{ "id": 5220813, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT AYRES et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ayres", "decision_date": "1992-04-30", "docket_number": "Nos. 3\u201491\u20140450, 3\u201491\u20140537 cons.", "first_page": "277", "last_page": "280", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 277" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511739 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 N.E.2d 447", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959147 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505975 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2586771 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 1269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1270" }, { "page": "1271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293125 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 963", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3501497 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/150/0283-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 469, "char_count": 7556, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5358705919855946e-07, "percentile": 0.6719550058709987 }, "sha256": "5b172a2baae862d92d30435dd25db9fd7e693d8473b7e1fc9a82c601b422730b", "simhash": "1:c9a1520f34e7bdfb", "word_count": 1218 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:32.943049+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT AYRES et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendants, Robert Ayres and Robert Brockett, were charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501). Both defendants took breathalyzer tests and thereafter filed motions to suppress the test results in their separate DUI proceedings. The trial court granted the motions, finding in each case that the defendant\u2019s consent to the breathalyzer test was involuntary. The State appeals both cases. This court ordered the consolidation of these appeals because they raise a common claim. We now reverse the trial court\u2019s suppression orders.\nBoth cases involve situations where the defendants were driving vehicles on a private parking lot when they struck other automobiles. In both cases, they were given the standard motorist\u2019s warning (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 951/2, par. 11 \u2014 501.1(c)) and each consented to a breathalyzer test. The tests disclosed blood-alcohol concentrations of .23 in Ayres and .10 in Brockett.\nThe statutory summary suspensions of defendants\u2019 driver\u2019s licenses were rescinded by the trial court following hearings based on the fact that the implied consent statute is inapplicable to individuals who drive on private property. See People v. Kissel (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 283, 501 N.E.2d 963.\nIn Kissel, the court held that the legislature has limited the application of the implied consent statute solely to persons who drive or have physical control of motor vehicles upon public highways. The court found the implied consent statute was not applicable to cases where the evidence was undisputed that the accused was only observed driving upon a privately owned parking lot. However, in Kissel, the court noted that DUI could be committed upon private property because the legislature had not limited the DUI statute solely to public highways.\nIn the instant appeals, it was undisputed that both defendants were only observed driving on privately owned parking lots. Therefore, based on these facts, we find the trial court was correct in rescinding the summary suspension orders because the implied consent statute did not apply to either defendant.\nThereafter, during the DUI proceedings, the defendants filed motions to suppress evidence. The trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motions and suppressed the breathalyzer results. The trial court, in granting the motions, found that the defendants had been misadvised by the police concerning the legal consequences of their refusal to take the breathalyzer tests. The trial court noted the defendants were not advised by the police: (1) that the implied consent statute did not apply to driving on private property, and (2) if they refused to take the breathalyzer test, there would be no adverse consequences resulting from the refusal.\nOn appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing the breathalyzer test results. The State argues that in a DUI prosecution the trial court is not required to determine whether the defendant voluntarily consented to the test. We agree.\nVoluntary consent is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of breathalyzer results in a DUI prosecution. A reviewing court need only determine whether the administration of a breath test without the defendant\u2019s informed consent ran afoul of constitutional safeguards. A warrantless and involuntary test of an individual\u2019s bodily substances does not violate any constitutional right so long as the search was supported by probable cause, the evidence was of an evanescent nature, and the means and procedures employed in taking the substance were reasonable. People v. Byrd (1991), 215 Ill. App. 3d 468, 574 N.E.2d 1269. See also People v. Franciskovich (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 693, 560 N.E.2d 19; People v. Giere (1989), 192 Ill. App. 3d 520, 548 N.E.2d 1104; People v. Todd (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 534, 322 N.E.2d 447.\nIn Byrd, the court observed that \u201c[p]rior to 1982, section 11\u2014 501(c)(3) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code), provided that \u2018[e]vidence based upon a chemical analysis of blood, urine, breath or other bodily substance shall not be admitted unless such substance was procured and such analysis made with the consent of the person as provided by this Chapter.\u2019 \u201d (Byrd, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 470, 574 N.E.2d at 1270, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 951/2, par. 11\u2014 501(c)(3).) The court further observed that the consent requirement of section 11 \u2014 501 was abolished by the General Assembly effective January 1, 1982. Therefore, the court reasoned that the statute no longer provided a restriction on compulsory tests of bodily substances. Finally, the Byrd court concluded that while the current codification of section 11 \u2014 501.1(c) articulates the civil consequences of a refusal to submit to testing, it in no way suggests that consent is a necessary requirement for the admissibility of the test results in a DUI prosecution.\nWe are aware that our adoption of the law and reasoning in the cases cited above may conflict with some of our prior decisions, specifically, People v. Monckton (1989), 191 Ill. App. 3d 106, 547 N.E.2d 673.\nIn Monckton, this court found that the legislature\u2019s enactment of section 11 \u2014 501.1(c) reflected its desire to prohibit involuntary blood and breath tests in DUI proceedings as well as in statutory summary suspension proceedings. We note, however, as was correctly pointed out in Byrd, that section 11 \u2014 501.1(c) is separate and distinct from section 11 \u2014 501. Therefore, we find the consent necessary for a proceeding under section 11 \u2014 501.1(c) is irrelevant to proceedings conducted pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501. To the extent that Monckton can be read to the contrary, it is hereby overruled.\nWe find, based on our review of the record, that sufficient probable cause exists to support the use at trial of the breathalyzer tests. The police officers in each case determined that the defendants had caused accidents while driving under the influence of alcohol. We note that the evidence was evanescent in nature because alcohol in a DUI suspect\u2019s blood begins to dissipate shortly after the individual stops consuming alcohol. There is no time to seek out a magistrate to obtain a search warrant. (Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826.) Finally, we conclude that the breathalyzer tests required by Illinois law are minimally intrusive and a reasonable means to measure a suspect\u2019s blood-alcohol level. Just as the court concluded in Byrd, we find \u201cthat defendant\u2019s consent, informed or otherwise, was not statutorily or constitutionally required for the arresting officer to administer a breath test.\u201d (Byrd, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 471-72, 574 N.E.2d at 1271.) Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in suppressing the use of the breathalyzer tests in the DUI proceedings.\nFor the reasons indicated, the judgments of the circuit court of Will County are reversed.\nReversed.\nGORMAN and HAASE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin, Robert M. Hansen, and Nancy Rink Carter, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Joseph C. Polito, of Joseph C. Polito, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellee Robert W. Ayres.", "James R. Brumund, of Brumund, Belom, Jacobs & Singer, of Joliet, for appellee Robert Brockett." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROBERT AYRES et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201491\u20140450, 3\u201491\u20140537 cons.\nOpinion filed April 30, 1992.\nEdward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin, Robert M. Hansen, and Nancy Rink Carter, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nJoseph C. Polito, of Joseph C. Polito, Ltd., of Joliet, for appellee Robert W. Ayres.\nJames R. Brumund, of Brumund, Belom, Jacobs & Singer, of Joliet, for appellee Robert Brockett." }, "file_name": "0277-01", "first_page_order": 297, "last_page_order": 300 }