{ "id": 5215325, "name": "BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Bailey v. Auto-Owners Insurance", "decision_date": "1992-04-30", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201491\u20140888", "first_page": "514", "last_page": "519", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 514" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "312 N.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5405907 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/57/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 638", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3180807 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0638-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 1044", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1049" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5454381 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 1076", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. App. 3d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5604549 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/78/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" }, { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075623 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" }, { "page": "423" }, { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0420-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 465, "char_count": 10227, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.565717474690665e-08, "percentile": 0.4022255737689726 }, "sha256": "f03bfec86900a02ef933d8a4c73eddd6948fa18909ab8861c7af073b8618fac8", "simhash": "1:466a4ad2078b96ef", "word_count": 1615 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:36.221708+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LUND\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Brian Bailey initiated an action for declaratory judgment in the circuit court of Champaign County to determine whether he is entitled to aggregate the limits of coverage from two auto insurance policies issued by the same insurer. Defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment was granted, and this appeal follows.\nPlaintiff contends that (1) the clause limiting the \u201cstacking\u201d of uninsured motorist coverage is ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the insured; and (2) the fact that plaintiff paid two separate premiums for uninsured motorist coverage indicates that the intent of the parties is unclear and the court should favor an interpretation that plaintiff had purchased additional indemnification through the second premium.\nPlaintiff holds an automobile insurance policy on a 1984 Buick Riviera that provides uninsured motorist coverage of $50,000. He holds an identical policy from the same company on a second car. Both policies include an itemized charge of $9.13 for the uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff was operating a nonowned, uninsured vehicle when he was struck by an uninsured motorist. Plaintiff claims that because the vehicle he was operating was not one of the vehicles insured by defendant, defendant is thereby bound by the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy to pay the limit of liability expressed in each of the declarations of coverage, for a total of $100,000. Defendant claims that the policy clearly and unambiguously precludes the \u201cstacking\u201d of uninsured motorist coverage and, therefore, limits its liability to $50,000, the coverage limit on each of the auto policies.\nThe threshold inquiry is whether the \u201climits of liability\u201d clause is clear and unambiguous. If the clause is ambiguous, the policy must be construed in favor of the insured. If it is unambiguous, there is no need for construction and the clause may be applied as written, unless it contravenes public policy. (Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 420, 423, 401 N.E.2d 539, 541.) Defendant relies on policy language in the first two paragraphs of the section titled \u201cConditions,\u201d where it states:\n\u201c1. APPLICATION OF LIMITS OF LIABILITY. Regardless of the number of *** (4) automobiles to which this policy applies, the Company\u2019s liability shall be limited as provided in Condition 2.\n2. LIMITS OF LIABILITY. The limit of liability expressed in the Declarations with respect to Coverages A and D as applicable to \u2018each person\u2019 is the limit of the Company\u2019s liability for all damages, including damages for expenses, care and loss of services, arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence ***.\u201d\n(\u201cCoverage D\u201d is the provision for uninsured motorist coverage.)\nIn Menke, the supreme court held that a similar limitation on coverage stacking was permissible, as long as it was stated unambiguously. There, the plaintiff held three separate policies from Country Mutual Insurance Company for his three vehicles. Each policy had a limit of $10,000 for uninsured motorist coverage, and the plaintiff paid a separate premium for the coverage on each policy. Like the present case, the insured was injured while riding in an uninsured vehicle. The plaintiff claimed he was entitled to aggregate the uninsured motorist coverage, for a total recovery of $30,000, while the defendant insurer claimed its liability was limited to the $10,000 coverage on each policy. After reviewing the policy provisions limiting liability, the court concluded that the policy was not ambiguous and clearly precluded the \u201cstacking\u201d of coverage among the three policies. The actual clause limiting liability in the Menke case reads:\n\u201c \u2018With respect to any occurrence, accident, death or loss to which this and any other automobile insurance policy issued to the Named Insured by the Company also applies, the total limit of the Company\u2019s liability under all such policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability or benefit amount under any one such policy.\u2019 \u201d Menke, 78 Ill. 2d at 423, 401 N.E.2d at 541.\nIn a similar case, Hanover Insurance Co. v. Cormack (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 368, 396 N.E.2d 1076, plaintiff\u2019s son was killed while a passenger in an uninsured auto. Plaintiff claimed he was entitled to \u201cstack\u201d the uninsured motorist coverage and demanded a separate $20,000 for each of the three autos he insured under the policy. Relying solely on the \u201cLimits of Liability\u201d clause, the court found the provision unambiguous and held that plaintiff would not be allowed to \u201cstack\u201d the coverages. The language used in that case is nearly identical with the language limiting liability in the case at hand. The provision in Hanover reads:\n\u201c \u2018Regardless of the number of *** automobiles *** to which this policy applies ***\n(C) the limit for Uninsured Motorist Coverage stated in the declarations as applicable to each accident is the total limit of the company\u2019s liability for all damages because of bodily injury sustained by one or more persons as a result of one accident.\u2019 \u201d (Hanover, 78 Ill. App. 3d at 370, 396 N.E.2d at 1077.)\nThe only difference between the provision in Hanover and the provision in the present case is that it was written for each \u201caccident\u201d instead of each \u201cperson,\u201d a fact that does not alter our analysis. The Hanover court emphasized the introductory phrase, \u201c \u2018Regardless of the number of *** automobiles *** to which this policy applies,\u2019 \u201d as the critical element in its holding that the language prohibiting \u201cstacking\u201d was unambiguous and conveyed the clear intent of the parties. This critical phrase is repeated verbatim in the clause limiting liability in the case at hand.\nPlaintiff relies on Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 167, 370 N.E.2d 1044, where the court held that language limiting \u201cstacking\u201d of coverage in an uninsured motorist provision was ambiguous and, therefore, allowed plaintiff to aggregate the coverage. However, as the Hanover decision points out, the contract language in Squire lacked the key phrase, \u201c \u2018Regardless of the number of *** automobiles *** to which this policy applies,\u2019 \u201d and is therefore distinguishable. Hanover suggests that since the decision in Squire was based on the lack of clear policy language precluding \u201cstacking,\u201d the presence of such language clearly distinguishes the two cases. We find that the provisions prohibiting the \u201cstacking\u201d of policy coverages in the instant case are substantially identical with the provisions in both Menke and Hanover. The provision is likewise both clear and unambiguous in its prohibition of \u201cstacking\u201d coverages.\nPlaintiff next contends that since separate premiums of $9.13 for uninsured motorist coverage were paid, the intention of the parties is unclear and the court should favor an interpretation that the insured was paying for additional coverage. Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on the Squire case for the notion that the existence of two premiums creates a fundamental ambiguity is misplaced. As that court stated, \u201c[H]ad the insurance company intended the additional [premium] to provide anything other than\u201d additional indemnification \u201cit should have so stated.\u201d (Squire, 69 Ill. 2d at 179, 370 N.E.2d at 1049.) In the present case, defendant did state the limits of coverage.\nThe notion that separate premiums necessarily indicates separate coverage is often referred to as the \u201cpremium rule,\u201d and is based on the concept that insurance companies should not be permitted to collect premiums for a given amount of coverage and thereafter apply limiting clauses to reduce or absolve their liability to the insured.\n\u201c[T]he \u2018Premium Rule\u2019 is best understood as a mere explication of the general rule that the insured is to be favored in construing insurance policies. Consequently, the \u2018Premium Rule\u2019 should be viewed as a rule of construction, and should not be applied unless the insurance contract reveals an ambiguity as to the amount of coverage intended.\u201d (Greenholt v. Inland National Insurance Co. (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 638, 641, 410 N.E.2d 150, 152-53.)\nWe find no ambiguity in the language describing the limitations of coverage, and therefore no need to apply the \u201cpremium rule.\u201d\nNext, plaintiff asks that we adopt the holding in Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247, where the court looked beyond the clear language of the policy precluding \u201cstacking\u201d of coverage and held that the policy did not meet the reasonable expectations of the insured. Glidden is not applicable here because the provisions relied upon in that decision deal with the \u201cstacking\u201d of coverages between different insurers, a so-called \u201cother insurance\u201d clause. Unlike Glidden, in the case at hand the provisions limiting liability specifically refer to limitations in the event of multiple policies issued by the same insurer.\nFinally, plaintiff contends that the specific language used to prevent \u201cstacking\u201d of medical coverage printed at the bottom of the declaration sheet indicates that the insurer had knowledge that without this language, the coverage for passenger injury would be ambiguous. The provision in question reads, \u201cPassenger accident coverage written on more than one vehicle does not increase the stated limit per person.\u201d Plaintiff contends that defendant knew the language in the limits of liability clause was ambiguous and attempted to rectify this situation relative to \u201cpassenger accident coverage.\u201d Once again, we need only look to theories of the parties\u2019 knowledge and intent when the language of the policy is ambiguous. The existence of any such subjective intent is rebutted by the clear and unambiguous language of the policy. (Menke, 78 Ill. 2d at 425, 409 N.E.2d at 542.) As we see no material issue of fact, the motion for summary judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LUND" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard B. Opsahl, of Rantoul, for appellant.", "Gary D. Nelson and Karen L. Kendall, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201491\u20140888\nOpinion filed April 30, 1992.\nRichard B. Opsahl, of Rantoul, for appellant.\nGary D. Nelson and Karen L. Kendall, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0514-01", "first_page_order": 536, "last_page_order": 541 }