{ "id": 5793632, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID P. O'BRIEN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. O'Brien", "decision_date": "1992-03-24", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20140034", "first_page": "302", "last_page": "308", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 302" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3151982 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2676767 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "941" }, { "page": "940" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0936-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294433 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3471333 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "321", "parenthetical": "officer's testimony considered where the trial court found the testimony truthful and credible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3472920 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515974 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2484910 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 1064", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2541421 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/1064-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3615720 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 Ill. App. 3d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2462440 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/200/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256584 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574148 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 618, "char_count": 13228, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1199000715626319e-07, "percentile": 0.5731936495139291 }, "sha256": "736e31b5558a2df56eca78f0b168e10cb4c47f94205b8d0754c1a247f72d043b", "simhash": "1:a1a83ee4774cdd77", "word_count": 2231 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:11.260403+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID P. O\u2019BRIEN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOODWARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State appeals pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) from an order of the circuit court of Kane County which granted the motion of defendant, David R O\u2019Brien, to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The sole issue raised by the State on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence regarding the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol and speeding. The State does not argue the propriety of the trial court\u2019s rescission of defendant\u2019s summary suspension, and, therefore, we do not address that portion of the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nOn September 30, 1990, defendant was charged with the offenses of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501(a)(2)) and speeding 35 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 601). Also on that date, Officer Craig Bahe prepared a \u201claw enforcement sworn report\u201d and served notice upon defendant of the summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95x/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1) based on his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test.\nOn October 10, 1990, defendant filed a petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license and a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. A hearing regarding defendant\u2019s petition and motion was held on December 18,1990.\nMichael Bergmann, a friend of defendant, testified that he and defendant went to a bar at about 11:30 p.m. on September 29, 1990. They each had \u201cmaybe two beers\u201d at the bar. They left the bar at approximately 1:30 a.m. and drove to a party but did not stay or have anything to drink there. They then left in Bergmann\u2019s car and went to Bergmann\u2019s house. Defendant left his car at the party. At Bergmann\u2019s house they had pizza and soda. Bergmann drove defendant to his car at approximately 3:30 a.m. Bergmann stated that defendant was not under the influence of alcohol at that time.\nOfficer Craig Bahe testified that he observed defendant\u2019s vehicle at approximately 4 a.m. on September 30, 1990. He followed defendant\u2019s vehicle for some time through a residential area. Bahe was attempting to catch up with the vehicle to get a \u201cpace\u201d or a reading of the vehicle\u2019s speed. The speed limit was 25 miles per hour, and Bahe was travelling approximately 40 miles per hour. Bahe estimated that defendant was travelling in excess of 40 miles per hour but was never able to get a reading of his speed. Defendant eventually pulled into a driveway, and Bahe followed him.\nBahe testified that defendant got out of his vehicle. Bahe spoke with him and observed that defendant had a moderate odor of alcohol on his breath, had difficulty with his balance, had bloodshot eyes and had slurred speech. Bahe then asked defendant to perform field sobriety tests. Defendant failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and the one-leg stand test. Bahe testified that he had defendant attempt the one-leg stand test on the driveway. The driveway was pitched but did not have a severe slope. Bahe placed defendant under arrest before the walk and turn test was completed. Defendant was not able to keep his balance while he was walking during that test. It was Bahe\u2019s opinion that defendant was under the influence of alcohol at that time. Bahe testified that he had written the most DUI arrests for St. Charles in 1989 and 1990.\nDefendant testified that, on the night of his arrest, he drank two or three 12-ounce beers at Sam\u2019s Tavern between 11:30 p.m. and 1:30 a.m. He was very tired when he was driving home from Bergmann\u2019s house at around 4 a.m. but was not under the influence of alcohol and was not having any difficulty driving. Defendant testified that he was driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour. He stated that the speed limit in the residential area was 25 miles per hour. Defendant testified that he told Bahe he was in a hurry to get home. He also testified that Bahe asked him if he had had anything to drink that night and that he told Bahe that he had a couple of beers earlier.\nDefendant testified that he was unable to do the one-leg stand test. He stated that the driveway at his residence is pitched at a 45-degree angle, and he kept losing his balance. Defendant stated that he had completed half of the walk and turn test when Bahe arrested him.\nFollowing this testimony, the trial judge made the following remarks:\n\u201cI\u2019ve been hearing hearings of this nature for a number of years and I\u2019ve never encountered this particular officer before. I thought his testimony and his mannerisms on the witness stand were incredible. He would smile and chuckle at inappropriate times. He would have a convenient lapse of memory when being questioned by the attorney for the Defendant.\u201d\nThe judge also commented that he thought that Bahe was simply following defendant because he saw another vehicle on the road at that late hour.\nHe finally stated:\n\u201cSo I think that the Defendant has met his burden of proof. I\u2019m not satisfied that there was any reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendant was driving under the influence. I emphasize the word \u2018driving.\u2019 I haven\u2019t heard a single significant fact about his driving that indicates that he was impaired in any way.\nAt 4:00 in the morning he\u2019s got a ticket for going 35 in a 25 zone. That\u2019s probably one of the cheapest speeding tickets I\u2019ve seen in a long time, so I don\u2019t think that we have anything there.\u201d\nHe then granted defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license and also granted his motion to quash arrest. The State filed a timely certificate of impairment and notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, the State is not contesting the order which granted defendant\u2019s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driver\u2019s license. The State argues, however, that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence regarding the offenses of speeding and DUI. The State contends that the record is clear that Babe\u2019s stop of defendant was valid because defendant\u2019s own testimony established that he committed the offense of speeding. The State asserts that the court\u2019s order quashing defendant\u2019s arrest and suppressing evidence should be reversed and the cause should be remanded for a determination of whether Bahe had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI.\nDefendant has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief in response. We will, however, consider the appeal under the standard set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 128.\nWith respect to a motion to suppress evidence, a defendant has the burden of proving that the search or seizure was unlawful. (See People v. Janis (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 300, 308.) A trial court\u2019s ruling regarding a motion to suppress evidence will not be overturned unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Redd (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 252, 289.\nIn this cause, we must agree with the State that the trial court erred in determining that the stop of defendant was improper. In assessing the credibility of the witnesses at the hearing, the trial court determined that Bahe was not a credible witness. However, the State correctly points out that defendant himself testified that he was driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour and that the speed limit was 25 miles per hour.\nThe proper standard to apply in determining whether the stop of a defendant\u2019s vehicle is justified is whether the police officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. (People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 268, 280; People v. Repp (1988), 165 Ill. App. 3d 90, 94.) A traffic violation, such as exceeding the posted speed limit, provides more than a reasonable basis for stopping a vehicle. (People v. Sorrells (1991), 209 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1069; see also People v. Washburn (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 655, 657; People v. Lillig (1988), 174 Ill. App. 3d 647, 649; People v. Houlihan (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 638, 643.) We therefore conclude that the investigatory stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle was proper as defendant\u2019s testimony established that he was speeding at the time of the stop. We also conclude that Bahe had probable cause to arrest defendant for the offense of speeding. That arrest should not have been quashed by the trial court.\nAs the State has recognized, however, this does not end our inquiry. Defendant also presented evidence at the hearing regarding whether Bahe had probable cause to arrest him for DUI. The State argues that the trial court based its decision upon its \u201cmisapprehension\u201d that there must be evidence that defendant was driving impaired before a finding could be made that probable cause existed to arrest defendant for DUI. The State contends that this cause must therefore be remanded so that the trial court can make a determination of the probable cause issue after \u201chaving acknowledged the existence of a valid stop.\u201d We conclude that a remand pertaining to this issue is not necessary.\nWe initially note that the State has cited no authority to support its assertion that evidence that defendant was driving impaired would not be necessary under these circumstances to support a finding of probable cause. The State is incorrect if it is suggesting that evidence of \u201cdriving impaired\u201d is unnecessary, as probable cause exists if the police officer has sufficient knowledge to believe that a defendant was \u201cimpaired\u201d at the time he was \u201cdriving.\u201d The State is correct, however, if it means that evidence that a defendant was observed driving in an impaired manner is not always necessary. See, e.g., People v. Wingren (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 313, 322 (it is not necessary for the officer to observe the defendant driving).\nThe State has also cited no authority to support its argument that the correct procedure would be to remand the cause to the trial court. We further note that, in determining whether the trial court\u2019s ruling regarding a motion to suppress is manifestly erroneous, the important question is the correctness of the ruling and not the correctness of the court\u2019s reasoning in reaching that result. People v. Faletti (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 61, 64.\nHere, the trial judge clearly stated that he found that Bahe was not a credible witness. It is the trial court\u2019s responsibility to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses (People v. Redd (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 252, 268), and \u201cthis court may not substitute its own judgment regarding the credibility of witnesses for that of the trial judge, who actually heard their testimony and observed their demeanor\u201d (People v. Roos (1989), 181 1Ill. App. 3d 682, 685). We therefore will not consider Bahe\u2019s testimony in determining whether the trial court\u2019s ruling was manifestly erroneous. Cf People v. Brodeur (1989), 189 Ill. App. 3d 936, 941 (testimony of officer considered in determining whether the court\u2019s ruling was manifestly erroneous as the court\u2019s determination was not based upon a lack of credibility of the officer); Wingren, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 321 (officer\u2019s testimony considered where the trial court found the testimony truthful and credible).\nTo determine whether the probable cause requirement has been met, a court must determine whether a reasonable and prudent person who has the knowledge possessed by the officer at the time of the arrest would believe that the defendant committed the offense. (People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 237; Brodeur, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 940.) Defendant testified that he was speeding approximately five miles per hour above the speed limit in a residential area at 4 a.m. He informed Bahe that he had a couple of beers \u201cearlier.\u201d He was unable to perform successfully the one-leg stand test because of the sharp incline of the driveway and had completed one-half of the walk and turn test when he was arrested. Both defendant and Bergmann testified that defendant did not have any alcoholic beverages after 1:30 a.m. and was not under the influence of alcohol. Based on this testimony, it is not clear that probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI existed. Therefore, we must conclude that the trial court\u2019s ruling which quashed defendant\u2019s arrest for the offense of DUI was not manifestly erroneous.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the trial court\u2019s order which quashed defendant\u2019s arrest for the offense of speeding and remand the cause for further proceedings. We affirm that portion of the trial court\u2019s order which quashed defendant\u2019s arrest for the offense of DUI.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.\nINGLIS, P.J., and BOWMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOODWARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DAVID P. O\u2019BRIEN, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20140034\nOpinion filed March 24, 1992.\nRehearing denied May 28, 1992.\nGary V. Johnson, State\u2019s Attorney, of Geneva (William L. Browers and Lawrence M. Bauer, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0302-01", "first_page_order": 326, "last_page_order": 332 }