{ "id": 5239664, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF LAURA M. MICHAEL, n/k/a Laura M. Fullerton, Petitioner-Appellant and CHARLES A. MICHAEL, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Michael", "decision_date": "1992-04-09", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201491\u20140355", "first_page": "1088", "last_page": "1091", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 1088" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491944 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510894 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 954", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2498676 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.W.2d 679", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10138324 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/539/0679-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 N.W.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10768731 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/204/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 3d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3274439 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/75/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5481723 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "329" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 N.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550827 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0161-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 446, "char_count": 8110, "ocr_confidence": 0.789, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.321517725519776e-08, "percentile": 0.38859891059285695 }, "sha256": "e767c2a52d63e7eccfb2d822bf0f4931e0221b9480c9dc472a706f84dee37116", "simhash": "1:cf96714e2b618c93", "word_count": 1332 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:35:12.469333+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF LAURA M. MICHAEL, n/k/a Laura M. Fullerton, Petitioner-Appellant and CHARLES A. MICHAEL, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HAASE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe petitioner mother, Laura M. Fullerton, filed a petition to enforce child support provisions of the parties\u2019 divorce decree. The trial court denied the petition, finding that Laura and the respondent father, Charles A. Michael, had agreed to reduce the amount of child support from $150 per week to $110 per week. Laura appeals from that decision. We reverse.\nThe record shows that the parties were granted a dissolution of their marriage on January 27, 1987. The judgment of dissolution of the marriage awarded custody of the parties\u2019 two minor children to Laura and ordered Michael to pay $110 per week in child support. After 12 months, the amount of support was to be increased to $150 per week. The support payments were to be paid to the Warren County circuit clerk and not directly to Laura.\nOn December 19, 1990, a hearing was held on Laura\u2019s petition. At that hearing, Michael testified that when the parties\u2019 marriage was dissolved he was working about 10 to 15 hours of overtime per week. He stated that his hours were subsequently reduced and that the $110 per week in child support he began paying in November of 1987 was about 25% of his net income. Michael also stated that he had discussed his work situation with Laura and that she had agreed to a reduction in child support from $150 to $110 per week.\nMichael further testified that in 1988 and 1989 the Warren County circuit clerk sent him notices that he was in arrears on his support obligation. After the first notice, Michael\u2019s attorney drafted a written agreement to reduce the amount of support.\nLaura testified that she had refused to sign the proposed agreement. Sometime later, Michael\u2019s attorney prepared a second agreement. Laura did not sign that document either, but apparently kept it in her possession.\nThe trial court found that the parties had an agreement to reduce Michael\u2019s support obligation. The court further found that $110 per week was 25% of Michael\u2019s net income. The court then entered an order reducing Michael\u2019s support obligation to $110 per week retroactive to November 1,1987.\nAt the outset, we note that Michael claims that the record on appeal is inadequate. However, we find that contention to be without merit, since the record contains a certified bystanders report of the hearing on Laura\u2019s petition.\nLaura first argues on appeal that she did not enter into an agreement to reduce Michael\u2019s child support obligation. In the alternative, she contends that even if she did enter into an agreement, it was unenforceable as a matter of law.\nSection 510(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) covers modifications of child support and it provides that \u201cthe provisions of any judgment respecting *** support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to due notice by the moving party of the filing of the motion for modification and only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 40, par. 510(a).) In Blisset v. Blisset (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 161, 167-68, 526 N.E.2d 125, the Illinois Supreme Court stated the law regarding modification of child support as follows:\n\u201cThe modification of a child support obligation is a judicial function, administered exclusively by the court as a matter of discretion. (Finley v. Finley (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 317, 329.) The court is obligated in marital dissolution proceedings to protect the best interests of the children involved. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 602; see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 502.) Moreover, although property disposition agreements between spouses are binding upon the court, unless unconscionable, in marital dissolution proceedings, the court is not bound by agreements providing for the support, custody, and visitation of the children. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 502(b).) Allowing former spouses to modify a court-ordered child support obligation by creating a new agreement between themselves without judicial approval would circumvent judicial protection of the children\u2019s interests. Former spouses might agree to modify child support obligations, benefiting themselves while adversely affecting their children\u2019s best interests. Parents may not bargain away their children\u2019s interests. (See Huckaby v. Huckaby (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 195, 199; Anthony v. Anthony (Iowa 1973), 204 N.W.2d 829, 833.) It is for this reason, then, that parents may create an enforceable agreement for modification of child support only by petitioning the court for support modification and then establishing, to the satisfaction of the court, that an agreement reached between the parents is in accord with the best interests of the children. See Finley v. Finley (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 317, 329; Hart v. Hart (Mo. App. 1976), 539 S.W.2d 679.\u201d\nIn the instant case, we do not find that the parties had an agreement to reduce support payments. Moreover, even if the parties did enter into such an agreement, it was unenforceable as to installments accruing prior to due notice of the filing of a motion to modify and a showing that an agreement reached between the parties was in accord with the children\u2019s best interests.\nHere, Charles failed to file the required motion to modify or to give proper notice. Instead, he merely asserted in his answer to Laura\u2019s petition that there was an agreement to reduce support. The alleged agreement was therefore unenforceable as a matter of law. See Baker v. Baker (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 294, 549 N.E.2d 954.\nAs the supreme court noted in Blisset, the reason that a motion for modification and a showing of a substantial change in circumstances are required is to protect the best interests of the children. In setting the original support award, the court was required to apply the statutory guidelines, and if it deviated therefrom, it was required to make express findings as to its reasons for doing so. If the parties were allowed to modify support without court involvement, it would circumvent the statutory framework of protecting the children\u2019s interests.\nCharles argues that despite the lack of an enforceable agreement, Laura should be equitably estopped from collecting delinquent child support payments.\nWe disagree. A claim of equitable estoppel exists where a person, by his or her statements or conduct, induces a second person to rely, to his or her detriment, on the statements or conduct of the first person. (In re Marriage of Webber (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 327, 547 N.E.2d 749; Johnston v. Johnston (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 101, 553 N.E.2d 93.) The party asserting a claim of estoppel must have relied upon the acts or representations of the other and have had no knowledge or convenient means of knowing the true facts and such reliance should be reasonable. Blisset v. Blisset (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 161, 526 N.E.2d 125.\nIn the present case, Charles had an attorney draw up two agreements to reduce his support obligation. Laura did not sign either document, and at the time the second one was drafted, the law was clear in Illinois that such agreements were unenforceable and required judicial involvement. Moreover, even after the dates of the alleged agreements, the circuit clerk continued to send Michael notices that he was in arrears on his support obligation. Under the circumstances, we are unable to say that Charles\u2019 reliance on Laura\u2019s alleged conduct was reasonable.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Warren County finding an agreement to modify child support is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Warren County for further proceedings on petitioner\u2019s petition to enforce child support provisions consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nBARRY, P.J., and GORMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HAASE" } ], "attorneys": [ "James R. Standard, of Monmouth, for appellant.", "Ronald D. Stombaugh, of Monmouth, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF LAURA M. MICHAEL, n/k/a Laura M. Fullerton, Petitioner-Appellant and CHARLES A. MICHAEL, Respondent-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201491\u20140355\nOpinion filed April 9, 1992.\nJames R. Standard, of Monmouth, for appellant.\nRonald D. Stombaugh, of Monmouth, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1088-01", "first_page_order": 1112, "last_page_order": 1115 }