{ "id": 5222497, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lewis", "decision_date": "1992-05-14", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140466", "first_page": "654", "last_page": "660", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 654" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 1054", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1059" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 999", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562678 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0999-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2606927 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2494677 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0433-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 541, "char_count": 11561, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.8045311733613704e-07, "percentile": 0.7168941123594464 }, "sha256": "02456c77985740e1f6ac77fdc7c95fe76d8dcb728178cf7a0ecb89b659fc0c4c", "simhash": "1:9fb016de6e84be34", "word_count": 1925 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:32.943049+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn December 1990, defendant, Reginald Lewis, entered a negotiated guilty plea to residential burglary (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 19 \u2014 3(a)), theft of property having a value in excess of $300 (theft over $300) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 16 \u2014 1(a)(1)(A)), and criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 15(a)(2)). In January 1991, defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 18 years in prison for residential burglary, an extended term of 8 years in prison for theft, and 125 days in jail for criminal sexual abuse. The court also ordered defendant to pay restitution and directed that all the sentences be served concurrently. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. In May and June 1991, the trial court conducted hearings on that motion and denied it. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by holding that defendant was not eligible for treatment as an alcoholic under section 10 \u2014 101 of the Illinois Alcoholism and Other Drug Dependency Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 1111/2, par. 6360 \u2014 1), (2) the trial court improperly imposed an extended term of imprisonment for theft, and (3) the order of restitution was defective. We affirm and remand with directions.\nI. Background\nOn April 23, 1990, the State charged defendant with committing criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual abuse (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 16(c)(2)) on April 20, 1990. On June 12, 1990, the State charged defendant with committing residential burglary and theft over $300 on June 12, 1990. Defendant posted a cash bond and was released on both of these charges, and on November 5, 1990, the State charged defendant with theft over $300 on or about November 3, 1990.\nIn December 1990, during the second day of defendant\u2019s jury trial on the June residential burglary and theft charges, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count each of residential burglary, theft over $300, and criminal sexual abuse. All of the remaining charges were dismissed. Additionally, the State reduced the criminal sexual abuse charge from a Class 2 felony to a Class A misdemeanor. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 15(d).) The agreement left open the sentence to be imposed, and the State announced that it would seek concurrent, extended-term sentences on both the residential burglary and theft over $300 charges. The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant as earlier indicated, ordered him to pay restitution of $4,875, and directed him to pay the balance of the restitution, which was not covered by the cash bond he had earlier posted, within two years of his release from prison.\nII. Defendant\u2019s Eligibility For Treatment Under The Act\nDefendant first contends on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to advise him at the sentencing hearing that, as an alternative to a prison sentence, he could elect to be treated as an alcoholic under the Act. The trial court considered this argument at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and rejected it, finding that defendant was not eligible under the Act to elect treatment. We agree.\nDefendant\u2019s sentencing hearing arose from his pleas of guilty to residential burglary, theft over $300, and criminal sexual abuse. Section 10 \u2014 101 of the Act, which outlines when a defendant is eligible to elect treatment, reads in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cElection of treatment. An addict or alcoholic who is charged with or convicted of a crime may elect treatment under the supervision of a licensed program designated by the Department *** unless (a) the crime is a crime of violence; (b) the crime is a violation of Section 401, 402(a), 405 or 407 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or Sections 4(d), 4(e), 5(d), 5(e), 7 or 9 of the Cannabis Control Act; (c) the person has a record of 2 or more convictions of a crime of violence; (d) other criminal proceedings alleging commission of a felony are pending against the person; *** (g) the person has been convicted of residential burglary and has a record of one or more felony convictions; (h) the crime is a violation of Section 11 \u2014 501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, as now or hereafter amended, or a similar provision of a local ordinance; or (i) the crime is a reckless homicide or a reckless homicide of an unborn child ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 1111/2, par. 6360 \u2014 1.\nBefore defendant pleaded guilty to these charges, he had not previously been convicted of residential burglary, although he had multiple prior felony convictions. Thus, the issue before this court then becomes whether defendant, upon the particular facts of this case, was eligible under section 10 \u2014 101 of the Act to elect treatment under the Act.\nThis court had occasion to construe the above section 10 \u2014 101 of the Act in People v. Williams (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 433, 437, 552 N.E.2d 389, 392, in which we held that a defendant who pleaded guilty to burglary was barred under section 10 \u2014 101 from electing treatment because he had a previous conviction of residential bur-, glary. Defendant in the present case seeks to distinguish his situation from that in Williams by pointing out that at the time of his sentencing hearing, he had not yet been formally convicted of residential burglary because, he claims, a \u201cconviction\u201d occurs when the court enters its final judgment, which is the pronouncement of sentence. Therefore, defendant argues, he was not convicted of residential burglary for purposes of the Act at the time of his sentencing hearing.\nWe do not agree with defendant\u2019s interpretation. First, we note that the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) and the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) contain identical definitions of the term \u201cconviction,\u201d and that definition does not support defendant\u2019s claim that a conviction technically occurs only when sentence is imposed. Section 2 \u2014 5 of the Criminal Code and section 5 \u2014 1\u20145 of the Unified Code both read as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Conviction\u2019 means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.\u201d (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 2-5, 1005-1-5.)\nThus, the term \u201cconviction\u201d in some circumstances may mean a judgment of conviction entered upon a plea of guilty. In the present case, after the trial court accepted defendant\u2019s guilty pleas, it entered judgment thereon \u2014 the standard practice in this State whenever a trial court accepts a guilty plea. Consistent with the above definition, we hold that the trial court\u2019s entry of judgment upon defendant\u2019s guilty plea to residential burglary constituted a \u201cconviction\u201d of that offense for purposes of section 10 \u2014 101 of the Act.\nAdditionally, we find defendant\u2019s argument contrary to the plain language of section 10 \u2014 101(g) of the Act, which speaks on the one hand of a person who has been convicted of residential burglary, while speaking on the other hand of a person who has a record of one or more felony convictions. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 1111/2, par. 6360 \u2014 1(g).) If the legislature intended section 10 \u2014 101(g) to have the effect that defendant now argues, it would read as follows: \u201cThe person has a record of one or more felony convictions and, in addition thereto, has a record of a conviction of residential burglary.\u201d This wording would indicate that a defendant\u2019s current conviction of residential burglary \u2014 then also before the court for sentencing \u2014 would render the defendant ineligible to elect treatment under the Act. Of course, no such wording is present in section 10 \u2014 101(g) of the Act, and we hold that section 10 \u2014 101(g) includes both past and current convictions for residential burglary.\nBecause we agree with the trial court that defendant was not eligible to elect treatment under the Act, we need not address whether the evidence before the court sufficed to require the court to instruct defendant about the Act.\nIII. Imposition Of Multiple Extended-Term Sentences\nCiting People v. Jordan (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 192, 207, 469 N.E.2d 569, 576, and People v. Clemons (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 667, 674, 534 N.E.2d 676, 680, defendant argues that because an extended-term sentence may only be imposed for the offense within the most serious class of offenses of which an accused is convicted \u2014 here, residential burglary \u2014 the trial court improperly imposed an extended term for his conviction of theft over $300. Although defendant accurately states the holdings in Jordan and Clemons, they do not apply to the present case.\nThe defendants in Jordan and Clemons were given extended-term sentences on lesser offenses which arose out of the same conduct as the greater offenses for which they were also given extended-term sentences. In the present case, defendant\u2019s convictions for residential burglary and theft over $300 are totally unrelated. Although the trial court imposed multiple extended-term sentences at one sentencing hearing, that hearing should be viewed as a joint sentencing hearing involving unrelated offenses. Accordingly, the trial court could properly impose extended-term sentences for each conviction. See People v. Whitson (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1006, 470 N.E.2d 1054,1059.\nIV. The Order Of Restitution\nThe trial court applied the cash bond defendant had posted toward restitution after first deducting various costs and fees. The court further ordered defendant to pay the balance of restitution within two years of his release from prison. Defendant argues that this order of restitution violates the terms of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) of the Unified Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20146(f)), which requires the sentencing court to \u201cfix a period of time not in excess of 5 years within which payment of restitution is to be paid in full.\u201d Defendant argues that because he was given an 18-year prison sentence, the court\u2019s order of restitution exceeds the statutory limit of five years within which restitution must be paid. The State concedes this point, and we agree.\nAlthough we sympathize with the trial court\u2019s goal of providing a means through which defendant could be required to pay restitution to his victims once he has been released from prison, the General Assembly has not seen fit to authorize trial courts to enter restitution orders such as the one entered in the present case.\nV. Conclusion\nFor the reasons stated, we vacate the order of restitution and remand with directions that the trial court consider the issue anew and, if it chooses to enter a restitution order, do so in compliance with the provisions of section 5 \u2014 5\u20146(f) of the Unified Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20146(f).) In all other respects, we affirm the judgment and sentence imposed by the trial court.\nAffirmed and remanded with directions.\nGREEN, P.J., and McCULLOUGH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gloria Ann Morris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Vince Moreth, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlinville (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REGINALD LEWIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140466\nOpinion filed May 14, 1992.\nRehearing denied June 10, 1992.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gloria Ann Morris, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nVince Moreth, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlinville (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0654-01", "first_page_order": 674, "last_page_order": 680 }