{ "id": 2510066, "name": "E. V. Kennedy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Community Unit School District No. 7, Champaign County, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Kennedy v. Community Unit School District No. 7", "decision_date": "1974-11-14", "docket_number": "No. 12145", "first_page": "382", "last_page": "386", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 382" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "282 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill.2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395825 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 A.L.R. 3d 1407", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7631", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 L.Ed.2d 797", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 84266 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/416/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.Ct. 1848", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 L.Ed.2d 534", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 365", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782863 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "56 Ill.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5404912 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/56/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 564", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782964 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570, 571" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "2709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 N.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395178 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 N.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Ill.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2938565 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0129-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 574, "char_count": 10043, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.911475404616242e-08, "percentile": 0.46133596978047753 }, "sha256": "b8ffa4e5de502a06d7bd317aa0a18a715703fa2ce86d661525cc71c748a4e584", "simhash": "1:7445c8742fb746c7", "word_count": 1679 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:19:43.775116+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "E. V. Kennedy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Community Unit School District No. 7, Champaign County, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff appeals the judgment entered upon dismissal of his second amended complaint seeking mandamus, actual damages in the sum of $25,992, and punitive damages in the sum of $90,000. He alleged wrongful and illegal dismissal as a principal and teacher.\nPlaintiff had been employed as a tenured teacher and principal of Pesotum Elementary School. He attained the age of 65 years on December 14, 1969. On March 26, 1970, defendants advised plaintiff by letter:\n\u201cReference Section 24 \u2014 11 of the \u2018School Code of Illinois\u2019 that contractual service shall cease at the end of the school term following the 65th birthday. The Board of Education has decided not to offer you a contract of employment for next school year.\u201d\nIt is sa:d that the failure to offer a contract violates the provisions of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 122, pars. 24 \u2014 11, 24 \u2014 12), the Age Discrimination Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 48, par. 881 et seq.), and plaintiff\u2019s rights of due process and equal protection under the federal constitution.\nSection 24 \u2014 11 of the School Code at issue provides in its fourth paragraph:\n\u201cContractual continued service shall cease at the end of the school term following the 65th birthday of any teacher, and any subsequent employment of such a teacher shall be on an annual basis.\u201d (Emphasis supplied.)\nPlaintiff contends that the term of contractual continued service did not terminate until the end of the school year (1970), following his 65th birthday in December, 1969; that he was a tenured teacher at the time of th\u00e9 notice in March, 1970, so that he was entitled to written notice stating specific charges as enumerated in section 10 \u2014 22 of the School Code, a bill of particulars and a hearing as provided in section 24 \u2014 12 of such Code.\nSection 24 \u2014 11 clearly states that the extension of employment contracts for the school terms commencing subsequent to a teacher\u2019s 65th birthday is not required by virtue of the teacher\u2019s status of contractual, continued service. Thus, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to \u25a0 a hearing on specific charges before defendant can \u201cterminate\u201d a non-existent right to contractual continued service. Plaintiff\u2019s conclusion appears to be contrary to the plain language of section 24 \u2014 11 in that it leaves meaningless the provision \u201cand any subsequent employment-of such teacher shall be on an annual basis.\u201d Appellate courts cannot restrict nor enlarge the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute (Bovinette v. City of Mascoutah, 55 Ill.2d 129, 133, 302 N.E.2d 313), and:\n\u201c \u2018[I]t is a cardinal rule in construing statutes that they are to be construed so as to give effect to each word, clause and sentence, so that no word, clause or sentence shall be considered superfluous. or void, [citations] and a statute should be so construed, if possible, as to give to each word and sentence its ordinary and accepted meaning.\u2019\u201d Vaught v. Industrial Commission, 52 Ill.2d 158, 165, 287 N.E.2d 701.\nParagraph 3 of section 24 \u2014 11 includes:\n\u201c[A]ny teacher employed on a full-time basis, not later than January 1 of the school term, shall receive written notice from the employing board at least 60 days before the end of any school term whether or not he will be re-employed for the following school term.\u201d\nWe hold that where, as here, a teacher is given such notice dining the school term during which he reaches age 65, his employment is properly terminated at the end of that school term,, without notice of specific charges or a hearing that would otherwise be required by section 24 \u2014 12 of the School Code.\nAs a constitutional issue, plaintiff urges that the portion of section 24 \u2014 11 at issue violates the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution by its failure to provide notice of specific charges and a hearing upon such. To determine whether plaintiff has alleged an interest within that amendment\u2019s protection of liberty and property, one must ascertain the nature of the interest at stake. (Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, 571, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 92 S.Ct. 2701.) Not to be rehired raises no issue of deprivation of liberty. (Roth; Powell v. Jones, 56 Ill.2d 70, 305 N.E.2d 166.) In certain circumstances, the courts have found a property right in continued, employment. To demonstrate an interest in such employment protected by procedural due process:\n\u201cA person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.\u201d Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577.\nInterests in property are not created by the Constitution, but \u201c[rjather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law \u2014 rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.\u201d (Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709; Powell v. Jones, 56 Ill.2d 70, 79, 305 N.E.2d 166, 171.) Thus, it must be determined that plaintiff possessed an interest in continued employment entitled to the protection of federal due process. It is clear that within the terms of the statute he was not entitled to the statutory contractual service. The complaint alleges no other rules or representations that would amount to \u201cde facto tenure\u201d beyond age 65 within the meaning of Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 33 L.Ed. 2d 570, 92 S.Ct. 2694, so that plaintiff has not alleged a \u201clegitimate claim of entitlement of continued employment.\u201d (Perry v. Sindermann; Powell v. Jones.) We conclude that the complaint fails to state a cause of action in the context of denial of due process.\nPlaintiff argues, in the alternative, that as section 24 \u2014 11 permits the nonretention of teachers over 65 without a statement of charges or a hearing thereon, but requires notice of charges and hearing as to those teachers under 65, plaintiff has been denied the equal protection of law contrary to the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution. It is a matter of general and common knowledge that many persons expect to and do retire from their employment at the age of 65 years. Such age marks the eligibility for benefits both under the Social Security Act of the United States and many public and private pension plans. It is thus apparent that the classification is not \u201cinherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.\u201d (Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 29 L.Ed.2d 534, 91 S.Ct. 1848.) If no fundamental right is concerned, a statutory classification which is reasonable and bears a rational relationship to a proper State objective, there is no denial of constitutional equal protection. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 39 L.Ed.2d 797, 803, 94 S.Ct. 1536.\nPlaintiff alleges that the nonrenewal of his contract violated the Age Discrimination Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 48, par. 881 et seq.). Section 884(1) provides, in relevant part, that:\n\u201cIt is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:\n(1) To refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his terms, conditions or privileges of employment, otherwise lawful, because of such individual\u2019s age, when the reasonable demands of the position do not require such an age distinction; 9 9\nThe Act appears to be directed against \u201c[hjiring bias against workers over 45 years of age 9 9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 881(b).\nThe statute, upon its face, does not state any age beyond 45 years at which it ceases to be applicable. Comparable Federal legislation provides that it shall not include persons who have reached 65 years of age. (29 U.S.C.A. \u00a7631 (1974).) It appears that most states provide that the statute shall cease to apply when a person reaches the age of 65 years. See Annot, 29 A.L.R. 3d 1407 (1970).\nThe statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 883) provides:\n\u201cNothing in this Act affects the retirement system of any employer where such system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purpose of this Act; 9 9\nThis State, for many years, has provided a system for teachers\u2019 annuity and pension. Section 16 \u2014 132 of the Pension Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 108%, par. 16 \u2014 132) provides an annuity and pension for teachers at age 55 who have 20 years of service; at age 60 who have 10 years of service and at age 62 who have 5 years of service. The record discloses that plaintiff has long qualified under the benefits of such annuity and pension system.\nThe long existence of the statutory system of annuities and pensions and its general application to teachers throughout the State demonstrate that the \u201cretirement system\u201d is not a subterfuge to evade the Age Discrimination Act.\nThe latter Act became effective in 1967. We note that Public Act 76-1138, approved August 28,1969, amended section 24 \u2014 11 of the School Code. Such amendment reenacted the provision that contractual continued service shall cease at the end of the school year following the 65th birthday of the teacher. We conclude that the sum of the legislative acts demonstrates an intended interrelation between the Teachers\u2019 Retirement System of Illinois and section 24 \u2014 11 of the School Code. We cannot conclude that the legislature intended that the Age Discrimination Act make inoperative a portion of section 24 \u2014 11 of the School Code and such Teachers\u2019 Retirement System. Courts should interpret the several statutes so as to give a reasonable meaning to each. Arnolt v. City of Highland Park, 52 Ill.2d 27, 282 N.E.2d 144.\nThe judgment below is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCRAVEN and SIMKINS, JJ., concur,", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP" } ], "attorneys": [ "N. E. Hutson, of Monticello, for appellant.", "Hatch, Corazza, Baker & Jensen, of Champaign (Harold A. Baker, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "E. V. Kennedy, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Community Unit School District No. 7, Champaign County, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\n(No. 12145;\nFourth District\nNovember 14, 1974.\nN. E. Hutson, of Monticello, for appellant.\nHatch, Corazza, Baker & Jensen, of Champaign (Harold A. Baker, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0382-01", "first_page_order": 406, "last_page_order": 410 }