{ "id": 5202002, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD QUINLAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Quinlan", "decision_date": "1992-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201490\u20140255", "first_page": "21", "last_page": "26", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 21" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2494518 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "953" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5293282 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/65/0268-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 529, "char_count": 10370, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.60591264155113e-08, "percentile": 0.4501870572377 }, "sha256": "d8c4bff1c85683f2ca662ab1b6ae3e39f93c8c9e09e5123e9a2940e75f72d638", "simhash": "1:13f811564e1ea233", "word_count": 1715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:19.187731+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD QUINLAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, defendant, Richard Quinlan, was convicted of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(2)) and sentenced to 18 years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was unable to give knowing consent and did not understand the nature of the acts. We affirm. The issue in this case is whether an illegitimate medical examination is covered by the criminal sexual assault statute and is a commission of a criminal act.\nOn November 11, 1988, D.S., a 26-year-old woman, was admitted to Humana Hospital in Hoffman Estates, Illinois, suffering from pneumonia and dehydration. D.S., who had bachelor\u2019s and master\u2019s degrees in psychology with some training in child sexual abuse, had suffered from respiratory problems most of her life. Defendant was employed as a respiratory therapist at the hospital and was assigned to D.S.\u2019s case.\nOn the first day of D.S.\u2019s hospitalization, defendant came into her room three or four times. Each time he asked D.S. questions about her medical history or explained the treatments to be administered. Defendant administered a respiratory treatment on that first day.\nThe next day, defendant came to see D.S. in the late afternoon. He told her that he had discussed her case with his colleagues and asked more specific medical questions, including questions relating to a vaginal yeast infection. Defendant asked D.S. how far she was willing to go to solve her medical problems. He related a story about another woman patient who told him that she was willing to go under a microscope to solve her medical problems. Defendant asked D.S. if she was willing to go that far. Frustrated, D.S. told defendant she would be willing to undergo whatever medical tests were necessary to make her feel well. Defendant left the room, stating that he was going to consult some colleagues.\nDefendant returned to D.S.\u2019s room about two hours later and administered a respiratory treatment. He then indicated that he and his bos? had come up with a medical test that would help get at the root of D.S.\u2019s problems. When D.S. asked about the identity of defendant\u2019s boss, defendant was evasive. When D.S. asked again, defendant responded that his boss was Dr. Hollan from Lutheran General Hospital. Both sides stipulated that no Dr. Hollan was on staff at Lutheran General Hospital in November 1988. Defendant asked more questions and left.\nAbout 7 p.m. that same night, defendant returned and asked D.S. more questions. He then told D.S. that his boss (Dr. Hollan) had decided that the cardio-pulmonary-respiratory examination, or C.N.R. test, was her best option. Both sides stipulated that there is no such procedure as a C.N.R. test relating to respiratory therapy.\nDefendant told D.S. that there were three ways to administer the C.N.R. test. While the first way did not apply to D.S., the second was a modified test, and the third was invasive. When D.S. asked about the modified test, defendant stated that it looked at \u201cprofusion,\u201d which he explained only as blood and circulation. Defendant then explained that the invasive C.N.R. consisted of rectal and vaginal penetration to determine if the muscles were contracting properly to see if the patient was neurologically intact.\nWhen D.S. indicated that she preferred the modified C.N.R., defendant responded that the invasive C.N.R. was in her best interest if she wanted to get to the root of her problems. D.S. told defendant that she wanted to consult with her primary physician, Dr. Round, but defendant said that her case had been referred to the pulmonology department, had been taken off Dr. Round\u2019s caseload, and that defendant and his boss (Dr. Hollan) were handling her case.\nNear the end of that conversation, D.S.\u2019s parents entered the room. Defendant briefly discussed the C.N.R. test with them, but did not elaborate about the invasive procedure. After defendant left, D.S. generally discussed the tests with her parents, but did not go into detail.\nAround 10 p.m. that night, defendant again came into D.S.\u2019s room to administer a respiratory treatment. When he finished, he asked D.S. if she had decided about the C.N.R. test. D.S. was unsure and asked whether it would give her the answers she needed. When defendant replied that the test was in her best interest, D.S. agreed to have the test performed. Defendant then told D.S. to remove all her clothes except her hospital gown and he would order the test.\nDefendant left and returned five minutes later. When D.S. asked him how many times he had performed this test, he responded \u201cmaybe 200.\u201d Defendant then instructed D.S. to roll over on her right side and pull her knees to her chest. He then began to examine her rectal area, supposedly to check for \u201cprofusion.\u201d Defendant inserted a metallic object into D.S.\u2019s rectum and asked her to contract and release her muscles. After removing the object, defendant inserted one finger and then more than one finger into D.S.\u2019s rectum and had her repeat the process.\nDefendant then told D.S. to turn over on her back and spread her legs, again telling her that he was going to check for \u201cprofusion.\u201d Defendant began touching her vaginal area and said, \u201cBoy, you certainly are saturated now, aren\u2019t you?\u201d He then inserted one finger into her vagina and asked her to contract and release her muscles. Defendant asked D.S. if he could insert fingers into her rectum and vagina simultaneously, but D.S. refused. Defendant then pinched D.S.\u2019s vaginal area, stroked the bottom of her feet, checked her cuticles for circulation, and told her he was finished.\nBefore defendant left, D.S. asked if Dr. Round would receive a copy of the report. Defendant replied that the report would be in her file the next day. D.S. cleaned herself off, then called her apartment. She spoke with her roommate and her parents. She told them that she felt violated, humiliated, and uncomfortable with the examination. Her parents encouraged her to speak with Dr. Round.\nThe next day, D.S. asked Dr. Round about the results of the test. Dr. Round informed D.S. that he did not order such a test. After questioning her about the test and who performed it, Dr. Round left, stating that he would check into it. The following morning, Dr. Round and the head nurse questioned D.S. about the details of the C.N.R. exam. Dr. Round explained to D.S. that she had been a victim. At trial, D.S. testified that she would not have allowed the incident to occur if she did not think it was a legitimate medical test.\nDefendant asserts that his conviction must be reversed because the evidence did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt since D.S. was an intelligent, educated woman who understood the proposed acts and knowingly consented to them. Furthermore, defendant argues, the statute\u2019s consent language has been applied historically to victims of a young age or of diminished mental capacity.\nThe State responds that defendant\u2019s acts violated both the language and the intent of the statute. Defendant took advantage of D.S.\u2019s frustration over- her illness and her reliance on him as a medical professional assigned to her case, the State argues. D.S. consented to a medical test, not to acts of sexual penetration. D.S.\u2019s consent is vitiated, the State claims, because it was received through deceit.\nWe agree. Defendant was convicted of criminal sexual assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(2)), which provides that:\n\u201cThe accused commits criminal sexual, assault if he or she:\n***\n(2) commits an act of sexual penetration and the accused knew that the victim was unable to understand the nature of the act or was unable to give knowing consent.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 \u2014 13(a)(2).\nKnowing consent \u201cpresupposes an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences.\u201d (People v. Blunt (1965), 65 Ill. App. 2d 268, 274.) Even though D.S. is an intelligent, educated woman, she is not a doctor or a trained respiratory therapist. She had no way of knowing that the proposed examination was not a legitimate medical test, but relied on the medical professional who was assigned to her case in a reputable hospital. D.S. consented to an invasive medical procedure, not to sexual acts. Since defendant\u2019s acts were not a medical procedure, the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that D.S. did not understand the nature of the acts and did not give knowing consent.\nFurthermore, the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that D.S. was unable to understand the nature of the acts or to give knowing consent. There were numerous conversations and questions where D.S. showed concern and an uncomfortableness with the invasive procedure. It was only after defendant used deceit to convince D.S. that the test would get to the root of her medical problems that she consented.\nMoreover, the State legislature exempted legitimate medical tests from the criminal sexual assault statute. 0(People v. Foster (1990), 195 Ill. App. 3d 926, 953.) Section 12 \u2014 18 of the Criminal Code of 1961 provides that exemption to the statute:\n\u201c(b) Any medical examination or procedure which is conducted by a physician, nurse, medical or hospital personnel, parent, or caretaker for purposes and in a manner consistent with reasonable medical standards is not an offense under Sections 12-13, 12-14, 12-15 and 12-16 of this Code.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12-18(b).\nThis section evidences a legislative intent that illegitimate medical examinations are covered by the criminal sexual assault statutes. Since defendant\u2019s acts were not part of a legitimate medical examination, defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nBased on the foregoing, defendant\u2019s conviction is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN, P.J., and RIZZI, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James H. Reddy, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICHARD QUINLAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201490\u20140255\nOpinion filed June 10, 1992.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (James H. Reddy, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nJack O\u2019Malley, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb and James E. Fitzgerald, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0021-01", "first_page_order": 41, "last_page_order": 46 }