{ "id": 5792540, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF LAKE IN THE HILLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCOTT T. LLOYD, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Lake v. Lloyd", "decision_date": "1992-04-29", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201491\u20141035", "first_page": "351", "last_page": "354", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 351" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156104 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 2d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2647235 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/98/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5320504 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "1401" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "1400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 1004", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3575113 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" }, { "page": "1006" }, { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/1004-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 382, "char_count": 7037, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.042577069197402e-07, "percentile": 0.7479129092082203 }, "sha256": "0ce9c11c9e41556d1d0f672921058f222bbd94b7c2a4a57a17bde81648f420d2", "simhash": "1:02aeb04e5745b1fe", "word_count": 1174 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:11.260403+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF LAKE IN THE HILLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCOTT T. LLOYD, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NICKELS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Scott T. Lloyd, was charged by traffic citation with the offense of driving with a revoked driver\u2019s license in violation of a Village of Lake in the Hills (Village) ordinance. Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, which the trial court granted. The Village filed a certificate of impairment and a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)). The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court\u2019s granting of defendant\u2019s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence was manifestly erroneous. We reverse and remand.\nThe only facts relevant to this issue are contained in a report prepared by the arresting officer on the date of defendant\u2019s arrest. The report was stipulated to by the parties and tendered to the court for consideration at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion. No other evidence was introduced or considered by the court in deciding defendant\u2019s motion.\nThe report is handwritten and is signed by the arresting officer. It states that the arresting officer, while on routine patrol, observed defendant\u2019s vehicle traveling westbound on Algonquin Road. The arresting officer then ran a \u201crandom registration check on the vehicle through the mobile data terminal.\u201d That check indicated that the owner of the vehicle had a revoked driver\u2019s license. The arresting officer stopped the vehicle and asked the driver for his driver\u2019s license. The owner, who was also the driver, was later identified as defendant. Defendant advised the arresting officer that his driver\u2019s license was revoked. After confirming via radio that defendant had a revoked driver\u2019s license, the officer arrested him for driving with a revoked driver\u2019s license.\nThe Village contends that the information that the vehicle\u2019s owner had a revoked driver\u2019s license provided the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining the status of the license of the driver. The Village relies on People v. Barnes (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 1004, in support of its contention that the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle was permissible under the fourth amendment.\nThe United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391, addressed the constitutional propriety of a police officer conducting a purely random stop of a motor vehicle for the purpose of checking the status of the license of the driver and the vehicle registration. The Prouse Court held that \u201cexcept in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver\u2019s license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\u201d (Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673, 99 S. Ct. at 1401.) The Court added that when there is no probable cause to believe that a driver is violating the law, \u201cor other articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered,\u201d it could not conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a police officer could decide that stopping a particular driver would be more productive than stopping any other driver. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 672, 99 S. Ct. at 1400.\nIn the present case, the officer did not stop defendant\u2019s vehicle completely at random, but only did so after ascertaining that the vehicle\u2019s owner had a revoked driver\u2019s license. The officer, however, did not otherwise attempt to ascertain whether the owner, who had the revoked driver\u2019s license, was in fact the driver of the vehicle. Thus, the dispositive issue is whether an officer\u2019s knowledge that an owner of a particular vehicle has a revoked license alone is sufficient to give the officer a reasonable suspicion that the driver of that vehicle has a revoked driver\u2019s license. Put another way, is it reasonable for the officer to conclude, absent any other information, that the owner of a vehicle is in fact its driver at any given time?\nIn People v. Barnes (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 1004, the appellate court concluded that an articulable basis existed to stop a vehicle to check the driving status of the driver based only on the information that the vehicle\u2019s owner had a suspended license. (Barnes, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1006.) In reaching that result, the court utilized a \u201creasonable inference\u201d that a vehicle\u2019s owner is the one driving the vehicle. (Barnes, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1006.) The court further explained that although other people may drive an owner\u2019s vehicle, it is clear that the owner will do the vast amount of driving. Barnes, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1006.\nThere is also a presumption in civil cases that a vehicle has been driven by its owner. (See Robinson v. Workman (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 420, 427-28; People v. Jendrzejak (1968), 98 Ill. App. 2d 313, 319.) Legal presumptions are inferences that common sense draws from known facts or events. (Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517.) Based on such common sense, we conclude that an officer may reasonably presume that the owner of a vehicle is also the driver.\nThere may be situations in which it may be equally reasonable for an officer to conclude that someone other than the owner, such as a family member, is operating the vehicle. However, the crucial inquiry is not whether other conclusions are also reasonable, but rather whether it is reasonable to conclude that the owner is the driver of the vehicle. Although many vehicles in our society are co-owned, such co-ownership merely makes it equally reasonable to believe that either one owner or the other may in fact be driving a car. Thus, in this instance, the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the driver was in fact the owner and, therefore, that the driver was driving with a revoked license.\nPolice knowledge that an owner of a vehicle has a revoked driver\u2019s license provides a reasonable suspicion to stop the owner\u2019s vehicle for the purpose of ascertaining the status of the license of the driver. Common sense dictates that such information, even alone, is enough to provide a constitutional basis for stopping a vehicle or its occupants. The order of the circuit court quashing defendant\u2019s arrest and suppressing the evidence was manifestly erroneous.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of McHenry County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nINGLIS, P.J., and DUNN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NICKELS" } ], "attorneys": [ "William R Stanton, of Zukowski, Rogers, Flood & McArdle, of Crystal Lake, for appellant.", "Kevin M. McCarty, of McCuaig, Haeger, Bolz, McCarty & Baudin, of West Dundee, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF LAKE IN THE HILLS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SCOTT T. LLOYD, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201491\u20141035\nOpinion filed April 29, 1992.\nWilliam R Stanton, of Zukowski, Rogers, Flood & McArdle, of Crystal Lake, for appellant.\nKevin M. McCarty, of McCuaig, Haeger, Bolz, McCarty & Baudin, of West Dundee, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0351-01", "first_page_order": 375, "last_page_order": 378 }