{ "id": 5211669, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTHUR DENT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dent", "decision_date": "1992-04-27", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201489\u20143394", "first_page": "238", "last_page": "247", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 238" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "424 N.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499788 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430447 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564854 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 Ill. App. 3d 969", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3422124 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/57/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 1250", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1258" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498489 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. App. 3d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3508743 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/162/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 1335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1348" }, { "page": "1348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542288 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" }, { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 N.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3482257 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/117/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 N.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2994485 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 905, "char_count": 20973, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.365543388481533e-07, "percentile": 0.637203558971971 }, "sha256": "92a3289c164a09965a868ee1858caa40af745dd6f1dde8dd577d33ba5b64c3d9", "simhash": "1:86d0f5abff669242", "word_count": 3446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:56:33.012273+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTHUR DENT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury trial, defendant Arthur Dent was convicted of first-degree murder. Defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecution\u2019s comments regarding the cause of decedent\u2019s death were improper and prejudicial and that the prosecution\u2019s question to defendant of whether it was an initiation rite of his gang to kill a human being was improper and prejudicial.\nDefendant was arrested on October 26, 1988, and charged with first-degree murder for the shooting death of decedent Andre Porter. Police officer Andre Mack testified that on October 19, 1988, at approximately 1:30 a.m., he was patrolling the vicinity of 4130 South Drexel Boulevard and noticed a person lying in the parkway as if he were sleeping. Since this was a common occurrence, Mack did nothing at this time. Mack drove by this same parkway at approximately 5:30 a.m. and noticed the same figure there. As Mack approached, he observed that it was a body of a male lying facedown. Mack examined the body and discovered that the person was dead. Mack also testified that 820 East Bowen is approximately one-half block away from where the body was found.\nNext, the prosecution called Detective George Carey, who testified that at approximately 6 a.m. on October 19, 1988, he was assigned to investigate decedent\u2019s death. Carey arrived on the scene to observe that the body was still lying in the facedown position. Upon closer examination of the body, Carey discovered gunshot entry and exit wounds on the decedent\u2019s arm and a reentry wound in the decedent\u2019s left chest area. Carey testified that he found no blood around the body.\nMark Capers testified for the prosecution as an occurrence witness. Capers testified that he is a member of the Black Gangster Disciples street gang (Disciples). The Disciples\u2019 \u201cterritory\u201d includes the housing project located at 733 East Bowen where Capers was residing at the time of decedent\u2019s death. Capers had known decedent for about four years and testified that decedent was also a member of the Disciples. Capers claimed that he knew defendant as Prince Steve of the enemy street gang, the King Cobras (Cobras). Capers stated that the title name \u201cPrince\u201d referred to a leadership position within the Cobras. On October 18, 1988, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Capers was on the second-floor balcony at 820 East Bowen with four or five other people. Decedent arrived at 8 p.m. At 10:15 p.m., defendant and Ralph James appeared on the balcony, reached into their jackets and pulled out guns. From a distance of four feet away, defendant and James shot in the direction of decedent. The group ran to the stairs. Capers testified that the following morning he was informed that Porter was dead. Capers went to the police station to reveal what he knew about the shooting. On October 26, 1988, Capers viewed a formal lineup and identified defendant as being one of the shooters.\nKobie Hunter testified that on October 18, 1988, at 9:15 p.m. he went to the second-floor balcony at 820 East Bowen. Hunter did not know decedent and had never seen him before that night. At 10:15 p.m., defendant and James arrived on the balcony. Hunter testified that defendant said something to decedent and pulled a gun out of his pocket. When Hunter saw the handle of the gun, he started to run. Hunter heard three shots. Hunter called the police to report that his friend Jerry Coleman had been shot. On October 26, 1988, Hunter was taken to the police station to view a formal lineup. Hunter identified defendant as the person who did the shooting. Hunter and also Darryl Phillips, another occurrence witness, testified that the lighting condition on the balcony the night of the shooting was bright and that they had no problem seeing defendant\u2019s face. Hunter and Phillips both made in-court identifications of defendant. Hunter further stated that he was only testifying because he was subpoenaed.\nThe parties stipulated that Dr. Choi, a deputy medical examiner, who performed the autopsy on decedent, would testify that he found internal bleeding in decedent\u2019s chest cavity and that a bullet had penetrated the left upper lung and left ventricle of the heart. Dr. Choi would have testified that decedent\u2019s death was a homicide caused by a gunshot wound.\nPolice officer John Robertson testified that he spoke with the occurrence witnesses, Hunter, Phillips and Capers, who gave him the names of two people involved in the shooting, Arthur Dent, also known as \u201cPrince Steve\u201d and Ralph James, also known as \u201cChicken Wing.\u201d Robertson arrested defendant at his home. Defendant stated that he was the leader of the Cobras and that James was a \u201csoldier\u201d in the Cobras. Robertson testified that defendant was proud of his position in the Cobras and told Robertson that he would not go out on \u201chits\u201d (shootings to kill people), but rather, would order them.\nLastly, defendant testified that he was not in a gang at the time of decedent\u2019s shooting death. Defendant testified on direct examination that he quit the Cobras in 1985, but on cross-examination, he claimed that he quit in 1987. Defendant stated that he went to the second-floor balcony and spoke with decedent about purchasing marijuana. Decedent pointed out a male on the playground below the balcony as a person who would sell marijuana to defendant. Defendant further testified that he thanked decedent for the information and turned to go down the stairs, when he heard a loud noise like a gunshot. Defendant ran down the stairs and stopped at the bottom, at which time he heard three or four more shots. Defendant also testified that he was not friends with \u201cChicken Wing,\u201d and that \u201cChicken Wing\u201d had joined the Cobras after he had quit. Defendant denied telling police that he was the leader of the Cobras or that he was friends with \u201cChicken Wing.\u201d Defendant claimed that the leader of the Cobras is known as the \u201cKing.\u201d There are smaller leaders under the \u201cKing\u201d known as \u201cgenerals\u201d and \u201cofficers.\u201d Defendant denied having a leadership position in the gang, even though he was known as \u201cPrince Steve.\u201d Defendant stated that he was nicknamed after the rock star \u201cPrince.\u201d\nAfter closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\nDefendant argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant\u2019s actions caused decedent\u2019s death. The prosecution argues that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Testimony at trial revealed that defendant fired three or four shots directly at decedent from a distance of three to four feet. Decedent\u2019s body was found a few hours after the shooting only one-half block away from the scene of the shooting.\nThe standard for reviewing a conviction which is challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence is whether in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267, citing Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781.) Once a defendant has been found guilty of a crime, the fact finder\u2019s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion. (Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.) A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329, 342, 385 N.E.2d 671, 676.\nDefendant argues that all the evidence against him is circumstantial and that such evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of murder. Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts or circumstances that give rise to reasonable inferences of other facts that tend to establish the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (People v. Jenkins (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 33, 452 N.E.2d 867.) The fact finder(s) do not have to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstantial evidence (People v. Hall (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 376, 409, 499 N.E.2d 1335, 1348); rather, it is sufficient if all the evidence taken as a whole satisfies the fact finder(s) beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant\u2019s guilt. (Hall, 114 Ill. 2d at 409, 499 N.E.2d at 1348.) It is well-established law that a defendant can be convicted of a crime solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence. People v. Bennett (1987), 162 Ill. App. 3d 36, 515 N.E.2d 840; People v. Edwards (1991), 218 Ill. App. 3d 184,196, 577 N.E.2d 1250, 1258.\nDefendant argues that the State failed to prove material elements of murder, namely, proof of death and proof of a criminal agency causing death. It is true that the evidence must show \u201cthat the defendant\u2019s act was, beyond a reasonable doubt, a contributing cause to a death such that the death did not result from a source unconnected with the defendant\u2019s act.\u201d (People v. Brown (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 528, 531, 373 N.E.2d 459, 461.) Defendant argues that the \u201c \u2018general public\u2019s perception\u2019 indicates that a person shot in one arm, one lung and the heart is not going to go anywhere, let alone down a flight of stairs and half a city block. The same type of perception indicates that a person found shot to death at that time and location with no wallet or any other identification, may well have been the victim of an armed robbery.\u201d We agree that these \u201cperceptions\u201d may be possible and the robbery scenario \u201ccould have\u201d happened. We, however, are obliged to review the evidence, direct and circumstantial, in a light most favorable to the State. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267.\nWhen viewed in the above light, the circumstantial and direct evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant shot and killed decedent. Three eyewitnesses to the shooting identified defendant as one of the two gunmen. These witnesses stated that defendant pulled out a gun and shot in decedent\u2019s direction from a distance of about three to four feet away. There was evidence that the gunmen were members of a rival gang. The medical evidence indicates a bullet traveled through decedent\u2019s arm and lodged in his chest. Two police officers testified that there were no signs of external bleeding. Additionally, medical testimony established that decedent suffered from internal bleeding in his chest cavity.\nThe fact finder is not required to accept defendant\u2019s scenario just because it was \u201cpossible.\u201d It is the fact finder\u2019s duty to judge the credibility of the witnesses and determine the weight to give to the evidence. (People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 51, 538 N.E.2d 453, 473.) Therefore, the \u201cperceptions\u201d and scenarios proposed by defendant are irrelevant. We find that after considering all the evidence as a whole, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt were committed by defendant.\nDefendant argues that during closing arguments, the State misstated facts in evidence and mischaracterized defense counsel\u2019s closing argument. Moreover, defendant argues that the prosecution committed reversible error by arguing that \u201cthere was no external bleeding,\u201d \u201che [decedent] died of internal bleeding\u201d and \u201cthat all of the witnesses said the shooting happened at 820 East Bowen and the defendant got up there and said the same thing.\u201d We find that the above comments were proper summations of the evidence or reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and therefore, no reversible error was committed.\nAttorneys are allowed great latitude during closing arguments. (People v. Amos (1990), 204 Ill. App. 3d 75, 85, 561 N.E.2d 1107, 1115.) The prosecution can base its argument on evidence presented at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences which can be drawn therefrom. (People v. Linscott (1991), 142 Ill. 2d 22, 38, 566 N.E.2d 1355, 1362.) Two police officers testified that they did not find any trail of blood leading to or from decedent\u2019s body and that they did not observe a pool of blood under or around his body. A reasonable inference which could be drawn from this testimony is that there was no external bleeding. The prosecution\u2019s argument that \u201cthere was no external bleeding,\u201d thus, was proper argument. Furthermore, there was medical evidence, to which defendant stipulated, that decedent suffered a condition known as hemothorax, which in lay person\u2019s terms is internal bleeding. This testimony, coupled with the facts that there were no signs of external bleeding and that decedent was shot in the heart, could lead to the reasonable inference that defendant died of internal bleeding. The prosecution\u2019s comments during closing argument regarding the above were proper.\nDuring closing arguments, defense counsel argued that the prosecution did not prove that decedent was shot at 820 East Bowen. In response, the prosecution argued that \u201cthey [Phillips, Hunter and Capers, the occurrence witnesses] said the shooting happened at 820 East Bowen and the defendant got up there and he said the same thing.\u201d Defendant argues that the prosecution\u2019s reply was improper and prejudicial because \u201c[n]one of the eyewitnesses or the defendant testified they saw decedent get shot at 820 E. Bowen.\u201d That is true; no one testified that he saw decedent get shot at 820 East Bowen. The State\u2019s argument, however, was not that the witnesses saw decedent get shot, but rather that defendant was at 820 East Bowen when he shot directly at decedent from three to four feet away and that defendant, himself, testified that a shooting did occur at that address. Not only does defendant misstate the record, he takes the prosecution\u2019s argument out of context. The prosecution was commenting on Capers\u2019, Hunter\u2019s and Phillips\u2019 credibility by stating that even the defendant agreed that there was a shooting at 820 East Bowen. We find that the prosecution\u2019s comment was not improper or prejudicial.\nDefendant further argues that the prosecution\u2019s reference to defense counsel\u2019s opening statement was improper. We find, however, that the reference was harmless error. (See People v. Smith (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 969, 975, 419 N.E.2d 404, 408.) The prosecution commented, \u201cAt the beginning of this trial Mr. Eppenstein [defense counsel] told you *** and maybe I\u2019m wrong but I thought I heard him say that one of the things that was not in issue was that on that particular night the victim in this case got shot and got shot at 820 East Bowen.\u201d Defense counsel immediately objected to the comment and the trial court sustained the objection. After the objection was sustained, the prosecution made no further reference to defense counsel\u2019s opening statement. The prosecution\u2019s reference to defense counsel\u2019s opening statement was not a material factor in defendant\u2019s conviction; therefore, the comment was harmless error. See Smith, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 975, 419 N.E.2d at 408.\nNext, defendant argues that it was error for the prosecution to characterize defense counsel\u2019s theory as ridiculous, farfetched or outlandish. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that an attack on a particular theory of defense does not necessarily prejudice the defendant. (People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 499, 526, 538 N.E.2d 500.) A reviewing court should assess arguments of counsel in the context of the whole trial and should sustain a conviction unless it appears that an improper comment substantially prejudiced the accused. (People v. Harbold (1984), 124 Ill. App. 3d 363, 371, 464 N.E.2d 734, 741, citing People v. Tate (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 540, 545-46, 259 N.E.2d 791, 794.) In People v. Trask (1988), 167 Ill. App. 3d 694, 521 N.E.2d 1222, the prosecution referred to defendant\u2019s defense as a \u201csham\u201d several times during closing argument. The court held that such references were not error, reasoning that the prosecution was \u201cmerely commenting on the unbelievability of defendant\u2019s testimony. In context, such a characterization does not seem prejudicial given the evidence against defendant.\u201d (Trask, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 713, 521 N.E.2d at 1235.) The court also found it significant that the trial court immediately sustained an objection to the argument. Trask, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 713, 521 N.E.2d at 1235.\nThe context of the complained-of argument in the case at bar is analogous to Trask. In the case at bar, the prosecution was commenting on how ridiculous the defense\u2019s theory was in light of the evidence. The prosecution said: \u201cTwo different people out to kill a guy the same night. That is ridiculous.\u201d After an objection, the trial court stated that the \u201cjury has heard the testimony.\u201d The prosecution went on to argue that defense counsel \u201cmentioned this outlandish theory to you because he doesn\u2019t want you to see what the real evidence is in this case.\u201d Defense counsel objected to that comment, arguing that it was \u201c[bjurden shifting.\u201d The trial court immediately sustained the objection. Any prejudice which may have occurred because of the complained-of remarks, thus, was cured when the trial court immediately sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the comments. Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, thereby requiring a reversal. See Trask, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 713, 521 N.E.2d at 1235.\nDefendant also argues that the above comments on the defense\u2019s theory, coupled with other comments made by the prosecution during closing arguments, amounted to accusations by the prosecution that defense counsel was employing trickery. When read in context, it is clear that the comments which the defendant claims amount to an accusation of trickery on the part of defense counsel were made by the prosecution to convey the idea that defense counsel\u2019s closing argument avoided the evidence actually presented at trial. The prosecution argued that defense counsel\u2019s theory that decedent was shot by someone other than defendant at a different place and time than the shooting which occurred on the balcony of 820 East Bowen was outlandish in light of the testimony of three eyewitnesses who saw defendant shoot directly at decedent from a short distance the night he was murdered. Since the prosecution was merely charging that the defense counsel was attempting to obscure the evidence, reversible error was not committed. See People v. Brown (1977), 47 Ill. App. 3d 920, 930-31, 365 N.E.2d 514, 522; People v. Lavoy (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 639, 644, 415 N.E.2d 487, 491.\nDefendant contends that it was improper for the prosecution to question him about gang initiation rites, namely, whether the Cobras required gang members to kill a human being in order to become a member. The defendant answered \u201cno\u201d to the above question. Defendant argues that the question violated the requirement of good-faith cross-examination and extremely prejudiced the defendant. Defendant contends that there was no evidence presented to support the prosecution\u2019s inquiry. This contention is untrue. A police officer testified that defendant told him that he was a leader in a gang and that decedent was a member of a rival gang. More specifically, defendant stated that he knew decedent as the person who injured the arm of a fellow member of the Cobras.\nThe prosecution\u2019s question concerning initiation was relevant to show motivation for the murder. Proof of gang membership is relevant and admissible where there is sufficient proof of a relationship between such affiliation and the crime charged, including motive or common purpose. (People v. Anderson (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 542, 549, 505 N.E.2d 1303, 1308, citing People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840; People v. Jackson (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 626, 495 N.E.2d 1207; People v. Calderon (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 657, 424 N.E.2d 671.) When relevance is established, the evidence need not be excluded because it tends to prejudice the defendant. (Anderson, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 549, 505 N.E.2d at 1308.) We find that the prosecution\u2019s question was relevant to show motivation, and therefore, defendant is not entitled to a new trial.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of the circuit court of Cook County are affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019CONNOR and MANNING, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Hugh Stevens, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Michael Latz, and John E. Gilhooly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARTHUR DENT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201489\u20143394\nOpinion filed April 27,1992.\nRehearing denied June 23,1992.\nRandolph N. Stone, Public Defender, of Chicago (Hugh Stevens, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Michael Latz, and John E. Gilhooly, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0238-01", "first_page_order": 258, "last_page_order": 267 }