{ "id": 5794258, "name": "CONCEPCION NOYOLA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Noyola v. Board of Education", "decision_date": "1992-03-19", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20141660", "first_page": "429", "last_page": "434", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 429" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3429364 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569862 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5549613 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492-93" }, { "page": "487-92" }, { "page": "487" }, { "page": "487-91" }, { "page": "492-93" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a71983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 463, "char_count": 10441, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.464848840373991e-07, "percentile": 0.6580651999402282 }, "sha256": "7f392228542f3ce756830bfe902b5c16083577f7ae5ddf1775c8061f29c80bde", "simhash": "1:a27ae36fe6691e71", "word_count": 1624 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:11.260403+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CONCEPCION NOYOLA et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from the trial court\u2019s dismissal with prejudice of a complaint filed by plaintiffs, who are (1) parents of allegedly disadvantaged Chicago school children and (2) community-based advocacy groups whose members include parents of allegedly disadvantaged Chicago school children. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 complaint under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615) because it concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the method by which the defendants, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (hereinafter the Chicago Board of Education) and the Illinois State Board of Education, allocate certain public funds for educational use. Because we find defendants\u2019 arguments insufficient basis to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint for lack of standing, we reverse and remand.\nThe plaintiffs in the instant cause are comprised of two groups. One group is parents of allegedly economically disadvantaged Chicago public school children. A second group is community-based advocacy organizations (Parents United for Responsible Education, Por Un Barrio Mejor, and United Neighborhood Organization of Chicago) whose members include parents of allegedly economically disadvantaged Chicago public school children. As ultimately amended, plaintiffs\u2019 suit challenged the method by which the State Board of Education allocates to the Chicago School Board certain public school funds intended exclusively for economically disadvantaged students. These funds are referred to by the parties as \u201cTitle I funds,\u201d and are provided for in section 18 \u2014 8(i) of the Illinois School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 18 \u2014 8(i)). Plaintiff\u2019s pleading was filed as a class action suit on behalf of all economically disadvantaged students of Chicago public schools.\nIn their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the Chicago School Board and the State Board of Education have been improperly allocating Title I funds among Chicago public schools. Count I of the complaint alleged that the defendants\u2019 improper allocation of Title I funds violated the plaintiffs\u2019 right to \u201cadequate educational opportunities\u201d under article X, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. X, \u00a71.) In count II, plaintiffs alleged that defendants\u2019 improper use of Title I funds created a system of unequal distribution of educational resources among Chicago public school students, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a72.) Count III alleged that defendants\u2019 actions were unlawful under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 1001 et seq.). In count IV, plaintiffs alleged that defendants\u2019 improper use of Title I funds violated plaintiffs\u2019 rights under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a71983 (1989)) and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief.\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615), for failure to state claims for which relief could be granted. Defendants argued inter alia that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue defendants for the alleged improper use of Title I funds. Following briefing and argument, the trial court allowed defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 complaint in its entirety with prejudice. Plaintiffs appeal.\nWe consider first the parties\u2019 arguments regarding the standing of those plaintiffs who are parents of allegedly economically disadvantaged Chicago public school students. Defendants claim that these plaintiffs have no standing to challenge the use of Title I funds under section 18 \u2014 8(i) of the School Code. Specifically, defendants assert that these plaintiffs cannot state a \u201cprivate cause of action\u201d under section 18-8\u00ae.\nUnder Illinois jurisprudence, a plaintiff possesses standing to sue when the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. (Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492-93, 524 N.E.2d 561.) The Illinois Supreme Court has refused to expand the requirements of standing to include a \u201czone of interest\u201d test. (See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 487-92.) Under the zone of interest test, a plaintiff must show that the defendant\u2019s violation of the statute will cause the plaintiff to suffer an injury and that the interest asserted by the plaintiff lies within the \u201czone of interests\u201d protected by the statute. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 487.\nDefendants argue that in order to have standing to sue, plaintiffs must state a \u201cprivate cause of action.\u201d A private cause of action is found to exist where: (1) the plaintiff falls within the class of persons the statute is designed to benefit; (2) the plaintiff\u2019s injury is one the statute is intended to prevent; (3) implying the cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private cause of action is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute. Board of Education v. A, C & S, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 428, 470, 546 N.E.2d 580.\nIn light of Greer, we must decline defendants\u2019 invitation to further engraft upon Illinois standing law the additional requirement that the plaintiffs satisfy the factors associated with the concept of a \u201cprivate cause of action.\u201d The criteria governing a private cause of action are markedly similar to the zone of interest test. In each test, the plaintiff must show that he has been injured by the defendant\u2019s violation of the statute and that the plaintiff\u2019s injury is one the statute is designed to prevent. Both analyses also require consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute in question. See Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 487-91; Board of Education, 131 Ill. 2d at 470.\nBecause the Illinois Supreme Court has refused to apply the zone of interest test to Illinois standing requirements, we find the criteria of a private cause of action equally inapplicable to standing requirements under Illinois law. We adhere to the view expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Greer that it would serve no useful purpose to further expand the concept of standing in Illinois beyond the present requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492-93.\nAccordingly, defendants\u2019 argument regarding a private cause of action is not properly considered in the context of whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring the instant suit against the defendants. Defendants raise no argument with respect to whether plaintiffs have standing under Illinois law, viz., defendants do not argue that plaintiffs did not suffer an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. In light of these circumstances, we reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal of these plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent herewith.\nDefendants also argue that the plaintiffs who are community-based advocacy groups with members who are parents of economically disadvantaged Chicago public school children lack standing to file the instant suit against defendants.\nAs we have previously stated, to determine whether the plaintiffs have standing, the proper inquiry is whether the plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact to a legally cognizable interest. (Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492.) Lack of standing is an affirmative defense, and it is the defendants\u2019 burden to show that the plaintiffs do not have standing to sue. (Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494.) The issue is not appropriately presented in a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss, which tests whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim for which relief might be granted. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 615; see Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494.\nDefendants dispute whether the plaintiffs who are community-based advocacy groups have alleged sufficient facts to show that the groups have suffered an injury to a right or interest possessed by these advocacy groups. (See Spring Mill Townhomes Association v. OSLA Financial Services, Inc. (1983), 124 Ill. App. 3d 774, 777, 465 N.E.2d 490.) However, the record before us does not contain facts from which such an analysis can be made. It was defendants\u2019 burden to plead and prove that these plaintiffs lacked standing. (Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 494.) Having failed to satisfy this burden, defendants\u2019 motion should not have been granted. Consequently, we reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the complaint filed on behalf of the plaintiffs who are community-based advocacy groups and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent herewith.\nDefendants also raise other arguments regarding the sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 complaint. The record indicates that the trial court declined to rule on these issues, because the court found the question of standing sufficient ground to dismiss the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint with prejudice. For this reason, the trial court would not permit plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint in response to the defendants\u2019 additional arguments. On appeal, plaintiffs assert that they should have been allowed to amend their complaint. We find that the defendants\u2019 additional arguments should be addressed by the trial court on remand, following amendments to the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint as the trial court hereinafter permits. Consequently, we do not consider defendants\u2019 additional arguments in this appeal.\nFor the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.\nReversed and remanded.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and LINN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ruben Castillo and Arturo Jauregui, both of Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and Michael Radzilowsky, of Radzilowsky & Dobish, both of Chicago, for appellants.", "Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CONCEPCION NOYOLA et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20141660\nOpinion filed March 19, 1992.\nRuben Castillo and Arturo Jauregui, both of Mexican American Legal Defense Fund, and Michael Radzilowsky, of Radzilowsky & Dobish, both of Chicago, for appellants.\nRoland W. Burris, Attorney General, of Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0429-01", "first_page_order": 453, "last_page_order": 458 }