{ "id": 5216782, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALVIN S. SPENCER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Spencer", "decision_date": "1992-06-12", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201490\u20140825", "first_page": "1098", "last_page": "1103", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "229 Ill. App. 3d 1098" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "138 Ill. App. 3d 899", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499746 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/138/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3448494 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/142/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2666513 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "844-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2605523 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5299403 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2576995 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" }, { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5809665 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236660 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 940", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2534706 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0940-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5253635 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "816" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0815-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 617, "char_count": 10929, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.506301832229462e-08, "percentile": 0.44669032827782623 }, "sha256": "1be25cca30c84fbf5a2c62f5a0114d195a0a2ef80473adcd9dec90e6c677f73a", "simhash": "1:bbe264dd7a4ebaf9", "word_count": 1836 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:04:36.221708+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALVIN S. SPENCER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEIGER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Alvin S. Spencer, was convicted following a bench trial of the offenses of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(1)) and theft of property under $300 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 16 \u2014 1(a)(1), (b)(1)). The defendant was sentenced to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment for the criminal sexual assault conviction and to a concurrent term of 364 days in the Lee County jail for the theft conviction. The sole issue raised by the defendant on appeal is whether the 12-year sentence imposed is excessive.\nAt trial, V.D. testified that, on March 16, 1990, she moved to an apartment in Dixon, Illinois, which was part of a public housing project. The defendant, the defendant\u2019s twin brother Calvin, and Walter Addison visited her apartment on March 23, 1990, in order to welcome her to the neighborhood. V.D. testified that, on March 25, 1990, she returned home at about 1 a.m. after riding around with a girlfriend. Shortly thereafter, the defendant knocked on her door. He asked to come in for a few minutes, and V.D. let him in because she \u201cjustified him as being a friend.\u201d\nV.D. and the defendant listened to tapes and talked for a while, and the defendant drank some vodka he brought with him. The defendant then took $46 that V.D. had placed in a chair pocket. The defendant told her that he would not return the money unless she had sex with him. He also offered to buy her a television set and pay her telephone bill if she had sex with him. V.D. refused and asked the defendant to leave. The defendant then threw her on the floor, held her arms and engaged in sexual intercourse with her. The intercourse occurred on a sleeping bag which was on the living room floor.\nV.D. did not call the police. She did tell her boyfriend what had happened and asked him to move back in with her because she was scared. V.D. testified that the defendant came back to the apartment several times after the incident and called her \u201cdirty names.\u201d On March 28, 1990, the defendant knocked on the door. V.D.\u2019s boyfriend was there, and V.D. asked the defendant to leave. V.D.\u2019s boyfriend and the defendant got into a fight, and the police were called. V.D. told a responding police officer what had happened on March 25, and the defendant was arrested.\nV.D.\u2019s boyfriend also testified regarding the defendant\u2019s visits to the apartment after March 25, and Debra McGlown, V.D.\u2019s neighbor, testified that the defendant told her that he had some of V.D.\u2019s money and that he \u201cgot that sweet, pretty thing.\u201d A forensic scientist testified that a hair found on the sleeping bag in V.D.\u2019s apartment was consistent with the defendant\u2019s head hair standard.\nThe defendant presented an alibi defense through his own testimony and the testimony of his girlfriend. This testimony was contradicted by three witnesses called by the State in rebuttal.\nThe trial court found the defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault and theft of property under $300. A presentence investigation report was prepared. The report stated that the defendant was 26 years old. The defendant had previous convictions of disorderly conduct, no valid driver\u2019s license, resisting arrest, misdemeanor unlawful use of a weapon, and the failure to have a firearm owner\u2019s identification card. The report also stated that the defendant had earned his GED. He had lived in Dixon for almost one year and was not employed but supported himself \u201cby gambling at Wilson\u2019s Tavern where he plays dice and shoots pool.\u201d\nA sentencing hearing was held on July 2, 1990. V.D. testified that she no longer had a job and was \u201cafraid to go anywhere.\u201d The State argued that it was a very serious offense and that the maximum sentence should be imposed. Defense counsel argued that the minimum term of imprisonment would be appropriate because the defendant had no prior felony convictions. The trial judge stated that he considered the presentence investigation report and the evidence presented. He then thoroughly discussed the relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. He specifically noted that the defendant\u2019s \u201crecord is minimum [sic] and that definitely is a mitigating factor.\u201d He also noted, however, that the defendant overpowered the victim when she told him \u201cno\u201d and further stated:\n\u201c[One] of the most troubling facts to me was that after the offense occurred it wasn\u2019t sufficient for him to let it alone. He came back every night thereafter. He called her dirty names. He knocked on her door. He wanted to fight. He called her names. He was asked to leave. So he continued to intimidate her and harass her all in a public \u2014 in a public facility which is designed to help people who need help and are looking for a place to live where they are in circumstances which are unfortunate for them and where they\u2019re not able to find other housing.\u201d\nThe court then sentenced the defendant to a term of 12 years in the Department of Corrections. The defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial was subsequently denied, and this timely appeal followed.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to 12 years\u2019 imprisonment, a sentence just three years short of the maximum penalty. He asserts that the sentence imposed is excessive because he had no prior felony convictions, had only a minimal record of misdemeanor convictions, and had no record of juvenile adjudications. He also contends that the sentence is excessive because the \u201ccomplaining witness suffered no physical harm as a result of the criminal sexual assault.\u201d He further argues that, based upon his prior record, the instant offense was \u201can aberration in an otherwise relatively law-abiding lifestyle.\u201d\nWe initially note that the defendant did not raise an excessive sentence issue in his post-trial motion and did not challenge the basis of his sentence in a motion to reconsider or reduce his sentence. Although this issue may therefore be deemed waived (People v. Macke (1992), 224 Ill. App. 3d 815, 816; People v. Bolden (1991), 210 Ill. App. 3d 940, 947), we will consider the issue raised by the defendant.\nThe defendant was convicted of a Class 1 felony (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(b)), and a sentence of imprisonment was required because of the nature of the offense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(2)(H).) The permissible sentencing range for a Class 1 felony is a term of imprisonment of 4 to 15 years. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(4).) The defendant\u2019s sentence of 12 years\u2019 imprisonment was therefore within the permissible range.\nA trial court\u2019s sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference and weight, and the standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. (People v. Streit (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 13, 18-19; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154.) A trial court has wide latitude in sentencing a defendant to a term within the statutory range prescribed for the offense so long as it \"does not consider incompetent evidence, improper aggravating factors, or ignore pertinent mitigating factors.\u201d People v. Hernandez (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 732, 740.\nFurther, a trial court is not required to give a defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential more weight in its sentencing decision than it gives the seriousness of the offense. (People v. Smith (1991), 214 Ill. App. 3d 327, 341.) In fact, the seriousness of the offense has been called the most important factor to consider in imposing sentence. Hernandez, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 740.\nIn this cause, the trial court specifically stated that the defendant did not have a significant record of prior criminal offenses and that it considered this a mitigating factor. The court also, however, gave consideration to the seriousness of the offense, including the fact that the defendant continued to harass the victim following the offense. It then imposed a sentence three years below the maximum possible sentence. We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion under these circumstances.\nWe further note that we agree with the State that defendant\u2019s past record is hardly impressive. While all of the defendant\u2019s prior convictions were of misdemeanor offenses, the defendant\u2019s previous experiences with the judicial system could be considered to indicate a lack of rehabilitative potential. See People v. Kendall (1991), 213 Ill. App. 3d 782, 788.\nIn addition, we note that we strongly disagree with the defendant\u2019s argument that his sentence was excessive because the victim \u201csuffered no physical harm.\u201d A criminal sexual assault is harmful to a victim, even if no bodily harm is caused, and has been classified as a serious offense, a Class I felony, by the legislature for that reason. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(b); cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 12 \u2014 14(a)(2), (d) (a criminal sexual assault where \u201cthe accused caused bodily harm to the victim\u201d is aggravated criminal sexual assault, a Class X felony).\nThe cases relied on by defendant to support his contention that the sentence imposed was excessive are inapposite and do not persuade us to change our conclusion. (See People v. Harris (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 832, 844-47 (25-year sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault excessive where the defendant was an alcoholic who was usually intoxicated during the criminal sexual acts with the victim and was being treated for his illness, had a good work record and provided financial support for his dependents, and had only two prior convictions of misdemeanor offenses); People v. Anderson (1985), 142 Ill. App. 3d 240, 243 (17-year sentence for residential burglary excessive where the defendants were 17 years old and lacked any significant or extensive prior criminal history); People v. Treadway (1985), 138 Ill. App. 3d 899, 904-05 (60-year sentence for attempted murder and armed violence excessive where the 24-year-old defendant had only a minor criminal history, had been physically abused as a child and had suffered from a drug and alcohol problem since the age of 14, and had perpetrated the offense in a fleeting moment of intoxicated rage).) Here, there was no evidence presented that the defendant had a problem with alcohol, and, as noted, the defendant had five prior convictions of misdemeanor offenses.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lee County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nNICKELS and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEIGER" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Daniel A. Fish, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALVIN S. SPENCER, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201490\u20140825\nOpinion filed June 12, 1992.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kim M. DeWitt, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nDaniel A. Fish, State\u2019s Attorney, of Dixon (William L. Browers and Martin P. Moltz, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1098-01", "first_page_order": 1120, "last_page_order": 1125 }