{ "id": 5220165, "name": "CYNTHIA RILEY, Special Adm'r of the Estate of John E. Riley III, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRAFULLA KONERU et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Riley v. Koneru", "decision_date": "1992-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201491\u20140641", "first_page": "883", "last_page": "888", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 883" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "453 N.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3481202 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3638983 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 1356", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 Ill. App. 3d 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2999557 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/110/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "508 N.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3466144 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 1324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3579351 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156104 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5595610 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" }, { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "Miller, C.J., specially concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 1164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2580707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "530 N.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 714", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3554507 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0714-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5438641 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 N.E.2d 970", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. App. 3d 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3186202 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/86/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 1096", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 1093", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5661880 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5416375 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "435 N.E.2d 939", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3028171 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 1072", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 1060", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3593218 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3495337 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 N.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443658 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0249-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 612, "char_count": 9491, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.161118481734489e-08, "percentile": 0.4748394597522867 }, "sha256": "bf23d96bc60fd1aa0889b8d425a051e2c4111490115f31b01907a07989da2f9e", "simhash": "1:30b634dc9fb64d07", "word_count": 1526 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:32.943049+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CYNTHIA RILEY, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of John E. Riley III, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRAFULLA KONERU et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDuring 1980, plaintiff, Cynthia Riley, was pregnant and received prenatal care from defendant Dr. Prafulla Koneru. Unfortunately, on August 5, 1980, plaintiff delivered a stillborn fetus by cesarean section. Subsequently, plaintiff, on behalf of the stillborn fetus, brought a medical malpractice action against Koneru and the medical corporation with which Koneru was associated, North Suburban Clinic, Ltd. The jury returned a verdict against defendants for $400,000, and the trial judge denied defendants\u2019 post-trial motions. Defendants appeal.\nWe affirm.\nAt trial, plaintiff\u2019s case in chief was based primarily on the testimony of her expert, Dr. Jeffrey Ellis. Ellis, who is board certified in obstetrics and gynecology and who has taught both at Rush Medical College and Northwestern University, stated he was familiar with the standard of care expected of obstetricians treating pregnancies similar to plaintiff's in the metropolitan Chicago area in 1980. It was Ellis\u2019 opinion that Koneru should have performed an ultrasound examination on July 21, 1980, to determine whether a condition known as hydramnios was present. Ellis also stated that Koneru should have hospitalized plaintiff when Koneru discovered, on August 1, 1980, that the fetus was lying horizontally in the womb. According to Ellis, Koneru also should have evaluated plaintiff when plaintiff complained of lack of fetal movement, cramping, and \u201cspotting\u201d on August 2, 1980. Finally, Ellis asserted that Koneru should have performed an immediate cesarean section on plaintiff. Ellis concluded Koneru\u2019s failure to take such action deviated from the standard of care and resulted in the fetus\u2019 death.\nI\nDefendants argue that plaintiff failed to establish the applicable standard of care because Ellis evaluated Koneru\u2019s conduct against a higher standard of care than that imposed by Illinois law. Defendants point to several portions of Ellis\u2019 testimony where he defined the standard of care to mean \u201cthe highest functioning level.\u201d Specifically, defendants refer to the following testimony:\n\u201cThe best medicine is practiced by following the standard of care. *** [T]he highest degree of knowledge then contributes to the standard of care.\u201d\nEllis further stated that he was\n\u201cequating standard of care with what I consider to be good medical practice based on current information to optimize outcomes. *** My understanding is, of standard of care, is what Mr. Young [plaintiff\u2019s attorney] and I described as good obstetrical practice based on scientific evidence to optimize outcome.\u201d\nPlaintiff responds that defendants have waived this argument by failing to properly object to Ellis\u2019 testimony. Although plaintiff argues that defendants\u2019 argument has been waived for failure to object, the record indicates that defendants did, indeed, object to Ellis\u2019 testimony as lacking the applicable standard of care. As a result, we find these objections were sufficiently specific to preserve defendants\u2019 argument for appeal.\nGenerally, in a medical negligence action, a plaintiff must establish by expert testimony the standard of care against which the defendant\u2019s conduct should be measured. (Walski v. Tiesenga (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 249, 381 N.E.2d 279; Lebrecht v. Tuli (1985), 130 Ill. App. 3d 457, 473 N.E.2d 1322; Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hospital (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 458 N.E.2d 1072; Smith v. St. Therese Hospital (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 268, 435 N.E.2d 939.) The plaintiff must then show by affirmative evidence that the defendant\u2019s conduct was negligent in light of that standard and that the negligence caused injury. Borowski v. Von Solbrig (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301.\nA plaintiff may rely upon the defendant\u2019s and the defendant\u2019s expert\u2019s testimony in establishing the applicable standard of care. (Metz v. Fairbury Hospital (1983), 118 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 455 N.E.2d 1096.) The defendant is held to that degree of skill, knowledge, and care exercised by a good practitioner in the same or similar community. (Bartimus v. Paxton Community Hospital (1983), 120 Ill. App. 3d 1060; Hirn v. Edgewater Hospital (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 939, 408 N.E.2d 970.) However, if only one standard of care exists, the national standard and the community standard are to be considered the same. Hunter v. Sukkar (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 169, 443 N.E.2d 774.\nAn examination of Ellis\u2019 entire testimony belies defendants\u2019 claims. The portions of that testimony to which defendants refer were statements made by Ellis during defendants\u2019 attorney\u2019s cross-examination. Defendants\u2019 attorney\u2019s questioning was an attempt to have Ellis recharacterize his direct testimony in which he established the standard of care in the Chicago metropolitan area with regard to obstetrics. Ellis\u2019 responses do not evince a retreat from Ellis\u2019 opinion of the standard of care in 1980 or Koneru\u2019s violation of that standard. The cross-examination appears to be designed to show Ellis\u2019 misunderstanding of the meaning of the legal term \u201cstandard of care.\u201d Ellis himself recognized the direction of defense attorney\u2019s questioning when he responded \u201cI am not an attorney and I don\u2019t understand legal terms. And I\u2019m testifying from the point of view of a physician who has an opinion.\u201d\nDefendants cite Smith v. Menet (1988), 175 Ill. App. 3d 714, 530 N.E.2d 277, appeal denied (1989), 124 Ill. 2d 562, 535 N.E.2d 921, in support of their argument regarding the standard of care. In Menet, the court addressed whether \u201cgood\u201d medical care could be interpreted to mean better than average, thereby imposing a greater standard of care than the law requires. The court noted that Illinois courts previously have rejected the phrases \u201chighest degree of skill\u201d and \u201cbest possible care\u201d because they set too high a standard. (Menet, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 718.) The court did note, however, that the word \u201cgood\u201d has been used to define the standing of doctors with which the defendant doctor is to be compared. (Menet, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 718.) As plaintiff notes, Ellis did not restrict the standard of care to good care, but rather to the \u201cstandard practice.\u201d Based on the foregoing, the circuit court did not err in allowing Ellis\u2019 testimony.\nII\nDefendants next claim that damages for loss of society of a stillborn fetus are not available to its parents, arguing that this court should not follow Smith v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (1990), 203 Ill. App. 3d 465, 560 N.E.2d 1164.\nDefendants\u2019 arguments on this point are groundless in light of our supreme court\u2019s holding in Seef v. Sutkus (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 336, 583 N.E.2d 510. There, the court noted that in Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, 468 N.E.2d 1228, it recognized that parents of a wrongfully killed minor child are entitled to a presumption of injury for the loss of the child\u2019s society. Relying on that holding, the court found no valid reason or distinction to deny similar recovery for the death of a viable fetus. (Seef, 145 Ill. 2d at 338.) Moreover, the court specifically rejected defendants\u2019 argument that Hunt v. Chettri (1987), 158 Ill. App. 3d 76, 510 N.E.2d 1324, appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 555, 515 N.E.2d 108, correctly states Illinois law with regard to the loss of society of a stillborn fetus. Seef, 145 Ill. 2d at 341 (Miller, C.J., specially concurring).\nIll\nDefendants finally contend that the jury\u2019s damage award was excessive and that the circuit court erred by not granting its post-trial motion for remittitur.\nDamages are a question of fact to be decided by the jury, and courts are reluctant to interfere with the jury\u2019s exercise of discretion in this area. (Chambers v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke\u2019s Medical Center (1987), 155 Ill. App. 3d 458, 508 N.E.2d 426, appeal denied (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 549, 515 N.E.2d 102; Mileur v. Briggerman (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 721, 442 N.E.2d 1356.) A reviewing court will not disturb a jury\u2019s award of damages unless it is obviously the result of passion or prejudice. (Shaheed v. Chicago Transit Authority (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 352, 484 N.E.2d 542.) Furthermore, an award is not excessive unless it falls outside the necessary limits of fair and reasonable compensation or it shocks the judicial conscience. (Shaheed, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 359.) A jury\u2019s award will not be subject to remittitur where it falls within the flexible range of conclusions which can be reasonably supported by the facts. Guerrero v. City of Chicago (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 348, 453 N.E.2d 767.\nThe evidence presented at trial revealed that plaintiff and her husband had three children and enjoyed a satisfying family life, sharing in the activities of each child. Each parent expressed aspirations for the child they expected in 1980. Moreover, the jury properly was instructed not to base any damage awards on prejudice, passion or sympathy and was also instructed not to consider arguments as evidence. In light of this, no basis exists for this court to disturb the jury\u2019s award.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019CONNOR" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, of Chicago (William L. Barr, Jr., and Erigid M. McGrath, of counsel), for appellants.", "Keith L. Young, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CYNTHIA RILEY, Special Adm\u2019r of the Estate of John E. Riley III, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRAFULLA KONERU et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201491\u20140641\nOpinion filed May 4, 1992.\nBell, Boyd & Lloyd, of Chicago (William L. Barr, Jr., and Erigid M. McGrath, of counsel), for appellants.\nKeith L. Young, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0883-01", "first_page_order": 903, "last_page_order": 908 }