{ "id": 5793702, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND WITT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Witt", "decision_date": "1992-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20140516", "first_page": "936", "last_page": "950", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 936" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 1341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3139532 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 726", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256443 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 N.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3626907 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/113/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 N.E.2d 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3565645 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 986", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2619796 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1235, "char_count": 31355, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5190844955068457e-07, "percentile": 0.6689557962645699 }, "sha256": "10d4f2f27c875d15f377cda84c1390f2d7144924ec83e7770882c1feb0aef7ae", "simhash": "1:9b7b71af7f65bfa3", "word_count": 5228 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:11.260403+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND WITT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Raymond Witt, was found guilty of the murder of Zachary Pinquind and sentenced to a prison term of 40 years. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) his conviction is invalid under the Illinois homicide law for first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1) because the statute was not in effect at the time of the offense; (2) he was denied his constitutional right to a bench trial; (3) he was prejudiced by the prosecutor\u2019s comments regarding flight during opening and closing statements; (4) an instruction to the jury regarding circumstantial evidence was in error; and (5) the trial court erred in allowing certain cross-examination of defense witnesses. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nThe record sets forth the following facts relevant to this appeal. Wendell Cain testified on behalf of the State that on April 14, 1987, at 7:45 p.m., he went to Fuzzy\u2019s liquor store, located on the southeast corner of 45th Street and Cottage Grove Avenue, Chicago. Cain was standing at the counter talking, when a man named Glen entered the store and stated that Zachary Pinquind, a Fuzzy\u2019s employee, was involved in an argument outside. Cain went to the back door and looked out toward 45th Street. He saw Pinquind seated behind the wheel of his car, which was parked on the south side of the street, pointed east, and saw three men standing in the street talking to Pinquind. Another car was parked in front of Pinquind\u2019s car.\nCain heard one of the men say, \u201cI will hurt someone about my money,\u201d in an angry tone, and another man say, \u201c[H]ere come those white guys.\u201d Just then, Cain saw a police car heading down 45th Street toward Pinquind\u2019s car and Fuzzy\u2019s. The men around the car walked away.\nCain reentered the store via the front door. Richard Cain, Cain\u2019s brother and the store manager, entered the store and Cain told Richard that Pinquind was arguing outside. Richard asked Cain to go and get Pinquind. Cain approached Pinquind\u2019s car and asked Pinquind to come into Fuzzy\u2019s. Pinquind did not accompany Cain into Fuzzy\u2019s. Richard sent Cain out a second time, and Pinquind said he was on his way. As Cain turned to go back into Fuzzy\u2019s, Pinquind was getting out of his car.\nPinquind walked into the store behind Cain. They both approached the counter, and Richard asked Pinquind what he was doing outside. Cain moved down the counter out of the range of the conversation, approximately 20 feet away.\nAt that point, defendant entered Fuzzy\u2019s and stood with his back toward the refrigerator at the front of the store. Defendant was watching Richard and Pinquind and he appeared to be angry. His arms were folded and he was moving his head from side to side. Cain stated that the store is brightly lit inside and that he was about the same distance from the refrigerator as from Richard and Pinquind.\nAfter about five minutes, Pinquind left Fuzzy\u2019s and defendant followed him. Cain then left the store. Cain turned to walk east on 45th Street and saw defendant crouched down in front of Pinquind, holding a gun. Pinquind was standing against the wall of the store. Cain saw defendant fire the gun and saw the gun flame. Cain looked down into defendant\u2019s face and defendant looked up at Cain. Cain stated, \u201cI know he saw me.\u201d Pinquind turned to pull away from the wall. Defendant arose from his crouched position and fired at Pinquind a second time. Pinquind jumped.\nCain then went back into the store and shouted to Richard, \u201csomeone just shot Zachary.\u201d Richard jumped over the counter and Cain said, \u201cRichard, don\u2019t go out there, they are shooting.\u201d But Richard ran out and Glen ran behind him.\nCain waited a minute, then left the store. He saw Pinquind on the ground, trying to get up. Cain turned to go back into the store to get help and was stopped by a tall, dark man who was blocking the door. The man had one hand in his pocket and was waving his other arm. He said, \u201cYou punks better get away from here, don\u2019t nobody mess with anyone in our family.\u201d Cain backed off toward the other side of 45th and Cottage Grove. He heard police sirens and saw the police cars heading toward the scene. The man blocking the door ran toward the alley to the car parked in front of Pinquind\u2019s car. Cain pointed in the direction of the man who was running. He saw defendant run south down the alley. Cain stated that Cottage Grove is a big, well-lit street.\nThe police car turned east at 45th and Cottage Grove, in the direction of the running man. Cain saw the car that had been parked in front of Pinquind\u2019s car heading south down the alley, followed by the police car. Cain went back into the store and found out that an ambulance had been called.\nCain accompanied police officers to the hospital where Pinquind was transported and later to the police station. At the police station he viewed a lineup. He identified the man who stopped him from reentering the store as Gregory Dixon. Cain did not see defendant in the lineup.\nOn the afternoon of April 29, Cain viewed police photographs and identified a picture of defendant as the man who had shot Pinquind. Cain signed the back of the photograph. On October 10, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Cain returned to the police station and identified defendant from a lineup.\nChicago police officer Mona Majeed testified on behalf of the State that on April 14, at 9:45 p.m., she investigated the scene of the shooting at 45th Street and Cottage Grove. She found Zachary Pinquind with a bullet wound in his stomach and interviewed Cain. Pinquind was lying with his head facing north and his feet pointed south.\nChicago police officer Guy Habiak testified that on April 14, he began an investigation of Pinquind\u2019s death. He interviewed Cain on April 14 and 29, and conducted the lineups in which Cain identified Dixon and defendant. On October 6, he and Detective Kutz left Chicago for Sacramento, California, to retrieve defendant, who was being held by California authorities pursuant to a Chicago arrest warrant. Habiak returned with defendant in custody on October 9. On cross-examination, Habiak stated that defendant had waived extradition from California. Chicago police detective David Kutz testified to the same essential facts as Habiak.\nCook County medical examiner Mitra Kalekar testified that she performed an autopsy on Pinquind on April 19. Kalekar found that Pinquind had a gunshot wound to his abdomen and she recovered a bullet from his spinal cord. She also found an incision on his right calf. Kalekar determined that Pinquind\u2019s death resulted from the gunshot wound to his abdomen.\nDefendant presented alibi witnesses on his behalf. Tyrone Witt, defendant\u2019s brother, testified that he lived with defendant at 4730 South Ingleside, Chicago. On March 28, at approximately 9 p.m., he and defendant attended a birthday party for their brother, Claude Witt, at their sister Doris Armour\u2019s home at 10342 South Eberhart. At that time, defendant took some of his belongings with him to Armour\u2019s home, but Tyrone did not know why defendant did so. Tyrone stated that his whole family was at the party, which lasted until 4 a.m. After the party, Tyrone went straight home, but defendant stayed at Armour\u2019s house. On Sunday morning, March 29, defendant left Chicago for Los Angeles, California. On cross-examination, Tyrone testified that he and defendant grew up together at 4742 South Ingleside, four to five blocks from Cottage Grove Avenue.\nDoris Armour, defendant\u2019s sister, testified that on Saturday, March 28, she had a birthday party at her home for her brother Claude. She stated that she invited all of her brothers and sisters to the party. Defendant stayed at her home that night because he was going to leave for California the next morning. Armour stated that she had bought defendant his plane ticket to Los Angeles and gave him $300. On Sunday, March 29, Armour and her husband drove defendant to the Greyhound bus station and he caught a bus at around noon or 12:30.\nOn cross-examination, Armour testified that she did not know Gregory Dixon and that he did not attend the party. She did not make arrangements for defendant to go to California, she only bought the ticket.\nLaura Galvez then gave alibi testimony on behalf of defendant. Galvez stated that she lives in Los Angeles, California, with her family. In April 1987, she was taking a computer terminal operator class in downtown Los Angeles at American Business Institute. She attended school every day for six months and received a certificate in 1988. Galvez first saw defendant on April 2 or 3 at the bus stop. They went to the beach together for a couple of hours and then she went home.\nGalvez testified that she met defendant again the next day and saw him every week day thereafter during April 1987. On cross-examination, she stated that she never attended the American Business Institute in Chicago. She also stated that she does not recall anything from her computer course except the keyboard. The jury found defendant guilty of murder. Defendant\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nInitially, defendant contends that the amended first degree murder statute was improperly applied in his case. Defendant argues that the indictment against him was void because first degree murder was not an offense at the time of the killing, and thus he was charged retroactively in violation of ex post facto laws. We disagree.\nFor a law to be applied ex post facto, the statute in question must apply to events occurring before its enactment and it must furthermore disadvantage the defendant affected by it. (People v. Spires (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 176, 537 N.E.2d 1010.) For a defendant to be disadvantaged by a statute, it must punish as a crime an act which was previously lawful, increase the penalty for a particular crime or deprive one charged with a crime of a defense that was available under the law at the time the act was committed thereby making conviction easier. People v. Shumpert (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 344, 533 N.E.2d 1106; Spires, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 181.\nPrior to July 1, 1987, the State had the burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of murder. The defendant then had the opportunity to present evidence of a factor in mitigation, serious provocation or unreasonable belief, either of which must have been present to reduce an offense of murder to voluntary manslaughter. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9 \u2014 1(a), (b).) However, the statute was amended defining the offenses of first and second degree murder, and shifting the burden of proof to a defendant, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, one of the factors in mitigation to reduce an offense of first degree murder to second degree murder. 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 2.\nIn People v. Shumpert (1989), 126 111. 2d 344, 533 N.E.2d 1106, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that the amended homicide statute became effective on July 1, 1987. The court examined the language of section 13 of the act, which provided: \u201cThis amendatory act of 1986 shall only apply to Acts occurring on or after January 1, 1987, which cause the death of another,\u201d and determined that the language was not straightforward in providing an effective date. The court noted that the Governor did not certify the Act until January 5, 1987, and determined that although the Act was to be applied retroactively from January 1, 1987, such application of the statute violated the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The court reasoned that the statute would be ex post facto if applied retroactively because it altered the burden of proof for proving second degree murder, decreasing the degree of proof necessary to convict a defendant:\n\u201c[T]he new Act not only requires the defendant to come forward with some evidence of a factor in mitigation; it requires the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a factor in mitigation. Furthermore, the State is no longer required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of the factor in mitigation. The Act is therefore ex post facto if retroactive.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) (126 Ill. 2d at 352.)\nThe court then explained its rationale:\n\u201cThe cornerstone of the State and Federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws is that persons have a right to fair warning of the conduct which gives rise to criminal penalties, the degree of punishment and the legal rules of evidence. (People v. Coleman (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 87, 93[, 488 N.E.2d 1009].) Likewise, the cornerstone of the rules governing effective dates of laws is that persons have a right to fair warning of the contents of a bill so as to be given a sufficient opportunity to conform their conduct to the law. (Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 303, 315[, 527 N.E.2d 1264].) The common purpose is to provide persons with fair warning. The Act, if applied retroactively, would violate the State and Federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws because persons indicted for homicide before the Act actually became effective would not have fair warning of the changes in the law.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) 126 Ill. 2d at 352-53.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on Shumpert is unavailing, as the three conditions determinative of ex post facto application of a law do not apply in this particular case. The record in the present case indicates that defendant\u2019s indictments of October 4, 1987, include the elements of murder as required under the old homicide statute. The indictments charge that on April 14,1987, defendant:\n\u201cCommitted the offense of first degree murder in that he, without lawful justification intentionally and knowingly shot and killed Zachary Pinquind with a handgun *** and\n* * *\nHe, without lawful justification shot and killed Zachary Pinquind with a handgun knowing that such shooting with a handgun created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Zachary Pinquind ***.\u201d\nThe trial court found that the elements of murder remained the same after the amendment of the homicide statute. Thus, the statute does not punish as a crime an act which was previously lawful.\nThe record further shows that defendant did not attempt to present an affirmative defense of self-defense or lawful justification to his charge of first degree murder in an attempt to reduce the charge to second degree murder. During pretrial discovery, the State, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413(d) (134 Ill. 2d R. 413(d)), requested that defendant give written notice of any defenses, affirmative or nonaffirmative, which the defendant intended to assert at any hearing or at trial. In his answer, defendant stated that he \u201cmay or may not raise the defense of alibi\u201d and supplied the date and location of the alibi. Defendant offered an alibi defense at trial and no other defense prior to or at trial. Thus, the degree of proof was unaltered in this case.\nFinally, the jury found that the State had satisfied the elements of murder and proved the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt as required by the law in effect at the time of the offense. (See People v. Snowden (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 763, 769, 498 N.E.2d 612.) Contrary to defendant\u2019s arguments, the record does not support a finding that the amended homicide statute defined a new crime, increased the punishment for a previously committed offense or shifted the burden of proof to defendant, thereby detrimentally increasing his burden of proof with regard to murder. See Spires, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 181.\nIn the present case, defendant\u2019s indictments provided him with fair warning of the elements of murder, and defendant was afforded the opportunity to present his defense. Where the language of the indictment sufficiently informs a defendant of the charges against him, and defendant cannot demonstrate any prejudice resulting from an incorrect statutory citation, the defect is formal and does not warrant reversal. (People v. McBrien (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 489, 494 N.E.2d 732.) We find, therefore, that although technically the State cited the improper statute in its indictments, defendant was not prejudiced by the error, and thus the error was harmless. People v. Ryan (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 28, 37, 509 N.E.2d 1001; People v. Weaver (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 434, 437-38, 243 N.E.2d 245, cert. denied (1969), 395 U.S. 959, 23 L. Ed. 2d 746, 89 S. Ct. 2100.\nNext, defendant contends that the State asserted its right to a jury trial after defendant requested a bench trial and that he was thus denied his constitutional right to a bench trial.\nEvery person accused of an offense has the right to a trial by jury unless that right is understanding^ waived by the defendant in open court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 103 \u2014 6.) It is axiomatic that the waiver of the right to a trial by jury cannot be presumed from a silent record. People v. Villareal (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 389, 392, 449 N.E.2d 198.\nDefendant argues that, prior to trial, he expressed his desire to be tried by the bench, that the State asserted its right to request a jury trial, and that the court indicated that it would respect the State\u2019s request for a jury \u201cif asserted by the State.\u201d The record indicates that the State never asserted its request for a jury. The trial judge stated: \u201cI will tell you in advance that my inclination is to grant the State\u2019s right to a jury trial *** if they demand a jury trial.\u201d No further proceedings indicate a discussion of a jury or bench trial demand. The record indicates that on December 13, 1988, the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay. Ready for the jury trial?\nTHE DEFENSE: Yes, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Let\u2019s have the jury.\u201d\nThe record indicates that the issue of a jury versus bench trial was not raised by defendant again until post-trial arguments. At that time, defense counsel admitted that defendant agreed to a jury trial and that no effort was made on behalf of defendant to formally waive a jury. Thus, having not elected to waive trial by jury, defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a bench trial.\nDefendant next contends that the prosecutor\u2019s comments during opening statement and closing argument regarding defendant\u2019s flight were improper because the State introduced no evidence at trial showing that defendant was guilty of flight or intentional concealment. In response, the State argues that defendant waived his right to appeal on this issue, as defense counsel failed to both object at trial and raise the issue -with sufficient specificity in his post-trial motion. (People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Even if the issue is not waived, we find that the comments were not improper.\nA prosecutor is given great latitude in closing argument, and the propriety of his comments is within the trial court\u2019s discretion. (People v. Morrison (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 171, 184, 484 N.E.2d 329.) It is well settled that the prosecution has the right to comment on the evidence that has been adduced at trial and make all legitimate inferences therefrom. (People v. Wheatley (1989), 183 Ill. App. 3d 590, 601, 539 N.E.2d 276.) Whether the People\u2019s argument exceeded the bounds of fair comment is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the comment. (People v. Jenkins (1989), 190 Ill. App. 3d 115, 135-36, 545 N.E.2d 986.) It is well settled that improper prosecutorial remarks generally do not warrant reversal unless they are so prejudicial as to constitute such a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction that the jury likely would have reached a contrary verdict had the remarks not been made. (People v. Townsend (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 385, 394, 483 N.E.2d 340.) Comments by the prosecution in rebuttal argument that are invited by defense counsel\u2019s closing argument are proper. (People v. Perez (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 143, 149, 446 N.E.2d 1229.) Moreover, a defendant is not denied a fair trial where the jury is admonished that the opening and closing statements are not evidence. People v. Thomas (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 500, 530, 561 N.E.2d 57.\nDefendant objects to various comments made by the prosecutor during her opening statement and closing argument that defendant fled to California after the shooting. In her opening statement, the prosecutor argued:\n\u201c[T]he Defendant had actually left the City of Chicago and he left the State of Illinois and he had fled all the way to California.\u201d\nIn reliance on People v. Harris (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 270, 178 N.E.2d 291, and United States v. Jackson (7th Cir. 1978), 572 E 2d 636, defendant contends that the prosecutor\u2019s arguments were based upon flight evidence that was not adduced at trial. Defendant\u2019s reliance is misplaced, as these cases do not stand for the proposition for which they are cited. In the present case, evidence of flight was not introduced at trial; rather, the prosecutor\u2019s comments are based upon the evidence adduced at trial that defendant was arrested in California, and that defendant presented an alibi defense that he was in California at the time of the shooting.\nAt trial, Wendell Cain testified that he saw defendant shoot Pinquind on April 14, 1987, in Chicago, Illinois. Cain testified \u201cI know he saw me.\u201d Through alibi testimony, defendant attempted to establish that he went to California on March 29, 1987, and remained there throughout April 1987. Defendant intended for the jury to infer that he was not in the State of Illinois on the day Pinquind was shot. The State argued that from this same testimony the jury could infer that defendant fled to California because he knew that Cain could identify him.\nDefendant also objects to a comment made by the prosecutor in closing argument:\n\u201cMr. Witt was probably at home before Zachary Pinquind ever got to the hospital.\u201d\nThe record indicates that Tyrone Witt and defendant lived four blocks from the scene of the shooting and that they grew up in the neighborhood. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that defendant ran from the scene of the crime to his nearby home.\nDefendant further objects to the following comments made by the prosecutor in rebuttal closing argument:\n\u201cThe waiver of extradition, ladies and gentlemen, does not show anything about the defendant. The only thing it shows is that he knows the police now know that he is wanted for a warrant for murder in Illinois.\n* * *\nThe defendant did go to California, that\u2019s absolutely true, and the defendant went to California, we know he did, because that\u2019s where the police picked him up and brought him back to Illinois. The question is when did he go to California? When did he go to California: Ladies and gentlemen, you\u2019ve heard the testimony of these witnesses about this birthday. How convenient. The end of March. Now we all remember it, right, and the next day we\u2019ll take him to the Greyhound Bus station. He didn\u2019t go the next day, ladies and gentlemen, He went when he got a feeling that the police were on his tail.\u201d\nThe record indicates that defense counsel argued in closing that the jury should infer from defendant\u2019s waiver of extradition that he was innocent of any wrongdoing:\n\u201cNow, if he was guilty, do you think he would have waived extradition? He could have. That was his right. They would have to prove, there are certain things that they have to prove before a person is extradited to another State. No, he didn\u2019t want that. He wanted his name cleared. *** Well, the fact that he waived extradition you can draw your inference. He didn\u2019t fight extradition. They\u2019re talking about flight now. A person, if you had fled from here, he is not going to waive extradition.\u201d\nThe prosecutor\u2019s comments were invited by the comments of defense counsel. Thus, the prosecutor\u2019s comments amount to fair comment on the evidence adduced at trial. In light of an eyewitness identification and the overwhelming evidence against defendant, any error by the prosecution in opening and closing statements was harmless.\nNext, defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court included a jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence where only direct evidence was presented at trial. The State responds that defendant failed to properly preserve this issue for review and that it is therefore waived under People v. Enoch. Even if the issue were not waived, we find that there was circumstantial evidence in the present case and thus the jury was properly instructed.\nCircumstantial evidence is the proof of certain facts and circumstances in a given case from which the jury may infer other connected facts which usually and reasonably follow according to the common experience of mankind. People v. Rhodes (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 241, 248-49, 422 N.E.2d 605.\nDefendant argues that State\u2019s witnesses presented only direct evidence testimony without the necessity for inference or presumption. However, the record discloses numerous instances of circumstantial evidence. For example, the record indicates that Wendell Cain saw defendant fire the first shot toward Pinquind\u2019s legs and the second shot as defendant was rising from his crouched position. The medical examiner testified that she found an incision on Pinquind\u2019s calf and a gunshot wound in Pinquind\u2019s abdomen. From this evidence, the jury could infer that these wounds were caused by the two shots fired by defendant.\nFurther, Cain testified that Pinquind was standing upright facing north and was in the process of turning away when defendant fired the second shot. Officer Majeed testified that Pinquind was discovered on his back with his head facing north. From this evidence, the jury could infer that the force of the second shot continued the momentum of Pinquind\u2019s turn and that his body landed in that direction. The record indicates that no weapons were discovered on the scene. The jury could thus infer that defendant carried the gun with him when he escaped from the scene. Because there was ample circumstantial evidence in the present case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence.\nFinally, defendant contends that the trial court permitted improper cross-examination of the defense witnesses thereby prejudicing his case. The State responds that defendant\u2019s objections are waived by defendant\u2019s failure to both object at trial and raise the alleged error in his motion for new trial. (Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 186.) We agree, but even so find that cross-examination of the witnesses was proper.\nThe scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court and a reviewing court should not interfere unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 269, 478 N.E.2d 267.) While cross-examination is limited to the scope of direct examination, circumstances may develop on cross-examination that lie within the knowledge of the witness which explain, qualify, discredit or destroy his direct testimony, even though that material may not have been raised on direct examination. People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 78, 97, 552 N.E.2d 743.\nDefendant first argues that the prosecutor\u2019s question to Doris Armour, defendant\u2019s sister, regarding Gregory Dixon\u2019s presence at the birthday party she had at her house on March 28 tied Dixon to the defendant and attacked Armour\u2019s credibility. In reliance on People v. Braggs (1988), 184 Ill. App. 3d 756, 540 N.E.2d 767, defendant contends the question created improper insinuation allowing the jury to substitute presumption for proof because the State presumed facts not in evidence as a precursor to impeachment of that witness, and then failed to introduce rebuttal evidence impeaching her testimony.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance is misplaced because the the question was properly based on the evidence presented at trial. Wendell Cain testified that at the scene of the shooting Dixon blocked his entry to Fuzzy\u2019s and told him, \u201cYou punks better get away from here, don\u2019t nobody mess with anyone in our family.\u201d On direct examination, Armour testified that her immediate and extended family and her close friends attended the birthday party. The question was proper since Armour would know whether Dixon was a family member who attended the party.\nLastly, defendant argues that the prosecutor\u2019s line of questioning to Laura Galvez on cross-examination regarding where she attended business school and what she learned in a computer course constituted impeachment on an irrelevant and collateral matter. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Galvez if she ever attended the American Business Institute in Chicago, and Galvez responded that she did not. The prosecutor then asked her to describe the various parts of a computer learned in her course, and she stated that she learned the keyboard.\nThe cross-examiner is permitted to delve into the witness\u2019 story to test the witness\u2019 perceptions and memory. (People v. Sandoval (1990), 135 Ill. 2d 159, 174, 552 N.E.2d 726.) The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony. (135 Ill. 2d at 174.) Generally any permissible kind of impeaching matter may be developed on cross-examination. (People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 269.) The purpose of impeaching evidence is to destroy the credibility of a witness. (People v. Bradford (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 492, 499, 478 N.E.2d 1341.) However, the cross-examiner may not impeach a witness on a collateral matter, which is a matter that can not be introduced for any purpose other than to contradict the witness. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 270.\nGalvez testified that she spent every weekday during the month of April 1987 with defendant. When she met defendant and throughout the time she dated him, Galvez testified that she was attending a six-month computer terminal operator training course at the American Business Institute in Los Angeles, California. Galvez also testified that she visited her family in Chicago. Defendant contends that Galvez\u2019 response that she did not recall anything from the class except for the keyboard does not disprove that she dated the defendant while he was in California.\nHowever, the prosecutor\u2019s line of questioning properly tested Galvez\u2019 memory, credibility, and her possible motive or bias regarding events that occurred during the period of time she allegedly spent with defendant in California. Moreover, defendant fails to cite authority showing how this line of questioning prejudiced his case. Therefore, the trial court properly allowed the prosecutor\u2019s questions on cross-examination.\nFor the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and MANNING, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Fred Weil, Alison Edwards, and Rita A. Fry, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Susan R. Schierl, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAYMOND WITT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20140516\nOpinion filed March 30, 1992.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Fred Weil, Alison Edwards, and Rita A. Fry, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Kenneth T. McCurry, and Susan R. Schierl, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0936-01", "first_page_order": 960, "last_page_order": 974 }