{ "id": 5238558, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARY J. QUIGLEY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Quigley", "decision_date": "1992-02-13", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140649", "first_page": "598", "last_page": "604", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 598" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 813", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2577651 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 544", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6185389 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554" }, { "page": "509" }, { "page": "1877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. App. 3d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2692551 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/188/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "314" }, { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251541 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "393" }, { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341150 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" }, { "page": "714-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0433-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 737, "char_count": 14283, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.753655331426585e-08, "percentile": 0.45577966128527186 }, "sha256": "bb55bb0e6707cba67cb42f46f4bc9861fb795489366b14865481845e5149c71b", "simhash": "1:90141f012770d075", "word_count": 2377 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:12.469333+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARY J. QUIGLEY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDwight police officers arrested defendant and charged him with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of section 11 \u2014 501(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014501(a)). Thereafter, he was charged by criminal complaint with DUI, driving with a blood-alcohol content in excess of 0.10, and unlawful transportation of alcoholic liquor in a motor vehicle. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11-501(a)(2), (a)(1), 11-502.) Defendant moved to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. The Livingston County circuit court granted the motion and also granted rescission of the statutory summary suspension of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license. The State appeals, contending the trial court\u2019s order substantially impairs its ability to prosecute the case. We reverse and remand.\nDwight police officer Tim Henson testified he observed the defendant on June 7, 1991, at approximately 11 p.m. Defendant stopped his car at the intersection of Routes 47 and 17 in Dwight, a four-way stop. He got out of his car and went to the vehicle stopped behind him. He then asked the woman driving the car \u201cwhere she learned to fucking drive,\u201d exchanged a few more words with her, and returned to his car, which he had left running. The entire exchange lasted 15 to 20 seconds and Henson never heard defendant threaten the woman or suggest they would meet later. He never saw defendant beat on her car or become physically aggressive. He observed no weapons. Defendant drove off in one direction and the woman in another. The two cars involved in the incident were the only vehicles at the intersection and the only vehicles within view on the two roads.\nHenson followed defendant and signaled him to stop, using the flashing red lights on his squad car. On approaching defendant\u2019s car, Henson smelled \u201ca strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle.\u201d He informed defendant he had made the stop to investigate the problem between defendant and the woman in the other car. The stop ultimately resulted in defendant\u2019s arrest.\nOfficer Glenn Peters, on patrol in the squad car with Henson, corroborated Henson\u2019s testimony.\nThe State filed a verified criminal complaint, charged defendant with two counts of DUI (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11\u2014 501(a)(2), (a)(1)), and one count of unlawful transportation of alcoholic liquor in a motor vehicle (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u2014502). Count II of the complaint alleged the concentration of alcohol in defendant\u2019s breath exceeded 0.10%. Because the concentration of alcohol in defendant\u2019s breath exceeded 0.10, his driver\u2019s license was summarily suspended pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Code. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, pars. 11\u2014501.1(d), (e).\nOn July 26, 1991, the defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The motion alleged the stop of defendant\u2019s car was made without specific and articulable facts and without probable cause. Further, defendant challenged the warrantless arrest and search of his car. Even if the officers properly stopped the car, defendant asserted there was no probable cause to justify the search.\nThe court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s motion on August 1, 1991. The parties agreed the motion would also be deemed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension as the primary issue was whether the stop of the vehicle was lawful. The court granted the motion and also rescinded the statutory summary suspension of defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license.\nThe court stated:\n\u201cWell, I believe that the current state of the law is that there seems to be three tiers of or layers of police involvement with a citizens [sic] probable cause arrest which we all agree this is far from, Terry stop, and then I think there\u2019s something in the nature of some sort of community caretaking function involved which I don\u2019t think this really would entail either.\nSo we\u2019re dealing with whether this was a valid Terry stop, reasonable suspicion that crime was afoot.\nHere, we just have a situation, from what the officers observed, one motorist was upset at another motorist apparently over the way the other motorist was driving. Whether right or wrong, we don\u2019t know; and obviously inappropriately the Defendant got out of the car and went back and cussed at the lady. But from the testimony, he was out of the car no more than 15 to 20 seconds. So it was a very brief, temporary stop or interference with the traffic; and apparently there was no interference other than with the two vehicles involved.\nAnd here from the evidence, as Mr. Luckman [(defense counsel)] pointed out, the stated purpose of stopping the Defendant was not to arrest him or warn him dealing with the two vehicles sighted but rather just to find out what was going on.\nNow, I can see a real problem obviously if both the cars continued in the same direction and there would be a possibility of a continued confrontation; and Dwight isn\u2019t the biggest city in the world; and two people at 11 o\u2019clock at night could still meet up with each other. But from the evidence, the Defendant turned left and the lady behind him went straight.\nSo it would appear from the evidence that there was no conceivable possibility of any further problems between these two motorists. It was sort of a temporary yelling back and forth or argument, and then they went on their merry way [sic].\nThis isn\u2019t a whole lot different from the situation where a Defendant and a person may stop, roll down his window, and yell at some other motorist. Here the Defendant went a little bit further \u2014 got out of his vehicle and went back and yelled at the lady.\n* * *\n11 \u2014 1303 [of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u20141303)] talks about except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or at an official traffic control device, no person shall stand or stop within 30 feet of a stop sign.\nHere, of course, the Defendant was stopped; and he was lawfully stopped; and he had to stop. Now, he didn\u2019t have to get out and pause 15 to 20 seconds.\n***\nI don\u2019t think that even though maybe technically 11 \u2014 1303 could arguably, conceivably be violated, I don\u2019t think practically it has. I think somewhere common sense has to come into play.\n11 \u2014 1416 [of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95\u00bd, par. 11\u20141416)], the same person, here we get into a question of whether the Defendant willfully and unnecessarily delayed the other lady from moving along. Yeah, technically there was a delay. Just a few seconds. But practically, I really don\u2019t think that\u2019s what this section was intended for.\nHere, for a Terry stop, the purported reason for the officer stopping the man was to find out what was going on, which is fine. But here I think Terry requires some reasonable suspicion that some sort of crime was afoot. Here instead of reasonable suspicion, there was [sic] just two people arguing; and I don\u2019t think that\u2019s what, right or wrong, police can get involved with.\u201d\nThe State filed its notice of appeal on August 30, 1991, stating, in part: \u201cNature of the Order appealed from: At a motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence, the Court found that there was no probable cause for the stop made by the officer and, therefore, the search and arrest were quashed[,] effectively dismissing the case.\u201d Defendant contends because the State failed to specify the docket number of the statutory summary suspension, and failed to reference the suspension in its description of the order from which it appeals, this court cannot consider the State\u2019s arguments regarding the suspension. The notice of appeal, however, indicated the State appeals from the order entered August 1,1991, which included the rescission of the suspension.\nOn appeal, the State contends the court\u2019s order was manifestly erroneous because a reasonable, articulable suspicion existed to justify the investigatory stop and probable cause existed for the arrest. We conclude the stop was not a Terry stop, but was part of the community caretaking or public safety function of the police officers. The stop did not violate the fourth amendment.\nThe Supreme Court first identified the community caretaking function in Cady v. Dombrowski (1973), 413 U.S. 433, 441, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 714-15, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528:\n\u201cBecause of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.\u201d\nThe Illinois Supreme Court recognized the community caretaking function in People v. Murray (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 382, 560 N.E.2d 309, rev\u2019g (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 488, 544 N.E.2d 1008. There, police officers observed the defendant asleep in a car parked on the side of the road. The officers woke him and asked him to exit the car and present identification. When defendant got out of the car, the officers observed a gun in the car and arrested him. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence. The appellate court reversed (Murray, 188 Ill. App. 3d 488, 544 N.E.2d 1008), concluding an unconstitutional seizure occurred when defendant was ordered to exit the car and show identification.\nThe supreme court found no violation of defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights. The court divided police-citizen encounters into three tiers. The first is arrest, which must be supported by probable cause. The second is a \u201cTerry\u201d stop, requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The third tier is the community caretaking function, also known as the public safety function. This tier of the police-citizen encounter \u201cinvolves no coercion or detention and therefore does not involve a seizure.\u201d (Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 387, 560 N.E.2d at 311.) The Murray court cited several examples of circumstances indicative of a seizure, originally set forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall (1980), 446 U.S. 544, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870:\n\u201c(1) the threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display of a weapon by an officer, (3) some physical touching of the person of the citizen, and (4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer\u2019s request might be compelled. (Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.)\u201d Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 390, 560 N.E.2d at 313.\nBecause the officers used no physical force or show of authority, the court concluded no finding of a seizure could be supported. Approaching defendant\u2019s vehicle and tapping on the window to wake him was not a seizure. The record indicated the officers asked, rather than ordered, defendant to exit the car. \u201cThis request allowed the officers to see whether the person they had just awakened and who may have appeared to be in some distress was fit to drive.\u201d (Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 393, 560 N.E.2d at 314.) The supreme court reversed the appellate court, concluding there was no violation of defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights.\nThe two police officers here arguably had reasonable suspicion criminal activity was afoot, ranging from disorderly conduct to assault to unauthorized stopping on the highway. The officers were candid, however, in conceding their purpose in stopping defendant was simply to investigate the problem between defendant and the other motorist. The officers followed defendant for one block and pulled him over after signaling with overhead flashing lights. Another police car followed the other vehicle so defendant was not singled out to be followed. The officers did not display a weapon or order defendant out of his car. Officer Henson simply approached defendant\u2019s vehicle to inquire about the incident at the intersection. A stop in these circumstances was part of the community caretaking function and did not violate defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights.\nThe defendant exited his running vehicle late at night at a highway intersection. He left the running vehicle unattended, however briefly, and approached the vehicle behind him. He loudly cursed and insulted the driver and obstructed the roadway. He then returned to his vehicle and drove away. It was not unreasonable or overzealous or intrusive for the officers to briefly stop defendant to inquire of his loud, confrontational and bizarre behavior. Not every contact between police and citizens is meant to detect crime. The police have a public safety role which the fourth amendment permits them to perform so long as they do so reasonably and with a minimum of intrusion into the privacy and mobility of the citizenry.\nA trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress will not be overturned on review unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 387, 560 N.E.2d at 311; People v. Bauman (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 813, 816, 562 N.E.2d 336, 339.) We conclude the trial court\u2019s decision to quash defendant\u2019s arrest, suppress the evidence and rescind his statutory summary suspension was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The order of the Livingston County circuit court is reversed.\nReversed, and cause remanded.\nCOOK and LUND, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Carey J. Luckman, of Pontiac, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GARY J. QUIGLEY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140649\nOpinion filed February 13, 1992.\nRehearing denied April 16, 1992.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Kenneth R. Boyle, Robert J. Biderman, and James Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nCarey J. Luckman, of Pontiac, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0598-01", "first_page_order": 622, "last_page_order": 628 }