{
  "id": 5219328,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMAL LAUDERDALE, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lauderdale",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:32.943049+00:00",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMAL LAUDERDALE, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McMORROW\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Jamal Lauderdale was indicted on one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 14(a)(2)) and one count of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1)) with respect to an incident pertaining to L.T. that allegedly occurred in January 1990. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the count of the indictment charging him with aggravated criminal sexual assault, arguing that the victim\u2019s injuries as alleged in that count did not warrant enhancement of the charge to aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the aggravated criminal sexual assault count in the indictment, and the State appeals. (134 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).) Because we conclude that the allegations of bruising and abrasion to the victim\u2019s vaginal wall and destruction of her hymen were sufficient to constitute the \u201cbodily harm\u201d element of aggravated criminal sexual assault, we reverse and remand.\nThe record shows that a two-count indictment was returned against defendant in February 1990. Count I alleged that he had committed an act of aggravated criminal sexual assault upon L.T. by \u201csexual penetration, *** to wit: contact between [defendant\u2019s] penis and [L.T.'s] vagina by the use of force and by the threat of force,\u201d and that this act \u201ccaused bodily harm to [L.T.] by causing destruction of the hymen, and causing bruises and abrasions on the inside of vaginal vault.\u201d Count II of the indictment alleged that defendant had committed an act of criminal sexual assault upon L.T. by \u201csexual penetration, *** to wit: contact between [defendant\u2019s] penis and [L.T.\u2019s] vagina by the use of force and by the threat of force.\u201d\nDefendant filed a motion to dismiss count I of the indictment alleging aggravated criminal sexual assault. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 1(a) (dismissal of indictment where charge does not state an offense).) Defendant argued that destruction of the victim\u2019s hymen and bruises and abrasions to the victim\u2019s vaginal wall were normal incidents to the criminal sexual assault and therefore could not support enhancement of the charge to aggravated criminal sexual assault.\nFollowing a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the aggravated criminal sexual assault count of the indictment. The court determined that the alleged bodily harm to the victim was implicit in the act of criminal sexual assault and could not serve to enhance the offense charged to aggravated criminal sexual assault. The trial court later denied the State\u2019s motion to reconsider, and this appeal followed.\nThe State argues that count I of the indictment, wherein the defendant was indicted for aggravated criminal sexual assault, alleged sufficient injury to the victim to charge the defendant with causing her \u201cbodily harm,\u201d thus enhancing the offense to aggravated criminal sexual assault. On this basis, the State contends that count I of the indictment was sufficient to withstand the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss that count of the indictment. Defendant responds that because the victim\u2019s vaginal bruises, abrasions, and ruptured hymen were the normal incident of the alleged criminal sexual assault, these injuries could not serve to enhance the offense to aggravated criminal sexual assault.\nSection 12 \u2014 13 of the Criminal Code of 1961 states that a person commits the offense of criminal sexual assault when he \u201ccommits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force or threat of force.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1).) Under the statute, \u201csexual penetration\u201d is defined as \u201cany contact, however slight, between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ *** of another person.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12\u2014 12(f).\nSection 12 \u2014 14(a)(2) of the Criminal Code provides that the offense of criminal sexual assault is enhanced to aggravated criminal sexual assault if the offender causes \u201cbodily harm to the victim\u201d in committing the act of criminal sexual assault. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 14(a)(2).) Section 12 \u2014 12(b) defines \u201cbodily harm\u201d to \u201cmean[ ] physical harm, and includes, but is not limited to, sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy and impotence.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(b).\nIn People v. Haywood (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 263, 515 N.E.2d 45, the Illinois Supreme Court found that it is proper to give the term \u201cbodily harm\u201d in the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute the. same meaning that the supreme court ascribed to the term \u201cbodily harm\u201d in People v. Mays (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 251, 437 N.E.2d 633, to interpret the battery statute. In Mays, the court stated:\n\u201cAlthough it may be difficult to pinpoint exactly what constitutes bodily harm for the purposes of the statute, some sort of physical pain or damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or abrasions, whether temporary or permanent, is required.\u201d (91 Ill. 2d at 256.)\nBy considering this definition for the term \u201cbodily harm\u201d under the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute, the court in Haywood determined that the definition of this offense was not unconstitutionally vague. (Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 275-77.) In so ruling, the Hlinois Supreme Court rejected the view that the distinction between criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault was vague on the theory that \u201can act of \u2018sexual penetration alone constitutes bodily harm by the mere invasion of the victim\u2019s sexual anatomy.\u2019 \u201d 118 Ill. 2d at 276.\nA similar ruling was reached by the court in People v. Wallace (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 247, 495 N.E.2d 665, where the court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the jury should have been given an instruction defining the term \u201cbodily harm\u201d under the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute. The defendant claimed that the lack of such an instruction permitted the jury to conclude that the vaginal trauma incident to forcible sexual penetration amounted to bodily harm, and thereby eliminate the distinction between criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. (145 Ill. App. 3d at 253.) The court rejected this contention, reasoning as follows:\n\u201cThe problem with this [argument of the defendant] lies in the assumption that \u2018forcible sexual penetration\u2019 of the vagina will necessarily cause some vaginal trauma. There is no basis for this assumption in the record, and it is certainly incorrect, as \u2018 \u201c[s]exual penetration\u201d means any contact, however slight, between the sex organ of one person and the sex organ *** of another person.' Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(f).\u201d 145 Ill. App. 3d at 253.\nIn light of this precedent, we are unable to accept the claim of the defendant in this cause that count I of the indictment failed to state the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault.\nThe definition of \u201cbodily harm\u201d under the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute includes injuries to sexual organs, such as sexually transmitted diseases, or other medical conditions such as pregnancy or impotence. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 12(b).) Inclusion of these conditions indicates that the legislature intended that the term \u201cbodily harm\u201d be given a broad interpretation to include injuries to the victim\u2019s sexual organs or reproductive capacities. Accordingly, the vaginal abrasions, bruises and ruptured hymen suffered by the victim herein are sufficient allegations of bodily harm to survive defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. These injuries constitute allegations of \u201cbruises or abrasions, whether temporary or permanent\u201d (Mays, 91 Ill. 2d at 256), and therefore are adequate to charge the defendant with aggravated criminal sexual assault.\nWe cannot agree with defendant\u2019s assertion that the vaginal injuries suffered by the victim were the normal incident of a criminal sexual assault. Criminal sexual assault does not require vaginal penetration, but only contact between the sexual organs of the defendant and the victim\u2019s vagina. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 12(f), 12 \u2014 13(a)(1).) We are unable to say that such sexual contact would necessarily cause bruises and abrasions to the victim\u2019s vaginal wall or destruction of her hymen. In addition, consistent with the reasoning of Haywood, and Wallace, we are not prepared to hold that forcible sexual penetration of a victim\u2019s vaginal cavity will necessarily cause the victim to suffer vaginal bruises, abrasions and a ruptured hymen.\nIn light of all of these considerations, we find that the allegations of the victim\u2019s injuries as stated in count I of the indictment were sufficient to overcome defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the aggravated criminal sexual assault count of the indictment returned against defendant and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent herewith.\nReversed and remanded.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and JOHNSON, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McMORROW"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Veronica X. Calderon, and Catherine A. Hufford, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.",
      "Tate & Schroeder, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JAMAL LAUDERDALE, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20140667\nOpinion filed April 30, 1992.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Veronica X. Calderon, and Catherine A. Hufford, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nTate & Schroeder, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0830-01",
  "first_page_order": 850,
  "last_page_order": 854
}