{ "id": 5215726, "name": "In re APPLICATION OF THE COUNTY COLLECTOR OF WILL COUNTY FOR JUDGMENT FOR TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1988 (John Weber, County Treasurer and ex officio Collector of Taxes of Will County, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Crossfield Chemical et al., Defendants-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "Weber v. Crossfield Chemical", "decision_date": "1992-05-29", "docket_number": "Nos. 3\u201491\u20140657 through 3\u201491\u20140678 cons.", "first_page": "641", "last_page": "645", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 641" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "373 N.E.2d 1332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1336" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5448551 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/71/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 106", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2971046 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598632 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/126/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 N.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Ill. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2512255 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/391/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "414 Ill. 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314152 ], "year": 1945, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/414/0419-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 440, "char_count": 7875, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.2181595544833095e-08, "percentile": 0.32945221902898586 }, "sha256": "ee19e8260ac2034fa658c83b714a1646b332aa9b58a7f148927463dabc7d755c", "simhash": "1:b9c7cddc4aa7d2f4", "word_count": 1296 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:36.221708+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re APPLICATION OF THE COUNTY COLLECTOR OF WILL COUNTY FOR JUDGMENT FOR TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1988 (John Weber, County Treasurer and ex officio Collector of Taxes of Will County, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Crossfield Chemical et al., Defendants-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 1988, Will County proposed a general real estate tax levy of $17,715,138, which was 122.84% greater than the general real estate tax levy for 1987. Pursuant to section 6 of the Truth in Taxation Act (Taxation Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 120, par. 866), Will County published the following notice prior to adopting the real estate tax levy:\n\u201cPUBLIC NOTICE\nTaxing Body: County of Will\n1987 Extension (Excluding election cost & Debt): $14,421,204.46\n1988 Proposed Levy (Excluding election costs & debt): $17,715,138\nPercentage Increase: 122.84%\nDate of Public Hearing: November 17,1988\nTime of Public Hearing: 9:30 a.m.\nPlace of Public Hearing: Will County Office Building\n302 N. Chicago St., Joliet, II. 60432\u201d\nThe defendants paid their 1988 real estate taxes under protest and argued that the tax levy was invalid because Will County had failed to strictly comply with the requirements of the Taxation Act. The defendants specifically claimed that the published notice did not comply with the legislative intent of the Taxation Act nor did the notice contain all the information required by the Taxation Act. The circuit court agreed and sustained the defendants\u2019 objections. The trial court ordered the treasurer to pay the defendants a refund of the real estate taxes they protested. The treasurer appeals. We affirm.\nThe sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred by sustaining the defendants\u2019 tax objections and finding invalid Will County\u2019s 1988 real estate tax levy.\nThe treasurer contends that Will County substantially complied with the publication requirements of the Taxation Act. He further argues that substantial compliance is all that is required by the Taxation Act. We disagree.\nThe defendants argue that strict compliance with the requirements of the Taxation Act is mandatory. The defendants further argue that Will County\u2019s failure to strictly comply with the Taxation Act rendered the tax levy invalid. We agree.\nObjectors to a real estate tax levy are required to bear the burden of proving the invalidity of a tax levy. Generally, it is presumed that real estate taxes have been legally levied. (People ex rel. Moore v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. (1953), 414 Ill. 419, 111 N.E.2d 509.) Real estate taxes can only be levied, assessed and collected in the manner expressly required by statute. People ex rel. Pickerill v. New York Central R.R. Co. (1945), 391 Ill. 377, 63 N.E.2d 405.\nThe interpretation and construction of a statutory provision is governed by the rule that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. (C.S. Johnson Co. v. Champaign National Bank (1984), 126 Ill. App. 3d 508, 467 N.E.2d 363.) The language used in a statute is the source from which its intent should be derived. (General Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 106, 338 N.E.2d 561.) However, \u201c[wjhere the statutory language does not adequately convey the legislative intent, the courts may look to the legislative history.\u201d C.S. Johnson, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 510, 467 N.E.2d at 365.\nWhile we believe that the provisions of the Taxation Act in question are quite clear and unambiguous, we will review the legislative intent of section 3 of the Taxation Act. Section 3 provides in part:\n\u201cThe purpose of this Act is to require taxing districts to disclose by publication and to hold a public hearing on their intention to adopt an aggregate levy in amounts more than 105% of the amount of property taxes extended or estimated to be extended *** upon the levy of the preceding year.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 120, par. 863.\nSection 5 of the Taxation Act contains mandatory directives for the taxing body. It provides in part:\n\u201cUntil it has complied with the notice and hearing provisions of this Act, no taxing district shall levy an amount of ad valorem tax which is more than 105% of the amount, *** which has been extended or is estimated [to] be extended upon the levy of the preceding year.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 120, par. 865.\nThe use of the word \u201cshall\u201d is generally regarded as mandatory statutory language. Where the word \u201cshall\u201d is used in connection with any right or benefit, and the right or benefit depends upon giving a mandatory meaning to the word, the words cannot be given a permissive meaning. (Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, 373 N.E.2d 1332.) The Andrews court held that the publication and notice provisions of the Illinois Revenue Act were designed for the benefit as well as protection of the taxpayers, and they were not adopted merely for the guidance of public officials. The publication requirements were enacted to afford the taxpayers information as well as the opportunity to evaluate the reasonableness of their assessments. (Andrews, 71 Ill. 2d at 22, 373 N.E.2d at 1336.) We hold that the publication requirements of the Taxation Act are mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the taxing body.\nWe further hold that section 6 of the Taxation Act also contains specific notice requirements which must be strictly complied with by the taxing body. Section 6 of the Taxation Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201c[T]he corporate authority shall give public notice of and hold a public hearing on its intent to adopt a levy in an amount which is more than 105% of the extensions *** for the preceding year.\n* * *\n*** The notice shall state in plain and simple language the following information: (1) the legal name of the taxing district; (2) the commonly known name of the taxing district; (3) the amount of property taxes, exclusive of election costs, extended or estimated to be extended on behalf of the taxing district for the preceding year; (4) the amount of the proposed levy, exclusive of election costs, for the current year; (5) the percentage increase; and (6) the date, time and place of the public hearing concerning the proposed budget and the proposed levy increase. ***\nAny notice which includes information substantially in excess of that specified and required by this Act shall be an invalid notice.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 120, par. 866.\nThe failure to strictly comply with the mandatory requirements of section 6 of the Taxation Act will cause a taxing body\u2019s levy to be found invalid following a proper tax protest.\nThe trial court specifically found that Will County\u2019s notice failed to make any reference to the extension being an extension of property taxes. The trial court also found that there was no indication in the notice as to what the public hearing concerned. We agree with the trial court\u2019s findings. We further note that nowhere in Will County\u2019s notice is there any mention of the words \u201ctax,\u201d \u201cproperty taxes,\u201d \u201ctax increase,\u201d or \u201ctaxable property.\u201d\nWe find that Will County\u2019s notice did not even minimally comply with section 6 of the Taxation Act. The trial court was correct in determining Will County\u2019s notice was clearly inadequate and that the notice failed to satisfy the legislative intent of the Taxation Act.\nFor the reasons indicated, the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGORMAN and SLATER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCUSKEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Philip A. Mock, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and John X. Breslin and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for appellant.", "Spesia & Ayers, of Joliet, and James A. Geraghty, of Wheaton (Neil T. Goltermann and Douglas E Spesia, of counsel), for appellee Crossfield Chemical." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re APPLICATION OF THE COUNTY COLLECTOR OF WILL COUNTY FOR JUDGMENT FOR TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1988 (John Weber, County Treasurer and ex officio Collector of Taxes of Will County, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Crossfield Chemical et al., Defendants-Appellees).\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201491\u20140657 through 3\u201491\u20140678 cons.\nOpinion filed May 29, 1992.\nEdward Burmila, Jr., State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Philip A. Mock, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and John X. Breslin and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for appellant.\nSpesia & Ayers, of Joliet, and James A. Geraghty, of Wheaton (Neil T. Goltermann and Douglas E Spesia, of counsel), for appellee Crossfield Chemical." }, "file_name": "0641-01", "first_page_order": 663, "last_page_order": 667 }