{ "id": 5240115, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH HILL, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hill", "decision_date": "1992-03-26", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201491\u20140121", "first_page": "670", "last_page": "675", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 670" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "488 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38" }, { "page": "538" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126614 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1067" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3416964 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565326 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 1234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1237" }, { "page": "1237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 844", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499966 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "849" }, { "page": "849" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "516 N.E.2d 936", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3547704 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0730-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 566, "char_count": 10684, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.690510966595542e-08, "percentile": 0.4532422546642681 }, "sha256": "3084760a794a8ef0c8cc2baac0dfd37bcc7171a3eaa3916a4148a2307a6b4998", "simhash": "1:2af9f5cc47da2a8c", "word_count": 1743 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:12.469333+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH HILL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Joseph Hill, appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Hill argues that proof of his possession of the weapon was lacking where another person living with him had lawful possession of the weapon. Hill additionally contends that the State made improper remarks during closing argument which shifted the burden of proof and misstated the law. We disagree with both arguments and affirm Hill\u2019s conviction.\nHill was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 24\u20141.1(a)) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to deliver (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 56\u00bd, par. 1401(a)(2)). A jury returned a not guilty verdict on the charge of unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and a guilty verdict on the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. Hill was sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment.\nAt 8:30 a.m. on August 7, 1988, Rock Island police officers arrived at Hill\u2019s home at 2380 11th Street to execute a search warrant. Hill rented the single-family residence and lived there with Karen Scott. The officers were admitted to the residence by Scott. The police then handcuffed Scott and Jacquelyn Bailey, who had stayed overnight in a guest bedroom. Thereafter, the police searched Hill\u2019s residence pursuant to the search warrant.\nOfficer Scott Reid testified that Hill was found in another bedroom, awake and lying in bed under the covers. Officer Reid handcuffed Hill and removed him from the bedroom. Behind Officer Reid, within four to six feet from the foot of Hill\u2019s bed, was an armoire. The left door of the upper cabinet of the armoire was open one to three inches. Officer Reid observed in the cabinet of the armoire the butt of a semi-automatic pistol, which was later identified as a .22 caliber Beretta. Officer Reid opened the doors of the cabinet and removed the weapon. A wallet containing Hill\u2019s Illinois driver\u2019s license was found in the lower right hand corner of the cabinet. A second wallet with Hill\u2019s Illinois identification card was found on top of the cabinet. Officer Reid also found a slightly opened, black zippered bag. The black bag contained cocaine, a chrome-plated Raven\u2019s Arm .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol, and Karen Scott\u2019s Iowa firearm owner\u2019s identification (FOI) card.\nJacquelyn Bailey identified the black bag as a purse belonging to Karen Scott. Bailey testified that she and Karen Scott had traveled to Chicago the previous day and that Scott had taken the purse with her. The women returned from Chicago at approximately 3:45 a.m. the morning the police conducted the search. Hill arrived home after 6 a.m. the same morning.\nHill first contends that proof of his exclusive control of the weapon was lacking since Karen Scott also had control over the bedroom. Hill additionally argues that he could not unlawfully possess the .22 caliber Beretta because Scott held an FOI card which would allegedly allow her lawful possession of the weapon. Hill contends that Karen Scott\u2019s presumed lawful possession of the .22 caliber Beretta precludes his conviction for unlawfully possessing the weapon. We disagree.\nTo support a conviction involving constructive criminal possession of a weapon, the State must establish (1) the defendant\u2019s knowledge of the presence of the weapon; and (2) his immediate and exclusive control over the area where the weapon was found. (People v. Rangel (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 730, 739, 516 N.E.2d 936, 942.) While Hill does not dispute that he had control over the premises he rented, he contends that his control was not exclusive.\nWe have previously addressed the question of whether another person\u2019s access to a weapon is sufficient to negate a defendant\u2019s responsibility for constructive possession of the same weapon. (People v. Williams (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 844, 424 N.E.2d 1234.) The police in Williams recovered a sawed-off shotgun following a search of premises occupied by Williams and two alleged prostitutes. The weapon was stored under a mattress in a bedroom of a second-floor apartment. Both women had taken clients into the apartment where the shotgun was located. One of the women admitted handling the shotgun and testified the other woman and several other persons also handled the weapon.\nThis court in Williams affirmed the defendant\u2019s conviction for unlawful use of a deadly weapon, rejecting his argument \u201cthat because several persons handled the weapon, he did not exclusively control and thus possess the weapon.\u201d (Williams, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 849, 424 N.E.2d at 1237.) Our court stated:\n\u201cThe law is clear that the exclusive dominion and control required to establish constructive possession is not diminished by-evidence of others\u2019 access to the contraband. [Citation.] When the relationship of others to the contraband is sufficiently close to constitute possession, the result is not vindication of the defendant, but rather a situation of joint possession. To hold otherwise would enable persons to escape criminal liability for possession of contraband by the simple expediency of inviting others to participate in the criminal enterprise.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Williams, 98 Ill. App. 3d at 849, 424 N.E.2d at 1237.)\n\u201c[T]he rule that possession must be exclusive does not mean that possession may not be joint.\" (Emphasis added.) (People v. Burke (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599, 483 N.E.2d 674, 679.) Scott\u2019s access to the bedroom and the contents of the armoire does not defeat defendant\u2019s constructive possession of the Beretta. See People v. Janis (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 160, 165, 371 N.E.2d 1063, 1067.\nWe note the .22 caliber Beretta was clearly visible in Hill\u2019s bedroom cabinet since the armoire door was ajar. The .25 caliber Raven\u2019s Arm, however, was recovered along with Scott\u2019s FOI card from inside her purse. Also, the storage by Hill of his wallet in his bedroom armoire supports a presumption that Hill was familiar with the contents of the armoire. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict.\nHill\u2019s second contention on appeal is that he was denied a fair trial because of improper remarks made by the prosecutor during closing argument. Hill argues the prosecutor\u2019s comments misstated the law and shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.\nHill objects to two comments made by the prosecutor. In the first comment, the prosecutor stated:\n\u201cWhen the defendant, \u2014he has no right to possess a weapon. Don\u2019t get hung up on this concept of ownership. It is not anything anyone has to prove or disprove.\u201d\nHill interprets the prosecutor\u2019s remark to suggest to the jury that ownership of the weapon was irrelevant. The State counters by arguing (1) the prosecutor\u2019s comment only implies to the jury that ownership of the weapon was not an element of the offense; and (2) that the prosecutor\u2019s remark is an accurate statement of the law. We need not address the merits of either parties\u2019 argument because Hill did not object to the prosecutor\u2019s comment at trial and failed to include it as an issue in his post-trial motion. Claimed errors not properly preserved for review are considered waived. (People v. Walker (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 484, 504, 488 N.E.2d 529, 537-38.) We also decline Hill\u2019s invitation to invoke the plain error doctrine. The plain error rule will be applied only where the evidence is closely balanced or the error alleged is of such gravity as to deny defendant a fair trial. (Walker, 109 Ill. 2d at 504, 488 N.E.2d at 538.) We find neither requirement has been met here.\nWe will, however, consider Hill\u2019s argument concerning the second comment made by the prosecutor. This comment was properly objected to by Hill at trial. During the State\u2019s rebuttal argument, the following exchange occurred:\n\u201c[PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Hoffman wants you to believe that Karen Scott owned that gun. There is no proof. Remember possessory offense, ladies and gentlemen.\nMR. HOFFMAN [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. It is the State\u2019s burden of proof. If they want to prove ownership, they can prove it. They don\u2019t have to disprove ownership or prove somebody else owned it.\u201d\nThe trial court overruled the objection. Hill contends the prosecutor\u2019s comment improperly shifted the burden to the defendant to prove that Karen Scott owned the weapon. Hill maintains the prosecutor\u2019s comment was especially prejudicial to him because he had argued to the jury that Karen Scott\u2019s alleged ownership of the .22 caliber Beretta would preclude him from unlawfully possessing it. We find no merit to this argument. Hill\u2019s argument is based upon the mistaken, and totally unsupported, belief that the State must prove the weapon was not legally owned by another. The prosecutor was only informing the jury that possession under the law, rather than ownership, is the critical element for the State to prove.\nHill also argues that the prosecutor\u2019s alleged misstatements of law led the jury to return inconsistent verdicts on the cocaine and weapon charges. The State contends that it was evidentiary differences presented with regard to the cocaine and the weapon which led the jury to return the verdicts. We find no inconsistent verdicts. We note Hill presented considerable evidence to suggest that the cocaine was purchased the day before the search during Karen Scott\u2019s trip to Chicago. Also, evidence was presented to the jury that the cocaine in Scott\u2019s bag was placed in the cabinet of the armoire in Hill\u2019s bedroom only hours before he went to bed. The only evidence Hill presented to rebut the weapon charge was the fact that Karen Scott possessed an FOI card. These differences in the evidence presented to the jury clearly allowed the jury to infer that Hill had knowledge of the presence of the .22 caliber Beretta but not the cocaine. The jury could reasonably find, based on the evidence presented, that the cocaine stored in Scott\u2019s purse was placed in the armoire without defendant\u2019s knowledge, while also finding the .22 caliber Beretta \u2014 recovered by police in plain view \u2014 was within defendant\u2019s constructive possession.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hill\u2019s conviction.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, RJ., and STOUDER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Catherine FitzSimmons, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Jay P. Hoffmann, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH HILL, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201491\u20140121\nOpinion filed March 26, 1992.\nCatherine FitzSimmons, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nMarshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Jay P. Hoffmann, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0670-01", "first_page_order": 694, "last_page_order": 699 }