/us/409/0857-04", "/us/409/0857-10", "/us/409/0857-01", "/us/409/0857-07", "/us/409/0857-03", "/us/409/0857-06", "/us/409/0857-11", "/us/409/0857-05" ] }, { "cite": "275 N.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3149271 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1546, "char_count": 46786, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.7492960360752035e-08, "percentile": 0.2978733509173701 }, "sha256": "66aa077785c5a63de0f7ace19ae3fe0495abb3b4e1dfc92b04e06d6c1527d9bd", "simhash": "1:b6ec30c0fc2b0c13", "word_count": 8086 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:12.469333+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD V. PERRY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LaPORTA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nReginald Perry was found guilty in a bench trial of armed robbery and murder and sentenced to consecutive terms of 50 years for the murder and 30 years for the armed robbery. On appeal, defendant raises as issues: (1) whether the prosecutor\u2019s failure to tender grand jury transcripts of witnesses against defendant in response to discovery requests prior to trial deprived defendant of a fair trial; (2) whether defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged; and (3) whether the imposition of consecutive sentences was excessive under the facts and circumstances of this case.\nDefendant was indicted October 12, 1985, on four counts of murder and one count each of armed violence, robbery and armed robbery. The trial judge granted pretrial discovery motions filed by defendant and the State. The defendant\u2019s motion included a request for disclosure of the names of any State witnesses and production of previous written or recorded statements by the witnesses. Before trial defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that he was promised immunity from prosecution on these charges because he had testified for the State against defendant in another case. The motion was denied.\nA bench trial commenced October 21, 1986, and was heard on six nonconsecutive dates. The final days of trial were December 17 and December 30,1986.\nNatalie Leon Lasko, older sister to the victim, Ivan Leon, testified that her brother came from Colombia to Chicago to live with her on October 14, 1984. She testified that her brother later moved to an apartment at 5400 N. Sheridan in Chicago and took a night janitor\u2019s job at the Sears Tower. She testified that in the early morning hours of August 8, 1985, she received a call from her doorman, who told her the police needed to speak with her at a nearby building. She spoke to police there and told them her brother also used the name of Julian Ciera. She testified that she went to the hospital where her brother had been taken and learned that her brother had died.\nShe testified on cross-examination that her brother was an accountant in Colombia and that the two were working to get his papers in order so he could stay in the United States permanently. She testified that the reason she told police her brother was feeling depressed was because he was homesick. She denied telling a police detective that her brother had threatened or attempted suicide.\nKathleen Frazier, who lived on the sixth floor of an apartment building on Sheridan Road in Chicago, testified that she heard someone shout two times, \u201cGive me your wallet,\u201d at approximately 2 a.m. on August 8, 1985. She testified that she went to the window and looked down to the intersection of Sheridan and Balmoral in Chicago. A tree partially obstructed her view but she testified she could see shadows, \u201cas if there was a fracas going on.\u201d She testified that she saw the victim fall to the ground, face up, and saw that his shirt was covered with blood. She testified that she saw the back of someone as he ran down Balmoral. She testified that the man running was a lighter hue black man or perhaps a lighter hue Hispanic man. He wore dark colored pants and no shirt. She testified that he was a younger man with a slim, muscular build and dark hair cut close to his head. She testified that she phoned 911.\nOn cross-examination she testified that she was having trouble sleeping and therefore was awake when she heard someone shout. She testified that she could not see what occurred on the ground below because a tree blocked her view. She stated that she could see the victim\u2019s upper torso when he fell to the ground. She did not see the person on Balmoral running away from the victim, she just saw him on Balmoral, running. She could not identify defendant as the assailant.\nAllen Lucas, a Chicago police officer, testified that he found the victim at the scene with several stab wounds to his chest and his pockets turned inside out. He inventoried several items found at the scene including men\u2019s glasses, a pen, a comb case and a man\u2019s wallet found near a mailbox. He testified that he interviewed Frazier, who told him that she was awakened by a man yelling \u201cGive me your wallet. Hurry up, give me your wallet.\u201d She looked out her window and saw a light-skinned male black with no shirt and dark pants. He testified that she believed a scuffle occurred, one man fell and the black man fled westbound on Balmoral. On cross-examination, Lucas testified that another officer interviewed someone else at the scene who indicated that a second offender might have been involved and was seen running northbound on Sheridan Road.\nRalph Archulita, a Chicago police sergeant, testified that he found two pieces of identification at the scene, one belonging to Ivan Leon and another to Julian Ciera.\nKimberly Rice, an acquaintance of the defendant, testified that at about 2:30 a.m. on August 8, 1985, Perry threw some rocks at her window at 5420 N. Sheridan Road and asked to be let in. She said she asked him what had happened because from the window she saw that he had a knife in his hand, a gash on his wrist and a little blood on him. She testified that the defendant had on no shirt, black pants and a pair of black boots.\nShe testified: \u201cHe told me he had got into a fight with someone, and then and a guy had got to struggling, and he robbed the guy. He thought he killed him.\u201d She testified that she opened a beer for defendant. She gave him a wet towel to wipe away the blood and then threw the towel in her closet. Later, a police detective, Stone, took the towel from the closet. She identified the towel in court.\nShe testified that when she buzzed defendant in and he came up to her apartment he no longer had the knife in his hand but had a brown-handled knife with a six-inch blade in his back pocket. She testified that he was intoxicated. She told him to calm down and dialed the phone for him because he said he needed to talk to a friend, Chuck Wade. She testified that Wade\u2019s girl friend answered the phone and said Wade wasn\u2019t there. She testified that she then went to the store to buy more beer, but stopped first to talk to police officers across the street who asked her how long she had been outside. She testified that while she was out there a police officer found a wallet near a mailbox. She testified that she paid for the beer with a bloodstained $10 bill defendant had given her and then returned home, where defendant explained what had happened.\nRice testified that Perry had injured his eye in a previous fight and told her he \u201cjust went off and stabbed\u201d the victim when the victim hit him in the eye. She testified that she gave him some clothes and walked with him for a few blocks before they parted company.\nShe saw him the next day after she ran into his girl friend and they found defendant at a friend\u2019s apartment. She testified that he was drunk but that they dressed him and took him to another friend\u2019s house, Rick Wade\u2019s, where they cut defendant\u2019s hair and tried to remove a tattoo from his chest with bleach, alcohol and lemon juice. She testified that defendant was crying and told her he needed to stop drinking and was going to get help.\nOn cross-examination, she testified that when she spoke to him from the window he was hysterical but when he was in her apartment he only was drunk. After refreshing her recollection with grand jury testimony, she then testified that he was hysterical and crying in her apartment. She testified that she remembered giving grand jury testimony that defendant\u2019s hair was long, but she did not remember telling the grand jury that he had an Afro.\nShe testified that the cut was on defendant\u2019s left wrist. She testified that when she returned from the liquor store, the defendant made three phone calls. He told her he was sorry and said he hoped he hadn\u2019t killed the guy. She testified that during this second conversation she could not recall whether he mentioned that he robbed the guy. When asked whether she told the grand jury that Perry never mentioned robbery during their second conversation, she testified that she had no recall of that. Rice testified that she threw Perry\u2019s boots away because one of the heels was broken. She testified that she never went to the police because she was scared. On redirect examination she repeated a statement she had made to the grand jury that defendant told her he had a fight with someone, robbed him, stabbed him and thought he killed him.\nPamela Fish, a Chicago police department crime lab expert, testified that the blood type and blood enzymes in the towel found at Rice\u2019s apartment and in some of Ivan Leon\u2019s blood were identical. On cross-examination she acknowledged that she was never given a sample of defendant\u2019s blood to analyze.\nCheryl Williams, a girl friend of Ricky Wade, testified that Rice, the defendant and the defendant\u2019s girl friend stopped at her home on August 8, 1985, in the late afternoon or early evening. She testified that Perry told her he had robbed a man in the 5400 block of North Sheridan and that the man hit him in the eye while he was attempting to rob him. She testified that Perry told her he pulled out his own knife and stabbed the victim from 12 to 14 times. She testified that Perry told her he stole a $10 and $5 bill from the victim\u2019s wallet and threw the wallet under the mailbox across the street, then he went to Rice\u2019s house.\nShe testified that before August 8, 1985, she had cleaned up a cut on Perry\u2019s arm that he suffered in a burglary at a shoe store. She acknowledged that she was currently on probation for juvenile pimping and solicitation. On cross-examination she denied she was ever told she could be prosecuted as an accessory to the murder.\nRick Wade, also known as Harold Wade, testified that Perry came to his house August 8 and told him he robbed $15 from a guy. He testified that the defendant told him he didn\u2019t know if the guy was dead and that he had given Rice $10 to buy alcohol. He testified that he had seen Perry the night before dressed in black pants and no shirt. He acknowledged that he had an attempted burglary conviction on his record and a pandering conviction, for which he was sentenced to two years.\nOn cross-examination Wade denied being told he could be prosecuted as an accessory to the crime. He testified that Perry never told him it was his intention to rob the victim from the very beginning but he understood that the incident had started as a fight. He testified that the first thing Perry told him was that he robbed the guy. He testified that he told Perry he had to leave because \u201cit was obvious he had hurt somebody, he had killed somebody.\u201d Wade testified that after Perry read in the newspaper that the victim had died he told Wade he didn\u2019t mean to kill anybody.\nThe parties stipulated that the victim died of multiple stab wounds and the State rested its case. The defense then called witnesses in Perry\u2019s defense.\nCharles Wade testified that he saw defendant briefly at his Franklin Park home on August 9 and defendant said the cuts on his arm were the result of a fight he had with someone. Wade\u2019s fiancee, Vivian Emrick, testified that she saw cuts on defendant\u2019s right and left arms.\nMichael Federichi, a delivery person for the Wall Street Journal and part-time taxi driver, testified that he delivered papers to 5415 N. Sheridan Road at about 2 or 2:15 a.m. on August 8. He testified that as he left the building and pulled away in his ear he saw two people standing next to each other at a sheltered bus stop on Sheridan near Balmoral. One man was wearing a dirty, white, long-sleeved shirt and dark brown or black pants. He testified that he believed they were both either Caucasian or Hispanic but did not believe they were black.\nHe testified that they crossed the street and then he saw them about 25 or 30 feet away \u201chorsing around.\u201d Soon he saw one on the ground kicking at the other, who was still standing. He testified that the man standing had a shirt on. He testified that he had his window down and heard nothing. The defendant was told to stand in the courtroom, and Federichi testified that defendant did not look like the person he saw standing over the other man because defendant was thinner.\nOn cross-examination Federichi testified that he did not get a very good look at either person. On redirect examination he testified that he returned to the area 15 minutes later and discovered police there and a maintenance man cleaning blood off the sidewalk where he had seen the two people.\nTeresa Suzy Mendoza, defendant\u2019s girl friend, testified that she received a phone call from the defendant at approximately 2 or 2:30 a.m. on August 8, 1985. She testified that it was Kim Rice\u2019s idea to buy Perry new shoes, get him some clothes, bandage his wounds and cut his hair. She testified that until that time he had an Afro hair style.\nMendoza testified that Rice had the motivation to lie about Perry because Perry was preventing Mendoza from working as a prostitute for Rice, which Rice wanted. Mendoza testified that she never worked for Rice as a prostitute. When asked why Rice might be motivated to lie about Perry, she testified that Rice was worried she would have to go to jail for helping Perry.\nThe defendant, Reginald Perry, testified that on the night of the incident he was drinking with friends for an hour or two and then intended to walk to another friend's house on Bryn Mawr. He testified that when he reached Balmoral and Sheridan he saw a man at the bus stop and they literally bumped into each other. He testified that the man asked him, \u201cWhat you be [?]\u201d which he interpreted to mean an inquiry about the street gang tattoo on defendant\u2019s chest. He testified that he received the tattoo six years ago when he was 12 and he denied gang membership at the time of trial.\nDefendant testified that he told the man to leave him alone but the man swung at him twice, hitting him once in the eye and once in the jaw. He testified that he stumbled back but then stepped forward and then pushed the man in the chest. He testified that he asked the man if he was crazy and swore at him but the man just swore back at him. He testified that he then started walking east on Sheridan Road but that the man followed two or three feet behind, eventually pushing Perry from behind. Defendant testified that he turned around and pushed back and the man took a swing at him. He testified that he fell to the ground and was lying on his back when he saw the man pull out a knife. He tried to kick the knife from the man\u2019s hand but the man dove on top of him with the knife and cut him three times, once on the hand and twice on the forearm.\nDefendant testified that the two wrestled with the knife and he obtained control of it and began hitting the man with the knife. After about a minute he stopped. He testified that he managed to get up and he ran down Sheridan Road to his friend Kim Rice\u2019s house. He testified that he was crying and bleeding. He rang her doorbell and she let him in and gave him a beer.\nHe testified that he went to the bathroom to wipe his wounds with a towel and then came back and told Rice he had been in a fight and a guy had tried to kill him. Defendant testified that shortly after that Rice left the apartment without explanation and returned three or four minutes later with a wallet in her hand that she said she found. He testified: \u201cI told her that the wallet might belong to the person I had the fight with and I told her her fingerprints would be on the wallet and she should get rid of it.\u201d He testified that she left again, returning five minutes later without the wallet and with a six-pack of beer. He testified that he phoned his girl friend while he was there.\nDefendant denied ever giving Rice money or telling her that he had robbed someone. He testified that it was never his intention to rob or fight with the man and that he only took the knife away from the man and never turned the man\u2019s pockets inside out. Defendant testified that Rice had the motivation to lie about their encounter because Rice had wanted defendant\u2019s girl friend to work as a prostitute for Rice and Rick Wade\u2019s prostitution ring but that defendant had refused to allow it.\nDefendant testified that he was at Rice\u2019s apartment for about 25 or 30 minutes and then the two left together although he proceeded alone to his friend Keith Allen\u2019s house on Bryn Mawr. He testified that he stayed at Allen\u2019s house overnight and was awakened the next day around noon by Rice, who was slapping him in the face. He testified that Rice told him the police were looking for him and she told him she was going to cut his hair.\nHe testified that he went to Rick Wade\u2019s house with his girl friend and Rice, but he denied telling Wade or his wife Cheryl Williams that he had robbed, stabbed and killed a guy. He admitted that when Rice brought in the newspaper about the person being killed, he told the people at Wade\u2019s house that \u201cI hope that I didn\u2019t kill the person.\u201d He denied telling Rick or Cheryl that he had tried to rob the man. He speculated that Wade was motivated to lie about him because the defendant would not permit his girl friend to work for Wade.\nDefendant denied ever carrying a knife with him and denied showing up at the Wade home a week before the incident with cuts on his arm. He testified that later in the day he went to Chuck Wade\u2019s house, where he changed his bandages. He was picked up by police three weeks later.\nHe testified that he did not know the man he had the altercation with on August 8, 1985, and had no intention of robbing him. He testified that he stabbed the man because he feared for his life. Defendant stated: \u201cI thought he was going to kill me.\u201d\nOn cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that after drinking with friends he walked from Irving and Sheridan (at 4000 N. Sheridan) to 5400 N. Sheridan. He testified that the victim, shown to him in a photograph, is the person he scuffled with that night.\nHe testified that though the man hit him in the eye, that did not make him mad and did not prompt him to start stabbing the man. He testified that the entire time he was stabbing the victim the victim was hitting him and he was afraid of the victim. \u201cI was protecting myself, I thought that he was trying to kill me.\u201d He testified that he feared for his life the entire time he stabbed the victim even though the wounds included four stabs to the back and about six stabs in the chest.\nHe testified that when he arrived at Rice\u2019s house he did not use the big white towel displayed in court but rather used a small face cloth to wipe up the blood on his body. He testified that he \u201chad an idea\u201d Rice got the wallet off of the person he had a fight with, but he denied ever seeing the man\u2019s wallet. He acknowledged that the police were at the scene of his altercation with the man when he and Rice left her apartment.\nHe admitted that he changed into new pants and shoes the next day because he was concerned that the police would find out what he was wearing the night before. He testified that Rice cut his hair because she wanted to disguise him but he stated, \u201cI wasn\u2019t trying to disguise myself.\u201d\nDefendant testified that he told Rick Wade he had gotten into a fight the night before but he denied telling Wade he had stabbed the man. He acknowledged that he read the newspaper article about the stabbing but denied telling his friends anything more than that he had gotten into a fight. He testified that the man he met on the street that night spoke English to him, not Spanish.\nOn redirect examination he testified that he never called police because he was afraid the police would not believe his story.\nThe record indicates that while defendant was putting on his evidence, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him or in the alternative for a mistrial. The motion stated that on November 21, 1986, defendant learned that Rick Wade and Cheryl Williams testified before a grand jury with regard to the death of Gladys Powell, allegedly at the hand of Prentice Jackson. Defendant\u2019s case is unrelated to the Jackson case. The defense motion asked the court to order the State to produce the grand jury transcript. The State notes in its brief that the transcript was produced when identified and requested.\nDr. An, an expert in forensic pathology, testified for the defense and said he did the autopsy on the victim, Ivan Leon. He testified that some of the victim\u2019s wounds on the hand and the forearms were suggestive of a struggle. He characterized the wounds on the hand as \u201cdefensive wounds\u201d or wounds sustained while someone was trying to defend himself. He testified that it would have been unlikely that the victim could have continued to struggle after receiving the fatal wounds to the chest but there was no way to tell which wounds occurred first. He testified that the body had 14 stab wounds and 10 \u201ccutting\u201d wounds. He testified that there were three abrasions on the body, on the left forehead, the left hip and the left ankle.\nThe defense then rested with the exception of \u201cperhaps\u201d bringing in Rick Wade to testify under subpoena. The court continued the case for approximately two weeks and then permitted the defendant to reopen his cross-examination of Harry \u201cRick\u201d Wade, who had testified in the State\u2019s case in chief. The court stated that it would allow the defense to reopen its cross-examination of Wade only for the purpose of asking about Wade\u2019s grand jury testimony in the unrelated Jackson case.\nUnder re-cross-examination Wade acknowledged that he testified before a grand jury in September 1985 about a shooting that occurred in his building August 17, 1985, between Gladys Powell and Prentice Jackson. He testified that he went to the police willingly a few days after Powell was shot, but he never told the police about Reginald Perry.\nWade admitted that he told the grand jury investigating the Powell murder that he was freebasing cocaine four or five times a day from July 1985 to around August 8, 1985, the date of Leon\u2019s murder. He denied that the cocaine use would have affected his ability to perceive things around him. Defense counsel attempted to question Wade about his drug arrest on March 18, 1985, and a pandering arrest on June 1, 1985. The court noted that the arrests were raised by the State in its case in chief and therefore the defense had ample opportunity to cross-examine Wade about these charges when it cross-examined Wade the first time. The court then permitted defense counsel to continue his questions with regard to Wade\u2019s prior arrests.\nWade admitted that he was arrested on the drug and pandering charges and that the State dropped the drug charge on October 1, 1985. He pleaded guilty June 1, 1986, to the pandering charge and was sentenced to two years but was released October 1, 1986. Wade admitted that the State did help him on the drug case by having it dismissed in exchange for help on the unrelated Prentice Jackson case.\nA stipulation was entered into the record that if Detective Fred Stone were to testify he would state that neither Rice, Wade nor Cheryl Williams came to him and volunteered information about Perry\u2019s involvement in the crime. A stipulation was entered that if Detective Sikorski were called to testify he would testify that the victim\u2019s sister told him the victim had a drinking problem, was depressed and had threatened suicide.\nAfter closing arguments, the trial judge found defendant guilty of armed robbery and of murder committed during an armed robbery. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge found as a matter of law that imposition of the death penalty was improper. In imposing sentence the trial judge stated:\n\u201cMr. Perry, I have reviewed the presentence report, the circumstances of the offense that you have been found guilty of, and, of course, I am considering your potential for rehabilitation as the law requires me to. Even if it did not, I would consider it because I think it is the proper thing to do. At the time of this offense you were just three months into your 18th year, or I should say your 19th year. With the grace of God if you had committed this offense four months earlier, you could not even be considered eligible for the death sentence. However, you were eighteen years of age and you were a young man and you probably had more experience on the street than the average young man your age because of circumstances that you have no control over, circumstances that effected [sic] your life. So I feel a certain amount of sympathy for you. However, that sympathy does not mitigate against the impact that your act has on the entire community. It is not only rehabilitation that must be considered but the extent to which you represent a danger to the community must be considered as well. We all come into this world with potential to do unspeakable harm and limitless good. What separates many of us is what we do with that capacity. Some people demonstrate the capacity to do harm and some don\u2019t, although we all share. In your case, you made that demonstration. You have gone out and killed another human being in a very cruel fashion. I think the community would be shocked if a minimal sentence were imposed.\u201d\nThe trial judge then sentenced defendant to the extended term of 50 years on the murder conviction and 30 years on the armed robbery, the sentences to run consecutively. Defendant moved for a new trial, alleging that: (1) the defendant should have been given immunity from the charges because he was offered immunity for testifying in another case and (2) the defendant was denied a fair trial because the State failed to turn over grand jury testimony regarding Rick Wade and Cheryl Williams until the middle of the defense\u2019s case. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial.\nDefendant appealed, raising four alleged errors at trial: the State\u2019s failure to turn over grand jury testimony regarding Wade and Williams, two alleged errors in sentencing and a contention that he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As to the latter three arguments, we note the general rule that the failure to raise an issue in a written motion for a new trial results in a waiver of that issue on appeal. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) We may, in the exercise of our responsibility for a just result, ignore considerations of waiver and decide a case on grounds even though they are not properly argued by a party. Anderson v. Smith (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 938, 940, 415 N.E.2d 643.\nDefendant\u2019s appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution twice, on June 10, 1987, and on March 6, 1990. Two times the case was reinstated on defendant\u2019s motion.\nInitially we consider whether the prosecutor\u2019s failure to tender grand jury transcripts of witnesses against defendant in response to a request for discovery prior to a commencement of trial deprived defendant of a fair trial.\nDefendant alleges that the State violated Supreme Court Rule 412, which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) Except as is otherwise provided in these rules as to matters not subject to disclosure and protective orders, the State shall, upon written motion of defense counsel, disclose to defense counsel the following material and information within its possession or control:\n(i) the names and last known addresses of persons whom the State intends to call as witnesses, together with their relevant written or recorded statements, memoranda containing substantially verbatim reports of their oral statements, and a list of memoranda reporting or summarizing their oral statements. Upon written motion of defense counsel memoranda reporting or summarizing oral statements shall be examined by the court in camera and if found to be substantially verbatim reports of oral statements shall be disclosed to defense counsel.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 412(a)(i).\nThe purpose of Supreme Court Rule 412 is to afford the accused protection against surprise, unfairness and inadequate preparation. People v. Boucher (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 436, 439, 379 N.E.2d 339.\nDefendant contends that he requested the production of grand jury transcripts involving prosecution witnesses and the State\u2019s failure to turn over those transcripts was a violation of defendant\u2019s due process right. We note, however, that he does not discuss Cheryl Williams\u2019 testimony but only discusses the grand jury testimony of Rick Wade, on which we will focus. The State disclosed Wade\u2019s grand jury testimony in defendant\u2019s case, but defendant alleges the State failed to comply with Rule 412 when it did not disclose Wade\u2019s grand jury testimony in the Prentice Jackson case.\nDefendant contends that he learned of Wade\u2019s testimony on September 11, 1985, in the Jackson investigation from another defense attorney only after the State had finished its case in chief. Defendant contends that the State\u2019s failure to produce this transcript prevented him from adequately preparing for inquiry into Wade\u2019s interests or bias. Defendant argues that knowledge of Wade\u2019s admission of drug use and pending criminal charges, disclosed before the Jackson grand jury, compromised Wade\u2019s testimony by demonstrating leniency to Wade in his pending cases. Defendant contends he was forced to call Wade in his case in chief by way of subpoena in order to impeach his testimony.\nAs the Illinois Supreme Court articulated in its 1964 decision People v. Johnson (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 602, 203 N.E.2d 399, grand jury minutes must be made available to a defendant for purposes of impeachment. In Johnson the court found none of the reasons to keep grand jury testimony secret was present when the defendant sought grand jury testimony of one witness who had already testified for the State. The court stated:\n\u201cPlainly the disclosure of grand jury minutes after an indictment is returned and the case proceeds to trial will involve no danger of flight by the accused and no risk of damage to his reputation. Nor is it to be expected that he will tamper with a witness who has already testified against him. There will be no impediment to future grand jury deliberations since such deliberations will remain secret.\u201d Johnson, 31 Ill. 2d at 606.\nCompliance with the discovery rules is mandatory (People v. Miles (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 922, 403 N.E.2d 587), and it is reversible error to deny a defendant access to statements of prosecution witnesses, properly shown to exist and related to impeachment purposes. People v. Telio (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 526, 530, 275 N.E.2d 222, cert. denied (1972), 409 U.S. 857, 34 L. Ed. 2d 102, 93 S. Ct. 138.\nThe State offers no excuse for the nondisclosure of the grand jury testimony but instead contends that it was under no obligation to disclose grand jury testimony State witnesses gave relating to other unrelated cases. The State contends that defendant\u2019s request is \u201cridiculous, unreasonable and would place an undue hardship on the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s office\u201d if the State was forced to look for any statement or testimony ever given by a State witness in an unrelated grand jury proceeding.\nIn the alternative, the State argues that the failed disclosure was harmless because the defense attorney did learn of the transcripts and was permitted to bring Wade to the stand and to reopen his cross-examination.\nWade\u2019s prior criminal convictions with regard to a burglary conviction and a pandering conviction were disclosed during the State\u2019s direct examination of Wade and therefore defense counsel had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Wade about the convictions. At no time did defendant request a delay because he believed he did not have adequate time to prepare.\nWe find no error in the State\u2019s failure to disclose Wade\u2019s and Williams\u2019 grand jury testimony. As the Telio court observed, one of the primary goals in the search for truth at a trial is to determine the credibility given to the testimony of witnesses. (Telio, 1 Ill. App. 3d at 530.) But Telio also stated that disclosure is required for statements properly shown to exist and related to impeachment purposes. Telio, 1 Ill. App. 3d at 530.\nSetting aside the compelling argument that the trial judge stated he would find defendant guilty absent Wade\u2019s and Williams\u2019 testimony, we find Wade\u2019s grand jury testimony in the Prentice Jackson case unrelated for impeachment purposes. We note that in his pretrial discovery request for statements by witnesses, the query was a general one and did not specifically identify the Jackson grand jury testimony. We agree with the State that were we to order the State to search every grand jury proceeding for testimony given by any State witness in a criminal trial we would place an impossible burden on the State which is not required or desirable.\nThe court found relevant Wade\u2019s grand jury admission that he was addicted to drugs, not for purposes of impeachment of Wade, but rather it was relevant to determine the credibility of Wade\u2019s testimony. Defendant cannot contend that all the criminal charges pending against Wade were unknown to him until disclosure of the grand jury testimony because Wade testified that he had been convicted of burglary and pandering. The defense questioned Wade about the charges on cross-examination and then the court permitted additional cross-examination on Wade\u2019s criminal history when the defense was permitted to reopen its cross-examination of Wade. We find defendant had adequate opportunities to cross-examine Wade.\nWe find that Rule 412 was not thwarted by the State. The disclosure of the grand jury testimony during trial did not deprive defendant of adequate time to prepare nor did it result in unfairness to defendant. We hold that the State\u2019s failure to tender grand jury transcripts of Wade\u2019s testimony as a witness in an unrelated case did not violate defendant\u2019s due process right and deny him a fair trial.\nNext we consider whether defendant was proven guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe test for sufficiency of evidence is whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found all of the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 48-49, 538 N.E.2d 453.\nDefendant alleges he was not found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and asks this court to remand the matter for possible conviction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Defendant contends he should have been convicted of the lesser included offense of manslaughter based on his intoxication or serious provocation by the victim.\nThe defense of intoxication is permitted under limited circumstances. \u201cA person who is in an intoxicated *** condition is criminally responsible for conduct unless such conduct either: (a) Is so extreme as to suspend the power of reason and render him incapable of forming a specific intent which is an element of the offense; or (b) Is involuntarily produced and deprives him of substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 6\u20143.\nThe defense of serious provocation based on mutual combat is described in the Criminal Code of 1961 as: \u201cA person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by *** the individual killed. Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9\u20142(a)(1).\nDefendant contends that the evidence established both his intoxication and the serious provocation. Defendant contends that his testimony was \u201cuncontroverted\u201d that he was drunk, that the victim had punched him in his injured eye and that the two struggled. We note that only the defendant and the victim were present at the time of the occurrence. Defendant argues that State witness Rice testified defendant was drunk and told her he did not mean to kill the victim. Defendant points to Dr. An\u2019s testimony of \u201cdefensive wounds\u201d on the victim\u2019s hand as a sign that the two struggled before the fatal wounds were inflicted. Frazier testified that she believed a struggle occurred and Federichi testified that he saw a struggle from a distance of approximately 30 feet.\nDefendant cites People v. Miller (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 212, 421 N.E.2d 406, to support his serious provocation position. In Miller, however, the court affirmed a trial court finding of no mutual combat or serious provocation when a man shot and killed his live-in girl friend after discovering her on the phone speaking with another man. The court held that words shouted back and forth and a limited degree of pushing and shoving did not amount to the type of mutual combat on equal terms needed to indicate sufficient provocation to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter. Miller, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 215.\nDefendant cites People v. Proper (1979), 68 Ill. App. 3d 250, 385 N.E.2d 882, to support his intoxication position. In Proper, the court affirmed the trial court finding of no intoxication when the evidence established defendant had a coherent and detailed recollection of the events which occurred immediately prior to the shooting and the only evidence of defendant\u2019s alleged drunkenness was his testimony that he \u201cguessed\u201d he was drunk. Proper, 68 Ill. App. 3d at 254.\nThe State argues that defendant\u2019s guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt based on: Frazier\u2019s testimony that she heard someone shouting \u201cGive me your wallet,\u201d heard a fracas, saw the victim fall to the ground with blood on his shirt and saw a young man without a shirt running down Balmoral Street; Rice\u2019s extensive testimony about the events of the evening; testimony of Wade and Williams that defendant told them he robbed the victim; Dr. An\u2019s testimony that the victim died of multiple stab wounds and suffered defensive-type cuts on his arms; and defendant\u2019s testimony that he stabbed the victim multiple times.\nThe State rejects defendant\u2019s contention that he should have been found guilty of the lesser included charge of manslaughter based either on intoxication or serious provocation, contending defendant was voluntarily drinking with friends that night and therefore does not fit into the section (b) exception. The State argues that there is no evidence to establish defendant was so intoxicated that his power of reason was suspended.\nThe State argues that the serious provocation defense requires proof of mutual combat that is a fight or struggle which both parties enter willingly or where two persons, upon a sudden quarrel and in hot blood, mutually fight upon equal terms and where death results from the combat. (People v. Austin (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 118, 125, 549 N.E.2d 331.) The State argues that no such evidence exists here where defendant approached the victim to rob him and the fight that ensued was proven to be the result of the victim defending himself.\nIn Austin, a Chicago Transit Authority bus driver was killed when she struggled with a passenger who had paid only 80 cents instead of the $1 fare. The two argued, then hit each other and a struggle ensued. The driver was killed when Austin took out a gun and fired, first into the floor of the bus and later at the victim while the two struggled outside of the bus. The appellate court reversed but the supreme court upheld the trial court finding of no evidence of mutual combat because the record showed the driver did not enter the struggle willingly, and the fight was not on equal terms. Austin, 133 Ill. 2d at 125.\nWe agree with the State that there is insufficient evidence of either intoxication or serious provocation to reduce defendant\u2019s murder conviction to manslaughter.\nAs to the intoxication defense, the record establishes only that defendant drank a quantity of beer during a two-hour time period immediately prior to the killing. Defendant did not testify that he was so drunk he couldn\u2019t walk or think. In fact defendant testified that he walked from his friend\u2019s house approximately two miles north to the place where the killing occurred. He testified in detail about his version of the struggle and stabbing. He went to Rice\u2019s house and rang her bell without difficulty, cleaned himself up, spoke on the phone and admitted he told Rice to get rid of the wallet she found because he thought it might belong to the victim. These are not the actions and thoughts of a man who was so intoxicated that his power of reason was suspended.\nLikewise we see no evidence of serious provocation that would place defendant\u2019s culpability at the level of the lesser crime of manslaughter. Defendant contends that his uncontroverted testimony established that the victim pushed him, swore at him and pulled a knife on him. Defendant relies on Federichi\u2019s testimony, but Federichi admitted under cross-examination that he was not paying too much attention to the encounter he noticed. State witnesses testified that defendant always carried a knife and others testified that defendant told them he robbed the victim. The trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses.\nWhen viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence does not establish defendant faced serious provocation which \u00a1 resulted in mutual combat on equal terms. One who instigates combat cannot rely on the victim\u2019s response as evidence of mutual combat sufficient to mitigate the killing of that victim from murder to manslaughter. Austin, 133 Ill. 2d at 126.\nWe affirm the trial court finding that defendant was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFinally we consider whether the imposition of consecutive sentences for the convicted crimes was excessive under the facts and circumstances of this case.\nThe Illinois Constitution requires that \u201c[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711.\nA court may order that two or more convictions be served consecutively under conditions articulated in section 5 \u2014 8\u20144(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections:\n\u201cThe court shall not impose a consecutive sentence unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis for which the court shall set forth in the record.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(b).\nDefendant contends that the trial judge erred because he failed to set forth any reasons on the record for the imposition of consecutive sentences. Defendant makes several references to the evidence to support his argument that imposition of consecutive sentences was inconsistent with the statute. He contends the State offered no evidence in aggravation at the sentencing hearing and defendant offered in mitigation the facts that defendant had no prior criminal record, was 18 years of age at the time of the offense, came from a broken home, was made a ward of the State and had been bounced between 10 foster homes in 12 years.\nDefendant argues that imposition of consecutive sentences in this case was an abuse of discretion. Defendant cites People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 404 N.E.2d 233, and People v. Steffens (1985), 131 Ill. App. 3d 141, 475 N.E.2d 606, to support his position. Carlson was a death penalty case where the majority found error in the imposition of the death sentence because of the trial judge\u2019s failure to consider defendant\u2019s previous crime-free lifestyle as a mitigating factor. (Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d at 587-90.) In Steffens, the defendant\u2019s 30-year sentence for murder was reduced to 20 years after the appellate court found that the trial court did not properly take into consideration defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential based on his age of 16, lack of significant prior criminal record and other circumstances of the case. Steffens, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 151-53.\nThe State contends that the sentence was appropriate because the trial judge articulated his reason for imposing consecutive sentences when he stated that the victim was killed \u201cin a very cruel fashion and that the community would be shocked if a minimal sentence were imposed.\u201d\nWe do not find the trial judge\u2019s comment on the record that \u201cthe community would be shocked if a minimal sentence were imposed\u201d to be a sufficient statement that the judge was \u201cof the opinion that [consecutive sentences were] required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20144(b).) The sentence of 50 years for murder is far from a minimal sentence when the range for sentencing is 20 to 60 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(1).) The sentence of 20 years for the armed robbery conviction where the permissible range is between 6 and 30 years also is not a minimal sentence. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005\u20148\u20141(a)(3).\nThough defendant committed the murder in the course of a felony, defendant was just a few months past his 18th birthday at the time of the offense and had no prior criminal record. Under the mitigating factors in this case and because sentences substantially greater than the minimum have been imposed, the community concerns have been adequately addressed. We see no compelling or appropriate reason to require the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively.\nAccordingly we reverse court\u2019s order that the sentences be served consecutively and order the mittimus amended to provide that the sentences shall be served concurrently.\nFor all the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant\u2019s convictions and affirm his sentences of 50 years for the murder and 30 years for the armed robbery. We reverse the order of the court which requires that the sentences be served consecutively and order that the mittimus be amended to order that the sentences be served concurrently.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nEGAN, P.J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LaPORTA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeffrey A. Kripton, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Andrea Bonin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD V. PERRY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201487\u20140463\nOpinion filed February 28, 1992.\nJeffrey A. Kripton, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and Andrea Bonin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0326-01", "first_page_order": 350, "last_page_order": 369 }