{
  "id": 5793900,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOE Q. JONES, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones",
  "decision_date": "1992-03-30",
  "docket_number": "No. 1\u201488\u20140700",
  "first_page": "917",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:11.260403+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOE Q. JONES, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Joe Q. Jones was convicted of possession of an automobile certificate of title without complete assignment pursuant to section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 951/2, par. 4 \u2014 104(a)(2)) for which he received a prison sentence of two years. Although defendant has challenged both his conviction and sentence, we need only address defendant\u2019s contention that section 4\u2014 104(a)(2) violates due process guarantees and therefore is unconstitutional because it fails to require a culpable intent.\nIn People v. Gean (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 281, 573 N.E.2d 818, our supreme court determined, in part, that section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2) required the mental state of knowledge, concluding that the section did not constitute an absolute liability offense. To obtain a conviction, the State needed only to prove that an offender possessed a certificate of title knowing it was without complete assignment.\nMore recently, in People v. Tolliver (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 397, the court, reaffirming the constitutionality of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), determined its holding in Gean was overly expansive, creating, under the language of section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), the possibility of a felony based on innocent conduct. (Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 401.) The court therefore modified the mental state of knowledge required under section 4\u2014 104(a)(2) as \u201ccriminal knowledge or knowledge with an intent to defraud or commit a crime.\u201d Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 400-01.\nBased on Tolliver, defendant\u2019s contentions that section 4\u2014 104(a)(2) is unconstitutional for lack of culpable intent are without merit. Nevertheless, because we conclude the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that defendant possessed the requisite mental state under section 4 \u2014 104(a)(2), we must reverse his conviction. See Tolliver, 147 Ill. 2d at 399-400.\nAt trial, the State presented its case against defendant by way of the stipulated testimony of Abraham Coach and Dixmoor, Illinois, police officer Richard Wright.\nWhile on routine patrol in the early morning hours of May 19, 1986, Wright stopped a late model automobile driven by Marvin Jones, defendant\u2019s son, after noticing the vehicle had mismatching front and rear license plates. Wright arrested Jones for driving with a suspended license.\nAt the police station, Wright determined that neither of the license plates was registered to the vehicle driven by Jones. In fact, Wright discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen from Coach on May 6,1986.\nShortly thereafter, defendant arrived at the police station and produced the certificate of title to the vehicle. Although the title bore what appeared to be Coach\u2019s signature, it contained no date of sale or assignment to a new owner. Defendant was then arrested for possession of the incomplete title.\nCoach was summoned to the police station. There, he informed Wright that he kept the title in the glove compartment and never sold the vehicle to defendant. Further, what had appeared to be Coach's signature on the title was a forgery.\nIt was Jones\u2019 testimony that he believed the vehicle actually belonged to defendant and that one of Jones\u2019 brothers had brought the car to him two days before his arrest and allowed him to use it.\nIt was defendant\u2019s testimony that he had purchased the vehicle from a man, representing himself to be Coach, who defendant later learned was Coach\u2019s nephew. Defendant stated that he had been introduced to Coach\u2019s nephew by a mutual acquaintance who informed defendant he knew a man who wanted to sell an automobile. After verifying that the vehicle\u2019s identification number appeared on the certificate of title, defendant purchased the vehicle. Coach\u2019s name had been signed on the certificate of title at that time.\nVirtually no evidence was presented at trial which could establish defendant\u2019s criminal knowledge or intent to defraud. The only evidence presented by the State was that defendant was arrested after producing the incomplete title at the police station on May 19, 1986. Nothing in defendant\u2019s own testimony reveals the requisite intent. We therefore reverse defendant\u2019s conviction.\nIn light of that reversal, we need not address defendant\u2019s other claims.\nReversed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Elyse Krug Miller, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "John M. O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Walter P. Hehner, and Miles J. Keleher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOE Q. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201488\u20140700\nOpinion filed March 30, 1992.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Elyse Krug Miller, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJohn M. O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Walter P. Hehner, and Miles J. Keleher, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0917-01",
  "first_page_order": 941,
  "last_page_order": 944
}