{ "id": 5204783, "name": "CHARLES YEKSIGIAN, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Yeksigian v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "1992-06-08", "docket_number": "No. 1\u2014 90\u20140786", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "313", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "231 Ill. App. 3d 307" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "438 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3091741 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/91/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5456767 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2970773 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 N.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2905836 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 1038", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531048 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/1038-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 1097", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3542750 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/1097-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607870 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628275 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5676089 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469434 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 N.E.2d 1148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3174007 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 1023", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. App. 3d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3086042 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/101/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 N.E.2d 186", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2969637 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 1286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5813145 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "549 N.E.2d 1266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 2d 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3260081 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/133/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 1243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228351 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0490-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 675, "char_count": 12971, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4255689123468406e-07, "percentile": 0.6498857655407709 }, "sha256": "b89a614a9c6c139642c7225a3ed62e3e192678df497eddfb0f10d9cf1aa0c954", "simhash": "1:afe6889433a7b6d5", "word_count": 2087 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:52:19.187731+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHARLES YEKSIGIAN, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MANNING\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case was brought by petitioner-appellee under the common law writ of certiorari challenging the decision of the personnel board of the City of Chicago (hereafter Board), and the City of Chicago (hereafter City), to discharge him from employment with the Department of Aviation for striking his supervisor with a clipboard and then running over the supervisor\u2019s foot with a truck. The trial court held that the Board\u2019s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence and found the sanction to be arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. The court reversed the decision of the Board, and the City brought this appeal.\nOn appeal, the City contends that: (1) petitioner\u2019s writ of certiorari was untimely; (2) the Board\u2019s findings of fact were proper and supported by the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the Board\u2019s findings of fact properly constituted \u201ccause\u201d for the discharge.\nThe incident giving rise to this case occurred on August 29, 1988. At the time, petitioner was employed by the City as a career service employee in the position of electrical mechanic at O\u2019Hare Airport and had been employed by the City continuously since 1962. Frank Guzzo held the position of \u201cperson in charge\u201d of the electrical mechanics on the day shift and purportedly was petitioner\u2019s immediate supervisor. Frank, petitioner and the other electrical mechanics worked out of the RB-40 or H&R budding at O\u2019Hare. On the day in question, an altercation occurred at the jobsite between petitioner and Frank. Thereafter Frank filed two criminal charges against petitioner in which the jury acquitted petitioner of both charges.\nOn October 17, 1988, the commissioner of the Department of Aviation sent petitioner a \u201cStatement of Charges and Explanation of Evidence\u201d to which petitioner filed a written response. The commissioner then sent petitioner a letter of termination of employment on February 7, 1989, and petitioner filed an appeal with the Board. The Board held a hearing on April 17, 1989, and on June 5, 1989, issued an opinion denying petitioner\u2019s appeal.\nThereafter, on August 7, 1989, petitioner filed a complaint in the circuit court for writ of certiorari alleging that \u201cthe decision of the Personnel Board was arbitrary and capricious, against the manifest weight of the evidence, and contrary to the governing law and regulations.\u201d Petitioner then filed an amended complaint for writ of certiorari. Following a hearing on the amended complaint, the circuit court reversed the decision of the Board.\nOn appeal, the City initially questions whether petitioner\u2019s complaint for writ of certiorari was timely filed; however, it did not raise the argument of timeliness of the complaint in the circuit court. It now alleges that petitioner\u2019s complaint was untimely because it was not filed within the 35-day period as provided by the Administrative Review Law (ARL) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 3 \u2014 103). The City contends that the period established by the ARL should also apply to common-law certiorari proceedings since such proceedings today are conducted in the same manner as proceedings under the ARL. (See Dubin v. Personnel Board (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 490, 498, 539 N.E.2d 1243.) It requests this court to remand the cause to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the complaint as untimely or, in the alternative, to hold prospectively that the 35-day requirement applies to certiorari cases.\nThe City did not previously raise this argument in the court below. However, it correctly assesses that the filing requirement in administrative review is jurisdictional, and thus the issue cannot be waived. Lockett v. Chicago Police Board (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 349, 354-55, 549 N.E.2d 1266.\nSection 3 \u2014 102 of the ARL provides, in pertinent part, that:\n\u201cArticle III [the Administrative Review Law] of this Act shall apply to and govern every action to review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the Act creating or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions of Article III of this Act or its predecessor, the Administrative Review Act. In all such cases, any other statutory, equitable or common law mode of review of decisions of administrative agencies heretofore available shall not hereafter be employed.\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 102.)\nIt is well settled that decisions of the Board, such as the one in the instant case, are reviewable through the common-law writ of certiorari. See Smith v. Department of Public Aid (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 529, 541, 367 N.E.2d 1286; Nowicki v. Evanston Fair Housing Review Board (1975), 62 Ill. 2d 11, 338 N.E.2d 186; Meylor v. Boys (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 148, 150, 427 N.E.2d 1023.\nAccordingly, we hold that petitioner\u2019s complaint was timely filed pursuant to the six-month requirement for filing a writ of common-law certiorari. Moreover, this court is without authority to create a new filing period, even assuming the validity of City\u2019s argument in reliance on Dubin (128 Ill. 2d 490, 539 N.E.2d 1243).\nThe City next contends that it was error for the trial court to overturn the Board\u2019s decision and \u201creweigh the evidence.\u201d (Collura v. Board of Police Commissioners (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 361, 372, 498 N.E.2d 1148.) We agree.\nJudicial review of an administrative decision to discharge an employee is a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the agency\u2019s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and agency findings are considered prima facie true and correct. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 1 \u2014 110; Collura, 113 Ill. 2d at 372.) Second, the court must determine whether the findings of fact constitute \u201ccause\u201d for the discharge. See Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 547, 550-51, 426 N.E.2d 885.\nWith respect to the first step, it is well settled that if there is evidence in the record that supports an administrative agency\u2019s decision, that decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and must be sustained on judicial review (Fagiano v. Police Board (1984), 123 Ill. App. 3d 963, 974, 463 N.E.2d 845), unless the opposite conclusion is clearly evident (O\u2019Boyle v. Personnel Board (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653, 456 N.E.2d 998) and no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency, could have agreed with the agency\u2019s determination. See Fair-view Haven v. Department of Revenue (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 763, 770, 506 N.E.2d 341.\nIn the present case, several witnesses testified that on August 29, 1988, they observed petitioner walk into the building and search for the clipboard containing his time sheet. They further observed him attempt to reach for the clipboard, which was on Frank\u2019s desk. Either no or very little conversation ensued between the men at this time. However, it is apparent that some grappling for the clipboard occurred when petitioner tried to take it from Frank\u2019s desk while Frank attempted to hand petitioner an envelope and hold onto the clipboard.\nFrank testified that petitioner hit him in the face and injured his tooth. Frank also testified that petitioner then ran out of the building and jumped into his truck. When Frank called the police, he was told to have petitioner stay on the premises. He then ran after petitioner. Petitioner, however, did not stop, but ran the truck over Frank\u2019s foot, causing injury to his toes. Petitioner denied hitting Frank in the face with the clipboard, explaining that he only grazed the top of Frank\u2019s head as he pulled it away. Petitioner also presented testimony that Frank provoked and staged the incident in an effort to have him discharged. During the administrative hearing, several other witnesses testified that petitioner hit Frank in the face with the clipboard.\nFollowing the hearing, the hearing officer recommended that the Department of Aviation\u2019s decision of discharge be sustained. The Board accepted this recommendation. Yet, the trial court overturned the Board\u2019s decision on the basis that there were discrepancies in the testimony of most of the \u201cdisinterested witnesses.\u201d\nThe trial court observed that someone testified that the rear wheels went over Frank\u2019s foot, while another said that it was the front wheels. However, because the testimony of the witnesses turned on the basis of credibility or because the court would have resolved conflicts in the testimony differently are insufficient grounds for a reviewing court to reverse the administrative findings. To the contrary, where credibility or conflicting testimony is the issue, the decision of the Board must be sustained. Sier v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1987), 157 Ill. App. 3d 1097, 1100, 510 N.E.2d 633.\nWe have reviewed the evidence presented during the administrative hearing and find ample evidence in the record to support the Board\u2019s decision. We find it was error for the trial court to reverse the Board\u2019s decision where the evidence in issue concerned either the conflicting accounts given in the testimony or turned on the credibility of the witnesses. Accordingly, we now reverse the trial court\u2019s decision and reinstate the Board\u2019s decision on the basis that it cannot be said that the Board\u2019s findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe second step concerns whether the findings of fact constitute cause for discharge. It is well settled that considerable deference should be accorded the administrative agency\u2019s finding that cause exists for the employee\u2019s discharge, and such a finding is only to be overturned if \u201carbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the service.\u201d (Allman v. Police Board (1986), 140 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1041, 489 N.E.2d 929.) Neither the appellate court nor the trial court may substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Davern v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 469, 472, 269 N.E.2d 713.\nCause is defined as \u201csome substantial shortcoming which renders the employee\u2019s continuation in office in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and which the law and sound public opinion recognize as a good cause for his no longer occupying the position.\u201d Kreiser v. Police Board (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 436, 441, 352 N.E.2d 389, aff'd (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 27, 370 N.E.2d 511.\nApplying these principles to the instant action, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding the penalty of discharge to be \u201carbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the service.\u201d The mere fact a reviewing court considers a different sanction more appropriate does not render a decision arbitrary. (Sutton v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 404, 411, 438 N.E.2d 147.) Recognizing that considerable deference is to be accorded the administrative agency\u2019s decision that cause exists for the employee\u2019s discharge, we do not lightly overturn its decision.\nOur review of the record here indicates that there is evidence to support the Board\u2019s finding that petitioner, without justification, struck his supervisor, Frank, in the jaw with a clipboard and drove his truck in a dangerous manner while in close proximity to other employees, causing injury to Frank, and that such acts violated the employer\u2019s personnel rules.\nAs previously stated, Frank\u2019s testimony that petitioner grabbed the clipboard from him and swung it in an arc into his face was corroborated by testimony of other witnesses. Frank also testified that petitioner then left hurriedly and drove his truck out the gate, clipping his right knee, hip and elbow, and moments later, turned the truck tire and ran over Frank\u2019s right foot. Ths testimony was also substantially supported by other witnesses. Additionally, the documentary evidence of the police and hospital reports corroborated Frank\u2019s testimony about the injuries to his tooth and toes.\nWe believe the Board\u2019s findings of fact that the petitioner\u2019s act of striking his superior, when coupled with his additional and continuing conduct harmful to the superior and co-workers, all of which violated the employer\u2019s rules, constitute \u201ccause\u201d for discharge. Further, we decline to substitute our judgment for that of the administrative agency and find that there was an insufficient basis for the trial court\u2019s reversal of the Board\u2019s decision to discharge petitioner.\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and reinstate the decision of the Board.\nReversed; order reinstated.\nBUCKLEY, P.J., and O\u2019CONNOR, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MANNING" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kelly R. Welsh, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Frederick S. Rhine, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.", "William T. Huyck, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHARLES YEKSIGIAN, Appellee, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u2014 90\u20140786\nOpinion filed June 8, 1992.\nKelly R. Welsh, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Frederick S. Rhine, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellant.\nWilliam T. Huyck, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 327, "last_page_order": 333 }