{
  "id": 5219683,
  "name": "FIRST CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, as Trustee, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OLD WILLOW FALLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "First Chicago Trust Co. v. Old Willow Falls Condominium Ass'n",
  "decision_date": "1992-02-28",
  "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20141810",
  "first_page": "750",
  "last_page": "753",
  "citations": [
    {
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      "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 750"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
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      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
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    {
      "cite": "32 Ill. App. 2d 55",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d",
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        5231372,
        5231862
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      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "N.E.2d",
      "year": 1961,
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    {
      "cite": "133 Ill. App. 3d 303",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
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      "year": 1961,
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    {
      "cite": "758 S.W.2d 921",
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        9987537
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    {
      "cite": "375 So. 2d 348",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "So. 2d",
      "case_ids": [
        9587788
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      "year": 1988,
      "opinion_index": 0,
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    {
      "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 753",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d",
      "case_ids": [
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  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 393,
    "char_count": 6448,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.806,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.4131246647970596
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:32.943049+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "FIRST CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, as Trustee, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OLD WILLOW FALLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McNAMARA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, First Chicago Trust Company of Illinois, as trustee, and Saul Azar, Alex Pinsky, and Zal Horn, as beneficiaries under trust No. RY \u2014 011121 (hereinafter plaintiff), sought a mandatory injunction against defendant, Old Willow Falls Condominium Association, ordering it to accept plaintiff\u2019s voting proxies and to permit Azar to become a candidate for the board of managers of defendant association. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff was a developer and not a unit owner with voting rights.\nAs set forth in the companion case of Azar v. Old Willow Falls Condominium Association, (1992), 228 Ill. App. 3d 753, Azar, Pinsky and Horn are beneficial owners of 48 units in Old Willow Falls Condominium Association. On December 18, 1990, an annual meeting was held to elect members to defendant board for the upcoming year. Plaintiffs attorneys presented voting proxies and attempted to nominate Azar to the board of managers. A dispute arose between the parties regarding plaintiffs voting rights. Defendant\u2019s attorney directed that a vote be conducted with double tallying. In the vote excluding plaintiff\u2019s votes, three incumbent members of the board and two challengers were elected. In the second tally, which included plaintiff\u2019s votes, Azar would have been elected to the board.\nThe sole issue presented for review is whether plaintiff is entitled to vote as a unit owner and run for election to the board of managers. Plaintiff contends that its previous status as developer does not preclude its right to exercise the powers of a unit owner.\nThe Condominium Property Act provides that the bylaws shall include provisions for:\n\u201cThe election from among the unit owners of a board of managers, the number of persons constituting such board, and that the terms of at least one-third of the members of the board shall expire annually and that all members of the board shall be elected at large.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 30, par. 318(a)(1).\nArticle II, section I, of defendant\u2019s bylaws provides that defendant shall have one class of members, and that each unit owner shall be a member of the association. The bylaws further provide that each member shall be entitled to the number of votes equal to his percentage ownership interest in the common elements at the time any matter is submitted to a vote of the members. If a unit is owned by more than one person, the voting rights shall not be divided, but shall be exercised as if the unit owner consisted of one person in accordance with the proxy.\nWhile there are no Illinois cases directly addressing the issue of whether a developer is considered a unit owner, we find cases from other jurisdictions instructive for purposes of our review. In Brooks v. Palm Bay Towers Condominium Association, Inc. (Fla. App. 1979), 375 So. 2d 348, the Florida court determined that a condominium developer is a unit owner and as such is liable for assessments that come due while title is held by the developer, regardless of how title is acquired. Belatedly, in Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson\u2019s Landing Owners\u2019 Association (Tex. App. 1988), 758 S.W.2d 921, the Texas court held that a partnership which managed and performed duties of an owners\u2019 association during the development period was an \u201capartment owner\u201d as to units within the condominium that it still owned during the development period and was subject to assessments. Like the developers in both Brooks v. Palm Bay Towers and Richard Gill Co. v. Jackson\u2019s Landing, plaintiff in this case was responsible for paying assessments on the 48 units held in trust.\nThe Condominium Property Act and the declaration of defendant association define a unit owner as: \u201cthe person or persons whose estates or interests individually or collectively, aggregate fee simple absolute ownership of a unit.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 30, par. 302(g).) In an Illinois land trust, the interests of the trustee and the beneficiary together aggregate fee simple ownership. (La Salle National Bank v. Triumvera Homeowners Association (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 303, 478 N.E.2d 1033; Robinson v. Chicago National Bank (1961), 32 Ill. App. 2d 55, 176 N.E.2d 659.) There are no express provisions in the Condominium Property Act or defendant\u2019s bylaws or declaration indicating that a developer cannot be a unit owner.\nApplying these rules to the present case, it becomes apparent that the interests of the trustee, together with those of the three beneficiaries, aggregate fee simple ownership of the 48 units in Old Willow Falls Condominium. Thus, plaintiff meets the definition of a unit owner found in both the Act and defendant\u2019s declaration and, therefore, becomes a member of the condominium association. In accordance with defendant\u2019s bylaws, plaintiff is entitled to the number of votes equal to his percentage ownership interest in the common elements at the time any matter is submitted to a vote of the unit members.\nArticle IV, section 2, of defendant\u2019s bylaws provides in relevant part:\n\u201cOnly a member of the Association may be a member of the Board. In the event that a member of the Association is a corporation, partnership, trust or other legal entity other than a natural person or persons, then any shareholder, officer or director of such corporation, partner of such partnership, beneficiary or individual trustee of such trust, or manager of such other legal entity, may be eligible to serve as a member of the Board.\u201d\nIn view of our finding that plaintiff is a unit owner and therefore becomes a member of the Association, we find that Azar, as beneficiary of the trust, is eligible to run for election to defendant\u2019s board of managers.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed. We remand the cause with directions to enter an order consistent with this opinion.\nJudgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.\nEGAN, P.J., and RAKOWSKI, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McNAMARA"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ellis B. Levin, of Lamet, Kanwit & Davis, of Chicago, for appellants.",
      "Marshall N. Dickler and Shelley R.Z. Barnett, both of Marshall N. Dickler, Ltd., of Arlington Heights, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "FIRST CHICAGO TRUST COMPANY OF ILLINOIS, as Trustee, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OLD WILLOW FALLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20141810\nOpinion filed February 28, 1992.\nRehearing denied April 20, 1992.\nEllis B. Levin, of Lamet, Kanwit & Davis, of Chicago, for appellants.\nMarshall N. Dickler and Shelley R.Z. Barnett, both of Marshall N. Dickler, Ltd., of Arlington Heights, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0750-01",
  "first_page_order": 770,
  "last_page_order": 773
}