{ "id": 2509975, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rachel Reeves, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Reeves", "decision_date": "1974-11-19", "docket_number": "No. 74-14", "first_page": "579", "last_page": "583", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "23 Ill. App. 3d 579" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 N.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill.App. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5003928 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/338/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill.App. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 2889648 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/192/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill.App.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5227297 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/31/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Ill.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2733016 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/21/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 N.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill.App.2d 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1587108 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/116/0039-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 534, "char_count": 9595, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0293332722803826e-07, "percentile": 0.5476655202677839 }, "sha256": "a0f9bd19c73d001fd9d974f0ea23344d8cd3fd7bca7e3ae4c12a4e668466d834", "simhash": "1:575faae744f9bbf4", "word_count": 1604 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:19:43.775116+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rachel Reeves, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nThis is an appeal from the order of the circuit court of Will County finding respondent, Rachel Reeves, guilty of criminal contempt and sentencing her to 7 days in the Will County jail. This contempt action was brought pursuant to a petition for rule to show cause filed on behalf of the People by Martin Rudman, State\u2019s Attorney of Will County.\nThis action arose out of a case in the circuit court of Will County which involved the custody of two children, Elaine and Susan Ross. The two children had been been in the foster care of respondent, Rachel Reeves, from 1966 until March 9, 1973, at which time they were taken from her by court order and placed in an orphanage. In January, 1973, the proceedings were begun to remove Elaine and Susan from Mrs. Reeves\u2019 care. Rafael Toruno, assistant State\u2019s Attorney handling the matter, had appeared four or five times in connection with the removal proceedings. On August 2, 1973, Judge Angelo Pistilli was to hear a motion from the Department of Children and Family Services regarding a modification of a custody order previously entered by Judge Pistilli. On that date Rafael Toruno requested Judge Pistilli to continue the hearing on the motion due to the absence of the natural parents and their attorney. Argument was heard on the motion to continue after which Judge Pistilli continued the cause to August 23, 1973. Toruno testified that he saw respondent in the courtroom at the beginning, during and at the conclusion of the proceedings. At one point during the hearing respondent\u2019s attorney asked- for a recess during which he took Mrs. Reeves, who was weeping, into the corridor. The events in question concerning the contempt occurred outside Judge Pistilli\u2019s courtroom in the corridor after the motion to continue was granted. About 15 to 20 people including news media and supporters of the Reeves milled outside in the corridor. Judge Pistilli was not present in the corridor during the incident. Five observers testified as to the occurrence including four news representatives and one attorney who had come out of another courtroom. None of the media representatives saw any poking of Mr. Toruno by Rachel Reeves but one did see Mrs. Reeves moving her right hand in an up and down motion and the attorney testified that he saw Rachel Reeves poke Rafael Toruno in the left cheek three or four times with the finger or fingers of her right hand and that he saw Mr. Torano\u2019s head go back and forth as he was poked. Mr. Toruno testified that as he came into the corridor from Judge Pistilli\u2019s courtroom Mrs. Reeves, a Mrs. Hahn and an unidentified lady walked toward him and began shouting at him. Mrs. Hahn was shouting about Torano\u2019s wife working for the Department of Children and Family Services in Will County and about Albert Rudman, father of Will County State\u2019s Attorney Martin Rudman, being the bailiff in Judge Pistilli\u2019s courtroom. Toruno stated that he turned from the three women to go toward Judge Pistilli\u2019s chamber doors but before he got there he began a conversation with a Reverend Norton during which the three women again approached him and he turned to face them. During this conversation Mrs. Reeves shouted words the basic import of which was, \u201cWhat are you doing to my children * * * you don\u2019t care about my children\u201d and thereupon poked him in the left cheek with the extended finger or fingers of her right hand three or four times. As he turned to leave by the door to the chamber area someone yelled, \u201cYou\u2019d better run you son of a bitch.\u201d Toruno then entered the chambers and a petition was subsequently filed by the People of the State of Illinois requesting that Rachel Reeves be adjudged guilty of indirect contempt of court. On September 4, 1973, Circuit Judge Michael A. Orenic conducted the hearing on the petition at which the above facts were adduced and then held Rachel Reeves to be in indirect criminal contempt and fixed her punishment at 7 days\u2019 incarceration in the Will County jail.\nOn appeal respondent\u2019s first contention is that it was error to admit evidence of the possibly contemptuous words and actions of persons other than Rachel Reeves. The evidence to which respondent refers is Torano\u2019s testimony that Mrs. Hahn made accusations that nepotism had colored the proceedings, his testimony that someone had shouted, \u201cRun you son of a bitch\u201d as he left the corridor area, the attorney-witness\u2019 testimony that Jack Reeves had shouted, \u201cRun you son of a bitch\u201d and that a female voice coming from the place where Rachel Reeves was standing but not necessarily from Rachel Reeves herself also shouted, \u201cRun you son of a bitch.\u201d Respondent concedes in her brief that if the People\u2019s contention that the evidence of the words and actions of others was offered not to prove their truth but to make the entire transaction understandable, then their admission would not be prejudicial to her. It is respondent\u2019s contention, however, that Judge Orenic\u2019s order clearly indicated that he attributed the crowds\u2019 temper to Rachel Reeves, wherein he stated, \u201cI do believe however that Rachel Reeves was emboldened by the support, aid and comfort from Mrs. Hahn and certain sympathetic members of the press.\u201d Respondent contends that the court inferred the intent of the crowd was that of Mrs. Reeves and that it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mrs. Reeves possessed the necessary intent to support a conviction for criminal contempt of court. Respondent cites two cases. In City of Chicago v. Hart Building Corp., 116 Ill.App.2d 39, 253 N.E.2d 496, the court held that the respondent acted knowingly, contemptuously and wilfully. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Barasch, 21 Ill.2d 407, 173 N.E.2d 417, the court merely stated that the guilt of the one accused of contempt criminal in nature must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We must hold here that there is sufficient evidence of the respondent\u2019s intent to knowingly and intentionally strike the assistant State\u2019s Attorney. We do not interpret the remarks made in the order as substituting the intent of the crowd for that of respondent, but rather such remarks reflect the circumstances present at the time as testified to by all the witnesses.\nRespondent next argues that the necessary intent here was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and cites a case which concerned direct contempt for giving false testimony in the trial of a case, People v. Bialek, 31 Ill.App.2d 281, 175 N.E.2d 278, which in turn cites language from People v. Hille, 192 Ill.App. 139, a direct contempt case, to the effect that the intent necessary is a \u201c malevolent intention to assail the dignity of the court, or to wilfully and knowingly interfere with its procedure or due administration of justice.\u2019 \u201d (31 Ill.App.2d 281, 284.) In the case at bar there is ample evidence to support a finding respondent knew she was hitting and did hit the assistant State\u2019s Attorney assigned to the custody case and did so immediately after leaving the courtroom and while in the corridor immediately outside the courtroom. Such facts are sufficient to support the necessary intent required for indirect contempt.\nRespondent argues further that, assuming the battery occurred, she was held in contempt not for the act but for the milieu in which that act occurred. The contention is made that tire rule applicable in cases of contempt for perjury that the further element of actual obstruction to the court in the performance of its duty must be proved should be applicable here. It is sufficient to hold here that the striking of an assistant State\u2019s Attorney by a party to a case assigned to such attorney immediately after they leave the courtroom and while in the corridor immediately outside such courtroom is sufficient to constitute indirect contempt of court. Again we note respondent is charged with responsibility for her own conduct and not that of the crowd.\nRespondent\u2019s final argument is that, even if the conviction for contempt is allowed to stand, the sentence imposed is harsh and inappropriate. We agree with defense counsel that a jail sentence here would be inappropriate. As the People quote in their brief, \u201cIn fixing a penalty for contempt of court, it must be made sufficient to vindicate the authority of the court, and of law, it must also inhibit further violations, and serve as a warning to others. A reasonable discretion must be allowed in weighing these factors.\u201d (American Zinc Co. v. Vecera, 338 Ill.App. 523, 531, 88 N.E.2d 116.) We hold here that, in light of the attendant circumstances, i.e., the emotional nature of the case and the distraught condition of respondent, in applying the standard in the foregoing quotation incarceration is not required and would serve no useful purpose. We believe the purposes of the extraordinary action for contempt will be adequately served and the authority of the court vindicated by the imposition of a small monetary fine.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed as to the conviction and reversed and remanded for the assessment of a penalty not involving incarceration.\nJudgment affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.\nALLOY and DIXON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dinah B. Dyer, of Wisch & Dyer, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Martin Rudman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rachel Reeves, Defendant-Appellant.\n(No. 74-14;\nThird District\nNovember 19, 1974.\nRehearing denied December 17, 1974.\nDinah B. Dyer, of Wisch & Dyer, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nMartin Rudman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet, for the People." }, "file_name": "0579-01", "first_page_order": 603, "last_page_order": 607 }