{ "id": 5222399, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY EVERETT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Everett", "decision_date": "1992-04-16", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20140797", "first_page": "1054", "last_page": "1061", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "228 Ill. App. 3d 1054" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5261213 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927578 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542309 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5283036 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "35 Ill. 2d 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5379867 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/35/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2827808 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/30/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512173 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2474002 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 787, "char_count": 16469, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.932688705549613e-08, "percentile": 0.37033800040079556 }, "sha256": "eb871a0b1e37cafc4f0f0a7a127f56b36df3ac1e3ca6adb96126225a3598d8d8", "simhash": "1:b7b2e94ef2bb4861", "word_count": 2734 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:00:32.943049+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY EVERETT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOHNSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn April 6, 1987, a Cook County grand jury indicted defendant Terry Everett and codefendant Jarvis Hollingsworth for murder, armed violence, conspiracy, and solicitation. Defendant\u2019s first jury trial resulted in a conviction for conspiracy. Yet, the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to the murder count and a mistrial resulted. After a second jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant was convicted of murder and solicitation. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 40 years for murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 \u2014 1), 15 years for solicitation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 1.1), and 7 years for conspiracy (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 8 \u2014 2). The sentences imposed were consecutive to a 12-year term of imprisonment imposed for attempted murder in case No. 87 \u2014 CR\u20142270.\nWe affirm.\nOn January 28, 1987, Darryl Walker was fatally wounded from multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by Jarvis Hollingsworth. Three days prior to the murder, defendant told his girl friend, Dawn Benson, that he was angry with the victim for stealing his VCR. He learned that his VCR was used to obtain a quantity of cocaine. Further, he told Benson that he could have the victim killed for $200. Two days later, while defendant and Benson were in defendant\u2019s apartment, Hollingsworth arrived. Benson overheard the conversation between defendant and Hollingsworth concerning a gun and bullets. Specifically, Hollingsworth told defendant that he had a gun and planned to kill the victim. Hollingsworth was arrested for the murder of Walker on March 30, 1987. He was identified by Herman Holmes and Darryl Pledger. Upon being interviewed, Hollingsworth implicated defendant, Terry Everett.\nDefendant was arrested by Chicago police detectives John Duffy, Michael Rowan, and Ernest Bell. In an interview room at the police station, he was questioned by Officers Duffy and Rowan. Defendant alleges that during questioning he was not allowed to use the bathroom, drink water, or contact his attorney. He claims that the officers did not allow him to telephone his attorney because he refused to give a statement. Questioning ceased sometime between 5 and 6 p.m., and defendant was then taken to the lockup. Defendant alleges that he was not given any food. He also alleges that he was not allowed to make a telephone call until 1 a.m. the next morning. The assistant State\u2019s Attorney arrived later that morning whereupon defendant was given his Miranda rights, questioned, and formally charged.\nThe State\u2019s version of the questioning differs from that of defendant. According to the State, defendant was arrested by Detectives Rowan, Duffy, and Bell. Detective Rowan advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant said he understood and spoke with detectives for 30 to 35 minutes. The police received defendant\u2019s permission to conduct a search of his automobile provided that defendant could be present. When a .32 caliber revolver was recovered, defendant said, \u201cYou can check that gun. That isn\u2019t the gun that killed \u2018D.J.\u2019 [the victim].\u201d\nAfter the vehicle search, defendant returned to Area 2 with the officers at about 4:15 p.m. He was returned to the interview room and, around 5 p.m., questioning resumed. At 5:45 p.m., defendant was placed in the lockup. At 5:50 p.m., defendant telephoned his girl friend and concocted a story for her to tell the police about what had happened the day the victim was killed.\nDefendant was taken from the lockup to a conference room between 11:15 and 11:45 p.m. He was given his Miranda warnings by Detective Rowan. The defendant was informed that other witnesses had been questioned, including Benson. Defendant stated that he did not shoot the victim himself but would tell the police the events that took place on the morning in question.\nAccording to the officers, defendant discussed the events for 45 minutes. Then the officers left to get food for defendant and themselves. Upon their return, defendant gave them an attorney\u2019s business card and said, \u201cI would like to call this man.\u201d Defendant contacted attorney Marshall Weinburg between 12:50 and 1 a.m. and told him of the statement he had made to the police. Mr. Weinburg responded, \u201cWhy are you calling me now after you made the statement^]\u201d The assistant State\u2019s Attorney introduced himself to defendant sometime between 2:45 and 3 a.m. and advised defendant of his rights. Defendant responded that he was advised by his attorney not to speak. Later he claimed that his statements were the result of police coercion.\nThere were several key witnesses for the State at the first trial. Herman Holmes shared an apartment with the victim. Holmes testified that he was awakened early on the morning of January 28, 1987, by a knock at the door. He allowed Hollingsworth to enter. Later the apartment door closed and the victim and Hollingsworth were gone. Holmes was again awakened by a second knock at the door. It was Darryl Pledger, his uncle. Holmes and his uncle left his apartment to go across the street and there saw the victim\u2019s body.\nDarryl Pledger testified that he awakened at 3:15 a.m. when he heard the door to a nearby apartment open and close. Within 10 minutes, he heard a pair of gunshots and from his window saw the body of a man lying in the middle of 92nd Street, just east of Halsted Street. Defendant alleges that both Holmes and Pledger were reluctant to testify before the grand jury. Holmes said he did so only after being threatened with jail on the charge of perjury.\nDawn Benson, defendant\u2019s former girl friend, testified that she was present when defendant and Hollingsworth returned to the apartment at 4 a.m. The witness stated that she overheard Hollingsworth say that he had killed Darryl Walker. During an argument between defendant and Benson on January 31, 1987, he pointed a gun at her, telling Benson that she \u201cknew too much.\u201d Benson responded that she would not tell anyone that he had killed Walker. Benson further testified as to what defendant told her about the events that led to the murder. Defendant and Hollingsworth left the apartment, and Hollingsworth went to the victim\u2019s house. They left together and went to a nearby alley where Hollingsworth shot the victim twice. Defendant was in a parked car around the comer and saw Hollingsworth flee the alley. He also saw the victim leave the alley. When the victim fell, defendant then ran over him with his car to ensure that he was dead. Benson also testified that defendant stated that he had paid Hollingsworth for his role in the killing with $200 and a quantity of cocaine.\nDefendant alleges that Benson was picked up by the police officers late in the evening on March 31, 1987, and that she was also the victim of police coercion. He bases his allegation on Benson\u2019s testimony that she was informed by the police that she could be charged with \u201caccessory to murder.\u201d Further, the witness was kept in police custody until she testified before the grand jury the next morning.\nDr. Kirschner, deputy chief medical examiner of Cook County, performed an autopsy on the victim\u2019s body on January 28, 1987. He was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology. The expert witness had performed hundreds of autopsies involving blunt trauma inflicted by motor vehicles. Dr. Kirschner stated that of the two gunshot wounds, the first gunshot wound was fatal. He testified concerning the blunt trauma injuries to the victim\u2019s head. He found two parallel-type abrasions running from the victim\u2019s left arm to his back. There were also corresponding tears in the left sleeve of each article of clothing worn by defendant. Dr. Kirschner\u2019s findings concerning the injuries, abrasions and tom clothing led him to conclude that the victim was struck a glancing blow by an automobile bumper or fender while lying down.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that (1) the evidence and accountability theory used by the prosecution did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the testimony of some of the State\u2019s witnesses was due to improper influence by the police; and (3) his statement was a result of police coercion and denial of right to counsel. We disagree.\nDefendant contends that the evidence used to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was insufficient. The standard of review for this type of challenge was recently explained by the Illinois Supreme Court. It stated the following:\n\u201cWhen faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is not this court\u2019s function to retry the defendant. [Citations.] Rather, \u2018the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 (Emphasis in original.) (Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789.) In addition, \u2018upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.\u2019 (Emphasis in original.) 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.\u201d People v. Illgen (1991), 145 Ill. 2d 353, 376.\nIn this case, defendant\u2019s oral confession was corroborated by the testimony of the State\u2019s witnesses. Defendant\u2019s girl friend testified as to what she overheard between defendant and Hollingsworth, the person hired to actually carry out the murder. Further, she testified as to the details of the incident based on admissions made to her by defendant, himself.\nThere was testimony by Holmes, who shared an apartment with the victim. He was awakened when Hollingsworth and the victim left the apartment. Darryl Pledger, Holmes\u2019 uncle, also testified about hearing a pair of gunshots in the early hours of the morning. He and Holmes later identified the victim\u2019s body as it lay in the street.\nFinally, there was the testimony of the State\u2019s expert witness, Dr. Kirschner. His conclusions on the manner in which the victim was killed were corroborated by defendant\u2019s oral confession. Dr. Kirschner\u2019s autopsy revealed that the gunshot wounds would have killed the victim. However, after examining the victim's clothing, injuries and abrasions, it was clear that the victim was also struck by an automobile while lying down. Defendant admitted running over the victim as he lay facedown in the street.\nDefendant argues that the evidence presented by the State is insufficient to convict based on a theory of accountability. By statutory law, a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when \u201c[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 5 \u2014 2(c).) Courts look at the circumstances surrounding the incident in question to determine whether there was a shared criminal intent between the principal and defendant or whether there was a common design of unlawful purpose. People v. Foster (1990), 198 Ill. App. 3d 986, 993.\nHere there was substantial evidence that defendant and Hollingsworth planned the murder together. Defendant attempted to provide Hollingsworth with bullets for the designated gun. Defendant even ran over the victim to ensure his death. Given the evidence presented, the jury was able to find defendant legally accountable for the murder, and we see no reason to disturb this finding. \u201cA trier of fact\u2019s conclusion that a defendant is legally accountable for a criminal act will not be set aside on review unless the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or unreasonable that a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt exists.\u201d Foster, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 993.\nDefendant argues that Holmes, Pledger, and Benson, three of the State\u2019s witnesses, were reluctant to testify. He alleges that Holmes and Pledger had a fear of being charged with perjury. Defendant contends that Benson\u2019s testimony should be viewed with suspicion because she was kept at the police station until she testified before the grand jury and was informed that she could be \u201ccharged with accessory to murder.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s argument does not adequately recognize the role of the jury in assessing the validity of the testimony, given the motivations and biases of each witness. The importance of the jury\u2019s role in assessing credibility was discussed in People v. Carter (1988), 168 Ill. App. 3d 237. In that case, the court stated: \u201cThe jury determined the credibility of and the weight to be given each witness, and the jury was aware of all inconsistencies and possible motivations for testifying.\u201d (Carter, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 245.) Here, the jury listened to the evidence, made its deliberations and found defendant guilty. This is the function of the jury and it cannot be usurped by this court. We find the evidence was not so improbable as to justify a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. See Carter, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 245.\nAnother aspect of defendant\u2019s claim that there is insufficient evidence against him stems from the State\u2019s failure to produce the testimony of Jarvis Hollingsworth, the previously convicted codefendant. The Illinois Supreme Court responded to such a claim as follows: \u201cThe State is not obligated to produce every witness to a crime and the failure to produce a witness does not give rise to a presumption that the testimony of that witness would be unfavorable to the prosecution.\u201d People v. Jones (1964), 30 Ill. 2d 186, 190.\nFurther, Hollingsworth\u2019s case was pending appeal at the time of defendant\u2019s trial. Since there was no incentive for him to do otherwise, Hollingsworth would have been compelled to claim his fifth amendment privilege before the jury. The State was not obliged to call Hollingsworth as a witness and engage in conduct that may have constituted reversible error. (People v. Myers (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 311, 334.) This type of conduct was discussed in a recent case: \u201cIt has been often held that it is improper for a party to call a witness if the party has reason to believe that the witness will invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination before the jury.\u201d People v. Eiland (1991), 217 Ill. App. 3d 250, 262, citing People v. Myers (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 311, 334.\nDefendant argues that the statement he gave while in custody should be inadmissible. He alleges that he was denied his right to counsel and was subject to police coercion while in custody. The burden of proof and standard of review in determining whether a confession was voluntary are as follows:\n\u201cWhere a defendant raises the issue, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a confession was voluntary. (People v. Clark (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 450, 501 N.E.2d 123.) Whether a statement is voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. The test is whether the statement was made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant\u2019s will was overcome at the time of the confession. (Clark, 114 Ill. 2d at 457.) The trial court\u2019s finding that a confession was voluntary will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (People v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 62, 70, 289 N.E.2d 601.)\u201d People v. Hubbard (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 605, 610.\nAt the trial, the testimony of the detectives as well as that of defendant was heard. From the evidence heard, the trial court found that defendant\u2019s oral confession was voluntary. The record shows that he was given an opportunity to exercise his right to counsel but instead chose to call his girl friend, Dawn Benson. Further, there was evidence that defendant was provided food and drink. We hold that the trial court\u2019s finding that defendant\u2019s statement was voluntary was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nJIGANTI, P.J., and McMORROW, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOHNSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Willis E. Brown, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and John J. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY EVERETT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20140797\nOpinion filed April 16, 1992.\nWillis E. Brown, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, James E. Fitzgerald, and John J. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1054-01", "first_page_order": 1074, "last_page_order": 1081 }