{ "id": 5792504, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACKIE D. HUNDLEY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hundley", "decision_date": "1992-04-22", "docket_number": "Nos. 3\u201491\u20140250 through 3\u201491\u20140252 cons.", "first_page": "1056", "last_page": "1063", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 1056" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "495 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 633863 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" }, { "page": "6" }, { "page": "1635" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "6" }, { "page": "1635" }, { "page": "5" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "1635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/495/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5283220 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6216740 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "743" }, { "page": "376" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177992 ], "weight": 9, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 640", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6192095 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 837", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564623 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574148 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0300-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 678, "char_count": 15220, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.894164110180297e-08, "percentile": 0.46047452959612706 }, "sha256": "425e8e59d05c80a8482d5a12d5d8c0d313322e7a7513e910268fea32d6e84b48", "simhash": "1:9d2ba406637785af", "word_count": 2450 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:11.260403+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACKIE D. HUNDLEY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Jackie D. Hundley, was charged with the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 56V2, par. 1402). Cocaine was found in Hundley\u2019s unattended automobile by an Illinois State trooper during a warrantless inventory search. Hundley filed a motion to suppress evidence which was granted by the trial court. The State appeals. We affirm.\nOn October 1, 1988, Hundley was involved in a one-car accident near the intersection of U.S. Highway 136 and Fountain Creek Road in Hancock County. Hundley\u2019s vehicle struck a utility pole near the highway and came to rest in an adjacent ditch. Trooper Anthony Grace investigated the accident. He discovered Hundley\u2019s unattended vehicle was locked and severely damaged from the accident. Hundley was not present. Trooper Grace called a tow truck to remove the vehicle from the ditch. The trooper opened the automobile with a \u201cslim jim.\u201d The trooper testified the vehicle was opened so the transmission could be shifted to avoid further damage to the vehicle when it was towed from the ditch.\nAn inventory search of the contents of the vehicle was performed by the trooper. He found a closed cigarette case which he opened. Inside the case he found cigarettes and a snorting tube containing cocaine residue. The trooper testified that he opened the cigarette case because in his experience he had found women often put their driver\u2019s licenses and money in these containers. No purse or other valuables were found in Hundley\u2019s vehicle. Trooper Grace testified he prepared an inventory list pursuant to State Police policy and gave copies of it to his commanding sergeant and the tow truck operator. No inventory form was ever introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the State admitted into evidence the Division of State Troopers\u2019 General Order DST ENF 13 (General Order), which contains the policy and procedure to be followed during a warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle.\nIn presenting a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the burden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful. (People v. Janis (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 300, 565 N.E.2d 633.) A trial court\u2019s decision on a motion to suppress evidence will generally not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous. At a hearing on a motion to suppress, it is the trial court\u2019s function to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Galvin (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 153, 535 N.E.2d 837.\nAn inventory search is a judicially created exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. (Illinois v. Lafayette (1983), 462 U.S. 640, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605.) Three requirements must be satisfied for a valid warrantless inventory search of a vehicle: (1) the original impoundment of the vehicle must be lawful (South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092); (2) the purpose of the inventory search must be to protect the owner\u2019s property and to protect the police from claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property and to guard the police from danger (Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092); and (3) the inventory search must be conducted in good faith pursuant to reasonable standardized police procedures and not as a pretext for an investigatory search. Colorado v. Bertine (1987), 479 U.S. 367, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739,107 S. Ct. 738.\nInitially, we note Trooper Grace lawfully impounded Hundley\u2019s vehicle. The vehicle skidded off the roadway and had sheared off a utility pole. The fallen power line created a hazard which impeded the flow of traffic. Hundley\u2019s vehicle was locked and unattended until it was towed from the ditch. The Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 1 \u2014 100 et seq.) authorizes the removal of a vehicle under these circumstances. According to section 4 \u2014 203(d) of the Code:\n\u201cWhen an abandoned, unattended, wrecked, burned or partially dismantled vehicle is creating a traffic hazard because of its position in relation to the highway or its physical appearanee is causing the impeding of traffic, its immediate removal from the highway or private property adjacent to the highway by a towing service may be authorized by a law enforcement agency having jurisdiction.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 4 \u2014 203(d).\nTrooper Grace was responsible for the safety of Hundley\u2019s vehicle and its contents since Hundley was not at the scene of the accident.\nAfter the trooper ordered the vehicle removed from the ditch, it was then towed to an unguarded storage facility. Hundley\u2019s vehicle was then exposed to possible theft or vandalism because it was parked at an unguarded storage facility. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Trooper Grace to inventory the contents of Hundley\u2019s vehicle. When vehicles are impounded, police departments generally follow a standardized procedure for inventorying the contents of the impounded vehicle. Such standardized police procedures were developed in response to three distinct needs: (1) the protection of the owner\u2019s property; (2) the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and (3) the protection of the police from potential danger. (Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092.) Section 13 \u2014 3 of the General Order enumerates the standardized Illinois State Police objectives regarding warrantless inventory searches of impounded vehicles. Section 13 \u2014 3 of the General Order provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cOBJECTIVES\n(a) To safeguard property in those cases where the actual owner or person in charge of such property is for any reason unable to provide ordinary care and protection for such property.\n(b) To protect those persons who actually remove and take custody of vehicles/boats towed by authority of the Division of State Troopers.\n(c) To protect the interests of the Division of State Troopers.\u201d\nBased upon our review of the record, we find Trooper Grace\u2019s warrantless inventory search of Hundley\u2019s impounded vehicle met the reasonable objectives of the General Order. The inventory search was undertaken for the purpose of protecting Hundley's property and to discourage claims against the State Police for theft or vandalism. However, we clearly find from the record that Trooper Grace did not open the closed cigarette case pursuant to a standardized State Police procedure. The General Order was silent concerning the opening of closed containers by State troopers during a warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle.\nThe trial court suppressed the evidence because Trooper Grace did not produce the required inventory form. The trooper testified that he completed the inventory form, but it was not introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing. The trial court ruled as follows:\n\u201cI believe the Supreme Court in the Bertine case is saying that since we are dealing with another exception to an individual\u2019s Fourth Amendment rights, the officer must dot the i\u2019s and cross the t\u2019s so that the trial court does not have to determine the officer\u2019s motives in connection with the search.\u201d\nWe believe the issue in this instant matter is not whether Trooper Grace prepared an inventory list pursuant to the General Order, but whether the trooper had legal authority to open Hundley\u2019s closed cigarette case. While we affirm the trial court\u2019s order suppressing the evidence, we do not agree with the trial court\u2019s analysis of the law governing warrantless inventory searches of impounded vehicles. The trial court was not correct in suppressing the evidence merely because Trooper Grace did not produce an inventory list at the suppression hearing. Instead, the trial court\u2019s inquiry should have been whether there were any existing standardized police procedures governing the opening of closed containers found within lawfully impounded vehicles.\nWe hold that Bertine allows police to open all closed containers during a warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle where there are standardized police procedures which require the opening and inventorying of the contents of all closed containers.\nIn Bertine, the defendant was stopped for driving under the influence of alcohol. After the defendant was taken into custody, a police officer, acting pursuant to standardized police procedure, inventoried the defendant\u2019s van. The officer discovered a closed backpack, which he opened. Inside the backpack the officer found various containers holding controlled substances, cash, and cocaine paraphernalia.\nThe police officer in Bertine followed a reasonable standardized police procedure which required the officer to open all closed containers during an inventory search of an impounded vehicle. The Supreme Court in Bertine stated that police should be given limited discretion in opening closed containers discovered within lawfully impounded vehicles, \u201cso long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.\u201d (Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 748, 107 S. Ct. at 743.) Justice Blackmun cautioned that the police should not be allowed discretion to turn a warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle into \u201ca purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.\u201d Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 749, 107 S. Ct. at 743 (Blackmun, J., concurring).\nIn the instant appeal, we note the General Order of the Illinois State Police was silent regarding the opening of closed containers found during a warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle. While the General Order requires a trooper to inventory areas of an impounded vehicle where people normally store their property, it fails to require a trooper to open closed containers. Sections 13 \u2014 2 and 13 \u2014 4(a)(2) of the General Order provide in relevant part:\n\u201c13 \u2014 2 POLICY\n*** A physical inventory shall be made of all vehicles towed, except when the vehicle is towed at the owner\u2019s request.\n* * *\n13 \u2014 4 Procedure\n(a) Forms ***\n(2) An examination and inventory of the contents of all vehicles/boats towed or held by authority of Division personnel shall be made by the officer who completes the Tow-In Recovery Report. This examination and inventory shall be restricted to those areas where an owner or operator would ordinarily place or store property or equipment in the vehicle/boat; and would normally include front and rear seat areas, glove compartment, map case, sun visors, and trunk and engine compartments.\u201d\nIn People v. Lear (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 712, 577 N.E.2d 826, the defendant was stopped for speeding when the trooper was informed the defendant\u2019s driver\u2019s license was suspended. The defendant\u2019s vehicle was immediately towed, impounded and searched. The trooper discovered a closed drawstring bag in the trunk. Upon opening the bag, the trooper discovered two loaded handguns. The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm without the requisite firearm owner\u2019s identification card (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 83 \u2014 2) and unlawful use of weapons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4)). The defendant moved to suppress the introduction of the gun into evidence. The trial court granted his motion.\nThe court in Lear affirmed the trial court\u2019s suppression of the evidence found inside the closed bag. In Lear, the court followed Bertine and concluded that when the trooper opened the closed drawstring bag, he violated the defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights. The court reasoned the guns were properly suppressed absent testimony that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standardized police procedure which required the opening and inventorying of all closed containers in every impounded vehicle. Lear, 217 111. App. 3d at 714-15, 577 N.E.2d at 828.\nAccording to the Supreme Court in Florida v. Wells (1990), 495 U.S. 1, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, the police should be given discretion to open closed containers when the police are unable to ascertain the contents of the closed containers and standardized police procedure requires the closed containers to be opened for further inventory. In Wells, the defendant was stopped for driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant agreed to take a breathalyzer test and permitted the trooper to inventory the trunk of his vehicle. The trooper forced open a locked suitcase found in the trunk of the defendant\u2019s vehicle. The trooper discovered in the suitcase a substantial quantity of marijuana. The Supreme Court in Wells reaffirmed its earlier holding in Bertine. (Wells, 495 U.S. at 3, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 6, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.) The Supreme Court in Wells once again affirmed the validity of warrantless inventory searches which follow a standardized police procedure requiring the opening of all closed containers in impounded vehicles. However, the Florida State Police in Wells, just like the Illinois State Police here, did not have any standardized procedure regarding the opening of closed containers discovered during a warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle.\nThe Supreme Court stated:\n\u201cA police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself.\u201d (Wells, 495 U.S. at 4, 109 L. Ed. 2d at 6, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.)\nThe Supreme Court in Wells held the warrantless inventory search of the locked suitcase did not satisfy the fourth amendment because there was no standardized police procedure governing the opening and inventory of closed containers found in impounded vehicles. Wells, 495 U.S. at 5,109 L. Ed. 2d at 7, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.\nHere, we find Trooper Grace opened the closed cigarette case using his own discretion without the benefit of a standardized police procedure requiring the opening of all closed containers. For a valid warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle, it is not incumbent upon the Illinois State Police to \u201cdot all the i\u2019s and cross all the t\u2019s.\u201d Police are allowed reasonable discretion in a warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle to open closed containers provided they act according to a standardized police procedure which mandates the opening of all closed containers and the inventorying of their contents in every impounded vehicle.\nFor the reasons indicated, the judgment of the circuit court of Hancock County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Samuel Naylor VI, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (John X. Breslin and Jay P. Hoffmann, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Capps, Ancelet & Stoverink, of Carthage (Albert V. Ancelet, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACKIE D. HUNDLEY, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201491\u20140250 through 3\u201491\u20140252 cons.\nOpinion filed April 22, 1992.\nRehearing denied May 28, 1992.\nSamuel Naylor VI, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carthage (John X. Breslin and Jay P. Hoffmann, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nCapps, Ancelet & Stoverink, of Carthage (Albert V. Ancelet, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1056-01", "first_page_order": 1080, "last_page_order": 1087 }